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Abstract 
This thesis expands on the literature in the under-researched field of airline risk 
management by exploring organisational structures and practices of airline risk 
management systems and their technical and institutional drivers. In particular, it 
focuses on the phenomenon of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and its alignment to 
the requirements of airline business contexts. The theoretical framework informing this 
study combines structural contingency theory with two strands of institutional theory, 
namely old institutional economics and new institutional sociology. In this thesis, the 
phenomenon of risk management is investigated in situ as an organisational practice 
through a two-stage empirical study. Firstly, an exploratory field study was undertaken 
in a panel of ten international airlines. Secondly, the field study was complemented with 
findings from two explanatory case studies.  
 
This study explains how in developing risk management systems airlines balance the 
sometimes conflicting technical and institutional demands of their respective task and 
institutional environments. The adoption and implementation of ERM in airlines are 
found to be driven primarily by coercive and normative pressures, and expectations of 
improved organisational effectiveness and efficiency. This study additionally improves 
general understanding of the nature of ERM and its coupling and fluidity in the 
organisational settings of airlines. It lends evidence for systematic variations in roles, 
uses, and organisational design choices of ERM systems. It shows the interdependent 
nature of airlines’ ERM systems and other management systems. The study also 
demonstrates that the adoption of ERM in airlines drives development of new 
institutions, rules, and routines for comprehensive management of risks. Consistent with 
the tenets of contingency theory, this study conveys lack of a universally appropriate 
design of an airline ERM system.  
 
The main contribution of this thesis is to assess airline risk management systems, 
identify core drivers of effective risk management practice, and provide a framework 
with the aim of guiding airlines in the development of enterprise-wide risk management 
approaches aligned with the requirements of their institutional and technical contexts. 
Furthermore, this research overcomes the limitations of previous, mostly quantitative 
studies of ERM coupling and dynamics in organisations, as it explores and explains the 
structures, practices, and rationales of airline risk management systems within wider 
organisational contexts through the use of qualitative methodologies. 
 
ii 
 
 
 
Dedication 
 
To my parents, Teresa and Leon, for their everlasting love and endless support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
First and foremost I would like to thank Dr Abraham Althonayan and Dr Mirna Jabbour 
for their support and encouragement throughout the duration of this research.  
 
I would also like to express appreciation to academic and administrative staff at Brunel 
Business School.  
 
My heartfelt gratitude especially to Fernando,  Julita, and Kamil, for their love.  
 
Last but not least, my special appreciation to all my friends who sustained me with their 
encouraging words and wishes over the years of study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iv 
 
 
 
Declaration 
 
I, Anna Misiura, hereby declare that the contents included in this PhD thesis are entirely 
my own work, have been developed specifically for this research, and have not been 
previously submitted for any other qualification.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2 ERM concept ........................................................................................................... 4 
1.3 Risks and challenges in the airline industry ............................................................ 6 
1.4 Research problem .................................................................................................... 9 
1.5 Aims and objectives of the study .......................................................................... 12 
1.6 Significance of the study ....................................................................................... 14 
1.7 Outline of the thesis............................................................................................... 16 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ...................................................................................... 17 
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 17 
2.2 Evolution of the risk management discipline ........................................................ 18 
2.3 Risk management in the airline industry  .............................................................. 20 
2.3.1 Airline business environment and risk management practice ........................ 21 
2.3.1.1 Key areas of airline risk management practice ..................................... 23 
2.3.1.2 Operational risk management in airlines .............................................. 27 
2.3.2 Trends and new directions in research and practice of airline risk  
management ............................................................................................................. 32 
2.4 Adoption and implementation of ERM and their driving forces .......................... 39 
2.4.1 Drivers of ERM adoption and implementation .............................................. 39 
2.4.2 ERM implementation ..................................................................................... 41 
2.5 Overview of landmark ERM frameworks and risk management standards .......... 44 
2.5.1 Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management  
AS/NZS 4360  ......................................................................................................... 48 
2.5.2 COSO Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework ...................... 49 
2.5.3 ISO 31000 Standard ....................................................................................... 52 
2.5.4 Alignment of ERM frameworks and risk management standards to 
organisational contexts  ........................................................................................... 55 
2.6 Limitations of literature ......................................................................................... 58 
2.7 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 59 
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework ............................................................................ 61 
3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 61 
vi 
 
 
 
3.2 Theoretical approach: Duality of technical and institutional environment ........... 62 
3.2.1 Contingency theory perspective ..................................................................... 64 
3.2.2 Institutional theory perspective ...................................................................... 66 
3.3 Theoretical model  ................................................................................................. 70 
3.3.1 Components of the theoretical framework: analysis under the contingency 
approach  ................................................................................................................. 72 
3.3.2 Components of the theoretical framework: analysis under the institutional 
approach  ................................................................................................................. 78 
3.4 Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 81 
Chapter 4: Research Design ......................................................................................... 83 
4.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 83 
4.2 Research paradigm ................................................................................................ 83 
4.3 Research methodology .......................................................................................... 86 
4.3.1 Field study ...................................................................................................... 87 
4.3.2 Case study ....................................................................................................... 89 
4.4 Definition of units of study ................................................................................... 91 
4.4.1 Field study sampling ...................................................................................... 91 
4.4.2 Case study sampling ....................................................................................... 96 
4.5 Research methods .................................................................................................. 97 
4.5.1 Data collection methods ................................................................................. 98 
4.5.2 Data analysis methods .................................................................................. 104 
4.6 Ethical considerations ......................................................................................... 107 
4.7 Limitations of the field study and case study research, and reliability  
and validity considerations ........................................................................................ 108 
4.8 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 112 
Chapter 5: Field Study: Airline Risk Management Structures, Practices,  
and their Determinants .............................................................................................. 114 
5.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 114 
5.2 Determinants of airline risk management approaches ........................................ 115 
5.2.1 Institutional pressures ................................................................................... 115 
5.2.2 Contingency factors ...................................................................................... 121 
5.3 Review of airline risk management systems ....................................................... 125 
5.3.1 Characteristics of airline risk management systems ..................................... 126 
5.3.2 Maturity and advancement of airline risk management approaches ............ 133 
vii 
 
 
 
5.4 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 138 
Chapter 6: Case Study: ERM System in Alpha Airlines  ....................................... 142 
6.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 142 
6.2 Outline of the case study ..................................................................................... 143 
6.3 ERM model ......................................................................................................... 144 
6.3.1 ERM governance structures ......................................................................... 145 
6.3.2 ERM technologies ........................................................................................ 150 
6.3.3 Pillars of the ERM model ............................................................................. 157 
6.3.4 ERM internal environment ........................................................................... 166 
6.4 Conclusions and lessons learnt ............................................................................ 168 
Chapter 7: Case Study: Risk Management System in Beta Airline ....................... 172 
7.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 172 
7.2 Outline of the case study ..................................................................................... 174 
7.3 Risk management model ..................................................................................... 175 
7.3.1 Risk management governance structures ..................................................... 179 
7.3.2 Risk management technologies .................................................................... 181 
7.3.3 Functionality of Beta´s risk management system ......................................... 193 
7.4 Conclusions and lessons learnt ............................................................................ 196 
Chapter 8: Discussion ................................................................................................. 199 
8.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 199 
8.2 ERM framework in the airline industry .............................................................. 200 
8.2.1 Risk governance structures ........................................................................... 203 
8.2.2 Management of enterprise-wide risks: ERM process and airline risk  
profile .................................................................................................................... 207 
8.2.3 ERM architecture ......................................................................................... 210 
8.2.4 ERM internal environment ........................................................................... 212 
8.2.5 Context-specific design of an ERM system ................................................. 215 
8.3 Determinants of airline risk management and ERM systems ............................. 217 
8.3.1 Institutional determinants of airline risk management systems ................... 217 
8.3.2 Technical determinants of airline risk management systems ....................... 224 
8.4 Maturity, roles and uses of airline risk management and ERM systems ............ 231 
8.5 Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 235 
 
viii 
 
 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusions .............................................................................................. 239 
9.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 239 
9.2 Research questions revisited ............................................................................... 240 
9.2.1 Determinants of adoption and implementation of risk management  
systems in airlines  ................................................................................................ 240 
9.2.2 Organisational structures and practices within airline risk management 
systems  ................................................................................................................. 242 
9.2.3 Assessment of airline risk management systems ......................................... 244 
9.2.4 Recommendations for improvement of airline risk management systems ... 246 
9.3 Contribution of the study..................................................................................... 247 
9.3.1 Contributions to theory ................................................................................. 248 
9.3.2 Contributions to methodology applications ................................................. 249 
9.3.3 Contributions to knowledge and practice ..................................................... 250 
9.4 Research limitations ............................................................................................ 254 
9.5 Recommendations for further research ............................................................... 257 
9.6 Final remarks  ...................................................................................................... 258 
References .................................................................................................................... 259 
Appendix A: Theoretical Framework ....................................................................... 288 
Appendix B: Coding Scheme .................................................................................... 297 
Appendix C: Analysis of Field Study Findings ........................................................ 299 
Appendix D: Extension of Findings from Alpha Case Study ................................... 326 
Appendix E: Interview Agenda Designed for the Field Study.................................. 335 
Appendix F: Interview Agenda designed for the Case Studies ................................. 341 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 2-1: ICAO’s Safety Management System Framework ..................................... 31 
Table 4-1: Airlines participating in the empirical research  ........................................ 95 
Table 4-2: Field study and case study interviewees .................................................. 103 
Table 4-3: Organisation and analysis of empirical data ............................................ 106 
Table 4-4: Triangulation............................................................................................ 109 
Table 5-1: Institutional pressures influencing airline risk management systems...... 117 
Table 5-2: Contingency factors influencing airline risk management systems ........ 123 
Table 5-3: Perceived status of risk management development ................................. 127 
Table 5-4: Characteristics of airline risk management systems ................................ 129 
Table 5-5: Maturity and advancement of airline risk management systems ............. 134 
Table 8-1: Drivers of effective risk management in airlines ..................................... 203 
Table 8-2: Review of key findings ............................................................................ 237 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 2-1: Airline risk management matrix ............................................................... 23 
Figure 2-2: Evolution of safety risk management ....................................................... 28 
Figure 2-3: Research trends in airline risk management ............................................. 33 
Figure 2-4: Evolution of airline risk management approaches ................................... 35 
Figure 2-5: Implementation of ERM ........................................................................... 42 
Figure 2-6: Risk management process - AS/NZS 4360 .............................................. 48 
Figure 2-7: COSO`s Enterprise Risk Management Integrated Framework. ............... 51 
Figure 2-8: Relation between the components of the ISO 31000 standard ................. 53 
Figure 3-1: Schematic representation of the theoretical model ................................... 71 
Figure 8-1: ERM framework in the airline industry ................................................. 201 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
ATM - Air Traffic Management 
AS/NZS 4360 - Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management 
CAPEX - Capital Expenditure 
COSO - Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the Treadway Commission 
EASA - European Aviation Safety Agency 
EMS - Environmental Management System 
ERM - Enterprise Risk Management 
EPS - Earnings Per Share Value 
ESARR - Eurocontrol Safety Regulatory Requirements  
FMS – Flight Management System 
IATA - International Airlines Transport Association 
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization 
IS – Information System 
ISO - International Organisation for Standardisation 
IT – Information Technology 
MCS – Management Control System 
NIS - New Institutional Sociology theory 
NYSE - New York Stock Exchange 
OHSMS - Occupational Health and Safety Management System 
OIE - Old Institutional Economics theory 
SeMS - Security Management System 
SUMS - Supplier Management System  
S&P - Standard and Poor's 
SOX - Sarbanes Oxley Act 
SMS - Safety Management Systems 
SOAM - Systemic Occurrence Analysis Methodology  
SWOT – Analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 
QMS - Quality Management System 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background  
This thesis explores organisational structures and practices of airline risk management 
systems and their technical and institutional drivers. Airline risk management systems 
are investigated within task (or technical) and institutional environments which, as 
conveyed respectively by contingency and institutional theories, exert technical and 
institutional demands on organisations. Under these theoretical perspectives technical 
pressures are concerned with enhancing efficiency and effectiveness of organisational 
performance (Scott, 2002; Gupta, 1994), and institutional pressures are concerned with 
gaining social legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The 
theoretical perspectives informing this study are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
In this theoretical context, this study particularly focuses on the phenomenon of 
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) in airlines, explained as follows in section 1.3 of 
this chapter, and its alignment to the requirements of airline business contexts. For the 
purpose of this study the researcher defines ERM as a continuous process of identifying, 
analysing, and managing exposures across different organisational units and functional 
areas in airlines, aimed at assuring the achievement of organisational objectives and 
therefore preserving and creating value through effective management of risks. 
 
Interest in corporate governance, particularly within the domain of risk management has 
continued to grow in recent years (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Gephart et al., 2009; 
Power, 2007). Risk management moved up the agendas of cross-industry regulators, 
rating agencies, practitioners, and scholars (Lam, 2006; Paape and Spakle 2012; Woods, 
2009). Although risk has always formed an integral part of business reality, the wide-
spreading concern for risk management has been recently stimulated by the growing 
complexity and volatility of the global environment, making organisations susceptible 
to an increasing number of risks affecting their operations (Wharton and Skinner, 2007). 
Over time, a paradigm shift occurred in the perception of risk management (Gordon et 
al., 2009). The traditional, silo-based approach to managing risks evolved towards a 
more holistic perspective, denominated Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), which 
links risk management with organisational objectives (Power, 2009), and which is now 
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advocated by regulatory and normative bodies as a recommended mode of corporate 
governance (Spira and Page, 2003; Power, 2004). 
 
Multiple principles, frameworks, and standards emerged to assist organisations in 
developing enterprise-wide risk management approaches, that conceptualised ERM in 
both regulatory and normative terms and have become widely followed across 
industries (Soin and Collier, 2013). Yet, scholars argued there may be a considerable 
value in adapting the “universal” and “hierarchical” risk management guidelines (Arena 
et al., 2010, p. 661) to match particular circumstances of organisations (e.g. Kaplan and 
Mikes, 2014; Woods, 2009, 2011; Power, 2007; Paape and Spakle, 2012; Barton et al., 
2002). Despite the “near theological belief in enterprise risk management” (Power, 
2009, p. 849) widespread among risk management professionals, critical arguments 
have been voiced in academia arguing that regulatory and normative frameworks should 
be a starting point for risk management, which needs to remain sensitive to 
organisational contexts (Woods, 2011). 
 
Managing risk is considered a fundamental concern in the complex, hazardous, and 
dynamic environment of the airline industry (Adler and Gellman, 2012). Airline 
operations are encapsulated within a labyrinth of actors and norms, which exempt 
airlines from freedom to operate in the same way as other global businesses, making 
them additionally susceptible to a myriad of risks related to other parties they are 
strongly dependent on (Otero, 2006; IATA, 2011). Apart from internally driven risks, a 
substantial part of airlines’ challenges is embedded in the social, political, and macro-
economic context with interdependent contextual variables (Tjorhom, 2010); in this 
complex system interlinking a network of human operators, technological systems, and 
policies and procedures, risks are interconnected (Netjasov and Janic, 2008). The 
operational complexities inherent in the airline business, and the highly volatile 
competitive environment of the industry, expose airlines to a number of significant 
risks; nowadays the challenges related to poor industry structure, misguided regulations, 
and inconsistent strategy choices of airlines are considered the major determinants of 
poor airline profitability (IATA, 2013). Although airlines create great value for other 
businesses along the air transport value chain, persistently poor profitability has been 
created for investors in airlines; over the last 40 years the airline industry, in comparison 
3 
 
with a wide array of other industries, registered some of the lowest returns on invested 
capital (IATA, 2013; Wojahn, 2012).    
 
The specificity of airline business promulgates the need to embrace enterprise-wide 
approaches to managing risks from different dimensions of airline operating contexts 
(Belobaba, 2009). However, airline risk management approaches have traditionally 
been rooted in compliance with multiple industry regulations, or else segregated into 
various functional silos, often focusing on management of a limited scope of risks. It 
should be noted, however, that neither the regulations-based compliance approach nor 
the silo-based functional approach have allowed airlines to generate returns for 
investors that are even close to being comparable to those of other service industries 
(IATA, 2013), while airlines rarely achieved sustained profitability over the last decade.    
 
Research centred in the phenomenon of risk management requires previous 
establishment of understanding of the term “risk”. A variety of definitions exist for this 
term, while the most commonly found interpretations in popular and academic 
discourses are possibility of loss or injury, potential for having a negative impact, and 
likelihood of an undesirable event (Hampton, 2009). Although the risk concept has been 
frequently associated with negative connotations, some organisations shifted towards a 
more positive view recognising the two-fold nature of risk, considering both the 
downside and upside factors associated with risk. Reflection of the upside of risk is an 
essential part of a strategic risk mind-set (Slywotzky, 2008); hence, risk management 
practice should not be aimed solely at eliminating risks and, as a result, the reward 
opportunities associated with them, but rather at balancing risk portfolios for optimal 
risk and reward ratios (Frigo, 2008). The two-fold view of risk is adopted by the issuers 
of the landmark guidelines for ERM. Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand 
(2004) define risk as “a possibility of something happening that impacts on the 
objectives; it is the chance to either make a gain or a loss”; ISO 31000 (2009) regards 
risk as the “effect of uncertainty on objectives”; similarly, COSO (2004) proclaims 
managing both events with possible negative and positive impacts, where events with 
negative impact represent risks potentially preventing value creation or eroding the 
existing value, and events with positive impact represent opportunities positively 
affecting the achievement of objectives and supporting the creation of value or its 
preservation. Following this logic, this research considers risk in terms of events which 
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may affect accomplishment of organisational strategies either in a positive or a negative 
way; similarly, the rationale for risk management lies in enhancing the likelihood of 
positive consequences and reducing the likelihood of negative consequences of events, 
both determined in relation to the objectives of organisational strategies.  
 
1.2 ERM concept 
Numerous ERM guidelines have been developed to date; an overview of the most 
prominent and frequently applied in practice frameworks, COSO's ERM Integrated 
Framework (2004), the Australia/New Zealand 4360-2004 Standard (2004) or AS/NZS 
ISO 31000-2009 (2009), and ISO 31000 (2009), is provided in the following chapter 
(Chapter 2, section 2.4). COSO’s (2004) definition of ERM is one of the most 
commonly cited in literature: “Enterprise risk management is a process, effected by an 
entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy setting 
and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the entity, 
and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance regarding 
the achievement of entity objectives”.  
 
COSO’s definition of ERM suggests a continuous nature of risk management, which 
should be regarded as a process rather than a one-time management initiative in 
organisations. Organisational risk portfolios are affected by dynamically fluctuating 
market cycles, and so risk management should be performed continuously, as an 
ongoing process designed to be aligned concurrently with changing market conditions 
and organisational strategies (Althonayan et al., 2011). Ad hoc risk management 
initiatives may create temporary advantages by punctually smoothing income streams; 
yet, markets may take sceptical views of such departures from the pattern, which may 
trigger uncertainty and consequently adverse reactions in the market (Chatterjee et al., 
2003). Through the embracement of ERM as an integral part of organisational strategies 
and creating a continuous pattern of risk management, organisations may reduce 
uncertainty and generate positive responses from the market (Barton et al., 2002). 
 
The need for an implication of key decision makers in the risk management function is 
highlighted in COSO’s definition of ERM. It is an especially valid note, given that 
many of the failures of previous risk management approaches were attributable to a 
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marginal importance given by organisations’ top management to risk management 
(Beasley and Frigo, 2010). Certain elements of risk management, such as objectives 
setting, risk assessment, defining risk responses, and communication and monitoring an 
organisation’s overall risk position, are subscribed to the board (Carey and Turnbull, 
2001). However, in order to make informed decisions boards need to thoroughly 
understand the risk profiles of their organisations and how the risks can affect strategies 
at both business and corporate levels (KPMG, 2010); ERM should thus be embedded in 
all organisational structures, forming an integral part of management oversight (Branson 
et al., 2008). COSO (2004) alludes to a risk culture permeating the entire organisation, 
with everyone in an organisation being risk aware and risk intelligent, alertly looking 
for opportunities and threats that could influence the organisation’s performance 
(Branson et al., 2008).  
 
As stipulated by COSO (2004), the hallmark of ERM lies in linking risk management 
closely to the objectives of organisational strategies (Power, 2009); such alignment 
steers the risk management initiatives and the formulation and execution of 
organisational strategies in the same direction as organisational risk appetites (Francis 
and Richards, 2007). In the execution of this alignment, risks are identified by taking 
into consideration the organisational objectives and managed consistently within pre-
established, organisation-specific risk tolerance levels (Buehler et al., 2008). ERM 
aspires not only to preserve but also to create value in organisations, and thus risk is 
considered both in terms of the downside and the upside of events potentially affecting 
organisational strategies (Wang and Faber, 2006). Under the ERM approach not only 
should a broad palette of enterprise risks be taken into consideration, but also the 
interplay and confluences among the various types of risks; such entity-level portfolio 
view of risks facilitates identification of potential interdependencies between risks 
which tend to be ignored in traditional risk management models and coordination of risk 
management efforts across various departments (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011).  
 
The above discussed attributes of ERM are believed to generate numerous benefits for 
organisations. Increased risk awareness should facilitate decision making at both 
strategic and operational levels, and consequently more objective allocation of resources 
leading to improved efficiency and return on equity; decreased earnings and stock price 
volatility should reduce the costs of external capital (Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; 
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Meulbroek, 2002; Miccolis and Shah, 2000; Beasley, et al., 2008; Lawrence et al., 
2009; Nocco and Stulz, 2006; Barton et al., 2002; Lam, 2001; Cumming and Hirtle, 
2001; Buehler, 2008). Apart from the arguments of a technical nature, related to 
enhancing organisational efficiency and effectiveness (Scott, 2002; Gupta, 1994), 
scholars also argued the benefits of gaining external legitimacy through improved 
communication of organisations’ risk profiles and signalling commitment to risk 
management (Meulbroek, 2002). Making organisational risk management efforts 
transparent to external stakeholders is considered a recent, yet increasingly widespread 
pressure (Bhimani, 2009). Power (2007, p. 180) explained: “Risk management is no 
longer a private matter for experts, but is increasingly publicly certifiable and visible 
because of its role in defining organisational virtue and legitimacy”. Finally, the 
argument of ERM maximizing enterprise value through the above cited indirect benefits 
has also been gaining momentum in literature; even the definition of ERM provided by 
Casualty Actuarial Society Committee (2003, p. 10) states “ERM is the discipline by 
which an organisation in an industry assesses, controls, exploits, finances, and monitors 
risks from all sources for the purpose of increasing the organisation’s short- and long-
term value to its stakeholders”. However, empirical evidence of ERM’s effects on 
shareholder value is limited or is often based on ill-designed measures of ERM 
(Lawrence et al., 2009; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011).  
 
1.3 Risks and challenges in the airline industry  
The business environment of the airline industry is uniquely complex. The airline 
industry has historically been one of the fastest growing industries in the world, despite 
numerous challenges inherent in the industry structure and surrounding provision of 
airline services (Swelbar and Belobaba, 2009). Airlines face general entrepreneurial 
risks just as any other business does, yet external challenges especially related to 
industry structure, macroeconomic conditions, or governmental interventions, over 
which airlines have limited or no control, are the most relevant challenges to airlines.     
 
Analysis of the airline industry structure through Porter’s ‘five-forces’ model delivers 
interesting results, suggesting the five forces are uniquely strong in the airline industry 
(IATA, 2011). The supplier power in the airline industry is high, with just few suppliers 
catering to the airline market while concentrated in oligopolies; airlines concern for 
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safety and quality, and the consequent need for regular updates of technological 
advances adds additional power to aircraft and engine producers. Expansion of airline 
operations is often restricted due to infrastructural shortcomings of airports and air 
traffic control systems (Brueckner and Dender, 2008). As air travel has become more 
accessible, infrastructure development has not kept the pace of demand growth, 
therefore hindering services’ speed and quality, indirectly placing a burden on airlines’ 
profitability, and jeopardising the ability of the airline industry to satisfy the growing 
demand for air transport services (Forsyth, 2007). Similarly, through the provision of 
transport services, airlines have extensive interaction with government and other 
agencies which influence the ownership of business processes, airport security, 
immigration, customs, airport authorities, etc. Airlines operate in a highly competitive 
environment, in which there are multiple direct and indirect rivals, while service 
differentiation among airlines is not substantial (Gillen, 2006); additionally, the threat of 
new competitors is high due to the week entrance barriers. Due to perceived 
commoditisation of air travel, switching costs for buyers are minimal, while buyers tend 
to be highly sensitive to prices (Gillen and Morrison, 2007; Brons et al., 2002). Since air 
travel is often regarded as discretionary, demand for airline services is cyclical and 
linked to overall economic conditions; airlines experience significant growth of traffic 
during periods of prosperity, and carry substantial excess capacity during crises (Mason, 
2005). Finally, the bargaining power of the global distribution systems (GDS) is also 
very high. On top of that, it should be noted that the industry is highly regulated in 
various areas such as safety, environmental impact, airspace usage, or passenger rights; 
with multiple restrictions and frequently changing regulations, airlines lack the 
commercial freedom to operate like other businesses.  
 
Apart from the challenges related to flawed and complex airline industry structure, 
airlines face risks related to their capital, labor, technology-intensive business models, 
and relevant external risks (Goetz and Graham, 2004). Airline businesses are 
characterised by high fixed costs and low profit margins; the share of operating 
expenses related to labor and fuel costs oscillates around 60% (Tsoukala et al., 2008). 
The nature of airline operations makes them especially susceptible to hazard risks. Even 
though technological improvements have resulted in increased safety of air travel, 
accident risk is inherent to air transport; the severity and multi-dimensionality of 
consequences related to airline accidents underlies the importance of safety (Janic, 
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2000). Natural phenomena are extremely relevant for airlines. Adverse climate 
conditions may lead to distortions in operating plans – flight cancellations, delays, and 
other diversions, which imply additional costs to airline operators. Finally, external, 
‘macro’ risks such as fluctuations of fuel prices, interest rates and exchange rates, 
political conflicts, changing legislations, among others, are regarded as extremely 
relevant, adding to the complex myriad of airline challenges.   
 
Despite the complex and volatile business environment, over the last four decades 
airlines have managed to reduce unit costs in real terms by 50% (Pearce, 2012), by 
streamlining operational costs, concentrating on core, value-adding services, increasing 
aircraft utilisation rates, re-launching services in ways that generate additional revenue 
streams, and improving revenue and yield management techniques (IATA, 2011). 
However, these efficiency gains have been passed on to consumers and generated 
additional value to other participants of the air transport value chain, while airlines’ 
margins have remained abnormally low in comparison to other industries (Wojahn, 
2012). This phenomenon is especially striking due to the high risk and volatility 
inherent in the airline industry. High risk is usually associated with potentially high 
returns while, conversely, investors expect low returns from low-risk investments. 
However, even though in the air transport value chain the airline business is attributed 
high risk and volatility, airlines have been earning the lowest return on capital, even 
below the cost of capital provided by investors (IATA, 2013; Pearce, 2012). 
 
Airline industry is expected to face multiple high-impact developments in the 
forthcoming two decades which will require effective management to ensure long-term 
sustainability of airlines; some of the major future challenges include threats of 
substitute services, market liberalisation and deregulation, finiteness of fossil fuels, 
development of virtual communication, trends in emission trading, and increasing 
overall industry vulnerability (Linz, 2012; Florian and Markus, 2011). The increasingly 
complex and dynamic nature of the airline business, and the anomalously poor 
profitability of airlines in the context of air transport industry, suggest that airlines face 
a demanding GRC (governance, risk and compliance) profile (Watchtower, 2010; 
Yilmaz, 2008a) and need to develop effective risk management systems to match the 
complex and dynamic nature of their businesses (Adler and Gellman, 2012; Nicolau and 
Santa-Maria, 2012; Niemeier and Tretheway, 2012). In its exploration of airline 
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industry risk management profile and airlines’ risk management strategies, structures, 
and practices, this research concentrates on passenger air transportation providers, 
including both scheduled and chartered services, while it excludes exclusive providers 
of air freight services.  
 
1.4 Research problem 
Enterprise risk management has gained momentum in the agendas of regulators, 
normative bodies, industry professionals, and scholars. Despite the multiplicity of 
principles, guidelines, and frameworks developed in the field of ERM, scholars still 
regard ERM as an unproven and emerging field in which important knowledge gaps 
remain in practice and in academe (Kaplan and Mikes, 2014; Paape and Spakle, 2012). 
ERM research is limited in terms of exploring the coupling and fluidity of ERM in 
organisational settings (Soin and Collier, 2013), and especially beyond the context of 
the financial industry (Arena et al., 2010). Exploring ERM in relation to a complex and 
volatile business setting with possible goal conflicts between diverse risk rationalities, 
such as those exemplified by the organisational settings of airlines, offers an interesting 
avenue for research.    
 
Risk management is a crucial yet challenging component of airline governance (Otero, 
2006; Yilmaz, 2008a). The current situation of the airline industry suggests the need for 
effective risk management (IATA 2013; Pearce, 2012; Adler and Gellman, 2012). 
However, despite relevance of this subject and demonstrated interest from related 
industry regulators, associations, and practitioners, scarce guidance from academic 
research has been offered to airlines in structuring their enterprise-wide risk 
management approaches. Literature in the field of airline risk management leaves ample 
room for development, especially with regard to ERM. Prior research comprehensively 
assessing airline risk management systems at all levels and in all functional 
departments, beyond the areas of operational risk management, and exploring 
organisational couplings and rationales underlying adoption of particular risk 
management approaches in airlines is scarce or, in relation specifically to ERM, barely 
existent.  
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Even though numerous models have been developed to date conceptualising ERM in 
universalistic terms, they are often criticised for failing to consider the specificity of 
organisations (Arena et al., 2010). Scholars argued there may be considerable value in 
developing ERM approaches aligned with the requirements of specific organisational 
contexts (Paape and Spakle, 2012; Barton et al., 2002). Contingency theory perspective 
has been suggested for developing customised ERM systems (Woods, 2009, 2011; 
Gordon, 2009; Moeller, 2007), which should encourage organisations to experiment 
with innovative configurations of ERM matching their contextual circumstances 
(Kaplan and Mikes, 2014). Contingency-based research was also called to explore more 
contemporary dimensions of management control systems (Chenhall, 2003), as 
represented by ERM, while the new studies were suggested to adopt stronger focus on 
the contexts and organisational and social outcomes of the systems (Soin and Collier, 
2013; Scheytt et al., 2006). Under the recommendation to adopt the contingency 
perspective in development of ERM systems, this study considers contextual 
characteristics of the airline industry underlying the rationales by which airlines 
structure their risk management approaches, in terms of both adoption and non-adoption 
of ERM. Literature review suggested that the determinants of adoption of ERM stem 
both from organisational quests for external legitimacy and improved effectiveness and 
efficiency; this suggests the need to conduct the analysis of determinants of airline risk 
management approaches in both institutional and technical realms.  
 
Prior research in the area of airline risk management focused on exploring airline risk 
management strategies, structures, and practices in relation to particular facets of risks, 
such as management of safety, financial, operational, fatigue risks and many others. 
However, the literature is scarce in empirical organisational studies adopting a more 
comprehensive approach to risk managements systems. Attending to this scarcity in 
literature, further research is needed to comprehensively understand and assess the 
phenomenon of enterprise-wide risk management in organisational settings of airlines, 
in terms of the structures, practices, and organisational logics constituting risk 
management systems, as well as their maturity, roles and uses, and their coupling with 
other management systems in airlines. Due to the signalled need for improvement of 
airline risk management approaches, attention should be directed at understanding the 
shortcomings of airline risk management systems in order to later address them, and the 
best practices of such systems for their further dissemination through this study. 
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Investigation of these diverse aspects of airline risk management systems is especially 
interesting to undertake from the under-researched perspective of ERM.  
 
Apart from the signalled gap in literature regarding the exploration of ERM specifically 
in the context of the airline industry, the pool of ERM studies can be contributed to in 
other aspects. Previous studies of ERM adopted primarily quantitative approaches in 
order to investigate diverse ERM-related issues such as ERM adoption drivers (e.g. 
Paape and Speklé, 2012; Beasley et al., 2005; Gordon et al., 2009), the characteristics of 
organisations that adopted ERM (e.g. Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Pagach and Warr, 
2007; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011), the relation between ERM adoption and the values 
or performance of organisations (e.g. McShane et al., 2011; Gates et al., 2012; Nocco 
and Stulz, 2006), or ERM coupling within organisations (Kleffner et al., 2003; Walker 
et al., 2003). Although these studies provided evidence from a wide range of samples 
including numerous organisations, their methodological approaches inhibited them from 
exploring ERM in cultural and organisational contexts. Evidence collected primarily 
through surveys would not allow for the exploration of contextual issues related to ERM 
coupling in organisations. Furthermore, the selection of organisations with ERM was 
usually based on simplistic proxies indicating existence of commonly adopted auditable 
trails of ERM which provided poor indication of the level of embeddedness and 
integration of ERM in organisational structures.  
 
A similar problem also relates to studies of drivers of ERM adoption in organisations, 
while academic literature on motivations for ERM adoption is generally scarce (Hoyt 
and Liebenberg, 2011). Research exploring the enactment of ERM in organisational 
practice and ERM adoption drivers within wider cultural and organisational contexts is 
limited. This indicates the need to employ more qualitative approaches in the studies of 
ERM. The need for recognising organisational fluidity and contextual sensitivity of 
management control systems in general, and risk management systems in particular, 
was previously emphasised by researchers (e.g. Power, 2009; Miller et al. 2008; Arena 
et al., 2010; Woods, 2009, 2011; Gephart et al., 2009; Mikes, 2009; Muralidhar, 2010); 
as explicitly expressed by Miller (1994, p. 9), risk management “could not, and should 
not, be studied as an organisational practice in isolation from the wider social and 
institutional context in which it operates”. 
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Although scholars have recognised the limitations of investigating independently the 
influences of task and institutional environments on organisational structures and 
practices (e.g. Scott and Meyer, 1983; Carruthers, 1995; Baxter and Chua, 2003; 
Suddaby, 2010; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988), previous research in the field of ERM 
still lacks a joint application of the technical and institutional perspectives. This infers 
that a considerable value can be derived from a conjoint consideration of the technical 
and institutional pressures shaping airline risk management approaches. Continuing 
with the theoretical perspectives, prior studies of management control systems and risk 
management systems would often rely on different strands of institutional theory, 
particularly old institutional economics (OIE) and new institutional sociology (NIS). 
Conjoint application of these perspectives allows for exploring both intra-organisational 
institutions, rules and routines, and the influences exerted by macro-institutions in wider 
organisational fields. This theoretical approach has not been adopted in prior 
organisational studies of airline management systems.     
 
1.5 Aims and objectives of the study  
Attending to the rationale outlaid in the preceding section, it can be inferred that further 
research in the area of ERM could benefit the airline industry, as well as contribute to 
closing the existing literature and knowledge gaps. An important purpose of airlines is 
to create value which, when applied in the context of risk management, translates to 
creating value through effective management of risks; adoption of ERM in airlines 
should balance legitimacy and technical rationalities in development of effective, value-
creating risk management approaches. As such, this research aims to investigate 
structures and practices of airline risk management systems in order to develop an 
enterprise-wide risk management framework in the airline industry; the final product of 
the thesis, the ERM framework in the airline industry, is presented in Chapter 8.      
 
A series of objectives has been set to facilitate achievement of this aim:  
1. To investigate the influences of business contexts on the risk management systems 
of airlines. 
2. To understand organisational structures and practices constituting airline risk 
management systems.  
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3. To investigate maturity and advancement, roles and uses, and shortcomings and 
best practices of airline risk management systems. 
4. To develop an enterprise-wide risk management framework in the airline industry.  
 
Four research questions were developed to guide this research. The first research 
question inquires about the characteristics of airline business context:  
 RQ1: How do different institutional and technical contextual factors determine 
the adoption and implementation of airline risk management systems? 
The second research question deals with organisational structures, practices, and 
dynamics of airline risk management systems: 
 RQ2: How do airlines structure and perform risk management functions? 
The third research question focuses on assessment of airline risk management 
approaches: 
 RQ3: Where are airlines placed on the continuum of maturity and advancement 
of risk management approaches, and what are the roles and uses of their risk 
management systems? 
Finally, this fourth research question focuses on developing propositions for the 
improvement of airline risk management systems: 
 RQ4: How can airlines improve and align their risk management systems with 
the requirements of their business contexts? 
 
Therefore, the matter at the heart of this research is to explore the drivers of effective 
risk management in airlines. As conveyed through the research objectives and 
questions, this research investigates organisational structures, practices, and rationales 
of airline risk management systems, paying special attention to identifying their 
shortcomings and best practices, in addition to investigating the contextual drivers of 
these systems. This should allow for developing recommendations on the design of 
enterprise-wide risk management approaches in airlines aligned to airline institutional 
and task environments, and for balancing legitimacy and technical logics within these 
systems so that they bring value to organisations. In this study ‘value’ is defined after 
Gattringer et al. (2014, p. 276) as “stakeholder’s perceived benefits as well as the 
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expected contribution to the attainment of their respective goals and objectives”. In 
order to achieve the aim and objectives of this research, this study relies on findings 
from relevant academic and industry literature and from an empirical study; the 
empirical study comprises a field study (as defined by Lillis and Mundy, 2005) 
conducted in ten international airlines, and two case studies involving the most 
informative cases from the pool of airlines selected for the field study.   
 
In this research ‘risk management system’ is considered as a set of components which 
sustain and support risk management throughout an airline, comprising foundations 
such as objectives, framework of policies and procedures, mandate and commitment, 
and organisational arrangements such as processes, activities, relationships, a structure 
of responsibilities and accountabilities, and resources (developed based on ISO 31000). 
In this regard, within the area of arrangements, ‘organisational structures’ can be 
defined as arrangements of lines of authority, communication, rights and duties, which 
determine the assignment of responsibilities and accountabilities across an organisation.  
Throughout this thesis the term “risk management system” will refer to the different 
possible configurations of organisational risk management foundations and 
arrangements, and the term “ERM system” will be considered as one of the possible 
variations of the “risk management system”. Finally, risk management systems in 
airlines are investigated as integral parts of organisational management control systems 
(MCS), as “it is inept to consider management control as being distinctly separate and 
independent from risk management or corporate governance concerns” (Bhimani, 2009, 
p. 4). 
 
1.6 Significance of the study 
The significance of this study is underpinned by four principal motives. Firstly, the 
airline industry has a uniquely challenging risk profile, making risk management a core 
competence for airlines (Janic, 2000). In the context of historically poor profitability of 
airlines, the challenges facing the industry add significance to this research and suggest 
the need for effective management of airline risks, which has been previously voiced by 
regulators, normative bodies, and industry professionals. However, despite the growing 
interest and adoption of ERM in the airline industry, this field has remained under-
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researched in academic literature. This investigation is one of the first to empirically 
explore issues related to adoption and implementation of ERM in airlines. 
 
Secondly, attaining to the calls for conducting airline risk management practice beyond 
the functional silos (Yilmaz, 2008a), this investigation aims to explore risk management 
systems in airlines, with a special focus on the core drivers of effective, enterprise-wide 
risk management approaches. Furthermore, acknowledging the need to fit the framings 
of risk management systems with the requirements of organisational contexts, this 
research aims to provide recommendations and highlight the issues that developers of 
ERM systems in airlines should take into consideration.   
 
Thirdly, although academic literature offers a broad range of studies on airline risk 
management systems conducted from diverse ‘siloed’ dimensions, focusing on 
management of particular types of airline risks, there is little empirical work available 
that empirically assesses the risk management structures and practices developed in 
airlines from a comprehensive perspective. This study is expected to fill the literature 
gap in this respect, and respond to the need for a better understanding of organisational 
coupling and performance of risk management systems in their multiple dimensions, in 
addition to exploring how they are affected by the demands of airline task and 
institutional environments.  
 
Fourthly, previous empirical research on ERM implementation draws mainly from 
survey findings (Hyot and Liebenberg, 2011), which are criticised for ignoring 
contextual factors of organisational assembling of ERM, and which rarely explore in 
practice the enactment of ERM rules and routines (structures and practices, see section 
1.5). The nature of ERM and its organisational coupling and fluidity vary in different 
organisational settings (Arena et al., 2010), and understanding ERM as an 
organisational practice requires attention to be paid to wider cultural, political, and 
social contexts. Therefore, this research attempts to overcome the limitations of 
previous studies by relying on field study and case study methodologies.     
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1.7 Outline of the thesis 
In addition to the introductory chapter, this thesis is comprised of eight additional 
chapters and a series of appendices.  
 
Chapter 1:  Introduced background to this research and stated the research 
problem, research aim, objectives, and questions.  
 
Chapter 2: Provides a critical review of literature related mainly to airline 
risk management approaches and landmark ERM frameworks 
and risk management standards.  
 
Chapter 3: Presents a theoretical framework informing this study, which 
combines structural contingency theory with two strands of 
institutional theory, namely old institutional economics and new 
institutional sociology.  
 
Chapter 4: Presents the research methodology and methods chosen for this 
study.  
 
Chapter 5: Describes the empirical findings from a field study conducted in 
ten international airlines.  
 
Chapters 6, 7:  Report on the empirical findings from two case studies.  
Chapter 8: Critically analyses and discusses the empirical findings in the 
context of the theoretical framework and relevant prior research.  
Chapter 9: Presents conclusions drawn from this study, outlines its major 
contributions and limitations, and discusses directions for further 
research.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Understanding the latest developments in airline risk management approaches and risk 
management discipline in general are important prerequisites for addressing the 
research problem underlying this study. The literature analysis is conducted in the 
context of the research questions stated for this study, and is aimed at developing 
conceptual understanding of the risk management discipline in three principal 
dimensions, namely the influence of  business context on airlines’ risk management 
approaches, adoption and implementation of ERM and their driving forces, and 
provisions and characteristics of the most prominent ERM frameworks and risk 
management standards. In addition, the literature review presented in this chapter aims:  
 To categorise the body of academic literature in the aforementioned themes.  
 To identify the leading researchers in the field and learn about their contributions to 
the body of knowledge.   
 To identify gaps in the existing body of knowledge.  
 To guide the researcher in positioning this research among the contributions of 
other researchers, building on their work.  
This review draws on a variety of different data sources. Priority was given to findings 
retrieved from high-ranked, peer-reviewed academic journals; however, since ERM is a 
relatively new concept in academic literature (Arena et al., 2010), the researcher found 
it beneficial to complement academic literature with industry publications. This proved 
to be especially relevant to the study of airline risk management approaches; although 
the academic literature offers a broad range of studies of airline risk management 
systems conducted from diverse ‘siloed’ perspectives, there is little empirical work 
available regarding the adoption and implementation of ERM in airlines.   
 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: the next section briefly describes 
evolution of the risk management discipline. The critical analysis of literature 
commences in the following section, which is focused on airline business environment 
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and its influences on the risk management practice in airlines, uncovering the specificity 
of airlines´ risk management requirements. This chapter further continues with an 
analysis of cross-industry studies of ERM adoption and implementation and their 
driving forces. The following section presents three internationally recognised ERM 
frameworks and risk management standards, and argues the need for alignment of their 
provisions to contextual requirements of different industries. Thereafter, the two last 
sections draw conclusions on the reviewed literature and identify gaps and areas 
requiring further development.  
 
2.2 Evolution of the risk management discipline  
Attitudes towards risk management have evolved over time from simple risk 
transferring strategies, through compliance-driven risk management initiatives, 
converting gradually to structured programmes forming an integral part of core 
enterprise strategies (Arena et al., 2010). Formal risk management programmes can be 
traced back to the 1950s, when risks were managed mainly through insurance, and the 
1970s, which marked the development of financial risk management strategies (Fraser 
and Simkins, 2010; Woods, 2011). Risk management would initially concentrate on 
managing only the downside of risk, with no consideration of the possible upside of 
events (Buehler et al., 2008). The financial and insurance industries have often 
pioneered the developments in the risk management discipline. The nature and 
profitability of these industries are underpinned by the ability to manage risk 
effectively. Risk management constitutes a core competence in financial and insurance 
industries; thus, they were the first, with the exception of academic bodies, to think 
about risk systematically (Buehler et al., 2008). 
 
It was only later that the notion of the opportunistic side and the value-creating potential 
of risk began to filter down to broader business communities; the defensive attitude 
toward risk shifted to a mind-set of exploiting risk (CAS, 2003). A series of factors 
drove the paradigm shift towards adopting ever more comprehensive approaches to risk 
management. Firstly, the competitive environment has become increasingly dynamic 
and turbulent, giving rise to ever more complex and interrelated risks (Chapman and 
Ward, 2003). Phenomena such as globalisation, deregulation, consolidation of markets 
or emergence of new ones, intensified competition, innovation in products and markets, 
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technological developments, information revolution, e-commerce, or economic crises, 
compelled the complexity of business environment and drove the need for evolution of 
the risk management discipline (Thomson, 2007; Verbanoa and Venturini, 2011; 
Floricel and Miller, 2001). Secondly, following a wave of corporate and financial 
scandals, external pressures have been exerted by regulators, rating agencies, 
institutional investors, and corporate governance oversight bodies that have been 
insisting on the need for a more comprehensive perspective of enterprise risks. This, 
consequently, triggered the introduction of laws and regulations (e.g. Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act in the US, the UK’s Corporate Governance Code, Basel, or NYSE Corporate 
Governance Rules), and normative guidelines in risk-related areas of corporate finance 
and internal control (CAS, 2003; Arena et al., 2010; Beasley and Frigo, 2010; Fraser 
and Simkins, 2010). 
 
Increasing market regularisation and professionalisation drove the development of 
structured risk management programmes in organisations; yet, the programs have 
initially been focused on the compliance function with multiple regulations and industry 
standards (Beck, 2004). Risk management initially consisted of implementing multiple 
auditing and controlling procedures of major business processes, which were gradually 
improved in terms of efficiency through the implementation of standardised procedures 
and automated monitoring controls throughout organisations (Abrams et al., 2007, 
Fraser and Henry, 2007). However, these risk management practices often proved 
insufficient to protect organisations’ interests, due to incomplete portfolios of risks 
contemplated in the risk management programmes, or due to ignoring the 
interconnectivity of particular risk groups (CAS, 2003). The fragmented approaches to 
controlling risks, which are also frequently referred to as “silo-based”, assumed 
managing particular risks independently, with little consideration of their 
interdependence (Olson and Dash-Wu, 2008). The “silos” would also often separate the 
strategic planning function from risk management initiatives; with no link between risk 
management and strategic planning, and ignorance of the interconnectivity of risks, 
organisations would overlook important strategic risks (Olson and Dash-Wu, 2008). 
The importance of implementing a broader approach to risk management became 
evident in the wake of the economic crises of the last decades, when the “siloed” risk 
management programmes often failed and abnormalities took serious tolls on 
organisations’ performance (Power, 2004; Collier and Agyei-Ampomah, 2005). In the 
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aftermath of the crises, there has been an increasing consciousness that a more holistic, 
value-adding approach to risk management is a compelling need (Beasley and Frigo, 
2010).  
 
The ultimate development in the risk management discipline, as previously mentioned - 
ERM, emerged during the 1990s (Power, 2009; Arena et al., 2010). ERM evolved 
beyond the traditional risk silos to implement a common thought process in the 
identification, assessment and management of enterprise risks (Frigo and Andersen, 
2011). Risks affect organisations in a holistic manner, and therefore their management 
should be holistic, trespassing arbitrarily chosen functional silos or disciplinary 
boundaries (Sobel and Reding, 2004). Thus, under the ERM approach, organisations 
should manage enterprise-wide risks through a comprehensive programme extending 
beyond internal control processes, internal audit, or adherence to compliance 
requirements. As interest in ERM has increased over time, the risk management 
function has been moved from organisations’ peripheral areas to the corporate levels 
(Arena et al., 2010); the ERM initiative became one of the core strategic efforts for 
generating prompt and more accurate responses to changing market conditions and 
improving overall organisational performance (Hampton, 2009). The growing interest in 
embracing an increasingly wide scope of organisational exposures and developing 
integrated risk management approaches was followed by a gradual formalisation of 
enterprise-wide risk management frameworks and standards (Lawrence et al., 2009).  
 
2.3 Risk management in the airline industry  
The analysis presented in the section to follow focuses on the risk management practice 
in the airline industry. Firstly, the core dimensions of airline risk management systems 
are presented in the context of the requirements of airline business environment and of 
the risk profile of commercial aviation. Secondly, current trends in risk management 
literature and practice are presented, while the researcher reflects on under-researched 
topics in the field of airline risk management. In order to improve an understanding of 
the airline risk management practice, the researcher complemented the review of 
academic literature with a wide range of alternative data sources such as industry and 
policy publications, and data published by airlines in any form of communications.  
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2.3.1 Airline business environment and risk management practice  
Risk management approaches in airlines are influenced by an interplay of institutional 
and technical factors and, among others, by the volatile business environment, the 
hazardous nature of airline operations, the highly regulated business context, or 
organisational risk profiles, aims and objectives (as discussed in Chapter 1, section 1.4).  
The airline industry is heavily regulated, and adherence to the regulatory framework to 
a large extent has an impact on the risk management practice of airlines (Adler and 
Gellman, 2012). The regulatory framework for civil aviation comprises international 
conventions, national laws, and rules and procedures issued by supranational legal 
authorities (Leloudas, 2009). Additionally, recognised industry organisations often 
prescribe best practices and standards, especially concentrating on quality and safety 
management systems (Boksberger, 2011). The head advisory organisation in the 
aviation system is International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), dedicated to 
promoting and harmonising quality and safety standards in airline operations. Standards 
and Recommended Practices (SARPs) issued by ICAO are implemented and supervised 
by national civil aviation authorities. Supra-national organisations, such as Joint 
Aviation Authorities (JAA), additionally work toward a unified implementation of 
aviation safety standards. Other organisations, such as European Aviation Safety 
Agency (EASA), with a mandatory power operate, for example, as certification 
institutions. Additionally, professional organisations such as the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) provide safety recommendations for airlines. Apart from 
the field of operational safety, airline air transport activities are additionally regulated in 
multiple areas such as, among others, the allocation of traffic rights, accesses to airports 
and time slots, and standards of aircraft noise and CO2 emissions, which have an impact 
on organisational strategies, including the risk management strategies (IATA, 2011). 
Airline risk management programmes therefore need to consider the demanding 
compliance profile of the airline industry, as well as a multiplicity of entrepreneurial 
and market risks.  
 
The core competency of airlines is delivering safe flights, yet they are evaluated in the 
market based on their ability to profit from taking complex risks, especially in the cases 
of listed organisations (Lin and Chang, 2008). Airlines, in the same way as 
organisations from other industries, face a dilemma of balancing risk and return in their 
22 
 
operations (Lin and Chang, 2008). However, the risk-return trade-off in the case of the 
airline industry, where lives may be at stake, differs from the capital-budgeting 
dilemmas of other industries (Simkins, 2011); maximisation of profit goals with little 
consideration of service quality and, implicitly, of safety goals generates higher costs to 
organisations (Noronha and Singal, 2004). Reason (1997) discussed organisational 
efforts directed at increasing system performance in complex socio-technical systems 
within the areas of safety and productivity; the scholar argued the productivity goals 
tend to be prioritised by organisations over protection goals. Previous studies also 
argued the trade-off between compromising quality by airlines and their financial 
health, suggesting that financially weak airlines do not prioritise the pursuit of safety 
and are more prone to compromising quality (Dionne et al., 1997; Golbe; 1986; Rose, 
1990). Thus, airlines need to find the optimal balance between production and 
protection goals; safety management can be considered as a fundamental process 
supporting the management of business in pursuit of profits (ICAO, 2012).  
 
The specificity of airline business environment is reflected in an airline’s risk profile 
(set of major risks as defined in ISO 31000, 2009), which is characterised in particular 
by the prevalence of external risks with a low level of controllability. The risk 
management strategies of airlines are conditioned by the different levels of occurrence 
probability and potential impact of the risks they face (Lin and Chang, 2008). Risks of 
low frequency and high severity, such as aircraft accident risks, can be transferred to 
external parties through insurance policies. Risks of high severity and with a high level 
of occurrence probability are not-insurable. Airlines employ means to minimise losses 
through crisis management programs and wider risk management systems. Risks of low 
severity and low frequency of occurrence are often retained by airlines, which may 
employ, for example, captive-insurance solutions. Risks of high frequency and low 
severity, such as operational risks, can be managed in airlines through the establishment 
of internal control and risk management programmes. The following figure (Fig. 2-1) 
summarises the common strategies employed by airlines, adapted to the typology of 
exposures they face. In the two-dimensional matrix the vertical axis indicates the degree 
of potential loss an airline would experience if the risks were to materialise, while the 
horizontal axis indicates the level of occurrence probability (frequency) of particular 
risks.   
 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Airline risk management matrix  
(Adapted from Lin and Chang, 2008, p. 455) 
 
2.3.1.1 Key areas of airline risk management practice  
The following sections discuss the key focus areas of airline risk management 
programmes, attending to the varying levels of occurrence probability and impact 
severity of risks commonly faced by airlines. The research cited throughout the 
following discussion does not claim to be exhaustive, but rather illustrative of trends 
and areas of special interest of airline risk management programmes.  
 
Safety risk management 
Air travel safety is a broad area, encompassing operational safety risks and security 
threats considered in terms of violent acts indented to harm aviation passengers or 
installations (Brooker, 2006). The assurance of safe operations, both on the ground and 
in the air, is the key concern of airline risk management programmes (Netjasov and 
Janic, 2008). An extensive regulatory framework has been developed, regulating 
operations of airlines and other organisations along the air transport service chain, 
aimed at limiting the risk of flying (Janic, 2006). Airlines are required to comply with 
numerous regulations in terms of safety by developing safety and security policies and 
emergency plans and procedures; in addition, airlines are required to report on the 
measures deployed in safety and security risk management programmes (Netjasov and 
Janic, 2008). This issue is further elaborated on in section 2.3.1.2 of this chapter.  
High Severity
Low Severity
Low Frequency High Frequency
Transferred Risks Avoidance and Controlled Loss
Undertaken or 
Ignored Risks
Prevention / 
Reduction of Risks
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The strong focus airlines place on safety management is due not only to the regulatory 
framework, but also to the severe consequences that safety failures may have on overall 
airline performance. Multiple studies highlight the importance of sound safety records 
from the business financial perspective (Noronha and Singal, 2004). Safety accidents, 
apart from material losses, generate multiple “hidden costs” for organisations, such as 
negative effects on airline reputation (ICAO, 2013; Graham and Bansal, 2007). Sound 
safety records in airlines generate higher customer demand (Squalli and Saad, 2006). 
Safety-related accidents generate immediate market responses, affecting multiple 
aspects of airline performance and market value (Dillon et al., 1999; Carter and 
Simkins, 2004). Financial context for safety provision in airlines was analysed by 
Noronha and Singal (2004), who stipulate that airline financial health affects 
organisational ability and willingness to provide improved safety measures.  
 
Security of airline operations has become a frequently discussed topic, especially after 
the “9/11” terrorist attacks (Kim and Gu, 2004). Considering the nature of the airline 
business, and its strong dependence on regulatory frameworks and performance of 
external service providers (as discussed in Chapter I, section 1.4), security-related risks 
can, to a large extent, be classified as external risks. Bazerman and Watkins (2005, p. 
365) refer to security-threatening events as “predictable surprises”, which are “events 
that take an organisation by surprise, although leaders had all of the information 
necessary to anticipate the events and their consequences”, and claim that “predictable 
surprises” occur regularly within organisations, and that it is the leaders’ responsibility 
to identify and avoid them – by recognising growing systematic weaknesses in 
organisations and taking steps to mitigate the scope of possible damages.  
 
Airline insurance policies 
Mitigating risks through insurance has traditionally been the most common form of risk 
management in airlines (Lin and Chang, 2008). Due to the nature of their core operating 
business, airlines are exposed to risks, such as accidental or incidental damage to 
aircrafts, and multiple resulting costs, such as liability claims related to passengers and 
general liability to third-parties. Hazard, safety and security-related risks, characterised 
by high severity and low probability of occurrence, are typically covered by insurance 
policies. Due to the complexity and financial impact of such risks if materialised, 
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insurance policies are jointly provided by various insurers who additionally trade the 
exposures on the reinsurance market (Lin and Chang, 2008). Insurance policies transfer 
the financial consequences of risks to another party (transferee), rather than the risk 
itself, and thus they help airlines to avoid the financial distress occasioned by 
unfortunate events (Lane, 2005). From a legal perspective, insurance is a contract 
"whereby one party, called the insurer or underwriter, undertakes, for a valuable 
consideration [premium], to indemnify the other, called the insured, against loss or 
liability from certain risks or perils to which the object of the insurance may be 
exposed, or from the happening of a certain event" (Article 2468 C.C.Q. cited in 
Leloudas, 2004). The importance of insurance policies in airline risk management 
strategies is reflected in airlines’ structure of expenses; in 2006 over 70% of airlines’ 
risk management resources were dedicated to covering insurance premiums (Jenner, 
2007). Insurance costs have become remarkably relevant for airlines, as premiums have 
experienced significant increases in recent years, especially after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks (Flouris et al., 2009).  
 
Risk management through insurance facilitates only partial optimisation of the risk 
portfolio. Although airlines can purchase coverage for a growing number of risks, 
insurance costs against some types of risks may be prohibitive (Leloudas, 2009). 
Additionally, since risks are interrelated, occurrence of some of the risks commonly 
covered by insurance, for example, catastrophic risks such as safety accidents, can 
affect airline businesses in multiple ways (Flouris et al., 2009). Although insurance 
policies cover certain types of risks, there are many uninsured costs for airlines and the 
industry which are triggered by the occurrence of such risks, such as the above 
discussed loss of public confidence following safety accidents. This entails the need to 
adopt a more comprehensive approach to management of airline risks, which should 
also consider those risks which are not covered by insurance policies, particularly 
strategic risks (Fraser and Simkins, 2010). 
 
Crisis management and contingency planning 
Airline business is conditioned by multiple external risks which can alter the planned 
course of operations by causing flight diversions, delays, or cancellations, or even 
provoke major operational crises such as prolonged closure of airspace or aircraft 
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accidents. Causes of operational crises may be complex, involving multiple and 
interacting factors, combining external exposures such as weather conditions with 
internal failures such as faulty maintenance procedures. Operational crises represent a 
significant economic cost to airlines, but also trigger commercial and human 
consequences for airlines and their customers (Nigel and Elphick, 2005). Development 
of robust crisis planning and management tools, involving multi-agency planning for 
handling diverse exceptional circumstances, is regarded as imperative for airlines 
(Alexander, 2013; Bejou et al., 1996; Sally, 1999; Sellnow and  Cowden, 2002). 
Coordinating inter-organisational efforts in times of crises is extremely challenging 
(Siomkos, 2000). The need to improve risk management programmes and crisis 
management plans has become evident to airline industry professionals over the last few 
years; for example, the closure of airspace in April 2010 due to a volcanic eruption, 
followed by adverse weather conditions, revealed just how unprepared airline managers 
were to handle crises of prolonged duration and extensive geographical range (Mikosz, 
2011; Alexander, 2013).     
 
Financial risk management 
Airlines are exposed to significant financial risks, which create uncertainty of future 
cash flow and have a material impact on airline operating results. Financial risks, such 
as fluctuations in interest rates, adverse movements of foreign exchange currency 
prices, or fluctuations of commodity prices, cause changes in revenue, airlines’ 
operating expenditures and financial expenses. Therefore, management of financial 
risks is considered to be of primary importance and is a commonly employed practice in 
airlines (Carter et al., 2006). The airline industry has a capital intensive nature, and 
airlines tend to operate with high debt leverage (Mikosz, 2011). Interest rate 
fluctuations may have important effects on the cost of debt and, consequently, airline 
operating results. Additionally, interest rates have an indirect impact on the airline 
industry by influencing progression of economic conditions and business cycles, while 
the industry is highly sensitive to economic cyclicality (Loudon, 2004). The cash flow 
of airlines is strongly affected by volatile exchange rates; this is due to the fact that 
revenue, expenses, and loans are denominated in multiple currencies. Furthermore, 
demand for airline services is also indirectly affected by exchange rate ratios (Loudon, 
2004). Finally, fuel costs account for a substantial part of airlines’ operating costs, and 
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thus changes in jet fuel prices may cause variations in airlines’ profitability (Morrell and 
Swan, 2006).  
 
The financial and market risks facing airlines are hedgeable, and airlines engage 
extensively in hedging operations (Morrell and Swan, 2006). Academic researchers 
explored airlines’ hedging practices, highlighting positive effects of hedging on airline 
operating performance (e.g. Berghöfera and Luceya, 2014) and on firm value (e.g. 
Carter et al., 2006). The use of hedging was argued to mitigate volatility of airlines’ 
cash flow, as capital markets assign higher prices to stocks of airlines with a less 
volatile cash flow (Carter et al., 2006). Interest rate derivatives and foreign exchange 
swaps and forwards are commonly employed by airlines in order to mitigate the risks of 
their adverse changes. Similarly, airlines often operate in forward markets, purchasing 
oil and petroleum derivatives (Loudon, 2004; Spinetta, 2006).  
 
2.3.1.2 Operational risk management in airlines 
Operational planning under uncertainty and operational safety are concerns of 
considerable importance to airlines, and therefore this section discusses in more detail 
these broad areas of airline risk management practice. Airline operations need to be 
constantly re-adjusted for capacity rationalisation and route, network, hub, or code-
sharing optimisation (Ahmed and Poojari, 2008). The operational risk portfolio 
encompasses a wide variety of challenges related to revenue and inventory 
management, promotion and distribution of services and products, cost containment, 
human resources policies, and IT and telecommunications systems, among many others; 
however, safety concerns, as indicated in the preceding section, constitute the main 
pillar of the broadly denominated airlines’ operational risk management practice. 
Within the context of airline operational risk management programmes, safety is 
defined as “the state in which the possibility of harm to persons or of property damage 
is reduced to, and maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing 
process of hazard identification and risk management” (ICAO, 2013, p. 2-1). As 
previously discussed, management of operational risks, interrelated with airline safety 
risks, is heavily regulated. Furthermore, in the areas lacking regulation, organisations 
such as, among others, ICAO, IATA, and EASA prescribe best practice 
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recommendations related to, for example, maintenance, ground handling, flight and 
cabin operations, or certification of personnel.  
 
Evolution of safety risk management 
Even though, over the years, reliability of technology in aviation has improved 
considerably, the reliability of human actions and overall systems has not evolved at the 
same pace (Liou et al., 2008). Accident risk is believed to be inherent to air travel 
(Netjasova and Janic, 2008). The evolution of operational risk management, and of 
safety risk management in particular, can be divided into three phases which are 
illustrated in the following Figure 2-2.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2-2: Evolution of safety risk management   
(Adapted from ICAO, 2013, p. 2-2) 
 
In the 1950s the focus of safety management programmes in airlines was placed on 
preventing technological failures, what consequently led to a decrease in frequency of 
aviation accidents. The field of operational risk management was later broadened to 
consider compliance to a regulatory framework of safety assurance. In the 1970s the 
focus of operational risk management shifted from technological issues to include 
human factors related to man-machine interface; human error had been increasingly 
recognised as a recurring factors in aircraft incidents and accidents. Consequently, since 
the 1990s human actions have been recognised as being influenced by complex 
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organisational factors. Aviation incidents and accidents have become perceived in a 
systematic perspective, considering the effects of formal frameworks and organisational 
culture on the effectiveness of safety risk controls. The reactive methods of collection 
and analysis of safety incidents and accidents data were complemented with proactive 
techniques of advanced detection of emerging safety threats. As the importance of 
human and related organisational factors in safety accident and incident causation was 
recognised, multiple accident causation and prevention models have been developed in 
the last decade. As technology has become more reliable, human factors have become 
perceived as a fragile component of complex socio-technical systems such as aviation. 
Therefore, safety accident causation models concentrate primarily on human factors 
such as human interactions with technology or human behaviours within organisations. 
Human factors are defined by Reason (1997) as “failure of planned actions to achieve 
their desired ends” (p. 71).  
 
The scholarly developments of Reason and Snook provide accurate representations of 
contemporary approaches in the area of operational risk management, and of human 
factors in accident causation models in particular. Reason (1997) in the “Swiss Cheese” 
model contends that aviation safety incidents and accidents take place in consequence 
of not single-point safety system failures, but successive breaches of multiple system 
defences, which can be related to technological failures, human errors, or organisational 
issues. The model further conveys that operational safety accidents include a 
combination of active and latent conditions; active breaches are actions and inactions 
with an immediate effect on system performance such as errors of front-line personnel 
in airline operations; latent failures may remain within a system long before an accident 
is produced, and are activated by breaches of a series of system defences, such as faulty 
procedural designs or lack of a safety culture in an organisation. In the context of the 
interplay of organisational, technological and human factors in accident causation, the 
model asserts the need to consider both active failures and latent conditions  in 
improving the performance of safety systems; organisational processes should be 
monitored to detect latent conditions and instil controls, and adequate workplace 
conditions, culture, and routines should be developed in order to prevent active safety 
breaches. Reason (1997) argued that the human condition cannot be changed, but “we 
can change the conditions under which people work” (p. 25). With reference to 
Reason’s postulate for detection of latent conductions, Dekker (2002) and Young et al. 
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(2004) argue that causality in airline accidents can be only attributed to latent conditions 
in retrospective.     
 
Snook (2000) developed a concept of “practical drift” to describe the deviation of 
airline systems’ performance from their original design, caused by failures in 
anticipating operational disruptions. Three groups of factors are combined in airline 
systems designs: technology, people and formal frameworks, while their undisrupted, 
‘model’ functioning is described as “baseline performance”. System designs consider 
“practical drifts” to take place as a consequence of limitations to operational 
performance of technology, people, or formal frameworks constituting the systems. 
Snook (2000) argues that despite the occurrence of practical drifts, people operating the 
systems are able to control the practical drifts by introducing punctual adaptations to the 
systems. The closer to the beginning of a “practical drift” from baseline system 
performance, the higher is the human potential to capture and analyse information on 
operational hazards and disruptions, and the easier it is to introduce adaptations in the 
systems and thus control and mitigate safety risks.  
 
The two preceding approaches recognise the relevance of human performance in 
causation and prevention of airline safety accidents. Human performance in safety 
assurance systems can be further analysed within a context of multiple interrelated 
components of such systems by use of a SHELL model (Hawkins, 1993). The model 
conceptualises the relationships between humans and other multiple, interrelated 
components of complex system such as the aviation system; the model considers 
interactions of humans (liveware) with software, hardware, and environment. When 
visualized within an aviation system, the model conveys the interactions between all 
system components need to be considered in order to optimise safety assurance, and that 
a mismatch between liveware and other system components contributes to human 
errors.    
 
Apart from stressing the role of human factors in accident causation in aviation systems, 
the importance of investigating safety incidents apart from safety accidents is often 
emphasised by scholars. Under the common cause hypothesis the pathways leading to 
incidents and accidents have a lot in common, and only minor alterations in the 
common factors influence the classification of the occurrences as incidents or accidents. 
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Therefore, investigation of pathways leading to the occurrence of incidents can result in 
generation of countermeasures preventing the occurrence of accidents (Heinrich, 1931).  
Similarly, Dekker and Hollnagel (1999) argued that incident analysis resulting in 
detection of breaches in safety barriers, which indicate vulnerability of safety systems, 
can prevent occurrence of accidents under the common cause hypothesis.   
     
Safety Management System 
Airline industry regulators and associations have been strongly advocating the use of 
the System Safety concept in managing a broad range of safety risks. The importance of 
managing safety risks was highlighted by the implementation of Safety Management 
Systems (SMS) in aviation service providers, which was mandated by ICAO; SMS can 
be defined as “a systematic approach to managing safety, including the necessary 
organisational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures” (ICAO, 2013, p. 
xii). The ICAO’s SMS framework consists of four main components and twelve 
elements presented as follows in the table 2-1.  
 
Table 2-1: ICAO’s Safety Management System Framework  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from ICAO, 2013, p. 5-2) 
 
Management commitment and responsibility
Safety accountabilities
Appointment of key safety personnel
Coordination of emergency response planning
SMS documentation
Hazard identification
Safety risk assessment and mitigation
Safety performance monitoring and 
measurement
The management of change
Continuous improvement of the SMS
Training and education
Safety communication.
Safety Management System
Safety Policy 
and Objectives
Safety Risk 
Management
Safety 
Assurance
Safety 
Promotion
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Air navigation service providers are obliged to establish formal risk management 
structures within the SMS framework, which should integrate safety management 
initiatives conducted across different organisational departments related to flight safety. 
The structures should assure systematic assessment of the organisation’s safety-related 
risks, establish risk mitigation measures, and define intra-organisational authorities to 
decide on tolerance levels for risks. These requirements, comprised within Eurocontrol 
Safety Regulatory Requirements (ESARR), were transposed by the European 
Commission into the Community law. Airlines are advised to complement the SMS 
framework with related safety risk governance models; for example, Systemic 
Occurrence Analysis Methodology (SOAM) is advocated by Eurocontrol for analysis of 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) occurrences.  
 
2.3.2 Trends and new directions in research and practice of airline risk 
management  
The previous section demonstrated how the business environment and unique risk 
profile of airlines condition organisational risk management structures and practices, 
among which the management of safety, hazard, and financial exposures is dedicated 
particular attention. As risk management, especially in the aforementioned areas, is at 
the core of airline competences, the academic literature exploring issues related to 
management of key airline exposures is extensive.  
 
Academic research conducted over the last two decades in the field of air transportation 
can be broadly categorised into several main themes such as airline management, 
airports and infrastructure, passengers demand and price elasticity, changes and 
influences of regulatory frameworks, environmental issues including CO2 and fuel 
emissions as well as acoustic pollution, network planning, alliances between airlines, 
cost bases of airline operations, financial performance of airlines, air transport safety, 
and parameterisation of  the industry (Ginieis et al., 2012). Among these popular study 
areas, within the categories of airline management and safety, extensive research was 
conducted regarding airline risk management practice. The figure below summarises the 
main streams of scholars’ interest related to the practice of risk management in airlines; 
the summary is illustrative rather than exhaustive and any more detailed review of 
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academic research conducted in these areas is considered beyond the interest of this 
study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Research trends in airline risk management  
(Developed by the author) 
 
Previous research on airline risk management systems was often conducted in thematic 
silos, focusing on selected dimensions of airlines’ risk profiles. There has been little 
work offering comprehensive assessments of airline risk management structures and 
practices. The most commonly studied dimensions of airline risk management practice, 
namely the management of, broadly defined, safety, financial, and operational risks, 
reflect the key focus areas of airlines’ risk management efforts (Zea, 2004; Otero, 
2006). As discussed in the preceding section, airline business environment and, in 
particular, the requirements of the regulatory frameworks have a strong impact on the 
designs of airline risk management systems. However, focusing on compliance with 
laws and regulations, or the risk management programmes´ consideration of, for the 
most part, the risks which are the easiest to identify and assess,  offers an incomplete 
form of assurance (Watchtower Risk Consulting, 2010; Abrams et al., 2006).  
 
Risk 
management 
research in 
the airline 
industry 
Financial 
and market 
risk 
management
Operational 
risk 
management 
Reputation 
risk 
management 
Strategic 
risk 
management 
Airline 
insurance
Safety and 
hazard risk 
management
34 
 
Recent research suggests that the most relevant challenges facing airlines, underpinning 
their persistently poor profitability over the last decade (Pearce, 2012), are related 
mainly to inefficiently designed regulation, poor industry structure, dynamics in the 
airline supplier markets, commoditisation of the airline product, and inconsistent 
strategy choices (IATA, 2011, 2013). Government policies are believed to have limited 
exit from airline business and hindered effective competition in the industry, while the 
overly-fragmented industry competes mainly on price (IATA, 2011). The importance of 
considering external and strategic risks has been emphasised in prior studies (e.g. 
Beasley et al., 2005; Power, 2004; Lam, 2006; D'Arcy and Brogan, 2001). Similar calls 
are articulated by industry practitioners (e.g. Bisignani, 2011; Zea, 2004; CAS, 2003; 
Berley, 2006); by way of an example, conclusions from the study of Zea (2004) 
attribute the losses of shareholder value in the airline industry primarily to strategic and 
financial risks, rather than to operational and hazard risks which, as claimed in the 
study, are at the core of airline risk management programmes; research of Barely (2006) 
suggests that 65% of factors driving declines of market capitalisation of organisations 
are strategy related, while 35% of factors are related to operational and financial risks. 
IATA’s reports of airline safety records may suggest that in the era of sophisticated 
organisational systems and advanced technologies which have significantly improved 
safety of air travel, airlines should adopt a more forward-looking perspective on 
identification and management of relevant strategic risks, apart from focusing on the 
historically relevant safety and operational exposures. Air travel has become 
significantly safer over the last two decades, with a worldwide average aircraft accident 
risk of 0,00004% for every flight taken (data from 2006), compared to 0,0002% in 1986 
(IATA, 2011). The year 2011 was the safest year ever for air transport (IATA, 2012). 
Similarly, security of air travel has improved over the last 40 years, to the point where 
the probability of participating in a flight subject to an ‘act of unlawful interference’ is 
less than 0,0001%, compared to 0,001% in the 1970s (IATA, 2011).  
 
Over and above the studies conveying the relevance of external and broadly defined 
strategic risks for the airline industry, previous research of strategic management in 
airlines, and implicitly the management of strategic risks by airlines, is extensive, while 
further discussion of them is beyond the interest of this study. However, little is known 
specifically regarding the governance structures and processes institutionalised in 
airlines specifically for identification and management of strategic exposures.  
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Towards development of enterprise-wide risk management systems in airlines  
Airlines have embarked on the journey towards adopting increasingly more 
comprehensive perspectives to managing enterprise-wide risks (Yimlaz, 2008a, 2008b, 
2008c). The following figure 2-4 illustrates the transition of airline risk management 
practices conducted in functional silos, toward an integrated, enterprise-wide risk 
management approach.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Evolution of airline risk management approaches 
(Developed by the author) 
 
Only scarce data is available in scholarly articles on the embedding of ERM principles 
in airline risk management structures and practices, empirically investigating the 
adoption and implementation of ERM and their driving forces, as well as 
accomplishments and challenges related to the implementation of ERM. The ERM 
concept is relatively new to non-financial industries, which were dedicated less 
attention in ERM research (Woods, 2011; Arena et al., 2010), thus it was no surprise to 
discover that the studies incorporating the notion of ERM related to the airline industry 
span over a relatively narrow time horizon of ten years. Although the vast majority of 
academic and industry publications regarding ERM in airlines has been conducted 
throughout the last decade, researchers of the airline industry laid the groundwork long 
before for a gradual development of this concept by anticipating the direction of future 
advancements of risk management practices. By way of an example, Davidson et al. 
(1987) investigated the impact of large losses related to airline accidents on the value of 
airlines; the study concluded that insurance policies cannot fully cover the large losses, 
and so the uncovered losses affected the enterprise value negatively; the scholars 
advocated the need to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the management of 
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airline risks, beyond merely purchasing insurance. By way of another example, Moss 
(1992) recognised the much needed change in risk managers’ roles in commercial 
aviation organisations; the scholar argued that they should consider an ever broader 
spectrum of risks and prepare airlines for organisational crises while simultaneously 
balancing their related costs. Moss additionally highlighted the significant costs of some 
of the risks facing aviation, if they should occur, highlighting the importance of 
preventing even minor safety accidents.  
 
Judgements of the adoption and implementation of ERM in airlines need to be made 
with caution, as little academic research exists in this regard, especially in terms of 
studies based on empirical evidence, and data in this area is supplied mainly by industry 
publications. The on-going transition towards enterprise-wide risk management in 
airlines was reflected in the survey commissioned in 2006 by the magazine ‘Airline 
Business’ and the insurance broker AON. The survey involved 51 airlines accounting 
for 41% of the world's top 200 airlines by total revenue. Two-thirds of the airlines 
participating in the survey reported having organisation-wide risk management 
strategies in place which considered strategic risks; average longevity of such strategies 
was two and a half years at that time. The survey revealed a positive trend in assigning 
ultimate responsibility for risk management to upper management levels, with 75% of 
the airlines imputing the responsibility at the boardroom level, and with the CEOs 
deciding on strategies for management of the most relevant risks in 45% of the 
participating airlines (Jenner, 2007). However, the survey failed to investigate the 
institutionalisation of ERM principles in airline risk management routines; thus, it 
cannot be concluded if the adoption of ERM claimed by survey participants was 
performance-driven and led to significant changes in risk management structures and 
practices of their respective organisations, or if the adoption was ceremonial, driven by 
external legitimisation demands, and if loose coupling existed between stated risk 
management objectives and actual work practices.  
 
A review of public data issued by airlines in annual reports, on corporate web-sites, or 
through other forms of external communications, suggests their interest in adopting 
comprehensive perspectives to risk management. Many airlines declare having 
implemented ERM (for example Air France, KLM, Air Canada, Malaysia Airlines, Air 
Mauritius, and many others), often providing descriptions of their risk management 
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governance structures and processes. However, just as in case of the above cited survey, 
assessing the level of institutionalisation of ERM principles in airlines’ risk 
management routines based on publicly available data is problematic; prior to empirical, 
contextualised examination of airlines’  risk management structures and practices, the 
maturity and functionality of ERM cannot be credibly determined. Limiting identifiers 
of ERM to a few simple proxies of implementation reported in public data ignores the 
complexities of ERM; a few imprecise identifiers are insufficient to represent the 
integral constructs of ERM.  For example, reporting on the existence of the position of 
Chief Risk Officer in airlines may imply the use of corporate resources for adopting a 
comprehensive view of risks, yet it does not entail the organisation followed through 
with implementation of all ERM principles (Beasley et al., 2008). Contrarily, 
organisations can assign the typical responsibilities of the CRO to other senior officers 
(COSO, 2004). Thus, caution must be exercised in concluding on the adoption and 
implementation of ERM in airlines based on uncontextualised empirical data.  
 
The body of academic literature does not provide sufficient evidence regarding drivers 
of the adoption and/or implementation of ERM in airlines. The influence of professional 
airline industry organisations may be a factor at play, as they recommend extending the 
focus of risk management practices beyond the operational aspects of airline 
management, and adopting an enterprise-wide approach to managing risks (Salter, 
2008). IATA is a good example of a potential normative influence on adoption of the 
ERM approach; as an advocate of best practices for the airline industry, IATA issued 
the “Integrated Risk Management Guidance Handbook”, providing airlines with advice 
on integrating their siloed risk management practices (IATA, n.d.). Similarly, ICAO 
(2013) recommends integrating risk management processes conducted within multiple 
airline management systems such as SMS, QMS, EMS, FMS, OSHSMS, and SMS, into 
an overreaching enterprise management system, while arguing “if the SMS were to 
operate in isolation of these other management systems, there may be a tendency to 
focus solely on safety risks without understanding the nature of quality, security or 
environmental threats to the organization” (pp. 2-16). An analysis of the transition 
stories of airlines which had embarked on the ERM journey, shared by airlines’ 
representatives in industry publications, suggests that airlines perceive the ERM 
approach as helpful in achieving various company objectives, especially while the 
industry undergoes painful changes and faces ever more complex challenges (see 
38 
 
Nomura, 2003; Penzner, 2006; Geisel, 2008; Nyce, 2002). Furthermore, the concept of 
ERM was initiated in the financial industry and gradually spread to other industries 
(Fraser and Simkins, 2010); thus, ERM adoption in the airline industry might have been 
caused by imitating best practices of other companies, or through recommendations 
made by advisory companies, which proved to be the case in other industries (see 
Jabbour, 2013).  
 
As discussed in section 2.5.4 of this chapter, scholars argued the need to adapt the 
provisions of the landmark ERM framework and risk management standards such as 
COSO (2004) or ISO 31000 (2009) to industry-specific business contexts (e.g. Arena et 
al., 2010; Paape and Spakle, 2012; Kaplan and Mikes, 2014). Following this rationale, 
and considering the demanding risk management profile of commercial aviation 
unmatched by other industries for its volatility and technical nature (Watchtower Risk 
Consulting, 2010), scholars, industry associations, and advisory companies have 
embarked on the idea of developing guidelines for airlines on conducting 
comprehensive and integrated risk management practices (see IATA, n.d.; Protiviti, 
2008; Mercer Oliver Wyman in Zea, 2004). Despite growing interest in ERM and a 
recognition of the need to develop effective risk management systems matching the 
complex and dynamic nature of airline businesses (Adler and Gellman, 2012; Nicolau 
and Santa-Maria, 2012; Niemeier and Tretheway, 2012; Mikosz, S., 2011), little 
academic work has been developed to date exploring the business environment of 
airlines and proposing ERM solutions adapted to the context of this industry.  
 
Implementation of more comprehensive risk management approaches is advocated by 
scholars in the field (e.g. Adler and Gellman, 2012; Nicolau and Santa-Maria, 2012; 
Niemeier and Tretheway, 2012; see section 1.3 of Chapter 1), with the focus directed at 
implementing ERM in particular (Yilmaz 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Flouris and Yilmaz, 
2010a, 2010b, 2010c). The scholars argue that implementation of ERM, which implies a 
more effective management of organisational threats and opportunities, could prevent 
further erosion of shareholder value in the airline industry (IATA, 2013; Wojahn, 2012), 
and improve investor returns by facilitating the achievement of organisational 
objectives. Yilmaz (2008c) proposed a model for integrating the concepts of ERM and 
corporate sustainability in airlines. Although the model conveys an interesting notion of 
conducting enterprise-wide risk management practices in airlines in a sustainable 
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manner, it requires further elaboration. The components and functioning of the model 
are vaguely articulated. Yilmaz (2008c) claims the model is “the best and effective 
way” for organisations to achieve corporate sustainability objectives and enlists a 
variety of management processes that the model should enable or support; however, the 
scholar did not provide convincing argumentation of how the proclaimed benefits can 
be achieved by airlines through application of the model. Similar critique applies to the 
‘Enterprise Sustainability Risk Management Model’ developed by Flouris and Yilmaz 
(2010c, p. 6) in order to, as claimed by the scholars, assist airlines in incorporating 
“environmental, social, and economic considerations into business decision-making, 
actions, and performance”. The alleged benefits of the model are scarcely justified, and 
both components and functioning of the model are vaguely discussed. Additionally, the 
scholars claim the model can serve as a tool, yet fail to provide guidance on its 
operationalisation.  
 
2.4 Adoption and implementation of ERM and their driving forces 
Considering the research questions stated for this study, the main areas of interest lie in 
exploring the structures and practices of airline risk management systems and their 
determinants, among which the adoption, implementation, and drivers of ERM should 
receive particular attention. As argued in the preceding section, research of airline risk 
management systems concentrates on selected, siloed dimensions of the risk 
management practice; little research is available offering multi-dimensional assessments 
of airline risk governance structures and practices, especially in the context of ERM. 
The existing research links airline risk management structures and practices to the 
requirement of airline operating environments and airlines’ risk profiles; however, 
literature lacks studies of the determinants of airline risk management systems 
specifically in terms of adoption and implementation of ERM. Therefore, in order to 
understand organisational coupling of ERM and the driving forces for ERM adoption 
and implementation, the following review additionally evaluates relevant studies 
conducted in the context of other industries. 
 
2.4.1 Drivers of ERM adoption and implementation  
Evolution of the risk management discipline discussed in the introductory chapter 
(section 1.2) signalled the wave of corporate scandals and economic crises of recent 
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decades as the cause for the growing interest of regulators, and later risk management 
practitioners, in developing more effective risk management approaches (Baranoff, 
2004). As the concept of ERM gained prominence, first in the financial industry (Mikes, 
2005) and later through a spill-over effect across non-financial industries, scholars have 
analysed a multiplicity of driving forces of both the institutional and technical nature 
behind ERM adoption and implementation.  
 
Increasing requirements of corporate governance were identified as motivators for 
advancements in risk management and internal control practices. NYSE Corporate 
Governance Rules, the UK’s Combined Code on Corporate Governance, or the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act in the USA are examples of regulatory requirements introduced 
internationally and exerting pressures on organisations for improved corporate 
governance (Financial Reporting Council, 2010). Regulatory requirements imposed 
responsibility on boards to provide sound and broad-in-scope risk management 
programmes, in addition to reliable financial reporting (Collier et al., 2006). Regulatory 
pressures were recognised as drivers of ERM adoption in the empirical studies of 
Kleffner et al. (2003) or Cowherd and Manson (2003); furthermore, according to 
Pagach and Warr (2011), regulated industries were indicated to be at the forefront of 
ERM adoption. Subsequently, the corporate governance best practice codes have been 
adopted in industries regardless of the intensity of regulations (Woods, 2011). Rating 
agencies such as Moody’s or Standard & Poor’s demonstrated interest in ERM and 
included risk management-related criteria in their rating methodologies. Relevance of 
agency ratings was empirically demonstrated to drive ERM adoption (Hoyt and 
Liebenberg, 2011).  
 
Popularisation of risk management frameworks and standards such as COSO (2004) 
was demonstrated to influence organisational perception of risk and configuration of 
risk management programmes (Beasley et al., 2005). Diffusion of ERM models was 
fostered though consulting companies advocating implementation of the recognised 
international standards or risk management programmes developed in-house (Beasley et 
al., 2005). Scholars debated the issue of ceremonial adoption of ERM, pointing to the 
importance of demonstrating legitimacy to shareholders, which was argued to drive 
adoption of ERM (Mikes, 2009). Shareholders pose demands on organisations for sound 
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corporate governance systems and communication of risk management initiatives 
(Nielson et al., 2005).   
 
Adoption and implementation of ERM were associated with the influence of risk 
specialists within organisations who, due to their professional and educational 
backgrounds, would contribute to the advancement of risk management systems 
(Colquitt et al., 1999; Mikes, 2009). The influence of Boards and executive directors 
was demonstrated to affect the development of ERM in organisations. Through official 
endorsements of the risk management function Boards and top management foster 
organisation-wide development of positive risk cultures (Altuntas et al., 2011). The 
presence of dedicated risk functions at executive levels in organisations, such as Chief 
Risk Officer and its equivalents, or cross-disciplinary risk management committees, 
were argued to be associated with the embedding of ERM in organisations (Walker et 
al., 2003). Scholars investigated the relationship between adoption of ERM and 
organisational sizes and complexities, concluding on the propensity of large 
organisations to adopt more structured and systematic risk management approaches 
such as ERM (Pagach and Warr, 2011; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011).   
 
2.4.2 ERM implementation  
Selected ERM frameworks and risk management standards such as COSO (2004) or 
ISO (31000) have gained international acceptance and have been applied across 
multiple industries in pursuit of improved governance and greater managerial efficiency 
and as means for communicating sound risk governance to various stakeholder groups 
(Power, 2009). Academic researchers discussed the potential benefits that 
implementation of ERM frameworks may bring to organisations such as reduced 
earnings and stock price volatility, increased capital efficiency, improved, risk-based 
decision making, increased firm value, or recognition among important external 
stakeholder groups (e.g. Hoytt and Liebenberg, 2011; Cumming and Hirtle, 2001; 
Meulbroek, 2002). However, it is believed that ERM brings value to organisations only 
if embedded correctly in organisational business processes; ERM needs to be adapted to 
the requirements of business contexts in order to drive benefits for organisations 
(Power, 2009).  
 
42 
 
The process of ERM implementation was summarised by Hampton (2009) in six major 
steps as presented in figure 2-3. Hampton advocated the need to assign responsibilities 
and accountabilities for risk management processes across organisational hierarchies, 
establish dedicated risk units for coordination and integration of enterprise-wide risk 
management efforts, and define procedures and tools facilitating performance of the risk 
management function at different levels in organisations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Implementation of ERM  
(Adapted from Hampton, 2009,  p. 73) 
 
The following section reflects on the propositions and characteristics of selected 
prominent and internationally recognised ERM frameworks and standards, and argues 
the need to implement their provisions with sensitivity to contextual requirements, 
which should inevitably result in systematic variations of ERM configurations. 
Although the various ERM frameworks and risk management standards normatively 
define elements for the implementation of risk management systems in organisations, 
risk management functions may retain a narrow, technical focus, or alternatively 
become of strategic importance, depending on how well the provisions of the risk 
management frameworks and standards are coupled with organisational realities (Arena 
et al., 2010).  
 
ERM was argued to serve as an umbrella for diverse configurations of organisational 
risk management practices (Power, 2007). Although ERM frameworks and risk 
management standards are often based on common principles and propose the 
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development of similar structural components for performance of the risk management 
function in organisations (Woods, 2011), empirical research demonstrated how ERM 
implementation is contingent upon the requirements of internal and external 
environments of organisations, and the logics of organisational actors involved in risk 
management processes (Mikes, 2009). Collier et al. (2006) discussed similarities among 
basic structures of ERM systems implemented in different organisations; however, the 
scholar argued that risk management at the operational level is contingent upon factors 
stemming both from intra- and extra-organisational environments. These findings were 
confirmed by Woods (2009, 2011) and Mikes (2005, 2009), who provided field-based 
evidence of systematic variations in ERM practices of different organisations, and co-
existence of alternative models of ERM contingent upon varying organisational 
contexts. In line with this notion, Gordon et al. (2009) argued that the relation between 
ERM and firm performance is dependent on the coupling between ERM and 
organisational internal and external contexts; the scholar suggested that implementation 
of ERM frameworks should be conducted in consideration of several contextual factors 
relevant to organisations, with special consideration of environmental uncertainty, 
competition within the industry, organisation size and complexity, and monitoring 
performed by board of directors.  
 
There is a general debate in literature regarding organisational motives for adoption and 
implementation of ERM. Empirical research conducted in a variety of industries lent 
evidence for both legitimacy drivers leading to ceremonial implementations of ERM, 
and ERM adoption in pursuit of direct economic benefits. By way of an example, 
Pagach and Warr (2011) attributed ERM adoption decisions of organisations to their 
expectations of improved effectiveness and efficiency of organisational processes. 
Contrarily, Arena et al. (2011) provided evidence of ERM adoption being motivated by 
compliance with formal requirements of regulatory frameworks and expectations of 
external stakeholders. The diverse motives of ERM adoption in organisations condition 
the level of institutionalisation of ERM principles in organisational structures and 
processes (Bruce, 2005). Legitimacy-driven implementation of ERM may be focused on 
producing auditable trails of evidence signalling organisational interest in sound risk 
governance, which may be manifested through creating CRO positions or formalising 
risk management processes through issuance of internal documentation. Despite that, 
ERM may be poorly embedded in organisations (Arena et al., 2010). Contrarily, 
44 
 
performance-driven ERM systems, often characterised by their comprehensiveness, 
high level of embeddedness across organisational strategies, and integration of 
enterprise-wide risk management initiatives, may lack highly formalised structures or 
risk management positions typically associated with ERM (Woods, 2011).           
 
2.5 Overview of landmark ERM frameworks and risk management standards 
The objectives stated for this study call for development of recommendations guiding 
airlines in designing customised, enterprise-wide risk management systems. Therefore, 
it is necessary to learn about the latest developments in the risk management discipline. 
This section analyses the propositions of the most prominent ERM frameworks and risk 
management standards, demonstrating their common characteristics and arguing about 
the need to align their provisions to the unique contexts of particular industries. The 
findings from this review are later drawn upon in the discussion and development of 
recommendations for airlines, as presented in Chapter 8.  
 
The relevance of the enterprise-wide approach to managing risks has been globally 
recognised and has become a fast-growing field in the management science (see 
Chapter 1, section 1.2); there has been an increasing consciousness among industries of 
the need to conduct the risk management function in organisations in a structured 
manner (Zolkos, 2008). Consequently, numerous risk management frameworks and 
standards (and later ERM frameworks and standards) have been developed by 
academics (e.g. Lam 2003; Mikes, 2005; Beasley et al., 2005; Liebenberg and Hoyt 
2003;) and practitioners (e.g. CAS 2003; COSO 2003, 2004), providing valuable 
guidance on the principles of effective risk management approaches, and guiding 
organisations on how to manage risks in a structured and systematic manner. The risk 
management frameworks and standards were published by professional, guidance-
setting organisations from different backgrounds (financial, insurance, safety, 
government, environment, engineering fields etc.), or international standard bodies. 
Some of the frameworks and standards are recommended to organisations, others are 
legally implied in their respective countries (IMA, 2011). Depending on the background 
of the issuer organisation, the frameworks and standards adopt different approaches, and 
may lean towards different fields such as financial reporting, internal control, etc.; while 
some of the risk management frameworks and standards are problem-focused, 
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concentrating on selected aspects of management, others, denominated as ERM 
frameworks and standards, aspire to cover a wide range of different risks (Shortreed et 
al., 2003).   
 
There have been numerous risk management frameworks and standards delivered 
worldwide, including generic, problem-based or industry-focused frameworks and 
standards, which provide standardised principles and steps recommended for 
establishing effective risk management programmes. Out of the many risk management 
frameworks and standards developed over recent decades, a few - which have risen to 
prominence and are most commonly applied in organisations or recommended by 
governments and industry associations, have been chosen for analysis in this section. 
According to a global survey conducted by ISO in 2011 (ISO, 2011), the enterprise-
wide risk management standards most often drawn upon in organisations  were ISO 
31000, COSO ERM, and AS/NZS 4360 (mentioned in order of popularity); the 
AS/NZS4360 risk management standard was the world´s first national definition of 
standard procedures of risk management, developed first in 1995, then re-issued in 2004 
jointly by Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, and finally re-issued as 
AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 jointly with ISO. The researcher does not regard it useful nor 
feasible to review the multiplicity of the existing risk management standard and 
frameworks; therefore, this section presents the three selected and above mentioned, 
internationally recognised frameworks and mainstream risk management standards with 
an enterprise-wide scope, which have become models of reference for risk management 
best practices (Muralidhar, 2010; ISO, 2011), and is aimed at exploring their major 
provisions and overlapping approaches. This purposeful selection represents just a small 
sample of the risk management frameworks and standards published to date; hence, the 
purpose of their presentation in this section is to demonstrate their contribution to the 
body of knowledge in the risk management area, rather than to analyse the whole 
variance of the frameworks available. The chosen frameworks and standards for risk 
management are analysed from a general and comparative perspective - a detailed study 
of their practical aspects is purposely restrained by the researcher.  
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Components of ERM frameworks and risk management standards  
The ERM frameworks and risk management standards tend to be conceptually similar, 
although their structural representations vary, especially in terms of how their integral 
parts are defined and grouped. They provide guidance on the principles of effective risk 
management, advocating customised implementation of such principles in 
organisational structures and practises (see forthcoming section 2.5.4). With reference 
to the definition of ‘risk management systems’, initially provided in section 1.5 of 
Chapter 1 (and as defined in ISO 31000, 2009), which comprise risk management 
foundations and arrangements, the principles of effective risk management conveyed by 
the various ERM frameworks and risk management standards developed to date can be 
regarded as foundations of organisational risk management systems. The principles 
conveyed through the various ERM frameworks and risk management standards affect 
the hierarchies of organisational risk management objectives, which are further reflected 
in formal frameworks of policies and procedures regulating risk management 
arrangements in organisations. In other words, risk management foundations embracing 
principles of effective risk management affect the way in which organisations constitute 
the “arrangements of activities or processes that assist and inform decision-makers 
about the risks in question, the assessment of the risk, the views of stakeholders, 
possible treatments available and the likely risk reductions and residual risks that will 
result” (Shortreed et al., 2003, p. 25). Therefore, the various ERM frameworks and risk 
management standards facilitate both public and private organisations to put in place 
their own customised risk management systems (Woods, 2011); they provide 
organisations with recommendations regarding, among others, designing enterprise-
wide risk governance structures and risk management processes, developing positive 
risk cultures and formal frameworks of policies and procedures, or adopting adequate 
risk management tools and technological solutions. 
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Synthesis of the selected ERM frameworks and risk management standards of 
reference 
The following ERM frameworks and risk management standards (further referred to as 
“the framework/s” or “the standard/s”) are summarised in this section, according to their 
order of issuance (of the first edition):  
 Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management AS/NZS 4360  
 The COSO Integrated ERM Framework  
 ISO 31000 Standard  
The three selected frameworks and standards share several common characteristics: 
 The frameworks and standards do not target any specific industry, but rather they 
are applicable to a wide range of both private and public organisations across many 
economic sectors.  
 The frameworks and standards suppose the continuous nature of the risk 
management process. 
 The frameworks and standards specify the need to carefully determine the context 
of organisations´ operations, either through an analysis of general business 
environment or organisational strategies and objectives.  
 The frameworks and standards set out generic guidelines for designing risk 
management processes in organisations, and propose universal elements of risk 
management processes.  
 The frameworks and standards have a generic character; they are principle-based 
rather than prescriptive, while sharing an assumption that their provisions should be 
later adjusted to the varying business environments in which different organisations 
operate.  
 The frameworks and standards consider both negative and positive effects of risks, 
and assume both qualitative and quantitative methods of their assessment.  
 The frameworks and standards emphasise the importance of integrating the risk 
management function within the organisation’s culture, core strategies, and 
processes. 
 The frameworks and standards stipulate that risk management processes should be 
conducted consistently across different business units and at all organisational 
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levels, and that open communication of risks across organisational structures is 
essential.   
 
2.5.1 Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management AS/NZS 4360  
The Australian and New Zealand Standard for Risk Management (AS/NZS 4360) was 
first issued in 1995 jointly by Standards Australia and Standards New Zealand, major 
non-government standards organisations in their respective countries; the standard was 
further revised in 1999 (second edition), 2004 (third edition), and 2009 (re-issued 
jointly with ISO as AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009). The AS/NZS 4360 standard provides 
generic, conceptual guidance on the risk management process, without focusing on any 
specific industry or economic sector, and states that the final configuration of the risk 
management function should be shaped by the varying needs of different organisations. 
Unlike in other standards and frameworks issued subsequently (e.g. ISO 31000, to be 
discussed below), general principles for risk management were not presented in the 
standard. The following figure 2-6 presents the seven components of the AS/NZS 4360 
Standard along the risk management process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Risk management process - AS/NZS 4360 
(Adapted from AS/NZS 4360, 2004)  
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The risk management process needs to be conducted within the context of the 
organisation’s goals, and taking into consideration the objectives of the organisation’s 
stakeholders. An analysis of the operating environment (context) of an organisation 
facilitates defining parameters for risk identification and management. The analysis of 
the context for the risk management process constituted an innovation in the risk 
management discipline when the standard was first issued (Fraser and Simkins, 2010). 
A thorough portfolio of risks needs to be created, with a special focus on the scenarios 
which may have major effects on core strategies of an organisation. Following the 
analysis of the context and identification of risks, the next step in the proposed process 
consists of examining the identified risks and determining their significance. Risks are 
analysed in terms of possible likelihood and impact they may have on achievement of 
organisational aims and objectives. In the following stage, risks are evaluated and 
divided into acceptable and unacceptable risks, which should later be either monitored 
or treated respectively. Risk treatment involves determining response strategies to the 
risks deemed unacceptable. Treatment strategies may be aimed at avoiding risks by 
ceasing the activities generating particular risks, or reducing the likelihood or impact of 
potential events. Progress in the treatment of risks should be monitored on a continuous 
basis, and the overall portfolio of risks needs to be reviewed regularly. The risk 
management process should be applied across all organisational levels, from specific 
projects to assisting with specific decisions.  
 
The AS/NZS 4360 standard served as a basis for other countries to develop standards 
relevant to their respective contexts, and also laid the groundwork for the development 
of an international ISO 31000 standard in 2009. Following publication of ISO 31000, 
the issuing organisations of AS/NZS 4360 officially adopted the international standard, 
and released Australian/New Zealand Standard Risk Management Principles and 
Guidelines AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009.  
 
2.5.2 COSO Enterprise Risk Management – Integrated Framework 
Numerous normative models outline the principles of ERM, while the COSO ERM 
framework, published in 2004 by the Committee of Sponsoring Organisations of the 
Treadway Commission, is believed to have become a global template for risk 
management best practices (Power, 2007; The Institute of Internal Auditors Research 
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Foundation, 2008; Tekathen, 2013; Beasley et al., 2010; Muralidhar, 2010). COSO was 
created under the sponsorship of several US-based professional accounting 
organisations in order to explore issues related to corporate financial reporting. The 
organisation further developed to cover other aspects of corporate management ethics 
and corporate governance, including internal control issues. The COSO Internal Control 
Framework eventually became an industry benchmark, and it was cited in the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 as a recommended scheme for public companies to maintain systems 
of internal control (Charette, 2010). Consequently, voices from the industry argued it 
would be beneficial for organisations to expand their risk management activities beyond 
financial control, including a wider range of business risks. Hence, the COSO’s 
Enterprise Risk Management - Integrated Framework was developed on the basis of the 
previously published Internal Control – Integrated Framework document. The ERM 
Integrated Framework by COSO expands on internal control issues, providing a broader 
perspective on the ERM-related subjects; the internal control framework is considered 
as part of a broader “enterprise risk management” framework. The ERM framework 
aspires to both satisfy the needs for internal control in organisations and advise them on 
implementing solutions for a more comprehensive and effective risk management 
process. The framework is additionally complemented with a document, denominated 
“Application Techniques”, providing advice for implementation of the principles of the 
framework in organisations.  
 
The COSO´s ERM Integrated Framework is based on a premise of maximisation of 
enterprise value through balancing the objectives of organisational strategies and their 
associated risks (COSO, 2004). The framework aligns organisational objectives and risk 
management components in a three-dimensional matrix, in the form of a cube (see 
Figure 2-2). The vertical columns represent four different levels of organisational 
objectives. “Strategic” objectives are associated with the organisation’s mission and 
vision. Objectives at the “operations” level are aligned with decisions on deployment of 
resources. “Reporting” objectives aspire to establish reliable reporting practices, while 
objectives from the “compliance” level refer to conformity of business practices with 
laws and regulations. The horizontal rows demonstrate the ERM process, and the third 
dimension – highlights the various levels of organisational units.   
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Figure 2-7: COSO`s Enterprise Risk Management Integrated Framework 
(Source: COSO, 2004) 
 
The proposed ERM process is comprised of eight components. “Internal environment” 
sets the context for risk perception within an organisation and determines its risk 
appetite. In the stage of “Objective setting” risk management objectives are articulated 
in consistency with the organisation’s mission and the previously defined risk appetite. 
“Event identification” leads to a delivery of the events that, if they occur, can have an 
impact on whether the organisation achieves its objectives or not. “Risk assessment” 
consists of analysing the level of risk likelihood and the possible impact of risks on the 
achievement of organisational objectives. “Risk responses” are elaborated based on the 
previous assessment of risks, recognising the organisation’s risk appetite and risk 
tolerances. The “Control activities” stage leads to the establishment of policies and 
procedures to ensure proper execution of risk responses. The “Information and 
communication” stage refers to capturing and sharing relevant, risk-related information 
across an organisation. “Monitoring” allows for evaluating the effectiveness of the risk 
management process, and modifying the process if needed.    
 
The COSO ERM Integrated Framework became a widely recognised benchmark for 
risk management schemes in organisations. While government regulators have not 
entirely embraced the framework as a standard, corporate credit rating agencies 
(Moody’s Investors Service, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch Ratings,) are gradually 
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acknowledging its importance by evaluating organisations’ ERM practices as a part of 
their ratings (Charette, 2010).  
 
2.5.3 ISO 31000 Standard 
Although the COSO ERM Integrated Framework has gained recognition on the 
international stage, a more recent risk management standard - ISO 31000, was delivered 
in 2009 by the International Organisation for Standardisation (a world famous developer 
of international standards). Although other ISO standards are certifiable, the ISO 31000 
cannot be used for certification, yet it does provide useful guidance on effective risk 
management practices. The standard is claimed to be universally applicable, and is also 
regarded as an important benchmark for enterprise risk management best practices 
(Fraser and Simkins, 2010; IRM, 2010) 
 
The ISO 31000 standard builds on developments from other recognised risk 
management and ERM frameworks and standards – the COSO’s ERM Integrated 
Framework, the Project Risk Management Framework, the Australian and New Zealand 
Standards (AS/NZS 4360:2004), and other renowned risk management standards and 
frameworks. The ISO 31000 Framework is presented in the following documents:   
 ISO 31000: Principles and Guidelines. 
 IEC 31010: Risk Management - Risk Assessment Techniques. 
 ISO/IEC 73: Risk Management – Vocabulary. 
The ISO 31000 standard has three integral components: risk management principles, 
risk management framework, and risk management process. The risk management 
principles (component 1) guide creation of the risk management framework (component 
2), which is employed in organisations through implementing the risk management 
process (component 3). The relation between the three components of the ISO 31000 
standard is summarised in figure 2-8.   
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Figure 2-8: Relation between the components of the ISO 31000 standard 
(Adapted from ISO 31000, 2009) 
 
The ISO 31000 standard has a descriptive, principle-based character rather than a 
prescriptive one. The following eleven principles proposed by ISO 31000 stipulate that 
the risk management frameworks in organisations should: 
 Create value for organisations. 
 Form an integral part of organisational processes. 
 Form part of decision-making processes, through an analysis of potential risks / 
rewards. 
 Explicitly address uncertainty.   
 Be systematic, structured and timely, while generating verifiable outcomes.  
 Be based on the best available information that an organisation is able to gather 
from a variety of external and internal sources.  
 Be tailored to the organisation, its objectives, capabilities, and business 
environment in general.   
 Consider human and cultural factors.  
 Be transparent and inclusive through continuous communication with both external 
and internal stakeholders.  
 Have a dynamic and iterative nature - undergoing a continuous process of 
improvement. 
 Lead to continual improvement of organisational processes. 
 
The above mentioned principles convey that the risk management framework in 
organisations should be determined by organisational needs, and thus the ISO 31000 
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standard can be adapted to meet the needs of organisations of different types and sizes. 
The framework outlines the following interrelated steps required to establish a risk 
management system in an organisation: 
 Mandate and commitment.  
 Design of framework for managing risks. 
 Implementing risk management. 
 Monitoring and review of the framework. 
 Continual improvement of the framework. 
Under the ISO 31000 standard, the proposed risk management framework should serve 
as a means of support for the risk management process. Alignment of enterprise-wide 
risk management processes with other processes and structures is an underlying 
principle of the framework (principles 2 and 3). The proposed risk management process 
is comprised of the following five interrelated stages and constitutes the essential 
element of the ISO framework: (1) establish context, (2) risk assessment, (3) treat risks, 
(4) monitor and review, and (5) communicate and consult. The flow of the risk 
management process proposed by the ISO 31000 standard follows a similar structure as 
presented in other frameworks, which the ISO framework is based on. The stages of the 
risk management process are interconnected and form a cycle, reflecting the 
recommended continuum of risk management efforts. Organisations should first analyse 
the internal and external context of their operations in order to identify and assess 
relevant risk factors. Risk criteria are elaborated on the basis of strategic and operational 
objectives, and serve to verify tolerability of risks in deciding whether to pursue an 
opportunity or act upon a threat. Risk criteria allow for properly evaluating risk factors 
and assigning adequate responses. The overall process needs to be monitored and 
reviewed on a continuous basis. Additionally, the organisation´s internal and external 
stakeholders should regularly be informed of risk management issues, so that they can 
ensure that both the personnel accountable for risk management in an organisation and 
external stakeholders understand the basis for particular management decisions, and to 
ensure compliance with legal disclosure requirements (ISO, 2009). Any decision in an 
organisation should be considered for its associated risks (uncertainties) and their 
possible impact on the objectives of an organisation; there may be multiple risk 
management processes taking place in an organisation at any given time. The 
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framework, therefore, should improve the decision maker´s comprehension of the 
effects that risks (uncertainties) may have on organisational objectives. As stated in 
principle 2, the risk management process should be integrated within other 
organisational business processes. It might be beneficial to consider it “embedded” 
within other processes, rather than as a separate activity linked with other processes. 
 
2.5.4 Alignment of ERM frameworks and risk management standards to 
organisational contexts 
ERM frameworks and risk management standards, the “universal, hierarchical models” 
of enterprise-wide risk management (Arena et al., 2010, p. 661), despite being globally 
legitimised have been broadly criticised by scholars for taking a simplistic view of 
organisations and their risks (Power, 2007), failing to consider fluidity of the ERM 
concept and the extent to which it is coupled with managerial and control processes 
specific to organisations (Arena, 2010; Miller et al. 2008), or for ignoring socio-political 
dimensions of the processes of identifying and analysing risks (Williamson, 2007). 
Arena et al. (2010) argued these models tend to conceptualise ERM in regulatory terms, 
yet they are disassociated from organisational realities and fail to consider specificity of 
organisations. Power (2009) in his critique of the COSO framework (2004) additionally 
raised the notion of a problematic proposition by COSO of a singular organisational risk 
appetite, complicity of ERM lying in the significance of ‘logics of auditability’, and  
framework’s inability to comprehend critical risks.  
 
Critics of normative ERM models raised the concern that advertising the models as 
applicable to all organisations and risks inhibits organisations from matching 
frameworks’ provisions to their unique organisational circumstances. The most often 
referenced ERM frameworks and risk management standards, despite adopting a 
universal perspective and recommending alignment of their provisions with contextual 
peculiarities of different industries, may lean towards particular fields such as financial 
reporting or internal control, depending on the background of issuer organisations, 
suiting the needs of some industries more than others (Shortreed et al., 2003). The 
critics also convey that despite the existence of multiple risk management guidelines, 
the risk management discipline needs further development and exploration of newly 
emerging approaches aligned with organisational circumstances (Kaplan and Mikes, 
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2014). Finally, Mikes (2009, p. 33) appeals to risk management standard setters to 
“accommodate more subjective and exploratory risk management styles” in future 
attempts of ERM modelling and standardisation. 
 
Along with the aforementioned criticisms of the normative ERM models and risk 
management standards, the issuers of some of the models (e.g. COSO, IRM) also 
recognise the need to align ERM with the features of organisational contexts, such as 
organisational structure, culture, competitive environment, and others. COSO (2004) 
suggested a contingency perspective towards designing ERM systems, and thus 
acknowledged that the enactment of ERM should vary between organisations; this is 
exemplified by COSO’s guidance linking risk management to the objectives of 
organisational strategies and risk appetites which vary between organisations. Power 
(2009, p. 849) further recognised the dynamicity of ERM as proposed by COSO (2004), 
in that “the model is that of a thermostat which adjusts to changes in environment 
subject to pre-given target temperature”, contingent on the changes occurring in 
organisational environments. Organisational uniqueness is also periphrastically 
recognised in COSO (2004) in the lack of prescriptive implementation techniques in the 
framework; that is to say, the annex to the framework offers practical operational 
guidance on ERM implementation, yet remarks this should not be considered as 
universally applicable best practices.  
 
Industries are characterised by distinct business environments (Chenhall, 2003). A 
complex set of industry-specific exogenous factors and organisation-specific 
endogenous factors constitutes the background for both formulation and execution of 
corporate strategies at various levels, and for managing their related risks under 
organisations’ inclination towards risk taking; thus, risk profiles vary among 
organisations from different industries. This suggests the universal provisions of general 
ERM frameworks and risk management standards can be further tailored to better 
reflect the specific business environments of particular industries (Beasley et al., 2005; 
Moeller, 2007; Locklear, 2012). Similar propositions were advocated in previous 
studies specific to the risk management systems. Gordon et al. (2009), in his empirical 
study of ERM implementation in US-based organisations, argued that aligning ERM 
with contextual settings is beneficial to organisational performance. Kaplan and Mikes 
(2014), who based their research on longitudinal data from three organisations, 
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concluded on the need to adapt ERM implementation to the specificity of organisational 
contexts; they outlined a “minimum necessary contingency framework” for ERM. 
Woods (2009) advocated applicability of the contingency theory to designing an ERM 
framework for the public sector, whilst Paape and Spakle (2012) similarly suggested 
benefits of developing ERM approaches tailored to the needs of organisations from the 
public sector. Mikes (2009) attributed the variety in risk management routines of 
financial institutions to their differing cultures and needs.  
 
Similar conclusions were presented in the case studies conducted by Arena et al. (2010), 
who attributed cross-organisational differences in risk management routines to pre-
existing risk management logics stemming from organisation-specific business 
environments. Woods (2011) recognised similarities in risk management models of four 
large organisations, yet argued that the risk management routines of each of the 
investigated organisations were contingent upon their context-specific factors such as 
objectives, sizes, cultures, or business models. Woods advocated the need for sensitivity 
to organisational contexts in ERM implementation, and advised practitioners to refer to 
risk management standards and frameworks simply as a starting point for designing 
their respective risk management systems. Barton et al. (2001) compared ERM 
implementation in five organisations from different industries and concluded on the 
uniqueness of each of the adopted ERM perspectives resulting from contextual 
differences among industries; the researchers argued against the universality of ERM 
designs. The notion of aligning ERM to the specific features of organisational 
environment was further advocated by multiple theorists and practitioners of ERM (e.g. 
Beasley et al., 2005; Moeller, 2007). The above discussed arguments match the findings 
from studies of various management control systems (MCS); research in MCS provided 
evidence of the need to align organisational control systems to context-specific settings 
of particular organisations (e.g. Otley, 1980; Chenhall, 2003; Gerdin and Greve, 2008; 
Colquitt et al., 1999; Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; Evans et al., 1986; Luft and Shields, 
2003; Mouritsen, 1999). Therefore, this research adopts a multiple contingent approach 
as defined by  Gresov (1989) and recognises the need to tailor airline risk management 
systems simultaneously to multiple external and internal, and both technical and 
institutional pressures (see Chapter 3, section 3.3 for further information).  
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2.6 Limitations of literature 
Despite the growing interest of scholars and practitioners in improving the risk 
management practice of airlines, the discussion of relevant literature on this subject 
revealed a series of limitations in academic research. Firstly, the existing studies of 
airline risk management systems tend to tackle different dimensions of the risk 
management practice in an isolated manner, contributing to loci-research on risk 
management structures and practices in airlines, and marginally subscribing to the 
complex understanding of risk management in a comprehensive perspective. The 
available research on certain aspects of risk management in the airline industry is 
extensive, while other dimensions of risk management remain enigmatic. Risk 
management has been analysed in academic literature in different dimensions, such as 
hazard, safety, financial, operational, etc., and the researcher argues that a unified 
conceptualisation and understanding of these dimensions is needed, for their integration 
has been poorly assessed in subject literature.  
 
Secondly, although ERM is becoming a commonly accepted approach in airlines, its 
practical implementation remains under-researched. There is little research available 
that empirically investigates the embedding of ERM principles in airline risk 
management structures and practices, and the  accomplishments and challenges related 
to the implementation of ERM. Thirdly, the academic research investigating airline 
business environment, in addition to its influences on risk management approaches 
adopted in airlines, is broad. However, the driving forces of adoption and 
implementation of ERM in particular have been scarcely explored. Fourthly, although 
the ERM frameworks and standards commonly adopted across industries have been 
criticised for ignoring organisational specificity, and although scholars called for 
development of ERM guidance better tailored to fit the business contexts of particular 
industries, scarce guidance has been developed for airlines in this regard.  
 
This research responds to the aforementioned limitations by providing empirical 
evidence of the governance structures and processes developed in airlines in 
deployment of the ERM approach. The research additionally investigates the 
determinants of ERM adoption in airlines, and the factors influencing the organisational 
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designs of airline ERM systems, by considering both institutional and technical realms 
of airlines’ business contexts.  
 
As reflected in section 2.4, due to the scarcity of academic research on adoption and 
implementation of ERM and their driving forces in the context of the airline industry, 
the researcher examined findings from relevant cross-industry studies. Although 
interesting empirical studies have been developed exploring ERM implementation in 
organisational settings by employing case study methodology (e.g. Arena et al., 2010, 
2011; Mikes, 2009; Woods, 2009, 2011), the studies of determinants of ERM adoption 
and implementation, and organisational configurations of ERM, have been conducted 
prevailingly through surveys (e.g. Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Gordon, 2009; Paape 
and Spakle, 2012; Beasley et al., 2005, 2008; Baxter et al., 2012). This study uses field 
study and case study methodologies to explore organisational coupling of ERM and the 
determinants of ERM adoption and implementation.  
 
2.7 Conclusions  
This chapter critically analysed literature relevant to the business environment of the 
airline industry and its impact on the risk management systems adopted in airlines. The 
literature review suggested both a growing need and interest in the development of 
enterprise-wide risk management approaches in airlines. However, the field of ERM 
adoption and implementation in airlines remains largely unexplored. This review also 
presented a pool of cross-industry studies on ERM coupling in organisations, reflecting 
their various roles and uses, and which signaled both the institutional and technical 
nature of determinants of ERM adoption and implementation. Prevalence of survey-
based studies in these areas suggests this research would best benefit academic literature 
by investigating ERM in organisational settings and by considering contextual 
circumstances under a qualitative research paradigm.  
 
Furthermore, this chapter provided a review of three selected landmark ERM 
frameworks and risk management standards, arguing the benefits of tailoring their 
provisions to the contextual specificity of the airline industry, which will be later 
reflected in the discussion of empirical findings from this study and the 
recommendations that this research aims to produce. Findings from the review of both 
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the principles and the major components of the landmark EMR frameworks and risk 
management standards are later drawn upon in development of the aforementioned (in 
Chapter 1) ERM framework for airlines, which is presented in the forthcoming Chapter 
8. The following chapter develops a theoretical framework aligned with the objectives 
of this research, which will underpin the collection and analysis of empirical data. The 
theoretical framework will combine structural contingency theory with two strands of 
the institutional theory: new institutional sociology and old institutional economics. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Literature review conducted in the course of this research provided a critique of current 
airline risk management systems, which often remain rooted in compliance with 
multiple industry regulations, or else are segregated into various functional silos (Adler, 
2012); neither the regulations-based compliance approach nor the silo-based functional 
approach have prevented airlines from impairing profitability of their businesses in the 
last decade (IATA, 2013). It is believed airlines could benefit significantly from 
implementing enterprise-wide risk management approaches (ERM) customised to fit the 
unique business environment of the airline industry (see discussion in Chapter 1). 
Previous research of management control systems in general, and of risk management 
systems in particular, recognised the need to consider the specificity of organisational 
context in designs of risk management systems (Miller et al. 2008; Arena et al., 2010); 
as stated by Woods (2011, p. 3): “All risk management systems need to be sensitive to 
the context and that means they will be individual to each organisation”. Thus, this 
research aims to understand organisational contexts and their deterministic influences 
on airline risk management systems, as well as the structures and practices comprising 
such systems.  
 
As the objectives stated for this research are related to understanding the structures and  
practices of airline risk management systems and their determinants, this chapter 
explains the theoretical framework which lays the basis for exploring the design choices 
of airline risk management systems and their determinants. The theoretical framework 
resumes the system of key concepts and theories supporting and informing this research, 
and positions this research among other key studies conducted within particular 
theoretical strands presented herein. This chapter begins with a discussion of the 
theoretical background in which the relevance of different organisational theories to risk 
management studies is analysed. Based on the theoretical discussion a multi-theoretical 
model is presented, which allows for conceptualising and later empirically assessing the 
structures and practices constituting airline risk management systems and their 
determinants. The research questions guiding this study are outlined in the light of the 
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multi-theoretical model in order to illustrate how the selected theoretical perspectives 
can address particular research questions. The model considers an interdependence of 
institutional forces and contingency factors in shaping the framing of organisational 
structures and practices of airline risk management systems. The multi-theoretical 
model integrates structural contingency theory with selected strands of institutional 
theory, in particular new institutional sociology (NIS) and old institutional economics 
(OIE). The proposed approach responds to recent calls for organisational studies of risk 
management (Gephart et al., 2009) to adopt a more holistic approach to organisational 
practices, considering risk within broader cultural frameworks (Lounsbury, 2008), 
investigating organisational coupling of risk management (Mikes, 2009), and 
conducting institutionally grounded studies of practices (Arena et al., 2010). 
 
As will be reflected later in this chapter, the contingency and institutional perspectives 
have often been drowned upon in organisational analysis of management control 
systems and, in the field of risk management in particular, proving their validity for 
investigating the organisational dynamics of risk management systems of airlines. In 
this study the institutional perspective is adopted to present airline risk management 
systems as sets of structures and practices embedded in a wider institutional 
environment which “defines and delimits social reality” (Scott, 1987, p. 507); in 
conceptualisation of risk management structures and practices, this research refers to the 
concepts of rules, routines, and institutions. Apart from addressing the question of “how 
are organisational risk management systems structured?” the institutional perspective 
also provides basis for analysis of the “why” behind adoption of particular structures 
and practices, especially in terms of the factors that make the risk management systems 
legitimate. Apart from investigating the institutional factors determining adoption of 
particular risk management structures, the contingency perspective extends the analysis 
of such determinants to include the technical, efficiency factors.   
 
3.2 Theoretical approach: Duality of technical and institutional environment 
Organisational settings are embedded within a dual context of task and institutional 
environments. The extent of pressures posed on organisations by the task (technical) 
and the institutional environments varies across different sectors (Scott and Meyer, 
1983). Organisations interact with the task environment by delivering products and 
63 
 
 
 
services in response to customers’ demands, and by securing the inputs necessary to 
deliver products and services; the primary imperative for organisations within the task 
environment is to adapt their structures so that they enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness (Scott, 2002). Foregoing the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness, 
alternative theories emerged highlighting the role of institutional environment, the 
prevailing societal norms, values, rules, and cognitive systems, in shaping 
organisational structures, and the focus of institutional environment on external 
legitimacy (Fernandez, 2010). 
 
The influences of technical and institutional factors on development of formal 
organisational structures have been researched primarily with contingency and 
institutional theories (Gupta et al., 1994). The contingency theory perspective to 
organisational design focuses on technical facets of environment; task environment and 
the technical nature of work performed shape coordination and control structures within 
organisations (Gupta et al., 1994). By emphasising the technical and economic 
pressures of environments, this perspective views the efficiency and effectiveness 
principles aimed at improving technical performance as the main adaptive forces for 
organisations. On the other hand, the institutional perspective highlights the importance 
of symbolic and cultural environments of organisations – the impact of legal systems 
and widely shared beliefs and norms; it argues the role of institutional factors and points 
to legitimacy as the main adaptive force of organisations, regardless of whether the 
newly adopted structures and practices lead to improved technical performance (Castel 
and Friedberg, 2004). Although contingency and institutional theories seemingly adopt 
contradictory approaches to understanding the determinants of organisational formal 
structures, interrelations between these theoretical perspectives were demonstrated in 
literature. Gresgov (1989) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) argued organisational control 
structures and practices may serve both figurative and instrumental purposes; 
organisations may both conform to external expectations by means of developing 
particular control structures, and target them at improving organisational control and 
performance. Scott (1987) advocated the need to consider both institutional and 
contingency theories in order to understand the technical and institutional determinants 
of management control systems and the instrumental and symbolic functions of such 
systems.  
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Considering the above, this research approaches complexity of the design of airline risk 
management systems through the conjoint application of the two theoretical 
perspectives, contingency and institutional, recognising the effects of both task and 
institutional environments on airlines’ organisational structures and practices; both 
efficiency (technical) and non-efficiency (institutional) factors have been identified in 
previous research as determinants of management control systems in organisations. 
Applying this combination approach facilitates gaining a better understanding of the 
determinants of airline risk management systems, the structures and practices 
comprising such systems, and the instrumental and symbolic roles fulfilled by them.  
 
3.2.1 Contingency theory perspective 
Along with institutional theory, contingency theory is one of the predominant 
approaches in the field of organisational design (Gupta, 1994). Contingency theory 
focuses on the fit between task environment, organisational characteristics such as 
leadership (Fiedler, 1967), strategy (Fredrickson, 1984), or structure (Donaldson, 2001), 
and organisational performance. Contingency theory approach in studies of 
organisational structure is rooted in organisation theory, and is commonly referred to as 
structural contingency theory (Pfeffer, 1982). The focus of structural contingency 
theory is both on an organisation and its environment. The leading notion of 
contingency-based approaches is that differences in formal organisational structures can 
be attributed to the differences in organisational contexts (Fisher, 1998); organisational 
structures depend on contextual factors existing within the environment. 
 
Organisational structures examined by contingency theorists are comprised of two 
elements: structure and processes (Van de Ven and Ferry 1980). Structure describes 
disaggregation of organisational tasks and allocation of sub-tasks to organisation 
members, while process refers to coordination of sub-tasks conducted by organisation 
members in order to complete organisational tasks and achieve organisational 
objectives. The prevailing notion among contingency theorists is that organisations are 
able to rationally align their structures to contingencies existing in the environment. 
Organisational performance is dependent on the fit between organisational structure and 
contingency factors specific to its respective task environment. Misfit between 
organisational designs and contextual factors results in performance losses. This 
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approach also conveys that there is no single, effective way to design efficient 
organisational structures in all organisations (Blau, 1970; Child, 1973; Thompson, 
1967). Organisational structures are chosen rationally in pursuit of organisational 
effectiveness (Donaldson, 1995, 1999, 2001). They are dependent on contingency 
factors specific to organisational settings, that is, internal features of organisations, as 
well as the conditions of external environment. Appendix A to this thesis extends the 
review of contingency theory literature, and discusses the different groups of 
contingency factors analysed by scholars.   
 
Contingency-based design of MCS 
Applied to management control systems, contingency theory conveys that control 
system structures are contingent upon the context of organisational settings and the 
strategic focus adopted by organisations. Aligning control systems to organisation-
specific contingency factors should lead to improved organisational performance. 
Contingency perspective has often been referred to in the study of management control 
systems (Dent, 1990; Fisher, 1998). Previous studies often focused on examining the 
designs which best suit organisational contexts in terms of various contingency criteria, 
principally the environment, technology, size, structure, strategy, and national or 
organisational culture (Chenhall, 2003). Appendix A to this thesis provides a review of 
contingency-related literature in the management control area, illustrative of the issues 
pertinent to development of the theoretical framework guiding this research. 
  
Drawing on the findings of researchers in the structural contingency field (see Appendix 
A) it can be concluded that airline risk management approaches should be tailored to the 
peculiarities of changing environments, considering organisation-specific contingency 
factors. Airlines are exposed to risks typical to their specific business contexts and their 
risk profiles display significantly different characteristics to those of organisations from 
other sectors. Many of the risks faced by airlines stem from a complicated industry 
structure, its flawed dynamics, and the specific capital, labour and technology-intensive 
business model, all of these increasing the complexity of the risk management 
challenge. Thus, the contingency perspective should provide valuable insight into the 
analysis of determinants of airline risk management structures.  
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3.2.2 Institutional theory perspective   
The institutional perspective comprises various strands of research which are united by 
recognition of institutional context in the study of organisations. The prevailing notion 
is that, in order to prosper, organisations need to conform to social norms and beliefs in 
addition to achieving operational efficiency and effectiveness; institutional studies 
consider “the relationships among organisations and the fields in which they operate, 
highlighting in particular the role of rational formal structures in enabling and 
constraining organisational behaviour” (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). 
Institutional theory inquires how organisational structures such as schemas, rules, and 
norms, guiding social behaviour are formed, diffused and adopted (Scott, 2004), and 
points to socially generated arguments and the drive for legitimacy as an explanation of 
these structures (Baxter and Chua, 2003). Selznick (1996, p. 273) argues that 
“legitimacy is seen as an organisational ‘imperative’ that is both a source of inertia and 
a summons to justify particular forms and practices”. The analysis of risk management 
systems in airlines conducted in this study builds principally on two streams of 
institutional theory: new institutional sociology (NIS) and old institutional economics 
(OIE). These theoretical approaches have often been referred to in previous research of 
managerial control systems. Despite having evolved from different intellectual 
traditions, both perspectives consider institutions and institutional processes and provide 
rich theoretical grounds for conceptualising risk management structures and practices.  
 
New Institutional Sociology 
The stream of new institutional sociology builds on the research of Meyer and Rowan 
(1977) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who emphasised organisational legitimacy 
and embeddedness in organisational fields, placing the focus on external institutional 
pressures determining organisational structures, products of norms, values, and beliefs 
originating in a wider institutional context. The NIS perspective considers organisations 
in a wider context of macro-economic, social and political institutions (Scott, 2001), 
which exert legitimacy pressures and cause organisations to become isomorphic (Scott, 
1987; Covaleski et al., 1996). Institutions are described as “the rules of the game in a 
society... the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990, p. 
3). Under the NIS perspective and in the context of management control systems, 
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institutions can be regarded as the commonly accepted principles of management 
control defined at the macro-level.  
 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) stated that organisations adopt socially institutionalised 
structures in pursuit of legitimacy rather than rationally, overlooking the impact on 
organisational efficiency and effectiveness. The scholars argued that “institutionalised 
products, services, techniques, policies, and programmes function as powerful myths, 
and many organisations adopt them ceremonially” (p. 340). Social legitimacy 
requirements are derived from external constituents. The adopted organisational 
structures and practices serve to demonstrate conformity with institutionalised 
templates, legitimising organisations in the institutional context. In this context, the 
structures of management control systems play a role of “rationalisation machines” 
(Burchell et al., 1980), shaped with the purpose of strengthening legitimacy while 
portraying organisational rationality according to institutionalised templates. The 
process through which organisational structures and practices become legitimated, 
adopted beyond the effectiveness and efficiency criteria, is referred to by Meyer and 
Rowan (1977) as institutionalisation. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) extend this 
reasoning by introducing the concept of institutional fields comprised of extra-
organisational institutions which is linked to the structuration theory (Giddens, 1979, 
1984), and by suggesting that organisations within organisational fields become 
isomorphic with their common institutional environment.  
 
Under the NIS perspective, the framing of risk management systems in airlines should 
be considered within the organisational fields in which airline organisations are 
embedded. According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), organisational field is 
comprised of independent but interdependent organisations which, in aggregate, 
constitute a recognised area of institutional life, e.g. suppliers, consumers, regulatory 
agencies, or other organisations offering similar products and services. As explained by 
Scott (1994, p. 207), “the notion of field connotes the existence of a community of 
organisations that partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants 
interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the 
field”. Organisations within their respective fields adopt similar formal structures in 
pursuit of legitimacy; gaining homogeneity within an organisational field is 
denominated by DiMaggio and Powell (1983) as a structuration process. Organisational 
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fields comprise three principal components – actors, institutional logics, and governance 
structures. Analysis of the organisational dynamics requires “following actors in action” 
(Latour, 1987) and interpreting their behaviour in an institutional light as “enabled and 
constrained by the prevailing institutional logics” (Thornton and Ocasio, 2008, p. 103). 
Both individuals and organisations can be referred to as actors, and their actions are 
embedded in institutional logics (Lounsbury, 2008). Institutional logics can be 
described as values, norms, beliefs, and meaning systems guiding the behaviours of 
actors. Finally, regulative and normative frameworks imposing control over field actors 
and the wider field level are referred to as governance structures. Thus, the analysis of 
airline risk management systems needs to consider the mechanisms of institutional 
logics both at the wider societal level and at the organisational level; institutional logics 
act as interpretative schemes underlying values, beliefs, and intentions which shape 
organising principles and strategies of organisations, in addition to motivating 
organisations to adopt particular control structures (Greenwood and Hinnings, 1993). 
Appendix A extends the review of institutional theory literature with additional insights 
regarding organisational phenomena such as isomorphism, institutional divergence, and 
institutionalisation of new practices in organisations.    
 
Old Institutional Economics  
NIS is criticised for insufficient consideration of cultural and political constructions of 
intra-organisational reality, for it mostly focuses on external institutional determinism 
(DiMaggio, 1988). While NIS is concerned primarily with extra-organisational 
dynamics, other strands of the institutional theory are applicable to studies of intra-
organisational relationships; old institutionalism is regarded as internally-focused, 
analysing micro-level institutions (Scott, 2001) and intra-organisational conflicts of 
actors related to power issues (Burns, 2000). The strand of old institutional economics 
(OIE) emerged at the end of the 19th and at the beginning of the 20th century (in the 
works of Thorstein Veblen, Wesley Mitchell, John R. Commons). OIE recognises the 
existence of both formal and informal institutions, while institution is defined as “a way 
of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embodied in the 
habits of a group or a customs of a people” (Hamilton 1932, 84). Formal institutions are 
grounded in procedures, manuals, and formal rules, whereas informal institutions have a 
rule-like status as they stem from traditions of applying institutionalised practices. 
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Unlike NIS, which adopts a dynamic view of macro-institutions at the societal level 
considering their emergence and change, OIE considers the micro-institutions 
comprising intra-organisational reality which determine and constrain organisational 
behaviours.  
 
Scapens (1993, 1994) argues OIE provides an adequate framework for understanding 
structures of management control systems, for this theoretical strand considers 
management control practices as institutionalised routines (social practices influenced 
by institutions; formalised or institutionalised habits – Hodgson, 1993) within a wider 
framework of rules. Burns and Scapens (2000), relying on the work of Giddens (1979) 
and Barley and Tolbert (1997), developed a theoretical framework applicable to intra-
organisational studies. Drawing on the concepts of routines, rules, and institutions, the 
scholars elaborated on how organisational practices (habits of individual organisation 
members, understood as predisposition to engage in previously adopted forms of action) 
become routines (unlike habits, involving a group of people), and over time become 
institutionalised; institutions are defined in their study as “collective taken for granted 
assumptions of a group of people about some action or thought” (Burns and Scapens, 
2000, p. 8) which “evolve as routinised actions of actors” (Abdel-Kader, 2011, p. 425). 
Rules are defined as “formalised statements of procedures”; rules are necessary to 
achieve coordination and coherence of actions of groups of individuals (Scapens, 1994). 
Routines are regarded as procedures that are actually in use in organisations, or 
“patterns of thought and action which are habitually adopted by groups of individuals” 
(Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 11), and they can be institutionalised if they “become the 
taken-for-granted ways of behaving”. Rules and routines are enacted and reproduced 
through actions, and they are influenced by the existing institutions. In the ongoing 
process of enacting and reproduction, changes may occur to rules and routines, and such 
changes later may become institutionalised (Abdel-Kader, 2011).   
 
In this study risk management phenomenon in airlines is conceptualised as a set of 
organisational rules and routines. In the context of airline risk management systems 
rules can be regarded as formal risk management frameworks translated into formal 
procedure manuals, while routines are regarded as the risk management practices 
actually in use which may vary from formal procedures and, which when enacted and 
reproduced over time, can become institutionalised. Under the OIE perspective risk 
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management routines can be institutionalised in the context of ceremonial or 
instrumental dichotomy (Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). Ceremonial 
institutionalisation of routines refers to organisational rituals used to preserve the status 
quo and the existing distribution of power among organisation members rather than to 
support decision-making processes; instrumental institutionalisation of routines is 
directed towards enhanced, informed decision-making.  
  
3.3 Theoretical model  
As indicated in the literature review (Chapter 2), empirical research comprehensively 
assessing airline risk management structures and practices and their determinants is 
scarce; literature review signalled several areas related to airline risk management 
systems which require further investigation. Following the review of theoretical 
perspectives informing research in organisational design, the researcher developed a 
theoretical model in response to the objectives and questions stated for this study; the 
theoretical model guides the collection and analysis of data on risk management 
phenomenon in airlines presented in subsequent chapters. According to the research 
objectives and questions elaborated in the previous chapters, this research investigates 
the design choices of airline risk management systems and their determinants in order to 
subsequently assess their maturity levels, best practices, and shortcomings.  
 
This research applies the combined approach of contingency and institutional 
perspectives in order to examine structures and practices within airline risk management 
systems, and technical and institutional determinants of organisational designs of such 
systems in a cross-case analysis. Contingency theory perspective is adopted in order to 
examine airline internal and external task environments in terms of contingency factors 
influencing organisational designs of risk management systems. Institutional theory 
perspective is employed in an analysis of airlines’ risk management phenomena in the 
context of organisational fields of airlines, considering governance structures, actors, 
and the institutional logics within the organisational fields, and the institutional 
pressures exerted on airlines. Airline risk management systems are examined in terms of 
their constituents, in particular institutions, rules, and routines. This research approach 
is graphically summarised in the following figure 3-1, presenting a schematic 
theoretical model.  
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Figure 3-1: Schematic representation of the theoretical model  
 
The investigation of airline risk management systems considers them as “outcome 
variables” (Chenhall, 2003, p. 134) of simultaneous tailoring to multiple institutional 
pressures and technical determinants. Chenhall (2003) recommends the study of 
organisational structures in disequilibrium conditions (in the presence of conflicting 
institutional and technical rationalities) to primarily establish adoption and uses of 
management control systems, then to examine their roles in enhancing decision quality 
and, finally, to investigate their effects on organisational performance. This study 
follows the recommended order, however, as previously explained, a detailed analysis 
of the effects of risk management systems on organisational performance is beyond the 
scope of this study.     
 
As per the investigation of technical and institutional determinants of airline risk 
management systems, it should be noted that categorisation of the nature of causality of 
drivers according to their institutional or technical origins may raise debate; the drivers 
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are often interrelated and may appeal to both of these realms. As conveyed by 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), strategies developed in the task environment under 
effectiveness criteria may, over time, transform to institutional norms if they are 
adopted across many organisations. This issue was also raised by Carruthers (1995) and 
Granlund and Lukka (1998, p. 159), when the latter stated: “in practice, economic and 
institutional pressures (or their effects) may get confused due to their interconnected 
relationship”. Thus, task and institutional environments are considered in this study 
rather as a continuum than a dichotomy (Cai and Yan, 2011).  
 
3.3.1 Components of the theoretical framework: analysis under the contingency 
approach  
Contingency theory applied to management control systems posits the designs of such 
systems are contingent upon the context of organisational settings; no unique system 
should be applied by organisations in all circumstances. Organisational performance can 
be improved if such systems are aligned to fit the contextual contingency factors 
(Emmanuel et al., 1990; Otley, 1980). Thus, structural contingency theory perspective is 
adopted to answer the question of the effects of airline task environments on 
organisational designs of airline risk management systems, and to conduct the analysis 
of relevant contingency factors. 
 
Researchers in contingency theory adopted different approaches to define the fit 
between organisational structure and task environment, which can be broadly classified 
into selection, interaction, and system approaches (Van de Ven and Drazin, 1985; 
Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985). The selection approach examines the relation of single 
variables to organisational structures; effects on organisational performance are 
excluded from analysis (e.g. Perrow, 1967). The interaction approach examines pairs of 
organisational environment and structure factors, and their effects on organisational 
performance (e.g. Schoonhoven, 1981). The system approach, or as defined by Gresov 
(1989) the ‘multiple contingent approach’, analyses holistically multiple contingency 
factors and their effects on structural characteristics and performance of organisations. 
This research adopts the multiple contingent approach to studying the contingency 
factors of airline risk management systems in a sense that multiple contingency factors 
are examined in relation to organisational designs of coordination and control 
structures. However, this research does not pre-define characteristics of organisational 
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structures and organisational performance; neither does it assess the direct effects of the 
chosen characteristics of task environment on organisational performance. Furthermore, 
influences exerted on risk management systems by different contingency factors may 
conflict, and thus simultaneous alignment of such systems to all factors is not possible 
and may require trade-offs in adapting the designs to some factors (Fisher and 
Govindarajan, 1993).   
 
As discussed in previous sections of this chapter, research within the contingency 
perspective can consider a wide variety of contingency factors (also referred to as 
‘variables’ in quantitative studies). According to Fisher (1998), contingent variables are 
relevant to the degree that organisations differing on such variables also differ in how 
their systems are related to performance. Airline task environment is broad and 
complex, therefore the researcher referred to prior studies in order to learn about general 
characteristics of task environments and the investigated contingency factors. In order 
to develop categories of contingency factors relevant to the subject of this research, the 
researcher investigated the contingency factors previously considered by structural 
contingency theorists; in the proposed broad categorisation of the characteristics of 
airline task environment, the researcher refers to the concepts proposed by Miller (1992) 
and Kaplan and Mikes (2014). Miller (1992, p. 313) discussed uncertainties (risks) 
faced by organisations operating internationally and examined organisational responses 
to manage uncertainties. The scholar discussed the alignment of organisational 
strategies with the uncertain environment and proposed an “integrated risk management 
perspective” considering numerous interrelated uncertainties. Miller’s framework for 
categorising uncertainties relevant to managerial decision making includes three broad 
categories of uncertainties which are related to (1) general environment, (2) industry, 
and (3) firm-specific variables. Similar categorisation of risks was considered by 
Kaplan and Mikes (2014). In response to the critique of universal propositions of ERM 
frameworks (discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.4.4), and following the arguments of 
scholars advocating the contingency approach for designing management control 
systems, Kaplan and Mikes proposed a “minimum ERM contingency framework”. The 
framework identifies three broad categories of contingency factors which condition the 
design of organisational risk management systems. The scholars extended the taxonomy 
of the major groups of contingency factors discussed by researchers under the 
contingency theory perspective (section 3.2.1) with a new category of factors concerned 
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with the typology of risks the organisational risk management frameworks target to 
address; they distinguish between the categories of (1) internal, firm-dependent factors, 
(2) external and industry factors, and (3) risk types. Kaplan and Mikes (2013, 2014) 
claim that management of strategic, external, and preventable risks requires adopting 
different approaches in terms of organisational structures and processes. Thus, the 
framings of risk management systems need to be tailored to the nature and 
controllability levels of the risks organisations face.  
 
Drawing on previous studies of contingency theorists, this research considers airline 
risk management systems as affected by a typology of contingency factors 
distinguishing three major categories as presented below. In this research all 
environmental and organisational conditions stemming from external and internal task 
environments and affecting the design of airline risk management systems are defined 
as contingency factors and are categorised as 1) general environment and industry 
contingency factors, 2) organisational contingency factors, and 3) contingency factors 
related to airline risk profiles. This research recognises the iterative nature of the 
process of defining contingency factors (Hambrick and Lei, 1985); some of the 
contingency factors are selected by organisations, e.g. contingency factors related to 
strategy choices (Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990), while others are determined 
exogenously, stemming from prior management decisions or from external 
circumstances beyond the direct control of organisations (Fisher, 1998). Under the 
multiple contingent approach (Gresov, 1989) this research acknowledges possible 
correlations or conflicts between the contingency factors. 
   
The combinations of contingency factors specific to particular airlines influence the 
designs of their risk management structures and practices, which are reflected in 
variations of “risk management mixes” among organisations. The concept of risk 
management mix (originally denominated as “ERM Mix”) was introduced by Mikes 
(2005, 2009) and further referred to by Kaplan and Mikes (2014) as a constellation of 
risk management practices and structures reflected across five categories: (1) processes 
for identifying, assessing, and rolling up risks, (2) frequency of risk roll-ups, (3) risk 
tools such as risk maps or matrices which allow for a visual display of risk data, (4) 
linkages from risk management to other important control processes, and (5) the roles 
played by organisational risk units. Mikes (2005) claims that, although key structural 
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elements of risk management systems of organisations operating within a particular 
industry are similar, their “risk management mixes” vary according to organisation-
specific contingency factors. This research examines the “risk management mixes” of 
airline risk management systems, yet not as outputs of solely contingency factors but 
also institutional pressures affecting such systems. The section related to analysing risk 
management systems under the institutional perspective further elaborates on examining 
heterogeneity among airline risk management structures and practices.  
 
General environment and industry contingency factors  
In this research the “General Environment and Industry” group of contingency factors 
describes multiple aspects of external technical environment of airlines, encompassing 
both general environmental conditions relevant to various industries and the 
environmental dynamics specific to the airline industry. With reference to general 
environment uncertainties, Miller (1992) discussed the following groups of factors at 
play: political, government policy, macroeconomic conditions, social context, and 
natural conditions. Regarding industry dynamics, the scholar elaborated on the effects 
of input and product market structures, and of competitive environment on 
organisational risk management structures. These two broad groups of external 
contingency factors influence organisations’ strategy choices and, consequently, their 
business models and management control system designs (Woods, 2011). 
 
External environment in airlines is especially relevant in terms of regulative and 
normative frameworks. Civil aviation is a highly specialised and regulated industry, 
requiring adherence to regulations and normative standards in the conduct of airline 
operations; regulative and normative frameworks have an impact on overall 
organisational strategies, structures, and practices of airlines, and specifically on their 
risk management systems. In the risk management area, regulators’ and industry 
professionals’ attention has concentrated principally on safety and hazard related issues, 
broadening and reinforcing airline risk management structures targeting these 
exposures.  
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Organisational contingency factors  
Organisation-specific factors related in broad terms to business model choices represent 
an important set of contingency factors affecting the design of management control 
systems (Chenhall, 2003); Osterwalder et al. (2005, pp. 17-18) define business model as 
“a description of the value a company offers to one or several segments of customers 
and the architecture of the firm and its network of partners for creating, marketing, and 
delivering this value”. Organisation-specific factors resumed under a business model 
design comprise features such as size, organisational structure, strategy, complexity of 
operations, resources, competencies, and technology; as previously indicated, different 
business model design features have often been the subject of contingency-based 
research in management control systems.  
 
Airline business model choices are conditioned on the sources of competitive advantage 
that organisations are intent on pursuing (Casadesus-Masanell and Ricart, 2010), which 
tend to be cost or benefit-related (Huettinger, 2014). Based on these two categories of 
competitive advantage drivers, airline business models have typically been categorised 
as legacy or low-cost; yet, over time, airlines have evolved in their models, creating 
new, hybrid forms in order to adapt to changing market conditions (Gillen and Gados, 
2008). Airlines basing their business models on cost-related advantages seek either to 
offer benefits which are similar to their competitors yet of a lower cost base, or offer 
fewer benefits compensated with lower prices; cost-related drivers have underlined 
creation of the low-cost carriers’ business model. To the contrary, legacy carriers base 
their business models on benefit-related advantages, offering supplementary benefits to 
customers; if a premium price can be charged for the benefits, airlines differentiate their 
business offer, while if no premium is charged then the benefits help to distinguish the 
offer among competitors. The cost or benefit-driven or hybrid business models are 
characterised by different combinations of organisational features (Graf, 2005) which 
constitute contingency factors of airline risk management system designs.  
 
Risk profile contingencies  
As illustrated in the schematic representation of the theoretical framework (figure 3-1), 
airline risk profiles are affected by external environments in which organisations 
operate, and by their intra-organisational characteristics. Kaplan and Mikes (2012) 
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argue risk management programmes should be tailored to the typology of risks facing 
organisations; the scholars propose a distinction between three major categories of risks 
– preventable, strategy-execution, and external risks. Risks from each of these three 
groups are characterised by different degrees of controllability and probability of 
occurrence and impact, and require different approaches to their identification, 
assessment, and management. Preventable risks arise from operational breakdowns or 
employees’ incorrect actions. Strategy-execution risks are taken in order to generate 
superior returns from strategies. External risks arise from events outside of an 
organisation’s ability to influence or control. Thus, the designs of organisational risk 
functions should be dictated, among others, by the nature and volatility of 
organisational risk profiles.  
 
The critique of airline risk management systems summarised in Chapter 2 conveys the 
inefficiencies in risk management systems which are often designed in a way that 
favours managerial focus on operational risks and does not facilitate management of 
other risks relevant to organisational performance. However, the downgrading 
performance of airlines is believed to be mainly driven by factors related to poor 
industry structure, misguided government intervention, and inconsistent airline strategy 
choices (IATA, 2013; Zea, 2004), and not the operational type of airline risks. This 
suggests airline risk management programs need to be re-adjusted according to the 
nature of their risk profiles, better suiting them for management of all three groups of 
risks - external, strategy-execution, and preventable risks; this implies adjustments in 
airline risk management practices, governance structures, technologies, etc. The 
preventable group of airline risks can be eliminated through monitoring of operational 
processes and effective internal control. Airlines should strive to eliminate the incidence 
of operational risks, since taking them on brings no value (Kaplan and Mikes, 2012). 
Kaplan and Mikes (2012) argue that strategic risks are not completely undesirable, as 
assuming these risks is essential for achieving strategic returns. Dealing with strategic 
risks in airlines should focus on their identification and cost-effective management of 
their likelihood and potential impact. ERM can provide airlines with strategic advantage 
by facilitating management of high-risk and return projects. Airline risk profile is 
characterised by high relevance of external risks arising from events outside of an 
organisation’s control ability, such as natural and economic disasters, geopolitical 
changes, etc. Some of the external risks can be classified and managed as strategic risks, 
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while others, where the probability of occurrence is extremely low, are difficult to 
analyse in strategy planning processes. Due to the nature of airline operations, 
management of external risks is considered organisational imperative, and is executed 
via a wide array of crisis planning and other risk management tools (Shaw, 2011). 
 
3.3.2 Components of the theoretical framework: analysis under the institutional 
approach 
This research draws on different strands of the institutional theory (OIE and NIS) in 
order to examine the institutions, rules, and routines comprising airline risk 
management systems, and their institutional determinants. It adopts the view of airlines 
as pluralistic entities composed of various groups of actors promoting different values, 
goals, and interests, and shaped by the institutional pressures they are subject to (Barley 
and Tolbert, 1997). Apart from exploring the risk management institutions, rules, and 
routines (OIE), under the NIS perspective this research investigates the institutional 
pressures which exert influence over airlines and under which risk management systems 
are shaped in order to gain legitimacy. The analysis conducted herein considers airline 
risk management systems in a wider institutional context, forming part of an 
organisational field of airlines, subject to influences of institutions at a macro-level. 
Thus, the proposed approach considers the dynamics of different institutional demands 
stemming from relevant individual and collective actors and their prevailing logics, 
embedded in wider governance structures.  
 
External and internal institutional pressures 
Airlines are exposed to multiple institutional demands imposed by their corresponding 
institutional environments, emanating from broader regulatory, social, and cultural 
contexts (Pache and Santos, 2010), exerting coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures. 
Coercive pressures are exerted by institutions upon which airlines are dependent, and 
are often related to political influence and legitimacy issues, and materialised as 
changing legal environment and authorities imposing new regulations on organisations 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983); coercive pressures have been evidenced in multiple 
studies of management control systems (e.g. Arena and Azzone, 2007; Arnaboldi and 
Lapsley, 2003; Boland et al., 2008). Airlines operate in a highly regulated environment 
and their businesses are constrained by a multiplicity of national and international 
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regulations imposed by governments and industry associations. Thus, coercive pressures 
are relevant in shaping airline control and risk management systems, causing coherency 
and homogeneity among structures and procedures within those systems. Furthermore, 
airlines faced with uncertainty may adopt mimetic behaviours in applying standard 
responses to uncertain conditions. Environmental uncertainty or lack of clarity of 
organisational strategies or technologies encourages imitation of organisational 
structures and practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Previous research provided 
evidence of mimetic isomorphism in relation to organisational structures, processes, 
strategies, or choices of technology (e.g. Benders et al., 2005; Burns and Wholey, 1993; 
Haveman, 1993; Massini et al., 2002, 2005; Yand and Hyland, 2012; Lapsley and 
Pallot, 2000). Airline business environment is extremely dynamic where uncertainty 
prevails. This lends itself to conclude that mimetic behaviour could be a relevant motive 
for the adoption of novice risk management practices in airlines. Modelling risk 
management practices on those of more successful airlines might be a reflection of 
organisations’ pursuit of legitimacy or improved performance. Normative isomorphism 
within organisational fields may be related to professionalisation of the fields through 
the existence of professional norms, roles, and values (Zucker, 1987). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) pointed to university education and professional networks and training as 
the most relevant sources of normative isomorphism. Homogenisation of management 
practices can also be supported by professionals migrating between organisations, or by 
normative pressures exerted at a supra-individual level such as national or corporate 
cultures (Granlund and Lukka, 1998). Normative isomorphism was evidenced to affect 
organisational management control structures; this can be seen in the studies of Cruz et 
al. (2009) or Tsamenyia et al. (2006). Professional organisations in an organisation field 
of airlines (e.g. IATA, ICAO), aiming for improvement of the situation in the airline 
industry, promote adoption of ever more comprehensive risk management systems in 
airlines; thus, the influence of normative pressures on airlines risk management systems 
can be substantial.  
 
Institutional demands are exerted on airlines through regulatory frameworks, normative 
prescriptions, and social expectations (Scott, 2001). Regulative and normative 
frameworks delimit and coordinate the actions of airlines within their organisational 
fields. Governance structures controlling the organisational field of airlines are 
especially relevant in the present analysis, as airline businesses are highly regulated; 
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regulatory frameworks governing the airline industry comprise international 
conventions, national laws, and rulings and procedures issued by supra-national legal 
authorities; among normative frameworks, recommendations of recognised industry 
organisations are especially relevant. Institutional demands are carried over to airlines 
through institutional logics (Thorton, 2005), broader cultural templates providing 
organisational actors with means-ends designations. Actors in the organisational field of 
airlines comprise both individuals and organisations; actors can be located either inside 
the airlines, performing organisational roles and involved to different extents in 
conceptualising and controlling uncertainty (Arena et at., 2010), or externally in 
professional organisations, regulatory bodies, or other types of external stakeholders, 
exerting institutional pressures on airlines. Actors enact within broader institutional 
logics (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 1999); the values and norms, 
ideas, beliefs, and broader meanings systems, all influence the actions of actors (Scott, 
2010). Institutional logics influence how actors in airlines understand the priority goals 
of organisational strategies, and within them the risk management strategy, and how 
uncertainty is conceptualised in airlines. Airlines act within various conflicting logics; 
by way of an example, their core competency lies in delivering safe flights, yet they are 
also evaluated based on the ability to generate profit. Conflicting goals of maximising 
profits and maximising safety need to be conciliated, yet they imply opposite cost 
strategies; trade-off exists between safety management and costs (Holloway, 2008) and 
airlines strive to find the optimal balance between production (profit maximisation) and 
protection (safety maximisation) goals, while they conceptualise safety management as 
a fundamental process supporting the management of business in the pursuit of profits.  
 
Rules, routines, institutions of risk management  
Through adopting the institutional perspective this research examines the rules, 
routines, and institutions comprising airline risk management systems, and a variety of 
institutional pressures driving the designs of such systems. The framing of analysis 
follows the concepts introduced by Arena et al. (2010) and later referred to by Tekathen 
and Dechow (2013), who summarised organisational dynamics of the risk management 
phenomena under several broad categories. Airline risk management systems are 
conceptualised under the categories of ‘context and rationalities’, ‘risk experts’, and 
‘technologies’. Context and rationalities are concerned with external and internal 
motivations for adopting particular framings of risk management systems in airlines 
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(e.g. compliance-driven vs. performance-driven approaches; coercive, normative, 
mimetic pressures), and with the way organisations conceptualise uncertainty into risks 
forming their risk portfolios. The concept of technologies denotes the complex set of 
rules, routines, and tools enrolled in the management of risks (previously mentioned 
‘risk management mix’). Risk experts refer to the roles and responsibilities assigned to 
organisation members involved in conceptualising and controlling risks. This 
conception of studying organisational coupling of risk management systems through 
risk management technologies and risk experts coincides with the dimensions of 
organisational systems proposed by Weber (1947), such as division of work, hierarchy, 
rules and procedures, and formalization. This analysis also considers the structural 
characteristics of organisational management systems summarised by Vroom (2002), 
such as differentiation and coordination of task responsibilities, standardisation of the 
performing of tasks through establishment of rules and routines, formalisation of 
processes, centralisation of power, and hierarchical configuration.  
 
3.4 Conclusions  
This chapter discussed the theoretical framework informing this research, guided by the 
research questions outlined for this study. This chapter provided an overview of core 
tenants of the theoretical perspectives, and explained their relation to the subject of the 
study. Conducting this research through the lenses of structural contingency theory, new 
institutional sociology theory, and old institutional economics should allow the 
objectives stated for this research to be achieved and address the gaps in the literature of 
airline risk management systems.  
 
The multi-theoretical framework developed for this research lays the basis for exploring 
the designs of airline risk management systems and their determinants. In particular, the 
framework suggests to explore airline risk management structures and practices under 
the tenets of OIE and NIE, as a set of institutions, rules and routines. Additionally, the 
framework facilitates exploring airlines’ organisational contexts and their deterministic 
influences on risk management system designs. Collection and analysis of empirical 
data, conducted under the tenets of this theoretical framework,  complemented with the 
findings of the preceding literature review, consequently lead to development of an 
empirically-based ERM framework in the airline industry, presented and discussed in 
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the forthcoming Chapter 8 (section 8.2). The following chapter elaborates on the 
research methodology and the chosen methods of empirical data collection and analysis.  
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Chapter 4 
Research Design 
 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents the overall philosophical approach adopted to conduct this study 
in the field of airline risk management, and describes and justifies the research design 
chosen in order to address the research questions underlying this study. It commences 
by discussing the interpretive paradigm guiding this research, and its implications on 
consequent methodology choices. In the following sections of this chapter, the 
researcher elaborates on suitability of the field study and case study methodologies and 
outlays the design of the empirical research in terms of data collection and analysis 
methods. Finally, reliability, validity, quality and ethical considerations related to the 
chosen approach are addressed. The last section presents conclusions of this chapter.    
 
4.2 Research paradigm 
Research paradigms provide larger frameworks and world views, foundations for 
conducting research (Kuhn, 1962). The choice between positivistic and interpretive 
paradigms to underpin this research is conditioned on the nature of the research problem 
and the aim and objectives stated for this research. Positivistic research is concerned 
with researcher independence and analytical objectivity, while it proposes studying 
social phenomena in a similar manner to conducting studies in natural sciences; 
contrarily, the interpretive approach perceives research as infused with culture, beliefs, 
and values ingrained in socially constructed reality, and recognises researcher’s 
engagement with actors and the contextual environment with which they interact 
(Morgan and Smircich, 1980). The nature of the research problem is defined in terms of 
an organisational phenomenon, and the aim and objectives of this research determine 
adoption of the interpretive paradigm concerned with exploring reality as a social 
construction “emergent, subjectively created, and objectified through human 
interaction” (Chua, 1986, p. 615). Previous research in management control systems 
and, specifically, in the risk management area would often be conducted under the 
interpretive paradigm (e.g. Arena et al., 2010, 2011; Mikes, 2005, 2009; Woods, 2009, 
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2011), as it allows for studying phenomena in wider historical, organisational, 
institutional and social contexts (Strati, 2000). 
 
The interpretive paradigm is chosen due to its ingrained assumptions about the world, 
the study of knowledge, and values (Collis and Hussey, 2003); the assumptions inherent 
in the interpretive approach determine the research methodologies and methods selected 
for this study. Under the ontological assumptions of the interpretive paradigm, the 
world is considered as socially constructed and can be understood through exploring the 
perceptions of human actions; reality is considered subjective and multiple, as perceived 
by participants in a study. This study is concerned with understanding reality as a social 
construction, as it defines the research problem in terms of an organisational 
phenomenon. The study explores the phenomenon of risk management in airlines, 
emphasising the importance of its social aspects. The phenomenon of risk management 
is studied with regard to its enactment by actors in organisations, considering not only 
formal organisational rules and structures, but also informal routines and practices 
actually in use. This study also pays attention to risk perceptions among organisation 
members in addition to the cultural and institutional influences on organisational logics. 
The epistemological assumptions under the  interpretive paradigm consider researchers’ 
beliefs as determinants of what should count as facts, while under the axiological 
assumptions of the interpretive approach research is value-laden and biased by 
researchers’ values, which determine what is recognised as facts and interpretations; the 
researcher’s perception depends, to some extent, on prior knowledge, state of 
preparedness, and expectations. The researched field is acknowledged not only as 
forming part of the empirical world, but also as being “shaped by the theoretical 
interests of the researcher” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p. 820). 
 
Under the above cited assumptions, risk management systems of airlines are studied in 
this research in natural settings, while the risk management phenomenon is explored in 
terms of meanings people assign to it, and considering the interaction of organisational 
risk management systems with both technical and institutional contexts. The chosen 
approach allows for exploration of organisational settings from the inside, contrasting 
the existing theory with empirical reality, challenging the taken-for-granted theoretical 
propositions and development of new concepts and relationships and more informed 
theoretical propositions. The research is conducted under an inductive approach. 
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Inductive arguments are derived from a limited number of specific facts to general 
conclusions (Chalmers, 1996). Although this research first deducts from the existing 
theories, forming explanations and predictions of theoretical constructs (see Chapter 3), 
it later relies on facts acquired through observation to create extension of theory through 
induction.     
 
One of the hallmarks of the interpretive paradigm is drawing on multiple theoretical 
perspectives to examination and interpretation of the researched reality; the processes 
and relationships observed in the field can be explored with multiple theories, each 
providing different but incremental insight into the overall interpretation (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003). Ahrens and Chapman (2006, p. 820) describe conducting empirical 
studies under the interpretive paradigm as involving “an on-going reflection on data and 
its positioning against different theories such that the data can contribute to and develop 
further the chosen research questions”. As discussed in Chapter 3, the theoretical 
framework underlying the basis for conducting this research involves institutional and 
contingency theory perspectives; furthermore, as is also explained in Chapter 3, studies 
drawing on the institutional perspective would typically be conducted within the 
interpretive paradigm, while studies drawing on the contingency perspective would be 
conducted within the positivistic paradigm. However, this research proposes a 
qualitative analysis of diverse contingency factors affecting the structures and practices 
of airline risk management systems and, while it additionally involves various streams 
of the institutional theory, it is conducted under the interpretive approach.   
 
The interpretive paradigm determines the methodology choice for conducting research 
on the identified research problem. The interpretive paradigm suggests employing 
research methods which are “an array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, 
translate and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency of certain 
more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social world” (Van Maanen, 1983, p. 
9). Van Maanen (1998) emphasises the focus of interpretive research on meaning, the 
use of analytic induction and maintaining close proximity to data. Since interpretive 
research is concerned with meanings rather than measurements of social phenomena, it 
implies collecting primarily contextualised, qualitative data through examining small 
samples in their natural locations, in order to gain in-depth information and make sense 
of it. Qualitative data places emphasis on quality, depth of information, allowing for 
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capturing richness of detail and nuance of the studied phenomena (Collis and Hussey, 
2003); such data is analysed in an inductive process of constructing abstract concepts 
and theories.  Thus, rich and contextualised accounts can be developed of organisational 
reality, delivering a deeper understanding of actors’ practices within organisational 
settings. This approach allows not only for discovering what happens in organisations, 
but also how and why phenomena occur (Ferreira and Merchant, 1992).  
 
4.3 Research methodology 
Research methodology refers to the philosophical and practical construction of research, 
from theoretical grounds to data collection and analysis; in this context, research 
methods specifically reflect strategies for collection and analysis of data (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003). The level of complexity of the risk management phenomenon under 
study, its social, organisational nature, the importance of contextual influences on the 
investigated phenomenon and, finally, the research aim and objectives call for 
employment of two related research methodologies, namely field study and case study 
methodologies. Prior to introducing the methodology in more detail, it is necessary to 
comment on the two-fold interpretation of the term “field study”. As indicated by Lillis 
and Mundy (2005, pp. 120, 121), “field study” may refer to a specific methodology of 
studying the “nature of the constructs on which the theory is built, the relations among 
these constructs, or their empirical interpretation” and the “nature and impact of key 
social and contextual influences”. On the other hand, the term “field study” may be used 
interchangeably with the term “empirical study”, referring to research involving gaining 
knowledge by means of empirical observation or experience. Following the distinction 
proposed by Jabbour (2013), it is important to clarify that in this research the term “field 
study” refers to the choice of methodology, while the expressions “empirical study” or 
“empirical research” describe the empirical study as a whole.  
 
In this research the field study methodology is employed in order to explore the 
diversity of configurations of airline risk management systems and their technical and 
institutional determinants. Additionally, the field study contextualises the fragmented 
literature findings of airline risk management practices through a systematic assessment 
of the degree of assimilation of ERM principles in airlines and, on a related note, the 
developments and shortcomings of airline risk management systems. Subsequently, the 
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case study methodology is employed in order to examine in more detail organisational 
coupling of risk management, the links with organisational logics, and the rationales for 
the alignment of airline risk management systems with their respective business 
contexts. 
 
Through employment of the field study and case study methodologies, this research 
responds to the calls for organisational studies of management control systems, 
exploring their characteristics in wider social, cultural and organisational contexts 
(voiced, for example, by Arena et al., 2010; Power, 2009; Mikes, 2009; Muralidhar, 
2010; Altuntas, 2011; Ahrens, 2010; Baxter and Chua, 2008). Particularly in the field of 
ERM previous research often explored adoption of this risk management approach and 
its driving forces, organisational configurations and effects on organisational 
performance by employing the survey methodology (e.g. Beasley et al. 2005, 2008; 
Paape and Speklé, 2012; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Pagach and Warr, 2010; 
Desender, 2007; Gordon et al., 2009). The positivistic approach of surveys was often 
used for collecting data through questionnaires and structured interviews, with the 
purpose of making statistical inferences about populations (Babbie, 1990). The survey 
methodology allows for studying larger samples, yet it has the negative point of not 
being able to provide a complex picture of the studied phenomena, for it misses 
contextual interpretations of research findings. Previous, survey-based studies 
demonstrated the rules of risk management systems, but they failed to demonstrate the 
enactment of routines by organisational actors, the constellations of employees, their 
risk management logics, and the influences of organisational and cultural contexts. The 
questions which this research aims to address require the study of airline risk 
management structures, practices, rationales, and their institutional and technical 
determinants in wider organisational contexts which cannot be captured through surveys 
within the limitations of time and resources. 
 
4.3.1 Field study  
The field study methodology chosen for conducting a part of this research was 
originally proposed by Merchant and Manzoni (1989). This methodology involves 
conducting several limited in-depth studies at a non-random selection of sites (Lillis and 
Mundy, 2005). The field study methodology exploits, to some extent, the breadth and 
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depth of research usually associated respectively with survey and case study 
methodologies. As explained by Lillis and Mundy (2005, p. 127, and based on research 
of Eisenhardt, 1989, and Aherns and Dent, 1998), field studies “draw on a larger 
number of observations than in-depth case studies, but can also deal with more complex 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions than survey approaches”. The field study methodology 
allows for deliberately focusing on selected relevant elements of airline risk 
management systems, while the focused versus complex study of the phenomenon is 
offset by extending the sample of participating organisations.  
 
According to Lillis and Mundy (2005), the field study methodology is best applicable to 
research contexts where there exists significant theory, but there is still doubt about the 
empirical interpretation of the constructs on which the theory is built, and the 
relationships between such constructs or their empirical interpretation. This 
methodological approach is especially applicable to exploring new and developing areas 
(Klein and Myers, 1999). Critique of the existing academic literature in the fields of 
ERM and airline risk management systems conveyed in the previous chapters of this 
thesis points to frequently occurring simplified modelling of risk management systems 
in empirical studies, and failures to identify important intervening factors in such 
simplified models. The critique also reports on problems with definition and 
measurement of theoretical constructs, partly attributable to their highly contextualised 
nature; for example, conceptualisation of determinants of complex and highly 
contextualised risk management systems in organisations is often reduced to a limited 
number of simple constructs. As argued by Lillis and Mundy (2005), the field study 
methodology can improve understanding of theoretical constructs studied empirically. 
Field studies pay attention to contextual influences of the constructs, yet they also allow 
for detecting cross-case patterns in issues that would otherwise be masked in extensive 
case study write-ups. Through investigating theory-defined constructs such as risk 
management rules and routines, institutional pressures or contingency factors in 
organisational settings of airlines, the theoretical constructs are empirically refined. The 
refinement is achieved by combining contextual interpretation of the theoretical 
constructs with their replication in different cases. In addition, the field study 
methodology allows for investigation of homogeneity and variations in a practical 
interpretation of theory-defined constructs. Cross-organisational verification of 
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theoretical constructs improves credibility and generalisability of the field study 
findings (Lillis and Mundy, 2005).  
 
Conducting only a limited number of in-depth case studies in the course of this research 
would similarly allow for documenting the rationale underlying the organisational 
dynamics of risk management systems of airlines; however, it would fail to provide 
evidence on cross-organisational patterns between multiple airlines. On the other hand, 
the survey methodology applied to this study would allow for increasing the sample of 
airlines, but it would omit contextual explanations of the findings such as causal 
reasoning of individual actors, organisational logics, or the effects of contingency and 
institutional factors on airline risk management systems. The field study methodology 
applied to exploring of airline risk management systems allows for making theoretical 
generalisations in much the same way as a case study methodology, while the relevance 
of such generalisations is improved by drawing on findings from multiple organisations; 
this also facilitates identification of patterns in empirical observations which improves 
the validity of findings, and allows for detecting variations between the investigated 
factors in different organisations. The aforementioned arguments indicate 
appropriateness of the field study methodology for conducting the research, attending to 
the objectives stated for this research and to the theoretical propositions informing this 
research. Finally, concerns regarding the chosen methodology are addressed in detail in 
the forthcoming section 4.7 of this chapter, where limitations, validity and reliability, 
and quality of the field study research are addressed.   
 
4.3.2 Case study  
Complex social phenomena and processes requiring in-depth descriptions are often 
recommended to be explored with the interpretive methodology of a case study (Yin, 
2009). Yin (2009) suggests employing the case study methodology for examining 
contemporary events over which the researcher has little or no control, especially when 
the ‘real world’ context of the phenomena is important. The scholar also advocates 
suitability of the case study methodology in studying the phenomena which are best 
addressed with ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. Case studies focus on understating the 
dynamics of phenomena within a particular context, while they concentrate on a limited 
number of units of analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989). The case study methodology implies 
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collection of in-depth, contextualised data on the units of analysis. Data is collected 
through multiple means such as interviews, observation, archival records and other 
documentary evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989). Case studies are applicable for providing 
descriptions of phenomena, testing theory or generating theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Case 
studies are especially recommended for research relying on prior theoretical 
propositions which guide data collection and analysis, while through their confirmation, 
modification, or rejection, analytic generalisations can be drawn (Yin, 2009). Through 
an in-depth analysis of phenomena within its contextual setting, case studies explain 
complex causal links which cannot be featured through other, especially positivistic, 
approaches such as surveys (Yin, 2009). Under the case study approach, phenomena can 
be investigated through single- or multiple-case studies, while in the case of the latter, 
cross-case conclusions can be drawn about the phenomena and surrounding  reality.  
 
As previously outlaid, the field study methodology was employed in order to address 
some of the questions stated for this research in cases where identifying cross-
organisational patterns was especially beneficial. However, in order to address in full all 
research questions, the case study methodology was additionally introduced into this 
study. Employment of the case study methodology was particularly determined by the 
need to explain, in detail, organisational coupling of risk management in order to 
understand organisational logics and rationales, and to explore the alignment of risk 
management system configurations with airline contextual settings. Combining the field 
study findings with more detailed, contextualized analysis of airline risk management 
systems through case studies provided richer, more in-depth data on the investigated 
phenomena. The highly complex, contextualised and contemporary nature of the above 
mentioned aspects of the risk management phenomenon fit with the features of the case 
study methodology. Applicability of the case study methodology to this research is also 
related to the reliance of this study on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 
3. Institutional studies of management control systems and risk management systems in 
particular were often conducted through case studies (e.g. Arena et al., 2010, 2011; 
Brignall and Model, 2000; Covaleski et al., 1993; Soin et al., 2002; Granlund, 2001; 
Modell, 2001); employment of case studies conducted under the contingency theory 
perspective is less significant, yet the few existing studies offer valuable insight into 
management control systems and risk management systems (e.g. Woods, 2009, 2011). 
Different types of case studies have been conducted in the management control 
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discipline, such as exploratory, explanatory, descriptive, experimental, or illustrative  
(Ryan et al., 2002). The case studies conducted in this research combine to certain 
extents elements of exploratory and explanatory studies; they explore characteristics of 
the risk management phenomena in the analysed cases; they further explain the 
relationships between the risk management systems and their contextual settings.  
 
4.4 Definition of units of study 
The interpretive approach guiding this research suggests employment of purposeful 
sampling of information-rich units of study (Yin, 2009). Purposeful sampling involves 
using the researcher’s judgment in selecting illustrative units of study facilitating 
achievement of research objectives (Saunders et al., 2003). Sampling, based on 
dimensional lines, is usually proposed by researchers employing the field study 
methodology (e.g. Arnold, 1970; Lillis and Mundy, 2005). It consists of identifying the 
dimensions along which members of a relevant population should vary. The list of 
relevant dimensions should serve as a sampling frame for selection of a relatively small 
number of units of study from a population. Thus, the researcher critically chooses 
sampling frame parameters and selects accordingly the organisations illustrating 
features and processes of particular interest to this study. In the cases studies, of the 
initially chosen field study sample the researcher chooses the units of study most 
illustrative of the phenomenon to be explored.   
 
4.4.1 Field study sampling  
Since this research, among other objectives, is concerned with developing guidance for 
designing effective, enterprise-wide risk management systems in airlines, in the first 
instance it may suggest selecting for the field-based study a sample of airlines which 
have successfully adopted ERM principles in their organisational processes and 
structures. However, several issues arise from this rationale, which are related mainly to 
identifying organisations which have implemented truly enterprise-wide risk 
management systems. Firstly, determining the existence of ERM in airlines prior to 
conducting empirical research, based only on publicly available information, may be 
problematic, especially in terms of one-dimensional determinants of ERM adoption. 
The ERM adoption determinants referred to in former studies, such as existence of a 
CRO figure in organisations or an equivalent risk-related position (e.g. Beasley et al., 
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2008; Pagach and Warr, 2008, 2011; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2003, 2011), explain little 
about the quality, depth, breadth, and impact of organisational risk management 
processes. Apart from that, ceremonial structures of ERM can be designed by 
organisations in pursuit of compliance or other forms of external legitimacy, while 
decoupling may occur of risk management routines from rules. Thus, simplistic proxy 
measures may fail to identify organisations which have implemented truly 
comprehensive risk management systems. Similar concern can be raised regarding 
searches of publicly available information such as 10-Ks, corporate websites, proxy 
statements, or any other type of public announcement for affirmations of ERM 
adoption. This strategy seems overly simplified, as it relies on the organisation’s 
definition and perception of ERM, and again, organisations may choose to publicly 
announce adoption of ERM principles in pursuit of external legitimacy, yet may not 
follow through with it.  
 
Finally, it was evidenced in subject literature that ERM is shaped by particular 
organisational settings, and translated into different organisational structures and 
practices (e.g. Arena et al., 2010, 2011; Mikes, 2005, 2009); literature suggests that 
organisations may adopt comprehensive approaches to risk management without 
actually referring to them as ‘ERM’ (e.g. Woods, 2011). Additionally, public disclosure 
on risk management issues may concentrate on management of specific types of risks, 
while little data may be revealed on managing risks in an integrated manner (Hoyt and 
Liebenberg, 2003). Thus, judging the existence and maturity of ERM is not a 
straightforward task, and a myriad of different organisational characteristics should be 
considered. There is still a vivid discussion in subject literature on organisational 
determinants of implementation of the ERM approach (Arena et al., 2010). Keeping 
these nuances in mind, organisations in this research are selected for analysis based on 
diverse criteria, not only the proclaimed or presumed adoption of ERM.  
 
An important principle to consider is that this study should benefit from variability in 
risk management systems of the airlines forming the sample. Variability enriches the 
findings on the contextual factors determining risk management systems, and of the 
possible alternatives of their organisational configurations, while both groups of 
findings can be further translated to implications for context-sensitive designing of 
ERM systems in airlines. Similarly, findings on shortcomings and best practices of 
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current airline risk management systems, drawn from airlines with varying levels of 
maturity of risk management systems, can be further capitalised on in developing 
implications for designing effective, enterprise-wide risk management approaches. 
Following this rationale, organisations for the field study are chosen with the underlying 
aim of promoting diversity within the sample, in terms of factors which, as explained 
above, are considered likely to cause variation in the framings of risk management 
systems of particular airlines. In order to define dimensions along which organisations 
forming the sample should vary, the researcher referred, in broad terms, to the 
constructs of the theoretical framework (Chapter 3), and specifically to the typology of 
the contingency factors presented therein; thus, sampling in this research can be 
considered as theoretically grounded. Firstly, two characteristics of airline business are 
selected pertaining to two different categories of contingency factors outlined within the 
framework. The two dimensions guiding selection of the sample in this research are (1) 
size and complexity of organisational structures of airlines, and (2) location of their 
businesses.  
 
Firstly, size and complexity of organisational structures (1) pertain to the group of 
‘organisational’ contingency factors defined within the theoretical framework. Size and 
complexity of organisational structures were proved to be positively correlated in 
organisations (Beck et al., 2006), and thus in this research each of these organisational 
features is regarded as an indicator of the other, while they are both classified under the 
same dimension. Business models adopted by airlines determine the complexity of 
organisational structures and, among them, corporate governance structures (Alves and 
Barbot, 2007). Previous studies showed that complexity of governance structures is 
often related to comprehensiveness of risk management systems in organisations 
(Beasley et al., 2005; Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011). The researcher is interested in 
examining contrary cases of airlines with complex and simple organisational structures 
of the risk management function. Secondly, location of the business (2) conditions to 
some extent the contingency factors classified within the theoretical framework under 
the category ‘general environment and industry’. Airlines operating in different 
geographical markets are subject to different regulatory frameworks and different types 
of risks, both of which affect the framings of risk management systems. Therefore, this 
research aims to examine risk management structures of airlines operating in different 
geographical markets. Since a majority of airlines nowadays conduct international 
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operations, origins of the airlines and locations of their headquarters were regarded as 
indicators of their prime locations.  
 
The third category of contingency factors outlined within the theoretical framework is 
related to the organisational ‘risk profile’, and is partly affected by the factors pertaining 
to the two aforementioned categories. Airline risk profiles are influenced by their intra-
organisational characteristics and by external environments in which organisations 
operate. This group of contingency factors is not employed as a separate criterion for 
selecting the field study sample, as the typology of risks faced by particular 
organisations is difficult to define based on publicly available information prior to 
actually conducting empirical research within organisations; a sampling criterion 
derived in this manner would not be regarded as viable. Finally, the researcher defined 
an additional dimension along which airlines in the sample should vary (3), namely the 
perceived comprehensiveness of the risk management systems. The researcher was 
interested in examining the risk management structures of airlines with proclaimed 
comprehensive risk management systems, in addition to airlines where risk management 
systems are expected to be less advanced. The underlying idea is to examine, in both 
cases, the organisational designs of risk management systems and their determinants, 
with special emphasis placed on the airlines which adopted mature and advanced 
systems.  
 
In total, ten airlines were selected in order to obtain a heterogeneous sample, diverse in 
terms of geographical locations, organisational sizes and complexity, and the perceived 
advancement of their risk management systems. As argued by Lillis and Mundy (2005, 
p. 122), this sample size is appropriate for capturing “cross-case patterns in specific 
issues”. Furthermore, studies of Merchant and Manzoni (1989) and Bruns and 
McKinnon (1993), which also draw on the field study methodology, were conducted 
based on samples of similar size (12 organisations in both studies). Organisations were 
selected according to the discussed criteria, based on publicly available information. In 
total 19 organisations were invited to participate in this study, out of which, as indicated 
above, ten organisations agreed to cooperate to an extent which allowed for collecting 
satisfactory amount of empirical data. The chosen sampling strategy maximised the 
likelihood of collecting meaningful data on the subjects of interest. Due to the 
variability within the sample, observations were repeated under a variety of conditions, 
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which additionally promoted making sound inductive interferences. The following table 
(Table 4-1) provides a summary of relevant characteristics of the airlines participating 
in the field study.  
 
Table 4-1: Airlines participating in the empirical research     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Due to the confidentiality terms safeguarding the agreements with the participating 
airlines (addressed in section 4.6), this research must not reveal the identities of the 
organisations nor any data which might easily suggest their recognition.  
(1) There is only a limited number of airlines headquartered in particular countries; 
therefore, revealing locations of the headquarters of the participating organisations 
might be prejudicial to safeguarding the confidentiality of their identities. 
(2) The sizes and complexity of airline operations were defined for the needs of this 
research by the simple proxy of passengers carried in 2013 by the particular airlines. 
Airlines classified as ‘large’ carried more than 30 million passengers, ‘medium’- 
between 30 million and 10 million passengers and, finally, ‘small’ – less than 10 million 
passengers. 
Airline 
Code Location 
(1) Organisational 
Size (2)
Risk 
Management 
Approach (3)
Alpha-1 Confidential Large ERM
Alpha-2 Confidential Medium ERM
Beta Confidential Medium Traditional
Gamma Confidential Small Traditional
Delta Confidential Small Traditional
Epsilon Confidential Medium ERM
Zeta Confidential Large ERM
Eta Confidential Medium ERM
Theta Confidential Medium ERM
Iota Confidential Medium ERM
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(3) The perceived state of advancement of the risk management systems of particular 
airlines was simplistically categorised for the needs of their presentation in this chapter 
as ‘ERM’ – referring to airlines which publically indicate adoption of ERM, and 
‘traditional’ – referring to airlines which do not claim in publicly available reports the 
adoption of ERM.        
 
4.4.2 Case study sampling  
Scarcity of empirical research of organisational ERM dynamics in airlines contributed 
to the choice of the case study methodology for an in-depth analysis of a particular case 
in which ERM is considered to be at an advanced level. The selected case, code-named 
Alpha, comprises a pair of airlines, Alpha-1 and Alpha-2 forming part of a holding 
which also forms part of a large, multinational group of organisations. The first part of 
the empirical research, the field study, revealed maturity of the ERM systems adopted in 
Alpa-1 and Alpha-2. The two airlines were analysed jointly with their holding company 
due to the fact that these organisations operate under a consolidated ERM system. This 
definition of the unit of analysis allowed for explaining how the risk management is 
structured across the group of organisations, specifying cross-organisational division of 
responsibilities and accountabilities, and the reporting links.  
 
Additionally, attending to the research questions inquiring about the alignment of airline 
risk management systems with contextual forces, especially regarding adoption or non-
adoption decisions of ERM, the second case study conducted in the course of this 
research comprises an airline whose risk management system was assessed in the course 
of the field study as advanced, yet which does not claim adoption of ERM. The airline 
is code-named Beta and forms part of a large airline group. Although risk management 
systems of the Alpha and Beta airlines were assessed as advanced, the two cases present 
contrasting characteristics of proclaimed adoption and non-adoption of ERM. 
Therefore, this deliberate combination of cases does not seek direct replication, but 
rather an extension of the perspective on theoretical concepts and the practices that may 
advance the risk management discipline, even though they may not be denominated as 
ERM or may be performed outside of the risk management function (Kaplan and Mikes, 
2014). Furthermore, analytic conclusions drawn from multiple cases versus an 
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individual case are considered more compelling (Herriot and Blackstone, 1983, cited in 
Yin, 2014).   
 
4.5 Research methods  
According to Geertz (1995), in interpretive research where the field is regarded as a 
social reality, the field can only be understood if it is defined with reference to a 
theoretical framework. Thus, requirements for conducting empirical research are 
derived from the basis of the theoretical framework developed for this investigation  
(Chapter 3), combining theoretical tenets of the institutional and contingency 
perspectives. As discussed in section 3.3 of Chapter 3, this research conceptualises 
organisational dynamics of airline risk management systems under three broad 
categories of theoretical coordinates, namely context and rationalities, risk experts and 
risk management technologies; this typology was inspired by the research of Arena et 
al. (2010) and Tekathen and Dechow (2013). Context and rationalities are concerned 
with external and internal, and both technical and institutional, motivations for adoption 
of particular designs of risk management systems in airlines. This concept also refers to 
the way organisations conceptualise uncertainty into risks comprising their risk 
portfolios. The concept of risk experts refers to the roles and responsibilities assigned to 
organisation members involved in conceptualising and controlling risks. The concept of 
technologies denotes the complex set of rules, routines, and tools (instruments) enrolled 
in management of risks. Risk experts and technologies combined constitute 
organisation-specific “risk management mixes” Mikes (2009).  
 
The field study and case study methodologies chosen for this research are well fitted for 
examining the above discussed intricacies of airline risk management system designs,  
their determinants and the surrounding contexts. Empirical research methods 
encompassing strategies for collection and analysis of data (Collis and Hussey, 2003), 
are chosen in this research to fit with the requisites of the field study and case study 
methodologies, for “specific research methods might be used for different 
methodologies” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006, p. 822). The interpretive approach 
guiding this research relies on words rather than on quantification in the data collection 
and analysis, and guides the researcher in selection of methods to empirically 
investigate the studied phenomena (Morgan and Smircich, 1980).   
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4.5.1 Data collection methods  
This research falls into the realm of cross-sectional studies, for the data was collected 
from a sample of organisations within a period of three months; evolution of data over 
time is not considered in this study. In the course of both the field study and the case 
studies, data on the risk management phenomena in airlines was collected through 
multiple means according to their capacity to extract data of a qualitative nature, for the 
interpretive approach seeks to “describe, translate and otherwise come to terms with the 
meaning, not the frequency of…phenomena in the social world” (Van Maanen, 1983, p. 
9). Data was collected principally through semi-structured interviews, due to their 
potential to generate qualitative, contextualised data. Under the interpretive paradigm 
adopted for this research, interviews were employed in order to comprehend 
interviewees’ views of the nature of management control in relation to their work 
(Ahrens and Chapman, 2006); the interviews were used as a means for expressing social 
reality, rather than clarifying objective reality (Alvesson, 2003). Data collection was 
extended to include publicly available data, such as corporate reports accessible through 
airline websites or publications issued through various industry-related organisations. In 
the airlines participating in the two case studies, data collection was further 
complemented with internal documentary evidence such as risk management policies, 
procedures, and management reports. Additionally, risk management tools, such as risk 
management software, corporate risk registers, and risk maps and matrices, were 
reviewed.  
 
Semi-structured interviews  
Any attempt to investigate in detail airline risk management systems would inevitably 
fail to cover many issues due to time constraints limiting availability of the 
interviewees. Thus, the multiplicity of issues related to airline risk management was 
brought down to a limited number of themes drawn from the theoretical framework 
informing this research, and a series of descriptive, open-ended questions was 
developed. Appendices A and B offer an introduction to the interview guideline. Prior 
to conducting interviews with the selected professionals from the sample of airlines, a 
pilot study was conducted with a total of three academics and risk management 
professionals from unrelated organisations. The pilot study allowed for refining the 
questions in order to elicit more relevant information, ensuring clarity of wording of the 
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questions, and adjusting the duration of the interviews to the busy schedules of the 
interviewees.  
 
Interviews with selected airline professionals, although informal, were guided by a pre-
designed schedule, and therefore they were not completely free-flowing. The approach 
to stating questions in the interviews was largely open-ended, which provided a 
qualitative component. This interview format facilitated discussion of the issues which 
were of particular concern to the interviewees and allowed for the generation of 
supplementary questions. This choice of interview structure also allowed for modifying 
the order of the questions according to the flow of conversation, and paying extra 
attention to the topics which were of special interest to either of the parties (Creswell, 
2009). Due to the inductive nature of this empirical research, the interviewees were 
encouraged to wander freely in their responses, facilitating emergence of new lines of 
discovery that could not be anticipated ex-ante. The researcher followed interviewing 
techniques recommended in previous research (e.g. Hannabuss, 1996) in order to 
facilitate rapport and unconfined flow of information. Limiting the researcher’s role in 
steering interviewees’ narratives helped to minimise researcher bias in the collected 
data. In the data collection process, factual descriptions of the components of airline risk 
management systems were differentiated from interviewees’ personal views of their 
appropriateness, influence and usability. The interviews, guided by the earlier discussed 
theoretical coordinates, allowed for exploring individual interviewees’ roles and 
responsibilities in the risk management process, and knowledge and perspectives of 
organisational risk management structures and processes.   
 
The majority of interviews were conducted individually, allowing for recording of 
individual interpretations; in the airlines participating in the case studies informal 
discussions were additionally conducted, involving groups of airlines’ members. The 
interviews were conducted face-to-face, via telephone, or using web-based conference 
tools, depending on interviewees’ location and preferences; the use of web-based 
conference tools and telephone allowed for interviewing airline representatives from 
various geographical locations. The interviews were conducted in three different 
languages depending on the interviewees’ preferences, what facilitated expression of 
ideas unrestricted by language barriers. Interview questions were prepared according to 
the desired duration of the interviews. Interviews with the top management members to 
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be conducted in the field study and in the case studies were designed to be held for up to 
40 minutes. Interviews in the case studies with middle and lower management members 
were designed to be held for up to 30 minutes. However, during the course of the 
interviews, in the majority of cases, the participants engaged in longer discussions 
beyond the expected timeframe, reaching up to 90 minutes in the case of face-to-face 
interviews. In the airlines participating in the case study research the semi-structured 
interviews were often complemented with a less structured discussion with the most 
informative interviewees, and with their colleagues who the interviewees often referred 
the researcher to during the visits to their premises, presenting them as knowledgeable 
of the specific topics of interest to the researcher. 
 
The collection of empirical data was conducted only after ensuring participants that 
their responses would be treated as anonymous and confidential, respecting the terms 
and conditions of non-disclosure agreements signed with the individual organisations. 
Ensuring anonymity and confidentiality is believed to have improved the accuracy of 
the findings from the empirical study. Rich, qualitative, non-standardised, descriptive 
data was collected in the interview process. Nearly all interviews were digitally 
recorded with prior interviewees’ permission, and then transcribed verbatim in order to 
ensure accuracy and facilitate further analysis, while in several cases interview 
summaries were reviewed by their respective informants. Additionally, notes were 
taken during the interviews, and major ideas or thoughts were written up in more detail 
immediately following the interviews. During the face-to-face interviews the informants 
often supported their responses by presenting documentary evidence, software, or tools 
they used along the risk management process.      
 
Selection of interviewees  
Within the chosen airlines the researcher initially approached their most informative 
members, with high levels of responsibility and accountability for risk management, 
whose knowledge and experience were most relevant to this study, and who were 
believed to provide the most valuable input. The researcher believed that in order to best 
investigate diverse aspects of airline risk management systems it was necessary to reach 
professionals from the top organisational levels involved in the development of risk 
management strategies, and/or performing oversight over the risk management function. 
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Online research was conducted in order to identify the target group of professionals 
from the selected sample of organisations, and their contact data. Additionally, 
recommendations of airline professionals and their contact details were shared with the 
researcher through networking. Initial contacts were established via emails and phone 
calls inviting the professionals to participate in this study. Repetitive follow-up contacts 
were made via emails and phone calls. Referral sampling was also used in this study, as 
the interviewees indicated other knowledgeable professionals from within their 
networks in their respective organisations.  
 
As previously explained, seven of the ten approached airlines participated solely in the 
field study, while the remaining three airlines participated additionally in the case 
studies. With regard to the airlines participating in the field study only, the researcher 
interviewed some of the most knowledgeable airline members with regard to the risk 
management functions of their respective organisations, mainly responsible full-time for 
coordinating or facilitating the risk management function; in the organisations where the 
risk management function was performed on a part-time basis by their members, and 
which lacked dedicated risk management positions, the researcher interviewed diverse 
professionals knowledgeable about the risk management systems of their respective 
organisations. In the course of the field study, between one to three professionals were 
interviewed in particular organisations; if, after the first interview, not all the questions 
had been fully answered, other professionals were also invited to participate until a 
satisfactory amount and quality of data had been collected from each organisation. 
Upon completion of the field study, the empirical research was extended by two case 
studies which engaged multiple members of the selected organisations, both performing 
the risk management function on a full-time and part-time basis, such as risk 
management professionals, members of executive committees, top management, heads 
of the Internal Audit, Safety, Finance departments, and others. Not only top 
management professionals, but also middle and lower management and operational 
positions were involved in the case studies; this was due to the need to understand the 
embeddedness and awareness of the risk management principles across organisational 
hierarchies. 
    
Table 4-2 provides a tabular overview of the interviewees and the positions they held 
within their organisations. The interviews varied significantly in length and quality of 
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the information they provided, which was mainly conditioned by interviewees’ 
expertise and experience in the subjects of interest to the researcher. With the aim of 
safeguarding the undertakings of the aforementioned non-disclosure agreements signed 
with the airlines participating in this research, the titles of the positions held by the 
interviewees were purposely changed in such a way so that they only generally reflect 
the functions performed by particular individuals. Due to the specificity of some of the 
original job titles held by the interviewees, revealing them might facilitate identification 
of the airlines under study. 
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Table 4-2: Field study and case study interviewees  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Airline Code Interviewee Code Abbreviated Code
Member of the Management Committee MCM-Alpha
Chief Risk Officer CRO-Alpha
Treasury and Risk Manager TRM-Alpha
Safety Risk Manager SRM/1-Alpha
Safety Risk Manager SRM/2-Alpha
Director of Risk and Compliance DRC-Alpha
Manager of Structured Finance MSF/1-Alpha
Manager of Structured Finance MSF/2-Alpha
Structured Finance Specialist MSF/3-Alpha
Strategy and Development Analyst SDA-Alpha
Transition Specialist TS-Alpha
IS Manager ISM-Alpha
Internal Audit Specialist IA-Alpha
Ground Operations Officer GOO-Alpha
Chief Financial Officer CFO-Beta
Head of Internal Audit  HIA – Beta
Director of Compliance DC-Beta
Director of Treasury and Risk Management DTR-Beta
IT Director ITD-Beta
Head of Safety Systems HSS-Beta
Internal Audit Specialist IA/1-Beta
Internal Audit Specialist IA/2-Beta
Fleet Financing FF-Beta
Structured Finance Specialist SF-Beta
Maintenance Manager MM-Beta
Flight Safety Manager FSM-Beta
Gamma Chief Financial Officer CFO-Gamma
Delta Representative of the General Director for Network 
Planning RGD-Delta
Chief Commercial Officer CCO-Delta
Operational Research Project Manager ORM-Delta
Epsilon Head of Risk and Compliance HRC-Epsilon
Zeta Risk Management Director RMD-Zeta
Eta Manager of Risk and Compliance RCM-Eta
Theta Senior Corporate Risk Officer SCRO-Theta
Iota Risk Management Coordinator RMC-Iota
Alpha-1, Alpha 2, 
Alpha holding 
company
Beta
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4.5.2 Data analysis methods 
The methods of data analysis were selected according to how suitable they were to the 
study conducted under the interpretive paradigm. An inductive approach, associated 
with the interpretive paradigm selected for this study, was adopted in the analysis of 
empirical data. The inductive approach was associated by Creswell (2009, p. 174) with 
generating themes and patterns by categorising the data into “increasingly more abstract 
units of information”; the inductive approach attempts to “ground science in observation 
and not purely logic”, for logic is concerned with deduction of statement from other 
given statements. According to Chalmers (1996), “all that logic can offer in this 
connection is that if the premises are true and the argument is valid, then the 
conclusions must be true. But whether the premises are true or not is not a question that 
can be settled by an appeal to logic. An argument can be a perfectly valid deduction 
even if it involves a false premise” and thus “scientific knowledge cannot be derived 
from the facts if ‘derive’ is interpreted as ‘logically deduce’”. The interpretive paradigm 
proposes inducting theory from observation, yet by acknowledging that the researcher’s 
perception of the observed facts is affected by previous theories. A narrative approach 
was adopted to analyse open-ended interview questions. Contrary to the realist 
approach, which treats respondent accounts as true representations of reality 
(Silverman, 2010) and which is more typical of positivistic studies, the narrative 
approach explores individuals' subjective perceptions of reality. 
  
Techniques of organising and analysing data 
Organisation and interpretation of rich data collected throughout the field study and 
case study stages was undertaken in a rigorous and systematic manner. Data collection 
and analysis were conducted simultaneously during the interview stage. Interviews were 
transcribed verbatim and data was continuously reviewed and coded. The overall 
interpretive paradigm adopted in this study, and the requirements associated with the 
objectives of the empirical research phase, determined analysis of data by employing a 
selection of non-quantifying methods. 
 
The analysis of qualitative data was conducted in four main stages as proposed by Miles 
and Huberman (1994): data reduction, data display, conclusion drawing and verification 
of the validity of the conclusions. There are two alternative approaches for coding 
105 
 
 
 
interview data: free-coding unconstrained by prior theory and deriving codes based on 
theoretical constructs (Malina and Selto, 2001). As Miles and Huberman (1994, p.56) 
noted, “codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or 
inferential information compiled during a study. Codes are usually attached to ‘chunks’ 
of varying size – words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs”. Since prior to 
analysing the data the researcher developed a theoretical framework, interview data was 
consequently coded, using non-numeral methods, under the categories pre-defined in 
the theoretical framework and synthesised by the drawing together of relevant themes 
and concepts, following the recommendations of Yin (2009), Miles and Huberman 
(1994), and Strauss and Corbin (1998). Axial and selective coding was applied to detect 
emergent themes pertaining to particular theoretical categories, to make connections 
among the categories, to summarise them into themes, and to refine them around 
explanatory concepts. Such synthesis of data allowed for comparing it with previous 
findings collected in the desk research stage and, in particular, contrasting it with the 
theoretical background. Besides the codes derived from the framework, “free” codes 
were further developed as suggested by additional topics which emerged from the data, 
permitting empirical flexibility and revision of the existing theory (Malina and Selto, 
2001).  
 
The two data analysis techniques, deriving a matrix of categories according to 
theoretical concepts and constructing a descriptive framework of new topics emerging 
from the data, are reflected in the explanatory-exploratory character of the forthcoming 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7, which report the empirical data from this research. The use of 
qualitative coding techniques promoted completeness and rigor of the analysis and 
provided useful audit trails through multiple sources of data. Based on the theoretical 
framework developed for this study and literature review, the researcher suggested 
explanations for particular features of the observed phenomena of risk management in 
airlines. In the process of theorising (Morse, 1994), links were made with the existing 
theory, and in the process of induction the theory was extended and refined with new 
developments. The following table 4-3 presents the process of organisation and analysis 
of empirical data. Additionally, Appendix B to this thesis presents general categories of 
a coding scheme. 
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Table 4-3: Organisation and analysis of empirical data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Field Study 
1 Publicly available data
2 Interview data
2a Data reduction: Coding of interview data (codes derived from theoretical framework, 
free coding, axial and selective coding)
Discarding irrelevant data
2b Data display Organising data into themes
3 Verification Constrasting findings from different data sources
4 Drawing conclusions
Case Study 
5 Publicly available data
6 Interview data
6a Data reduction: Coding of interview data (codes derived from theoretical framework, 
free coding, axial and selective coding)
Discarding irrelevant data
6b Data display Organising data into themes
7 Internal documentation
8 Risk management tools and technologies
9 Verification Constrasting findings from different data sources
10 Drawing conclusions
Review of  risk management software, corporate risk registers, and risk maps and 
matrices
Organisation and analysis of empirical data
Explores: 1) diversity of configurations of airline risk management systems, 2)  their technical and institutional 
determinants, 3) assimilation of ERM principles in airlines
Explores: 1) organisational coupling of risk management, 2) the links with organisational logics, 3) the 
rationales for the alignment of airline risk management systems with their respective business contexts
Review of publicly available data regarding organisational risk management systems 
Review of publicly available data regarding organisational risk management systems 
Analysis of risk management policies, procedures, and management reports
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4.6 Ethical considerations  
Conducting research with human subjects may pose ethical concerns regarding the well-
being of the participants. The following discussion contemplates various ethical issues 
related to participation in the empirical study, confidentiality of data, anonymity of 
informants and their respective organisations, and security of the collected data. The 
Research Ethics Committee of the Brunel Business School approved on the procedures 
of the empirical research, which were later meticulously followed by the researcher.  
 
Participation in the study was voluntary. Informants were provided upfront in writing 
with a brief overview of this research, information on the requirements for participation, 
description of the data collection process, and they were assured that the data revealed 
in the course of their participation would be confidential. Participants were informed of 
their right to refuse to complete the study at any point or to answer any questions with 
which they might feel uncomfortable, and to approach the researcher with any doubts 
they might have. Permission was obtained from the informants relevant to the use of 
any data which was not publicly available shared by them in any forms other than 
verbatim.   
 
This research respected informants’ right to confidentiality and anonymity. Empirical 
data was collected only after ensuring the informants that any type of publication 
drawing on this study would not reveal any data which might allow the readers to 
deduct informants’ identities or the identities of their respective organisations. Thus, 
informants to this study and their respective organisations are referred to in this thesis in 
a codified manner. Non-disclosure agreements were signed between the researcher and 
the organisations participating in this study, assuring that confidential data would be 
accessible only to authorised members of academic institutions assessing this research.  
The researcher ensured security and confidentiality of empirical data by employing 
diverse measures. The encrypted data is stored on password-protected devices. The 
transcription of all interviews was carried out by the researcher.    
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4.7 Limitations of the field study and case study research, and reliability and 
validity considerations 
Adoption of the interpretive research paradigm as a basis for this study, and the 
subsequent choice of the field study and case study methodologies, allowed the 
researcher to fully explore the research questions stated for this study. However, the 
chosen methodological approach entails a series of concerns relating to validity and 
reliability of data collected in the course of this research and the findings it produced.  
 
This interpretive research aimed to provide credible accounts and understanding of 
airline risk management systems, by applying correct procedures in response to research 
questions and to produce convincing accounts as an implication of the research. 
Reliability of findings in this context can be challenged with the question, if based on 
the collected data, repeated assessment would provide findings consistent with the ones 
initially delivered. Although reliability tends to be low in interpretive studies, the 
researcher undertook efforts to conduct the research process in a systematic, rigorous, 
and well documented manner, and thus to assure reliability of this study. A consistent 
data collection protocol was employed in collecting data from different organisations. 
The data analysis framework was described in terms of coding procedures. The research 
procedures were duly reported and documented, with interview protocols and transcripts 
available for an independent review. Considering the interpretive nature of this research 
exploring social reality surrounding the risk management phenomena in organisations, 
the researcher interacted with representatives of the organisations participating in this 
study and thus cannot be regarded as a neutral, independent observer. In response to this 
concern, this research employed various means to mitigate the data and researcher 
biases in interpreting social reality. Multiple sources of evidence were collected and 
contrasted; interview data was corroborated with multiple types of documentary 
evidence. The triangulation of data improved construct validity of this research. Finally, 
by employment of the field study, apart from the case study methodology, the 
methodology bias was naturally reduced; the field study methodology chosen for 
conducting this research benefits, to some extent, from the breadth and depth of studies 
usually associated with alternative methodologies such as case study and survey.  
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Table 4-4: Triangulation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Validity is concerned with the extent to which the designed research process allows for 
assessing what it meant to assess and what is claimed by the researcher, and the extent 
to which it accurately reflects the state of reality; validity can be considered in terms of 
internal and external validity (Yin, 2009). Internal validity is concerned with legitimacy 
of results deriving from adopting accurate sample and diligent data collection and 
analysis protocols. The internal validity of this study was assured by conducting the 
research based on a carefully selected sample, and by applying appropriate and diligent 
data collection and analysis procedures. By applying the interpretive paradigm to this 
research, rich, contextualised insights were extracted on the investigated phenomena. 
The researcher embraced and became involved in the context of the phenomena, 
assuring that findings properly reflect the context from which they are drawn. Although 
interpretive research may be criticised for poor definition of theoretical grounding and 
fuzzy definition of research protocols, which poses concerns for its internal validity, in 
response to this threat the researcher developed a strong theoretical foundation prior to 
conducting the empirical study, and identified the constructs in the theoretical 
framework which were to be investigated empirically. A clear connection between the 
Field Study Case Study 
Interviews Interviews: contrasting opinions of multiple 
organisation members at different organisational 
levels
Publicly available data: corporate reports accessible 
though airline websites or publications issued 
through various industry-related organisations
Publicly available data: corporate reports accessible 
though airline websites or publications issued 
through various industry-related organisations
Internal documentation: as risk management policies,
procedures, and management reports
Risk management tools and technologies: risk
management software, corporate risk registers, and 
risk maps and matrices
Theory/ perspective : Data examined and interpreted from contingency theory and institutional theory 
perspective
Methodology: Field study combined with a case study in order to a) verify and b) extend findings 
Triangulation
Data sources:
 
Verification of consistency of data proceeding from: 
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interview protocol and the theoretical constructs was assured, adding rigor to the 
analytical procedures and assuring data was collected within a tightly defined domain. 
Meanwhile, the research protocol still allowed for capturing contextual variability 
related to particular theoretical constructs. Linking the analytical procedures to theory 
promoted “completeness” in assessing the constructs in relation to the cases 
investigated, which additionally improved credibility of data (Lillis and Mundy, 2005). 
Apart from constructing the research protocol, theoretical constructs were used in this 
research to guide the data analysis process, such as coding of data and their  
arrangement into themes. Such analysis allowed for interpretation of data based on 
existing theory. Rival explanations for data were contrasted, and the researcher 
additionally examined patterns in the collected data. 
 
External validity is concerned with generalisability of research findings, or their 
transferability to other populations. Since interpretive studies tend to be highly 
contextualised, questions may arise about the generalisability of their provisions 
(Greene and Caracelli, 1997). This limitation of the qualitative approach generates 
doubts about extrapolation of findings from qualitative studies. However, Yin (2009) by 
specifically referring to the case study approach, argued that qualitative studies can be 
generalised to theoretical propositions (analytic generalisation) rather than to broader 
populations (statistical generalisation). The researcher acknowledges the limitation of 
the chosen methodology for conducting the empirical study regarding statistical 
generalisation from the findings. This limitation is believed to have been partly 
outweighed by providing rich and contextualised data which allowed for generating 
patterns and concepts and for making conceptual developments in the area of airline risk 
management systems. Norman (1970) argued about the possibility to generalise from 
few cases if the analysis has captured correctly the characteristics of the research 
phenomena and generated concepts, patterns or theories which, although generated in a 
particular environment, can be transferred to other environments. The researcher 
deliberately employed a sampling strategy which maximised variability in relevant 
dimensions of the sample in order to gain a meaningful comparative of data in the 
particular dimensions. Data was further analysed in a systematic manner, allowing for 
drawing patterns across cases. Thus, the researcher gained confidence in transferability 
of the observed patterns and theoretical concepts and principles to other members of the 
population of commercial airlines. Results obtained from this research highlight 
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important factors of organisational coupling of airline risk management systems, 
rationalities behind the selection of particular framings of such systems, and ‘best 
practices’ in the area of airline risk management; these results are relevant to other 
organisational settings beyond the investigated sample.  
 
Quality considerations  
There has been growing debate within social sciences regarding assessments of the 
accomplishments of qualitative research (Baxter and Chua, 2008). Apart from 
evaluating the reliability and validity of this study, alternative validation criteria of 
particular relevance to qualitative research are considered. In the debate on the 
appropriateness of criteria for evaluating interpretive research, scholars proposed a 
variety of different assessment measures such as “trustworthiness”, “methodological” or 
“interpretive rigour”, or “convincingness”, argued respectively by Stiles (1993),  Fossey 
et al. (2002), and Golden‐Biddle and Locke (2003). The latter argued that interpretive 
researchers can convincingly validate their insights based on qualitative data by 
adhering to the criteria of authenticity, plausibility, and criticality.  
 
Authenticity of research refers to providing written assurance of the researcher’s 
genuine presence and comprehension of the investigated field. The authenticity criterion 
was fulfilled in this research by facilitating analysis of the airline management and risk 
management fields, and by providing rich descriptions of the empirical study conducted 
in the fields. Plausibility in qualitative research refers to providing credible, rigorous 
accounts of the fields, assuring that “renditions of the field make sense” (Baxter and 
Chua, 2008, p. 104), connecting the reader with the studied phenomena in such a way 
that it facilitates easy understanding. Plausibility of this research was assured through 
linking the provisions of the contingency and institutional theory perspectives to 
interpretation of the data collected in the empirical study and to inductive reasoning, 
and assuring accurateness of the interpretations drawn from the data. As claimed by 
Ahrens and Chapman (2006, p. 820), “the task of connecting data and theory to 
compelling research questions [author: in qualitative research] is a source of great 
discipline”. According to Lukka and Modell (2010), authenticity and plausibility share 
an “intricate relationship” and are suitable criteria for the validation of highly 
descriptive and explanatory interpretive research. Finally, criticality refers to the 
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imaginative possibilities which may be provoked by empirical research, such as raising 
new research ideas or questions from the research (Golden-Biddle and Locke, 1993). 
Criticality of this research was achieved by challenging the reader to consider various 
possible interpretations of data, providing guidance through novel ways of thinking and 
interpretation of theoretical constructs underlying the empirical study.  
 
4.8 Conclusions 
This chapter discussed the overall philosophical approach and the consequent design 
chosen for this research. The interpretive paradigm perceives reality as a social 
construction, and thus it best fits the nature of the research problem explored in this 
study, defining risk management in terms of a social phenomenon. The interpretive 
paradigm and the questions which this research seeks to answer jointly determine the 
choice of the field study and case study methodologies that allow for considering the 
complexity and importance of contextual issues in exploring the risk management 
phenomena in airlines. The field study and case study methodologies are consistent with 
the theoretical framework informing this research. Institutional and contingency 
theoretical perspectives provided accounts for conceptualising airline risk management 
structures and practices and their determinants, and provided the framing for conducting 
empirical research.  
 
The interpretive approach has often been adopted by scholars exploring organisational 
management control systems in general, and risk management systems in particular 
from the institutional theory perspective, and less from the contingency theory 
perspective. Notwithstanding, scarce previous research has adopted the methodological 
approach as employed in this study to explore organisational risk management systems 
and their determinants. The empirical study of airline risk management systems relied 
mostly on semi-structured interviews and documentary evidence, emphasising words 
rather than measurement in the collection and analysis of data. The philosophical and 
methodological choices underlying this study allowed for achieving a “fit”, as described 
by Silverman (1993, pp. 1–2), necessary for a qualitative study to contribute to the 
literature.  
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Empirical research conducted as described herein, allowed the researcher to collect data 
regarding the designs of airline risk management systems and institutional and technical 
determinants of such systems. Analysis of the empirical data, complemented with 
findings from the literature review (Chapter 2), led the researcher to develop an ERM 
framework in the airline industry, which conveys key drivers of effective risk 
management in airlines. The following Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present findings from the 
empirical research. 
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Chapter 5 
Field Study: Airline Risk Management Structures, Practices, and their 
Determinants 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical evidence from a field study undertaken in ten 
international airlines. The filed study attained to the research questions as outlaid in 
Chapter 1 (section 1.6), and collected data of airline risk management contexts and 
rationalities, risk experts, and risk management technologies as defined in Chapter 3 
(section 3.3). In particular, the field study was focused on exploring the diverse 
configurations of airline risk management systems and their determining forces, while it  
also set out to assess assimilation of ERM principles in airlines, additionally revealing a 
series of ‘best practices’ of their adopted approaches. The field study findings are 
elaborated on in two case studies presented in Chapters 6 and 7, which deepen the 
understanding of organisational couplings of airline risk management systems and their 
alignment with airlines’ respective business contexts.  
 
A combined approach of contingency and institutional perspectives is applied in order 
to examine the diversity of configurations of airline risk management approaches, and 
the determinants of risk management rules and routines constituting such approaches. 
The analysis presented herein considers airlines in the context of a wider organisational 
field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), comprising actors, logics and governance structures 
which, in aggregate, constitute a recognised area of institutional life. As suggested by 
Scott and Mayer (1991), the forthcoming analysis considers the interdependence of 
airlines’ institutional environment and task environment; the latter assigns meaning to 
airline risk management structures within airlines’ technical goals, and emphasises the 
efficiency and effectiveness principles of organising towards achieving improved 
technical performance.  
 
This chapter commences with a cross-organisational analysis of institutional pressures 
and technical factors denominated herein as contingency factors, determining 
organisational designs of airline risk management systems. The analysis considers 
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multiple institutional demands imposed on airlines by their corresponding external and 
internal institutional environments, emanating from airlines’ broader regulatory, social, 
and cultural contexts (Pache and Santos, 2010). In addition, the analysis considers 
external contingency factors related to airline environment and the industry, internal, 
organisation-specific factors, and factors related to the typology of risks that airline risk 
management frameworks target to address. Secondly, the analysis focuses on the formal 
and informal institutions at a micro-organisational level (Scott, 2001), combined with 
the systems of rules and routines, evidencing systematic variations between them. The 
following part of this chapter introduces a critical, multi-dimensional analysis of the 
attributes of maturity of airline risk management systems. The final section draws 
conclusions from this chapter. For the comfort of the reader, the field study findings 
presented herein have been summarised in tables, while an extended analysis of the 
findings, with supportive quotes from the interviewees, is enclosed in Appendix C to the 
thesis.   
 
5.2 Determinants of airline risk management approaches 
Following the recommendations of, among others, Scott and Mayer (1991), Carruthers 
(1995), Suddaby (2010), (Gupta et al., 1994), and Baxter and Chua (2003), this section 
presents the factors exerting determining power over airlines’ risk management rules 
and routines, by recognising the effects of both task and institutional environments; the 
institutional and technical realms are considered as two interdependent dimensions. 
Extending the organisational analysis beyond the technical aspects of environment by 
including the institutional aspects, facilitates gaining a better understanding of the 
contextual requirements, and of the risk management systems themselves (Suddaby, 
2010). The following report of field study findings considers an interplay of factors 
which directly affect the design choices of airline risk management systems as per their 
rules and routines, and the factors which drive adoption decisions and implementation 
of increasingly enterprise-wide risk management approaches.  
 
5.2.1 Institutional pressures  
Under the (neo) institutional perspective, the environment is viewed as a location of 
institutional rules which exert a deterministic influence over organisational structures 
and practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott and Meyer, 
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1983). Conformance to the institutionalised norms is believed to produce legitimacy, 
which, under the aforementioned perspective, is considered as the main adaptive force 
of organisations, regardless of whether the newly adopted structures and practices lead 
to improved technical performance (Castel and Fredberg, 2004). The findings presented 
in this section consider specifically the multiple institutional demands imposed on 
airlines by their corresponding external and internal institutional environments, 
emanating from airlines’ broader regulatory, social, and cultural contexts (Pache and 
Santos, 2010). 
 
Drawing on the concepts proposed by DiMaggio and Powell (1983), who observed how 
organisations within their respective organisational fields become isomorphic with their 
common institutional environment, the following analysis considers coercive, 
normative, mimetic, institutional pressures and other external institutional pressures. 
Actors within organisations act accordingly to institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio, 
1999) such as values and norms, ideas, beliefs, and broader meanings systems (Scott, 
2010), which influence how actors understand priority goals of organisational strategies 
and, within them, the risk management strategy, and how uncertainty is conceptualised 
in organisations. Therefore, internal institutional pressures, derived from institutional 
logics ingrained within organisations, are also considered in this analysis. The following 
table (5-1) provides an overview of the external and internal institutional pressures 
which, as indicated by the interviewees, influenced the rules and routines of their 
respective risk management systems (see also Appendix C for relevant interviewees’ 
arguments).  
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Table 5-1: Institutional pressures influencing airline risk management systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Coercive pressures 
The interviewees of this field study suggested relevance of three major types of coercive 
pressures influencing the designs of airline risk management rules and routines. They 
emphasised the influence of the regulatory framework governing airline operations, the 
regulatory requirements for listed companies, and the requirement of demonstrating 
financial strength to rating agencies. 
 
 
Pressures / Airlines Alpha-1 Alpha-2 Beta Gamma Delta Epsilon Zeta Eta Theta Iota
External institutional pressures
Coercive pressures
Regulatory framework 
governing airline operations
X X X X X X X X
Regulatory requirements for 
listed companies
X X X
Rating agencies assessment 
methodologies
X X
Mimetic pressures
Influence of  the approach 
adopted in group organisations
X X X X X X X
Adoption of best practices of 
other organisations
X
Normative pressures
Professionalization of the risk 
management field
X X X X X
Recommendations from 
consulting companies
Z Y X X
Other external institutional 
pressures
Meeting shareholder 
expectations
Credibility in the eyes of capital 
providers
X X
Internal institutional pressures
Impulses from management 
team
X X X
Organisational culture X X X X
X - evident - clearly stated and/or agreement on the argument between organization members
Y - not evident  - contrary opinions of different organization members
Z - discarded  - in the eyes of the interviewees does not apply to their organization 
X* or Y* - applies to the Alpha holding company and/or the Alpha group
X*
X*
X*
Y*
Y*
X*
X*
X*
X*
X*
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Regulatory framework governing airline operations 
 Interviewees from all ten airlines pointed out the importance of the regulatory 
framework governing numerous areas of airline operations; the interviewees 
pointed out that the regulatory framework has an impact on organisational 
structures and practices of airlines in general (in multiple areas), and also 
specifically the risk management rules and routines.  
 Although the regulatory frameworks relevant to particular airlines impose standards 
and requirements for multiple areas of business operations, it is the air transport 
associations (for example, IATA), rather than the regulators, who advocate best 
practices in the area of centralised management of corporate risks, in addition to 
issuing recommendations and requirements for management of operational, safety, 
or hazard risks.   
 
Regulatory requirements for listed companies 
 Evidence supporting the influence of regulatory requirements applicable to listed 
companies on airline risk management structures and practices was found in a 
cluster of both publicly traded and privately held airlines - Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Beta, 
Gamma, and Zeta. 
 The case of Beta provided additional evidence of airline’s concern for compliance 
of its integrated internal control and risk management systems with the regulatory 
framework, and specifically with the ICFR framework.  
 A possibility of legitimacy motivations for developing auditable trails of advanced 
risk management systems in organisations was indicated in the field study, which 
may not be matched with organisational routines. It is an interesting notion in the 
context of increasingly growing expectations of the involvement of organisational 
boards in instituting sound corporate governance systems and assuring reliability of 
public disclosures of performance data.   
 
Rating agencies´ assessment methodologies 
The interviews with airline representatives suggested that airline risk management 
approaches are driven by the concern for demonstrating financial strength to the rating 
agencies.  
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b) Mimetic pressures 
The field study findings revealed two types of mimetic pressures occurring among the 
airlines forming the sample. The majority of airlines demonstrated that their risk 
management structures and practices have been influenced by the risk management 
approaches adopted in other organisations from their respective groups. Adoption of 
best practices of unrelated organisations from both the airline industry and other 
industries was also discussed with airline representatives, yet scarce evidence was found 
for this mimetic pressure.  
 
Influence of the approach adopted in group organisations 
Field study evidence demonstrated how the risk management approaches of nine out of 
ten airlines forming the sample were influenced by the pressures exerted by other 
organisations from their respective groups. Although some interviewees pointed out 
synergies achieved through affiliation with airline or multi-enterprise groups and 
adopting unified rules across group organisations, contradictory opinions were 
expressed by others regarding their perceived usefulness of the alignments developed, 
to varying extents, between the risk management systems of the investigated airlines 
and their respective groups. Additionally, the high uncertainty of airline business 
environment was mentioned as a reason for airlines to model their risk management 
systems on those of other organisations.       
 
Adoption of best practices of other organisations 
The field study interviews provided records of varying extents of airlines’ modelling of 
risk management structures or practices on those of other organisations outside of their 
respective groups.  
 
c) Normative pressures 
The findings revealed that professionalisation of the risk management field had an 
influence on risk management structures and practices of some of the airlines forming 
the field study sample. The professionalisation mechanisms relevant to the airlines 
under study were evidenced to be primarily related to an increasing popularity of 
normative guidance in the risk management discipline provided by organisations such 
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as COSO or ISO, and to recommendations from air transport associations regarding 
strengthening governance over airline risks. The interviewees also pointed to the role of 
the consulting companies in shaping airline risk management practices and structures.     
 
Professionalisation of the risk management field 
The interviewees reported on the influence of the international risk management 
standards and frameworks such as COSO or ISO31000 in framing of the risk 
management systems of their organisations; these landmark frameworks guided 
development of organisational risk management rules, causing a certain level of 
coherence among them. However, the analysis showed how risk management routines 
became institutionalised in the organisations adhering to the requirements of their 
specific intra- and extra-organisational contexts, causing diversity at operational and 
performance level of the risk management functions. It was also emphasised in some 
airlines that although the risk management models of their respective organisations 
incorporate general principles of such standards and frameworks, more importantly they 
have been designed to fit with the particular risk management approaches the airlines 
aimed to adopt. The interviewees, when asked about the recommendations from air 
transport associations such as IATA or ICAO regarding their effects on airline risk 
management systems, would primarily focus their responses on issues related to 
selected dimensions of risk management, such as safety, fatigue, hazard exposures, and 
many others. Surprisingly enough, however, although some of interviewees 
acknowledged familiarity with the recommendations of air transport associations 
regarding ERM, they did not indicate them as relevant determinants of the risk 
management approaches of their respective organisations.  
 
Recommendations from consulting companies 
Representatives of six airlines reported having been advised by consulting companies in 
the development or optimisation of their risk management systems. However, opinions 
varied in respect to the usefulness and applicability of consulting advice, which 
influenced the ERM adoption decision in airlines rather than its implementation across 
the organisations.  
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d) Other external institutional pressures 
Apart from the trio of coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures often discussed in 
academic literature under the institutional perspective, the field study signalled 
relevance of additional external legitimacy pressures which are related to gaining 
credibility in the eyes of capital providers, which is also related to the aforementioned 
findings of rating agency influences such as meeting shareholder expectations or 
gaining credibility in the eyes of capital provides.  
 
e) Internal institutional pressures 
The interviewees indicated two additional types of institutional pressures, stemming 
from the inside of the organisations, which are impulses from the management team and 
organisational culture. 
   
Impulses from the management team 
Representatives of all the airlines from the sample claiming adoption of ERM 
mentioned in the interviews in general terms the role of ‘tone from the top’; the 
interviews suggested the importance of the commitment of management teams in ERM 
adoption decisions and ERM implementation processes.  
 
Organisational culture 
Organisational culture was evidenced in this study to affect the way in which airlines 
conceptualise risks, form risk management rules, and enact risk management routines. 
The interviewees reported on cultural influences of their respective countries and 
organisations, as well as on the effects of institutional versus private ownership 
structures, on the adoption of particular risk management approaches.  
 
5.2.2 Contingency factors  
Having reported in the previous section on the effects of institutional environments on 
the designs of airline risk management systems, in this section the researcher extends 
the analysis and, additionally, recognises the effects of task environments through the 
lens of the structural contingency theory. Under the structural contingency theory, 
organisations adapt their structures to best fit with their rational, task environments 
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(Donaldson, 1996). The primary imperative for organisations within the task 
environment is to adapt their structures so that they enhance organisational efficiency 
and effectiveness (Scott 2003).  
 
Influences of the task environment on airline risk management systems were 
denominated in this research as the contingency factors. In order to develop discrete 
classes of contingent factors relevant to the subject of this research, the researcher drew 
on the work of Miller (1992) and Kaplan and Miles (2014). Miller (1992) proposed a 
framework for categorising uncertainties which determine organisational risk 
management responses; three broad categories of uncertainties were considered, related 
to “general environment”, “industry”, and “firm-specific variables”. Kaplan and Mikes 
(2014) proposed three broad categories of contingency factors, or “contingency 
variables” as denominated by the authors, conditioning the design of organisational risk 
management systems; the “contingency framework” suggested by Kaplan and Mikes 
(2014) distinguished between “firm variables”, “industry variables”, and “risk 
variables”. In a previous study (2012) Kaplan and Mikes proposed a taxonomy for 
classifying different types of risks according to their sources, degrees of controllability, 
and approaches required for their identification, mitigation, and management; three 
major risk categories were proposed: preventable, strategy, and external risks. Thus, 
drawing on the work of Miller (1992) and Kaplan and Mikes (2014), this research 
considers three broad categories of contingency factors: external factors related to the 
environment and the industry, internal, organisation-specific factors, and factors related 
to the typology of risks that airline risk management frameworks target to address. The 
following table (5-2) provides an overview of the contingency factors which, as 
indicated by the interviewees, affected airline risk management rules and routines, 
classified into the three aforementioned categories (see also Appendix C for relevant 
interviewees’ arguments).  
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Table 5-2: Contingency factors influencing airline risk management systems 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a) Environmental and industry-related contingency factors 
Uncertainty of airline operating environment was a frequently occurring theme in the 
discussions held with the interviewees. They would underline the uncertainties in 
multiple dimensions of airline business context, such as macroeconomic volatility, 
political and social instability, and uncertainty related to natural environment, among 
others. The high volatility and uncertainty characteristic of the airline industry was 
commonly recognised in the field study to drive development of airline risk 
management systems.  
 
Within the broad category of ‘environmental and industry-related’ contingency factors, 
one group of factors, related to volatility of the macroeconomic environment, was 
regarded as especially relevant by the interviewees. Macroeconomic volatility was also 
reported to have a strong influence on demand for airline services, while cyclicality, 
apart from seasonality of airline business, was emphasised. Representatives of all ten 
airlines forming the sample for this research stressed the importance of managing 
Drivers / Airlines Alpha-1 Alpha-2 Beta Gamma Delta Epsilon Zeta Eta Theta Iota
Environmental and industry-related contingency factors
Macroeconomic volatility X X X X X X X X
Uncertainty of natural 
environment
X X X X X X X X
Politican and social 
instabilities X X X
Competitive environment X X
Organisation-specific contingency factors
Organisational size and 
complexity 
X X X X
Organisational strategies and 
objectives X X X X X
Ownership structures X X X X X X X
Contingency factors of airline risk profiles
Typology of risks in airline 
risk portfolios
X X X X X X X X X X
X - evident - clearly stated and/or agreement on the argument between organization members
Y - not evident  - contrary opinions of different organization members
Z - discarded  - in the eyes of the interviewees does not apply to their organization 
X* or Y* - applies to the Alpha holding company and/or the Alpha group
X*
X*
X*
X*
X*
X*
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broadly defined macroeconomic risks, among which they considered the most relevant 
to be volatility of jet fuel prices, currency exchange rates, and interest rates.  
 
Findings from the interviews suggest that management of financial and market risks is 
considered one of the major pillars of airlines’ risk management frameworks, 
independently of the maturity level of airlines’ risk management approaches, or 
interviewees’ functions within their respective organisations. All ten airlines have 
structures and practices in place for the management of financial and market exposures. 
The importance of creating risk management systems directed specifically at managing 
operational, safety, or hazard risks related to natural hazards was emphasised; airline 
businesses are susceptible to uncertainty and hazards related to the natural environment.  
 
Field study findings underlined the importance of responding to risks embedded in 
political or social contexts, which required maintaining flexibility in airline operational 
and business planning. Geopolitical instability in various areas of the world was 
reported to have a major impact on airlines’ operations. As per the industry-related 
contingency factors, in the discussions with airlines’ representatives issues related to the 
competitive environment were mentioned as another variation of contingency factors 
influencing airline risk management approaches; by way of an example, the need for 
aligning strategic planning with risk management processes in the context of dynamic 
changes in the airline market structure was underlined.  
 
b) Organisation-specific contingency factors  
Findings from this study provided evidence that the size and complexity of 
organisational structures and operations were important determinants of the design 
choices of airline risk management systems; the level of formalisation of the airline risk 
management approaches was often linked with organisational sizes and complexity, yet 
the need to adopt risk management systems aligned with unique organisational 
structures and needs was also discussed. Another group of internal contingency factors 
can be broadly defined as related to organisational strategies and the objectives they are 
driven with. The interviewees reported on numerous achieved or perceived benefits of 
developing ever more structured and comprehensive risk management approaches, 
which were generally believed to enhance the achievement of organisational objectives. 
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The increasingly advanced designs of airline risk management systems were reported to 
be determined by organisational attempts to achieve the objectives set out in 
organisational strategies.  
 
c) Contingency factors related to airline risk profile   
As is broadly conveyed across this thesis, airline risk profiles are affected by factors 
stemming from both external and internal institutional and task environments, while 
organisational logics also strongly influence the way in which airlines conceptualise 
uncertainty into risks forming their risk portfolios, and the way in which priority is 
assigned to management of particular risks. As previously discussed, Kaplan and Mikes 
(2012, 2014) argued organisational risk management systems should be tailored to the 
typology of risks that organisations face, while distinguishing between three major 
groups of risks characterised by different degrees of controllability and probability of 
occurrence and impact – preventable risks, risks related to strategy-execution, and 
external risks which require different approaches to their identification, mitigation and 
management. This field study provided evidence that the design choices of the risk 
management systems of all ten airlines forming the sample were conditioned by the 
nature and volatility of risks forming their risk portfolios, and by organisational 
perception of priority of particular exposures over others.  
  
Independently of the level of maturity and advancement of airlines’ risk management 
approaches (further discussed in section 5.3.2), all ten airlines under study proved to 
have structures in place facilitating the management of, among others, financial, safety, 
and hazard exposures, and contingency plans related to risks of operational disruptions. 
However, aside from the impact of regulatory requirements enforcing the development 
of risk management structures in airlines targeting specific types of exposures, evidence 
was found to support the argument of airline risk management rules and routines being 
aligned to the typology of risks which the airlines considered most relevant to their 
businesses.  
 
5.3 Review of airline risk management systems 
 The contingency theory perspective adopted in the study of management control 
systems conveys that control system structures are contingent upon the context of 
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organisational settings and the strategic focus adopted by organisations; there is no 
“universally appropriate” control system applicable to all organisations and in all 
circumstances (Otley, 1980). The preceding sections reviewed a variety of institutional 
pressures and contingency factors determining the design choices of airline risk 
management systems. This section briefly presents empirical evidence of the designs of 
airline risk management systems, while it examines homogeneity and variability of such 
systems and assesses their corresponding levels of advancement. Appendix C to this 
thesis extends on the different characteristics of airline risk management systems and 
quotes interviewees’ opinions in support of the findings presented therein.  
 
5.3.1 Characteristics of airline risk management systems 
From the perspective of old institutional economics (as discussed by Burns, 2000), 
airline risk management systems are conceptualised in this research as a constellation of 
formal institutions grounded in procedures, manuals, formal rules, and informal 
institutions with rule-like status, which are developed as institutionalised routines 
(Scapens, 1994). This research analyses risk management rules and routines, and 
explores in situ their enactment and reproduction through the actions of organisational 
actors (Burns and Scapens, 2000). The phenomenon of risk management in airlines is 
explored at different organisational levels, revealing diversity in risk management rules 
and routines designed to fit different organisational purposes. The configurations of 
airline risk management systems are articulated in this study through four principal 
dimensions. The comparative considers the level of structuring and formalisation of 
airline risk management frameworks, distribution of roles and responsibilities along risk 
management processes performed across organisations, as well as the methodologies 
and tools employed in performing these processes. In order to provide a useful context 
for interpreting the particular configurations of airline risk management systems, the 
following comparative reviews the perceived status of risk management systems in the 
particular airlines, as articulated by their respective members; the perceptions of the 
state of development of such systems should facilitate understanding of the design 
choices related to the risk management function. The following table 5-3 presents 
interviewees’ perceptions of the state of development of the risk management systems 
employed in their respective organisations.    
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Table 5-3: Perceived status of risk management development 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Perceived status of risk management development 
Seven out of ten airlines forming the sample claimed adoption of the ERM approach in 
publicly available reports: Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Epsilon, Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota; the 
risk management approaches of these airlines were generally regarded as mature by 
their interviewed members. Representatives of Beta reported that the risk management 
system is currently in transition toward a more enterprise-wide approach. The risk 
management systems of Gamma and Delta were recognised by their organisation 
members as rather basic and traditional in terms of focusing risk management efforts on 
selected types of exposures such as safety and security, hazard, or financial risks. 
However, judging the levels of advancement and maturity of ERM based solely on the 
perceptions of organisation members may be problematic, as it is conditioned on their 
levels of knowledge and expertise of risk management best practices developed across 
industries. Additionally, as signalled in the preceding sections of this chapter, 
organisations may claim adoption of ERM in pursuit of external legitimacy, while the 
depth and breadth of implementation of ERM principles in their structures and 
processes may be low. Therefore, the researcher conducted an independent analysis of 
Airline 
Code
Perceived Status of Risk Management Development
Alpha-1 Officially adopted ERM, perceived as mature
Alpha-2 Officially adopted ERM, perceived as mature
Beta
Effective risk management system, in transition,  planned 
ERM adoption
Gamma
Basic yet considered relatively well suited to airline's needs, 
recognised need for improvement; further development not 
probable in the near future
Delta Basic, siloed approach, recognised need for development, 
discussions on introduction of a more structured approach
Epsilon Officially adopted ERM, perceived as mature
Zeta Officially adopted ERM, perceived as mature
Eta Officially adopted ERM, perceived as mature
Theta Officially adopted ERM, perceived as mature
Iota Officially adopted ERM, perceived as mature
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the state of development of airlines’ risk management approaches and contrasted it with 
the perceptions and announcements of airline members, additionally discussing the 
issues of ceremonial versus instrumental ERM adoptions, external legitimacy, and 
decoupling between risk management rules and routines. The following table 5-4 
summarises the main characteristics of the risk management systems of the airlines 
under study.   
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Methodology Tools
Alpha-1 Highly formalized Formalized, enterprise-wide methodology; 
standardized at group level
Risk maps, risk registers, risk 
management software
Alpha-2 Highly formalized Formalized, enterprise-wide methodology; 
standardized at group level
Risk maps, risk registers, risk 
management software
Beta
Formalized 
management of 
selected types of risks
Risk management responsibility assigned to Internal Audit Methodology defined for selected groups 
of risks
Risk maps, matrices, risk 
registers
Gamma Minimally formalized Local, separate risk management units responsible for 
segmental risks; lack of a central coordinating unit
Methodology defined for selected groups 
of risks
Basic risk registers
Delta Minimally formalized Local, separate risk management units responsible for 
segmental risks; lack of a central coordinating unit
Methodology defined for selected groups 
of risks
Basic risk registers
Epsilon Highly formalized 
Centralized coordination of ERM at the executive level by 
dedicated units; risk ownership assigned across the 
organisation
Formalized, enterprise-wide methodology; 
standardized at group level
Risk maps, risk registers, risk 
management software
Zeta Highly formalized 
Centralized coordination of ERM at the executive level by 
dedicated units; risk ownership assigned across the 
organisation
Formalized, enterprise-wide methodology; 
standardized at group level
Risk maps, risk registers, risk 
management software
Eta Highly formalized 
Centralized coordination of ERM at the executive level by 
dedicated units; risk ownership assigned across the 
organisation
Formalized, enterprise-wide methodology; 
standardized at group level
Risk maps, risk registers, risk 
management software
Theta Highly formalized 
Centralized coordination of ERM at the executive level by 
dedicated units; risk ownership assigned across the 
organisation
Formalized, enterprise-wide methodology; 
standardized at group level
Risk maps, risk registers, risk 
management software
Iota Highly formalized 
Centralized coordination of ERM at the executive level by 
dedicated units; risk ownership assigned across the 
organisation
Formalized, enterprise-wide methodology; 
standardized at group level
Risk maps, risk registers, risk 
management software
Risk Management Process
Dedicated risk management positions at the executive 
levels in the airlines and in the holding company; risk 
committee in Alpha-1; risk ownership assigned across the 
organisations
Airline 
Code
Formalisation of 
Risk Management Roles and Responsibilities 
130 
 
 
 
Formalisation 
The level of formalisation of airline risk management systems varies from highly 
structured systems to ones which are characterised by only a minimal level of 
formalisation. In the airlines with highest levels of formalisation of risk management 
systems: 
 Risk management frameworks are outlined in numerous documents specifying 
responsibilities and accountabilities in the risk management process, as well as 
policies and procedures for identification, assessment, treatment, and reporting of 
risks.  
 Formalisation is reflected through translation of risk appetite to risk tolerances 
defined for a variety of exposures such as, among others,  maximum acceptable debt 
ratios or safety incidents ratios.  
 
Airline representatives reported to have followed the normative propositions of 
landmark ERM guidelines such as COSO (2004) or ISO 31000 (2009), which may have 
influenced a certain level of coherence in airlines’ risk management structures; this is 
noticeable, among others, in governance structures based on three lines of defence, in 
the appointment of risk management professionals, risk committees, or maintaining 
central risk registers. Despite the apparent similarities in risk management rules among 
the organisations which claimed adoption of ERM, diversity was noticed in risk 
management routines reported by the interviewees from different airlines, such as 
processes for identification or reporting risks. Airlines with less formalised risk 
management approaches demonstrated having formal structures in place for 
management of selected types of risks, such as risks related to financial reporting, safety 
risks or financial and market risks, yet management of a variety of other types of risks is 
conducted in a non-formalised manner, in compliance with relevant regulatory 
frameworks.  
 
Roles and responsibilities 
A noticeable difference was observed between the airlines claiming ERM adoption and 
the airlines with more traditional risk management approaches in assignment and 
coordination of risk management responsibilities across organisational structures. 
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Airlines claiming ERM adoption (Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Epsilon, Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota) 
demonstrated the following characteristics: 
 Risk management units at the executive levels which coordinate risk management 
processes.  
 Risk committees exist either in the airlines or in their respective holding 
companies, in order to overview enterprise or group-wide risk management 
systems.  
 Dedicated risk management positions at the executive levels which coordinate and 
bear responsibilities for proper functioning of ERM, denominated as chief risk 
officers, heads of risk management, risk directors, and others.  
 Pyramid-like risk ownership structures in which the boards were specifically 
assigned responsibility for risk management, and risk management responsibilities 
and accountabilities are cascaded throughout their hierarchies. 
 Formally assigned responsibilities for managing risks in specific dimensions.  
 
Beta’s risk management system assigns accountabilities and responsibilities as follows: 
 Coordination of enterprise-wide risk management processes is formally assigned 
to Head of Internal Audit, reporting to the Audit Commission and superior risk 
structures of its respective holding company.  
 Lack of a centralised risk review structure at the executive level overviewing 
enterprise-wide risk management initiatives.  
 Risk committees dedicated exclusively to management of safety and financial 
risks. 
 
Finally, in Gamma and Delta: 
 Multiple organisation members manage different types of risks, either formally or 
informally, yet without reporting to a head person or unit responsible for 
coordination of enterprise-wide risk management efforts.  
 No central senior level executive position or unit coordinating the management of 
enterprise-wide risks.  
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 At the operational level risks managed within functional areas.  
 Safety management and crisis prevention are the most structured areas in the 
organisational panorama.    
 
Risk management process  
The airlines which claim adoption of the ERM approach appear to have developed and 
formalised methodologies guiding risk management processes:  
 Risk management methodologies are delineated in procedures and protocols for 
identification, assessment, treatment, and reporting of particular groups of risks.  
 Variety of risk identification strategies in use: 
 Bottom-up risk identification approach; members from all across organisational 
hierarchies engaged in the process.  
 Identification of important types of exposures, such as strategic or emerging 
risks, subscribed to the executive levels in organisations. 
 Key risk indicators (KRIs) defined in selected areas of operations. 
 Qualitative and quantitative risk evaluations. 
 Variety of tools and technologies facilitating risk management processes: risk 
management software, risk registers, and risk maps or matrices, which facilitate 
robustness, accuracy, and timeliness of processing and reporting risk data.  
As previously explained, the level of formalisation of risk management frameworks of 
the airlines which did not claim ERM adoption is significantly lower than that of the 
rest of the airlines forming the sample: 
 Protocols are in place for the management of selected types of exposures, often as 
required by applicable regulations; lack of protocols guiding identification, 
assessment, treatment, and reporting on some important groups of risks, such as 
strategic or emergent risks.  
 Less sophisticated tools to support their risk management processes; lack of 
specialised risk management software; risk registers and risk maps, rather than 
being operated through automated systems, are prepared through the use of Word 
documents, Excel spread sheets or Power Point presentations.  
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5.3.2 Maturity and advancement of airline risk management approaches 
Continuing with the review of the institutions, rules, and routines of airline risk 
management systems, the researcher assesses the maturity of airline risk management 
systems, drawing conclusions on where particular airlines position themselves on the 
continuum between traditional, ‘siloed’ approaches, and enterprise-wide risk 
management approaches. The degree of assimilation of ERM principles in the airlines 
under study is assessed independently of the interviewees’ perceived level of 
development of the risk management approaches of their respective airlines (discussed 
in the section 5.3.2, with additional data in Appendix C).  
 
The criteria for assessing the level of development of airline risk management 
approaches were adapted from academic literature (e.g. Arena et al., 2011) and 
normative literature (e.g. COSO, 2004). Risk management systems are assessed as per 
the comprehensiveness of the risk portfolios considered by particular airlines and 
priorities assigned to management of particular risks within the portfolios, the level of 
embeddedness of the risk management function across organisational hierarchies, the 
level of integration of various risk management practices from across the organisations, 
and the roles and uses assigned in airlines to the risk management function. The 
assessment of airline risk management systems’ maturity conducted by the researcher 
returned results which were highly coherent with the aforementioned interviewees’ 
perceptions in this matter. The risk management approaches of the airlines claiming 
adoption of ERM were assessed as advanced with regard to the four analysed 
dimensions, and focused on serving instrumental purposes rather than ceremonial 
displays of legitimacy. The following table 5-5 summarises the maturity hallmarks of 
the risk management systems of the airlines under study.   
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Airline 
Code Comprehensiveness Embeddedness Integration  Roles and Uses
Alpha-1 Comprehensive, enterprise-
wide risk portfolio
High 
embeddedness
High integration both at airline and group 
level 
Support in definition and execution of 
strategies
Alpha-2 Comprehensive, enterprise-
wide risk portfolio
High 
embeddedness
High integration both at airline and group 
level 
Support in definition and execution of 
strategies
Beta Comprehensive, enterprise-
wide risk portfolio
Moderate 
embeddedness
Medium integration Alignment with Internal Audit function; 
support in decision-making
Gamma Moderate 
comprehensiveness
Low embeddeness Low integration, independent risk 
management routines at the airline level; 
integrated management of strategic risks at 
the group level
Compliance and decision making 
function 
Delta Moderate 
comprehensiveness
Low embeddeness Low integration, independent risk 
management routines
Compliance and decision making 
function 
Epsilon Comprehensive, enterprise-
wide risk portfolio
Unclear High integration both at airline and group 
level 
Support in definition and execution of 
strategies
Zeta Comprehensive, enterprise-
wide risk portfolio
High 
embeddedness
High integration Alignment with organisational strategies 
and with management accounting
Eta Comprehensive, enterprise-
wide risk portfolio
High 
embeddedness
Medium-high integration; independently 
operating safety and corporate risk 
management systems
Support to operational decision-making 
and planning
Theta Comprehensive, enterprise-
wide risk portfolio
High 
embeddedness
High integration Support in definition and execution of 
strategies
Iota Comprehensive, enterprise-
wide risk portfolio
High 
embeddedness
High integration Focus on internal control; support in 
decision-making and planning
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Comprehensiveness  
Comprehensiveness of airline risk management systems refers to the range of risks they 
consider (Arena et al., 2011). While traditional airline risk management approaches 
were primarily focused on managing hazard, safety, and financial risks (Zea, 2004), 
ERM advocates consideration of a wider range of intra- and extra- organisational 
exposures, including important strategic and emergent risks (Olson and Wu, 2007; 
DeLoach, 2000). According to the interviewees’ accounts, comprehensiveness of the 
risk portfolios of their respective organisations varies from high to low: 
 The interviewees from the airlines Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Beta, Epsilon, Zeta, Eta, 
Theta, and Iota described processes for management of a wide variety of risks, 
including relevant external risks, which are difficult to assess.  
 Although Beta‘s risk management structure demonstrates only a limited 
formalisation, the airline considers a wide variety of risks through a combination of 
formal and informal risk management practices. 
 The risk portfolios of Gamma and Delta concentrate on financial, safety, hazard, 
operational, and compliance risks, while the airlines lack formal structures for 
management of important strategic or market risks which, as reported by the 
interviewees, are managed through informal routines.        
 
Embeddedness of risk management 
Risk management systems of the investigated airlines vary in terms of embeddedness of 
risk management responsibilities and accountabilities across different organisational 
levels and functions. Through interviewees’ accounts it was inferred that while in some 
airlines risk management ownership is distributed across multiple lines and levels of 
business and reciprocal influence was noticeable between them, in other airlines risk 
management responsibilities and accountabilities are concentrated solely on a limited 
number of organisational units. Notwithstanding, due to the nature of the airline 
business and extensive requirements of regulatory frameworks, risk management is 
implicitly embedded in selected areas of airline operations. Such implicit embeddedness 
is especially noticeable in the production departments, where risks are managed through 
adherence to regulations, operational manuals, and performance standards. 
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 The airlines Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Epsilon, Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota demonstrate high 
levels of embeddedness of the risk management function across their organisational 
structures:  
 Responsibilities for identifying and managing risks are assigned across different 
organisational levels and functions, although diversity was observed in terms of 
assigning ownership for different types of risks across the airlines.  
 The interviewees stressed the importance of institutionalisation of risk 
management being among the priorities of line managers.  
 The level of embeddedness of risk management in Beta is perceived to be relatively 
lower than in the above mentioned organisations, yet it can still be classified as 
moderately high; this is due principally to the actions of internal auditors who, on a 
regular basis, require airline members related to particular business processes to 
report their view of the risks related to their areas of responsibility. Additionally, 
formal risk management structures were established in selected divisions, which are 
complemented by numerous informal practices conducted across the airline.  
 The level of embeddedness of the risk management function is considered relatively 
low in Gamma and Delta, where responsibilities for risk management are 
concentrated in only a few selected areas within the organisations, such as, among 
others, safety and financial departments.   
 
Integration of risk management 
Evidence from the field study interviews suggests a relatively higher level of integration 
of risk management routines enacted across the organisational hierarchies in the airlines 
Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Epsilon, Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota, which claim adoption of the ERM 
approach, than in the remaining airlines of the sample. Under the ERM approach 
particular risks should be considered as parts of an overall risk portfolio managed in an 
integrated manner (COSO, 2004). The researcher concluded on the degree of integration 
of risk management routines based on the existence of central risk management units in 
all of these airlines, and interviewees’ explanations of the risk integration techniques 
employed in their respective organisations. The central risk management units, such as 
enterprise-wide risk committees and not committees dedicated only to selected types of 
risks, or risk management coordinators such as CROs or their equivalents, compile risk-
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related data from across the organisations and report on an integrated view of risks to 
organisational boards.  
 
In Beta an integrated view of risks is achieved at the executive level through informal 
routines, namely an inter-departmental collaboration in the development of corporate 
and business strategies which involves analysing strategy-related risks. Although 
different types of risks are considered at these occasions, integrating risk-information 
constitutes an unstructured process. The airlines Gamma and Delta demonstrated 
traditional risk management approaches in terms of integration of risk management 
practices. Traditional risk management approaches are attributed managing risks 
separately in functional silos, while little importance is dedicated to risk interrelations 
(Lam, 2003).  
 
Roles and uses of risk management  
Risk management in organisations can be linked to various management and control 
processes such as strategic planning or internal control (Mikes, 2009), and have 
different modes of focus and use in decision making or corporate governance processes 
(Arena et al., 2011). This field study provided evidence of different rationalities 
underlying the development of airline risk management systems, leading to their 
varying roles and uses ranging from support in planning and decision making processes 
to internal audit or compliance functions, which appear to be overlapping to some 
extent:   
 In Alpha-1 and Alpha-2 risk management is aligned with strategic and business 
planning processes, while the airlines also strive to convey an image of sound 
corporate governance.  
 In Beta the risk management function falls into the realm of internal audit, but 
organisation members perceive risk management, both in its formal and informal 
dimension, as a function providing material benefits to the organisation.  
 The airlines Epsilon, Eta and Theta demonstrated alignment of risk management 
processes with strategic and business planning. 
 The risk management frameworks of Zeta and Iota have been designed to 
specifically support the management accounting (in Zeta) and internal control (in 
138 
 
 
 
Iota) functions, while also being aligned with strategic and business planning 
processes.  
 The formal risk management rules of Gamma and Delta are predominantly framed 
under the compliance rationality; except for airlines’ financial risk management, the 
remaining risk management structures seem to have been created in adherence to the 
requirements of relevant regulatory frameworks. On the other hand, multiple 
informal risk management routines were evidenced in Gamma and Delta to support 
decision making processes in an unstructured manner.  
 
5.4 Conclusions 
This chapter reported findings from a field research conducted in ten international 
airlines. Firstly, an analysis was conducted of the determinants of organisational design 
choices of airline risk management rules and routines, including the driving forces for 
adoption and embedding of ERM. Secondly, this chapter reported on diverse 
configurations of airline risk management systems in general and of the implementation 
of ERM in particular. Thirdly, the maturity of airline risk management systems was 
assessed, whilst it revealed a series of ‘best practices’ and shortcomings of their 
approaches. The analysis of field study findings was conducted herein under the 
perspectives of institutional theory, with a special focus on new institutional sociology 
theory and old institutional economics, and of structural contingency theory. Therefore, 
the analysis considered airline risk management systems as embedded both in the 
realms of their respective task and institutional environments. Findings reported herein 
are further extended on in the Appendix C to the thesis.  
 
Findings from this field study provide evidence of isomorphic pressures present in the 
organisational field of airlines. The principles of legitimacy and survival are the driving 
forces of isomorphism in airline risk management approaches (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). Evidence was found in support of coercive, mimetic, normative, and other 
external, as well as internal, institutional pressures exerting a deterministic influence 
over the design choices of airline risk management systems. The findings suggest a 
particularly high relevance of coercive pressures, and especially the importance of the 
regulatory frameworks and of the corporate governance best practice codes, in the 
structuring of airline risk management systems.  
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The evidence from this field study provided support for the influence of a variety of 
contingency factors on airline risk management approaches. Contingency factors drive 
the development of airline risk management structures in pursuit of enhanced 
organisational efficiency and effectiveness (Scott 2003). Three broad groups of 
contingency factors were considered, based on categorisation proposed by other 
scholars and based on the themes which emerged from the interview data, namely 
external factors related to the environment and the industry, internal, organisation-
specific factors, and factors related to the typology of risks prioritised in airline risk 
portfolios. The field study findings suggest that airline risk management systems were 
developed in response to the volatile nature of the airline operating environment, and in 
an attempt to improve organisational performance and achieve organisational 
objectives, among other factors. Evidence supports the relation between the size and 
complexity of airline organisational structures and operations and the ownership 
structures, and the design choices of risk management frameworks. Finally, in 
accordance with the propositions of Kaplan and Mikes (2014), this field study provided 
evidence of the design choices of airline risk management systems being conditioned by 
the types of risks which the airlines considered most relevant in their overall risk 
portfolios. 
 
Drawing on the concepts of rules, routines, and institutions, diverse configurations of 
airline risk management systems were reviewed in an examination of their 
homogeneity, variability, and maturity as assessed by diverse criteria. Under the 
premises of structural contingency theory, evidence from this study suggests diverse 
and contingent designs of airline risk management frameworks, adopted to fit airline-
specific operating environments and organisational contexts (Fisher, 1998). Airline risk 
management approaches range from highly structured and formalised to unstructured, 
which appeared to be primarily related to whether the airlines have officially 
implemented ERM or not. Airlines claiming adoption of ERM have created dedicated 
risk management units at the executive levels which coordinate enterprise-wide risk 
management processes, have developed formalised methodologies guiding risk 
management processes, and rely on different risk management tools and technologies 
facilitating such processes.       
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This study examined the level of embracement of ERM principles in airline risk 
management approaches according to the comprehensiveness of risk portfolios, the 
level of embeddedness of the risk management function across organisational structures, 
the level of integration of various risk management practices, and the roles and uses 
assigned to the risk management function. The airlines forming part of this study lie in 
different places on the continuum between traditional and enterprise-wide risk 
management approaches. With regard particularly to the airlines claiming adoption of 
ERM, the maturity of their risk management approaches was regarded as relatively 
high. Despite the effects of the isomorphic mechanisms acting in the organisational field 
of airlines and exerting pressures of social legitimacy on airlines, the findings suggest 
rather non-ceremonial adoption of ERM; evidence from this study supported links 
between the risk management function and the decision-making and planning processes 
in the airlines claiming adoption of ERM. Finally, the findings suggest that despite 
lacking advanced risk architectures and formalised frameworks, and while not 
announcing introduction of ERM, airlines can adopt effective enterprise-wide 
approaches to managing risks and embrace ERM principles into their day-to-day 
activities (Woods, 2011); this case is exemplified by Beta, and is further described in 
Chapter 7.  
 
In conclusion, the theoretical framework developed for this research facilitated analysis 
and understanding of the determinants and organisational couplings of airline risk 
management rules and routines, as well as an assessment of the embracement of ERM 
principles in the airlines forming the sample. A detailed discussion of the field study 
findings in the context of theory underlying this research and in the context of literature 
is presented in Chapter 8. The findings presented throughout this chapter, 
complemented with case study findings (Chapters 6 and 7), laid the grounds for 
development of the ERM framework in the airline industry, which conveys drivers of 
effective, enterprise-wide risk management in airlines, and which is also presented in 
Chapter 8.  
 
As previously signalled, based on the case study findings the researcher selected airlines 
exemplifying the most interesting cases with regard to the research questions stated for 
this study. In the following chapters (6 and 7) the case study methodology is employed 
in a more detailed examination of organisational coupling of risk management systems, 
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the links with organisational logics and the rationales for the alignment of such systems 
with airlines’ respective business contexts. The forthcoming Chapter 6 presents a case 
study of Alpha-1 and Alpha-2 airlines jointly with their holding company, which 
operate under a consolidated ERM framework. The ERM approach implemented in the 
Alpha airlines is considered very mature, and thus they constitute a suitable case for 
learning about organisational dynamics of ERM; the case should deliver valuable 
implications for airlines considering the adoption of ERM principles.  
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Chapter 6 
Case Study: ERM System in Alpha Airlines 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The objectives stated for this research call for a more in-depth empirical investigation of 
the integral components of airline ERM systems, particularly the aspects related to 
organisational logics and rationales of ERM and its alignment within wider contextual 
circumstances. Attending to these objectives, this chapter presents a case study in which 
the unit of analysis is comprised of the airlines Alpha-1 and Alpha-2, and of their 
holding company, all operating under a consolidated ERM framework; the group of 
these three organisations is jointly codenamed ‘Alpha’ in this study. As evidenced in the 
field study, the ERM approach embraced in Alpha is very mature, and thus Alpha can 
provide rich illustrations of the issues of interest to this study.  
 
Any attempt to investigate organisational coupling of ERM in organisations as large and 
complex as the airlines forming Alpha would inevitably fail to cover many important 
issues. Therefore, the analysis in this chapter is structured around a number of research 
questions and selected concepts from the two theoretical perspectives (institutional 
theory and contingency theory) underpinning this study. Drawing on the theoretical 
framework developed in Chapter 3, and on the data collection and analysis scheme 
presented in Chapter 4, the case study of Alpha explores organisational risk 
management systems in terms of ‘risk management technologies’ and ‘risk management 
experts’. In addition, the case study provides complementary insight into the ‘context 
and rationalities’ of airlines’ risk management approaches that were previously analysed 
in the field study (Chapter 5; Appendix C). The analysis is based on the use of different 
theoretical concepts such as organisational fields and actors, risk management 
institutions, rules and routines, or institutionalisation. Attending to the objectives stated 
for this research, the case study presented in this chapter has both an exploratory and an 
explanatory character. An exploratory study of organisational coupling of ERM in 
Alpha is a necessary pre-requisite providing a context for further explanation of the 
logics and rationales of the interconnected designs of the risk management system in 
Alpha organisations; thus, this study not only answers the ‘how’ but also the ‘why’ 
questions regarding Alpha’s risk management system. 
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The primary source of data for this case study were interviews conducted with senior 
management executives, middle and lower management, and operational staff from 
diverse organisational areas in the two airlines and in the holding company. These 
included, among others, financial, risk management, production, or internal audit units 
(see Table 4-2 in Chapter 4 for a list of the 14 interviewees). In addition, informal and 
unscheduled conversations were held with members of the Alpha airlines at different 
organisational levels. The secondary source of evidence was internal documentation 
provided by Alpha, such as internal reports, presentations, and company regulations 
including risk management policies and procedures. Thirdly, risk management tools and 
technologies were presented to the researcher in support of interviewees’ arguments, 
such as risk registers, risk maps and matrices, or the software employed for storing and 
analysing risk-related data. Finally, the researcher studied the web sites of Alpha in 
search of relevant information, and reviewed publicly available reports issued by the 
Alpha holding company and Alpha-1 and Alpha-2 airlines.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. The second section 
succinctly outlines the unit of analysis under study and defines the nomenclature to be 
used across this chapter. This is followed by an analysis of the key elements of Alpha’s 
ERM model, as discussed in the third section. The last section summarises the findings 
from the case study. Additionally, Appendix D to this thesis provides insights into the 
evolution of risk management systems in the Alpha airlines, and elaborates on the 
maturity and advancement of the systems.  
 
6.2 Outline of the case study  
Alpha is a multinational airline holding pertaining to one of the world’s largest airline 
groups. As previously mentioned, this analysis includes the Alpha holding company and 
only two of its subsidiary airlines, Alpha-1 and Alpha-2 airlines, also referred to as 
‘Alpha airlines’, while all three entities are denominated jointly in this study as ‘Alpha’. 
The Alpha airlines are legacy carriers and operate under separate brand names. The 
Alpha holding company is a listed company trading on stock exchanges of the countries 
of origin of its subsidiary airlines. The operations of Alpha airlines encompass both 
passenger air transport services and cargo services. The Alpha airlines operate 
scheduled services, both short-haul and long-haul, to numerous destinations across 
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Europe, North America, Latin America, Asia Pacific, Africa, Middle East, and South 
Asia.  
 
The following analysis reports on the overall consolidated risk management system of 
Alpha, explaining how the risk management function is structured across the Alpha 
holding company and its subsidiary airlines; organisations within Alpha which operate 
independent (non-consolidated) risk management systems, independently of their level 
of advancement, have been excluded from this analysis. The description of the Alpha 
holding company and its subsidiaries, the Alpha airlines, is purposely limited solely to 
general information on the scope of their operations. Disclosure of a more detailed 
description of Alpha, its structures and operations, might provide suggestions to the 
readers regarding the identity of the analysed entities, and compromise contractual 
confidentiality and anonymity undertakings agreed upon between the entities and the 
researcher. Similarly, with the aim of safeguarding such undertakings, as explained in 
Chapter 4 (section 4.5.1), the titles of some of the positions held by the interviewees 
from Alpha were purposely changed in such a way that they only generally reflect the 
functions performed by particular individuals, for revealing the exact titles held by the 
interviewees might facilitate identification of the Alpha airlines and Alpha holding 
company under study.   
 
 6.3 ERM model  
The consolidated ERM model of Alpha resembles the standardised approaches outlaid 
in internationally recognised ERM frameworks and risk management standards, such as 
the COSO framework (COSO, 2004) or ISO 31000 risk management standard (ISO, 
2009), especially in terms of the objectives and rules underpinning risk governance and 
management processes. However, as further reflected in this chapter, the ERM 
approaches of the Alpha airlines were customised according to multiple technical and 
institutional rationalities, aligning the approaches with the specificity of airlines’ 
business environment, especially in terms of airlines’ risk profiles and compliance 
requirements. Alpha’s ERM approach is guided by a formalised risk management 
strategy, which specifies the objectives of the risk management processes and defines 
organisational risk appetite. ERM principles are grounded across Alpha through a 
framework of formal institutions and rules, including corporate statutes and regulations 
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which assign responsibilities and accountabilities for risk management and which 
regulate risk management routines across the Alpha airlines and the holding company. 
Internal regulations assign responsibilities and specify procedures and mechanisms of 
identification, assessment, and management of risks at different corporate levels, and 
outlay reporting lines; such regulations enter into a high level of detail, which can be 
exemplified by, for example, specifying the frequency with which risk owners are 
required to update risk registers with new data relevant to their assigned risks. Internal 
regulations additionally specify risk appetite by particular categories of risks, together 
with risk tolerance levels. Apart from general internal regulations governing risk 
management systems across Alpha, more specific policies and procedures have been 
developed which are relevant to specific groups of risks such as financial and safety 
risks, while their implementation is supervised by related functional committees. For 
example, policies regulating management of financial risks specify risk tolerance levels 
for particular exposures and outlay principles of hedging strategies. Finally, the risk 
management function in Alpha airlines is also institutionalised through related 
regulations, such as in Codes of Conduct and Corporate Social Responsibility principles 
developed in certain airlines. Appendix D to this thesis additionally elaborates on the 
perceptions of Alpha’s representatives regarding the level of formalisation of the risk 
management system.    
 
The following sub-sections present findings on the key constructs of Alpha’s ERM 
approach. Firstly, ERM governance structures and technologies are discussed. The 
researcher then considered it relevant to this study to describe in more detail the two 
important pillars of Alpha’s ERM approach - the financial and safety risk management 
systems. This section concludes with a discussion of the internal environment of 
Alpha’s ERM programme.  
 
6.3.1 ERM governance structures  
As discussed in the preceding section, formal rules delineate within Alpha the roles and 
responsibilities assigned to organisational ‘risk experts’ involved in conceptualising and 
controlling risks (as defined in Arena et al., 2010 and Chapter 3 of this thesis). Ultimate 
responsibility for the risk management function in Alpha is assigned to the Board of the 
Alpha holding company, which delegates the supervisory function to the Audit 
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Committee (full name altered to protect confidentiality). In the Alpha holding company 
ERM is led by the Management Committee, which, as reported by the interviewees, 
cooperates closely with the aforementioned Board and the Audit Committee. Alpha’s 
risk management strategy and risk profiles are reviewed by the Board and the 
Management Committee semi-annually, in accordance with stipulations of regulatory 
frameworks governing operations of the listed airlines integrated within Alpha. The 
general opinion regarding the involvement of the Board in the risk management 
function, as inquired among influential members of the holding company, was positive.  
By way of an example, CRO-Alpha noted:  
“Executive directors who are on our Management Committee would get quite 
involved in ERM, discussing risks in quite some detail” (CRO-Alpha).  
According to the accounts of CRO-Alpha, discussion on enterprise-wide risks regularly 
takes place during Management Committee and Board meetings, and risks are 
considered in the strategy setting process. Additionally, as evidenced in the archival 
documentation of the Alpha holding company, Alpha’s enterprise-wide exposures are 
reviewed by the Audit Committee. Risk management systems established in the Alpha 
airlines are similarly under the control of their respective Boards, which review airlines’ 
risk profiles on a quarterly basis, while the risk management function in the airlines is 
also led by their respective risk teams and committees.  
 
Discussion on risks at the holding company level is facilitated by CRO-Alpha, who 
captures exposures of particular airlines and group-level risks on a joint risk map, 
plotting risks on impact and probability scales. CRO-Alpha thus maintains a 
consolidated view of all relevant Alpha exposures, facilitating their review to the 
Management Committee and to the Board of the Alpha holding company; CRO-Alpha 
additionally establishes the risk management methodology and overviews its 
implementation across the holding company and the airlines. CRO-Alpha highlighted 
the need to consider all major exposures at executive levels in the Alpha holding 
company, for in his view it facilitates an integrated view of risks:  
“I deliver data on all corporate risks to the Management Committee and the Board, 
and this is where discussion takes place and a global view of all risks and their 
interrelation is generated” (CRO-Alpha).  
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CRO-Alpha also noted:  
“But before I even take the risk map to the Management Committee, I talk to the 
strategy guys about it, see their view and get their input into it. Then risks are 
discussed with the Management Committee, and they propose a strategy considering 
risk information... The Board also discusses risks and sets a strategy for the 
business” (CRO-Alpha).  
 
Both Alpha airlines have risk management structures in place facilitating identification 
and management of relevant risks, which are supervised by their corresponding Risk 
Management Committee (Alpha-1) or Management Committee (Alpha-2) and Boards. 
The risk function in the individual Alpha airlines is led by Risk Directors (e.g. cited 
herein as DRCs-Alpha), reporting to the Management Committee and the Risk 
Management Committee and to CRO-Alpha. The Risk Directors compile risk data from 
across the airlines and plot them on separate risk maps, which, as mentioned before, are 
later consolidated at the group level. As expressed by the CRO-Alpha:  
“We are a small holding company, so risks need to be actually managed in particular 
airlines, so lots of responsibility is delegated to them… They have their own risk 
systems, which are different but are compatible in terms of the risk maps they 
generate” (CRO-Alpha).  
Risk Directors provide guidelines to heads of different functional departments across 
the Alpha airlines responsible for managing particular risk groups. They also compile 
registers of all the identified risks and include data relevant to their management. 
Internal Audit departments of the Alpha airlines are additionally involved in the risk 
management function, mainly in that they oversee the controls put in place for particular 
types of risks.  
 
There are separate structures in place in the Alpha holding company and in the Alpha 
airlines for management of financial and safety risks. The areas of financial and safety 
risk management constitute separate, yet integrated, pillars of the ERM framework. 
TRM - Alpha holds ultimate responsibility for financial risk management within Alpha, 
and presides over the Financial Risk Committee established in the holding company. 
TRM-Alpha supervises treasurers of Alpha airlines and their teams of traders in the 
financial markets; TRM-Alpha is also in charge of the financing of Alpha operations, 
including asset purchases and leases, in addition to societary transactions. Operational 
148 
 
 
 
safety at the holding company level is overseen by the Safety Committee, which 
monitors the systems, procedures, and resources dedicated to safety activities across the 
Alpha airlines, yet the responsibilities for safety management and technical assessments 
lie within the airlines. Production and technical departments of individual airlines have 
safety structures incorporated within them. Additionally, crisis and business continuity 
committees are involved in safety risk management. 
 
As reflected above, institutionalisation of ERM across the Alpha entities was associated 
with creating governance units often considered as auditable trails of ERM, such as the 
risk director positions or risk committees (Gordon et al., 2009). Criticisms have 
emerged in management control literature regarding organisations developing 
ceremonial displays of ERM through governance structures, which do not guarantee 
embeddedness of the ERM principles in organisational routines (Bruce, 2005; Collier et 
al., 2006; Fraser and Henry, 2007). However, as will be further discussed in sections 
6.3.2 of this chapter, through the assessment of organisational routines and the logics of 
organisational actors, the researcher concluded on ERM principles being encoded not 
only in organisational rules but also in the routines enacted across Alpha. Although 
legitimacy motivations for creating ERM governance structures are not discarded (see 
Chapter 5, section 5.2.1, Appendix C), evidence was found in support of the perceived 
functionality of such structures among organisational actors, suggesting instrumental in 
addition to ceremonial uses of ERM and developing auditable ERM structures and 
formal rules.     
 
The description provided above of the ERM governance structure of the Alpha holding 
company and Alpha airlines was the necessary introduction for discussion on the 
concept of three lines of defence for risk management, as established in Alpha public 
communications, or towards which Alpha is still aiming, as reported by IA-Alpha. 
Although IA-Alpha considered the ERM governance structure to be well fitted to 
Alpha’s needs, the interviewee emphasised that it is still undergoing a gradual 
transformation, as explained:  
“We know where the process is going. We should reach a point where we would be 
able to create an assurance map under a truly joint perspective in order to detect 
areas of ‘over-assurance’ and ‘under-assurance’ of risk management. This is 
required by the level of materiality of our risks” (IA-Alpha).  
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Among several shortfalls of Alpha’s ERM approach, where IA-Alpha also included the 
above discussed excessive formalisation of risks in certain areas hindering 
organisational agility, the interviewee considered lack of a truly integrated view of risks 
as one of the biggest flaws. It was argued by IA-Alpha that despite apparent 
coordination and synergy of the risk management perspectives of the different Alpha 
entities, it still has not been fully institutionalised or become the taken-for-granted way 
of behaving” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 11). According to IA-Alpha, the 
organisational members in charge of risk management are used to acting under the 
perspective of individual organisations rather than from the consolidated perspective of 
various entities. This implies the need for further institutionalisation of the ERM 
principles in organisational cultures of Alpha. 
 
IA-Alpha was of the opinion that the three lines of defence in the risk management 
process, involving risk owners, the organisation members performing day-to-day risk 
management activities, and internal auditors, perform their respective risk management 
responsibilities at a rather satisfactory level in the individual entities of Alpha. This 
view, as further discussed in section 6.3.2, is shared by other representatives of various 
Alpha entities. However, the interviewee considered the levels of assurance provided by 
the individual lines of defence in the different Alpha entities as non-homogenous and, 
as aforementioned, lacking a common perspective developed from the Alpha holding 
company towards the airlines, which would allow for balancing assurance across the 
Alpha entities. IA-Alpha concluded:  
“What we have is a simple aggregation of [Alpha airlines’] risks assessed under 
individual airlines´ perspectives on the common risk map. What we should be 
looking for is not simply aggregating all risks together and then filtering them by 
materiality, but as a group saying this is the catalogue of our critical risks, and we 
make sure that what our airlines consider important is consistent with this catalogue. 
So we should look at the critical risks of different airlines from the group 
perspective, thinking about whether they can materialise or not in the airlines, and 
assuring effectiveness of the controls across the airlines, which are designed to make 
sure our residual risks correspond with our risk appetite, the group’s appetite and 
not the ones of individual airlines” (IA-Alpha).  
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IA-Alpha continued:  
“If not, some risks in our group catalogue can be under-assured, some may be over-
assured, typically because different departments do the same thing, and also we use 
the external assurance services. So we should manage the map better, the 
distribution of assurance of particular risks between the airlines. This is exactly 
where ERM can add value across the group” (IA-Alpha).    
 
6.3.2 ERM technologies  
The concept of risk technologies denotes a complex set of rules, routines, and tools 
enrolled in the risk management process (Arena et al., 2010; see Chapter 3, section 
3.3.2). In the context of risk management systems, institutionalised rules regulate 
enterprise-wide risk management processes and governance structures in Alpha, 
constituting the formal risk management system. The rules are enacted in routine 
practice, for routines are the “patterns of thought and action which are habitually 
adopted by groups of individuals” (Burns and Scapens, 2000, p. 6). This section 
describes ERM technologies, yet focuses in particular on the enactment of formal rules 
in the daily routines of Alpha organisations’ members. Consequently, it therefore 
demonstrates the level of institutionalisation of ERM principles in organisational 
routines, and the coupling between ERM rules and routines, allowing the researcher to 
later judge the maturity of Alpha’s ERM systems. Rules may be implemented in the 
airlines in demonstration of legitimacy from the holding company or external 
constituencies. However, they may become decoupled from the practices of 
organisational actors performed under the criteria of preserving technical efficiency 
(Siti-Nabiha and Scapens, 2005). It also explores the enactment of common risk 
management policies established at the holding company level, and enacted according 
to organisational logics of actors in Alpha airlines, causing differences among the 
performed routines in different airlines. 
  
Risk management processes, formally institutionalised in Alpha through a framework of 
policies and procedures, facilitate identification, assessment, management, and review 
of relevant risks. Identification of risks is formally conducted at multiple levels across 
the Group, from lower operational levels in the Alpha airlines to executive levels of the 
individual airlines and of the Alpha holding company.  
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As explained by CRO-Alpha: 
“Risk teams in the airlines interview directors of different departments at least every 
quarter to see what is going on in the business, how risks are being managed and 
what new problems have come up... Emerging and strategic risks are discussed by 
executives in the airlines” (CRO-Alpha). 
Risks are additionally identified in individual functional committees of the Alpha 
airlines and Alpha holding company. As previously indicated, the involvement of 
organisational actors from across Alpha’s hierarchies, if formally required through the 
extensive framework of Alpha’s policies and procedures, was acknowledged by Alpha 
members to effectively streamline risk identification processes. With regard to financial 
and safety exposures in particular, within Alpha’s risk management system there are 
separate strong pillars of financial and safety risk management, and there are review 
structures in place assuring these systems are often updated. Interviews conducted with 
individuals holding related positions in Alpha-1 and Alpha-2, in functions related to 
safety and financial risk management such as MSF/1-Alpha, MSF/3-Alpha, SRM/1-
Alpha, or SRM/2-Alpha, despite being guided by a common framework of policies, 
revealed differences in the risk identification routines performed in the two 
organisations.  
 
Review of risk tools in use in the Alpha airlines and Alpha holding company facilitated 
during site visits allowed the researcher to verify how risks are formally recorded in risk 
registers which compile data relevant to all identified risks. Records of exposures 
include information on the nature of risks, their assessed levels of probability of 
occurrence and potential impact, criticality, risk owners and related persons who should 
cooperate in their management, and a description of the controls in place. Each risk 
figuring in the registers is assigned at least one owner; for example, in cases of risks 
related to operational crises, risk ownership is assigned to heads of contingency plans. 
Differences have been detected in assignment of ownership for risks in Alpha-1 and 
Alpha-2, in terms of assigning single versus multiple owners to particular types of 
exposures. Additionally, risk register records include estimations of future increases or 
decreases of particular exposures and indicate what other risks are related to the 
exposures. Finally, the records indicate how audits should be performed on the 
exposures. Risk registers are formally required to be updated on a quarterly basis; 
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however, representatives of risk teams claimed to encourage risk owners to update the 
registers more frequently, in order to keep the records as accurate as possible. 
 
CRO-Alpha explained how emerging and strategic risks are considered at the executive 
levels of Alpha airlines and the Alpha holding company, which was later confirmed in 
the accounts of other interviewees. Group executives demonstrated awareness of the 
importance of the emerging and strategic risks.  
MCM-Alpha pointed to the volatility and unpredictability of airline business 
environment:  
“Unknown unknowns will happen, so you cannot know what it will be, but you have 
to be prepared for something extraordinary to happen” (MCM-Alpha).  
In a different discussion he also stated:  
“...It shows that the black swans, they happen. They happen and they stay, causing a 
change in paradigm” (MCM-Alpha). 
TRM-Alpha similarly confirmed the importance of emerging risks:  
“In this sector the most relevant risks are the ones we don´t know yet” (TRM-
Alpha).  
Formalised policies enforce assessment of the identified risks in terms of their perceived 
levels of probability of occurrence and potential impact on organisational performance. 
Both quantitative and qualitative measures are used in the risk assessment mechanism. 
According to CRO-Alpha: 
“Risks at operational level tend to be evaluated in a more qualitative manner, while 
higher level risks, for example major financial risks, are often quantified” (CRO-
Alpha).  
 
The Alpha airlines evaluate the economic impact of particular risks on separate scales 
according to the sizes of their operations; for example, risks evaluated as having a “low 
economic impact” in one Alpha airline may fall into the category of “medium economic 
impact” in a smaller Alpha airline. Risks from across the airlines are consolidated at the 
holding company level; however, risks classified with “low economic impact” in a 
smaller Alpha airline may not get included in the risk maps issued at the holding 
company level, as these are excluded from analysis risks when the potential impact is 
below a certain value. DRC-Alpha highlighted difficulty in assessing the economic 
impact of certain risks; while referring to the risk of operational disruption, and 
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specifically to the eruption of volcanic ashes which paralysed the European airspace in 
April 2010, the interviewee stated:  
“The volcanic ashes crisis demonstrated how challenging it is to evaluate the 
economic impact of certain events; even after the crisis had finished, it was still very 
difficult for us to calculate how much it had cost us” (DRC-Alpha).  
This is partly due to correlated effects of risks on multiple areas of airline operations; 
DRC-Alpha also noted: 
“Evaluating the economic impact of risks is, to some extent, an exercise of the 
imagination… For example, in the case of an air crash, it may cause the deaths of 10 
or 300 people, each scenario implying different consequences on insurance policies, 
airline reputation, or resources required to manage the situation” (DRC-Alpha).  
Despite the difficulty in assessing the economic effects of certain risks, this exercise is 
systematically performed across the Group, for as expressed by the TRM-Alpha: 
”Unless you can at least approximately assess risks, you cannot deal with them” 
(TRM-Alpha). 
Furthermore, DRC-Alpha emphasised the need to consider multiple aspects of risk 
impacts in Alpha’s assessment methodologies. 
DRC-Alpha stated: 
”The financial bottom line cannot be the ultimate criteria for assessing risks. For 
example, we cannot think of safety only in terms of how much safety risks can cost us 
in this business human lives are at stake” (DRC-Alpha). 
 
Priority is given to management of risks with relatively high levels of potential impact 
and probability of occurrence. Risk controls are defined for the majority of risks and 
they are developed by the owners and related parties assigned to particular risks. 
However, as verified by the researcher through a review of corporate risk registers, not 
all risks featuring in the risk registers of Alpha airlines are assigned controls; this was 
explained by DRC-Alpha: 
“No controls are assigned to, for example, the risk of economic downturn. But we do 
look at the effects of economic downturn, for example, on profitability of long-haul 
routes and we take it from there; or in terms of effects of the economic crisis on 
market risks – let us say interest rates, we implement controls, we make sure airlines 
go to the market and place hedges according to our policies” (DRC-Alpha).  
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Based on a review of internal documentation the researcher concluded that the reporting 
lines for communicating risk-related data are clearly established in the policies 
developed at the holding company and at individual airline levels. Reporting on risk 
exposures is officially conducted every three months, although in some Alpha airlines 
risks are reviewed more frequently; as explained by DRC-Alpha: 
“It is sometimes necessary to review risks more often so that we can correctly 
capture the dynamics and volatility of particular exposures, and to better control the 
evolution of particular risks, and also to see which risks are no longer a priority, 
which risks have materialised... (DRC-Alpha). 
DRC-Alpha also commented on the reporting extraordinary risks:   
Apart from regularly reporting schedules we often prepare reviews of risks which we 
consider should be discussed immediately by different committees; they need to know 
what the major threats are and how they are being managed. They need to be 
frequently updated on the risk situation in order to make informed decisions” (DRC-
Alpha). 
During periodical reviews the levels of probability and potential impact of risks are 
reassessed, and the effectiveness of controls in place for mitigation of risks is revised. 
The researcher verified, in internal documentation, the existence of risk tolerances and 
Key Risk Indicators (KRIs) which are established in individual Alpha airlines, yet not at 
the group level, in order to facilitate review of risks.     
 
The need to constantly maintain the risk management system up to date was stressed by 
different interviewees, who reported how, previously, risks would be reviewed and 
reported across Alpha airlines and the group every six months. According to DRC-
Alpha and TRM-Alpha, this was not enough taking into account high volatility of the 
airline operating environment. TRM-Alpha additionally stressed the importance of 
presenting risk information across the group in an understandable and accessible 
manner. In the discussion on the models and equations underlying the group’s Financial 
Risk Management framework he noted:  
“We often present findings from the Financial Risk Management framework in a 
graphical manner, in order to make them more understandable for non-financiers... 
It is important to understand the outcomes of the models we use, rather than making 
everyone understand the econometrics and the mathematics behind the conclusions” 
(TRM-Alpha).  
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Quarterly reporting requirements imply conducting regular reviews on the development 
of particular risks and identification of new exposures. DCR-Alpha noted:  
“If during several consecutive reviews a particular risk position does not change, it 
is often the case that the risk is defined improperly, so it needs to be redefined in 
order to better reflect the nature of the risk and its volatility” (DRC-Alpha). 
 
As previously discussed (section 6.3), the risk management framework of Alpha is 
characterised by a high level of formalisation which, despite criticisms of excessive 
bureaucracy voiced by some organisation members, was argued to be necessary in order 
to ensure a uniform level of diligence throughout all phases of the risk management 
process and across all Alpha entities. This organisational objective seems to be partly 
achieved, as shown by the evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of the risk 
management processes, in which the interviewees in general expressed positive views 
of the functionality of the processes. However, some organisation members called for 
more clarity and uniformity of risk management processes conducted in the different 
Alpha entities. IA-Alpha explained:  
“Indeed, we should have a better idea of what the controls are in each company, 
what is the treatment of each of the inherent risks that make the risks later settle at 
the residual levels within our risk appetite…. We are in different places right now 
when it comes to giving transparency to these issues in the individual companies 
[Alpha entities]” (IA-Alpha).  
IA-Alpha continued: 
“Because it´s really easy to put on paper ‘our residual risk is EUR 300 million, but it 
tells me nothing if I don´t know exactly what is the inherent risk behind it, what 
controls have been put in place to lower the risk to EUR 300 million” (IA-Alpha). 
The alleged lack of clarity and uniformity in risk management processes conducted in 
the airlines may be another factor causing variations in organisational routines, despite 
them being guided by a common set of highly formalised rules.   
 
Based on the review of responsibilities and accountabilities throughout the different 
stages of Alpha’s risk management processes, the researcher concluded that the risk 
management function facilitates strategy-setting and decision-making processes in the 
Alpha airlines and Alpha holding company.  
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CRO-Alpha commented on the alignment of these functions:  
“Risk and strategy are related, to put it simply, in that we take into account risks 
when strategy is being developed. If you look at our strategy, and you look at our 
risks, we do not map one to another on paper, but this is implicit, they are discussed 
by the same people at executive level” (CRO-Alpha).  
CRO-Alpha elaborated on this thought:  
“We don´t bother to make the leap to mapping risks onto the strategy, because it´s 
something people should have at the back of their minds and not by producing extra 
matrices and documentation” (CRO-Alpha).  
MSF/2-Alpha also noted how structures and practices implemented in the Alpha 
holding company support close cooperation of the risk management and strategic 
management functions:  
“The Management Committee meets in the office next door, so we [the risk function] 
know them well and cooperate with them very closely. So every risk report or 
presentation we produce, almost immediately [TRM-Alpha] visits the Management 
Committee and is delivered, so it is all ultra-quick” (MSF/2-Alpha). 
 
Following the assessment of the risk technologies employed in Alpha, the researcher 
concluded they facilitate generation of an integrated view of risks across the Alpha 
entities. This is due to the risk management rules and routines as reflected above, as 
well as the tools supporting the risk management function. Multiple risk owners are 
assigned to many types of exposures in figuring in risk registers, while the records also 
indicate related professionals who should provide advice to the risk owners. Formal 
involvement of the risk owners and the related parties representing various business 
areas which could be affected by risks boost integrated risk management in Alpha. The 
cooperation of the risk owners with the related parties was formalised in such a way that 
all parties figuring in the risk register in relation to a particular risk are required to 
provide written input on a regular basis, including an independent assessment of the 
levels of probability of risk occurrence and risk impact, and a proposition of mitigating 
measures.  
 
Furthermore, the researcher was shown by Alpha members how the risk registers allow 
for exporting risk-related data to different formats of reports such as risk maps. The 
systems employed across Alpha, although different in terms of technological solutions 
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in use, are compatible when it comes to generating reports and risk maps, and merging 
risk data from different airlines to consolidated reports of the Alpha holding company, 
which facilitates obtaining an integrated vision of risks faced across the Alpha entities. 
For example, one of the Alpha airlines developed a proprietary intranet application for 
risk management, arguing in-house development of the risk tool allowed them to best 
tailor utility of the tool to organisational needs, facilitating incorporation of the risk 
management function into the ordinary business activities of individual departments. 
The tool was claimed to be compatible with the technological solutions operated in the 
remaining Alpha entities in that it allowed for combining data and feeding data to the 
risk maps generated in the Alpha holding company. The researcher reviewed different 
risk maps which consolidated data on threats related to the execution of company 
strategies, as explained by CRO-Alpha: 
“Risk maps present the business situation from the bad news point of view” (CRO-
Alpha).  
Review of risk maps demonstrated how they integrate exposures from different 
management frameworks operated across Alpha airlines, such as safety, quality, 
security management systems, and others. While risk maps concentrate on the 
‘downside’ of risks, Alpha’s risk management approach was concluded to also consider 
the ‘upside’; opportunities related to strategies are discussed in Alpha through different 
mechanisms. CRO-Alpha explained how, for example, the acquisition of a competitor 
airline would be regarded as an opportunity and would fall within discussion of strategy 
departments; however, once the acquisition had been executed, integration risk would 
be displayed on the risk maps.   
 
6.3.3 Pillars of the ERM model 
The risk management function in Alpha, as previously reported (section 6.4), lies within 
three independent yet integrated pillars: corporate risk management, financial risk 
management, and safety risk management. The corporate risk management pillar 
comprises management of enterprise-wide risks, and, as indicated in the discussion on 
Alpha’s ERM technologies, it draws on the input from financial and safety risk 
management pillars. Due to extraordinary importance of financial and safety exposures 
to Alpha’s business, this section provides a more detailed overview of the rules and 
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routines directed at their management, and shows integration of financial and safety risk 
management pillars within the corporate risk management pillar.       
  
Financial risk management 
In the case of legacy carriers such as the Alpha airlines, jet fuel currently constitutes 
about 35% of their overall cost base; Alpha airlines compete in the commodity market 
with sophisticated investors with speculative approaches, and thus are forced to employ 
advanced hedging strategies in order to put some degree of certainty into the business. 
The recent financial crisis restricted funding to airlines, which experience difficulties in 
gaining access to debt unless their credit ratings are relatively high. ‘Black swan’ events 
such as the terrorist attacks of September 2001 demonstrated the importance for airlines 
to maintain strong cash positions; among other things, airlines need to carefully manage 
the balance between owned versus leased assets, in order to ensure availability of cash 
flow during changing economic cycles. Taking into account the nature of operations of 
Alpha airlines that predisposes them to substantial financial risks, it came as no surprise 
to the researcher to learn how the Alpha airlines devoted particular attention to 
management of the financial risks. This also shows the aforementioned argument 
(Chapter 5, section 5.2.2; Appendix C) that the risk profiles of the Alpha airlines are 
relevant contingency factors determining airlines’ overall risk management approaches.  
 
The Financial Risk Management model (hereinafter to be referred to as FRM) employed 
in Alpha seems to play an important role in Alpha’s efforts to align the risk 
management function with the strategic management function. The framework was 
designed in order to allow for testing different scenarios of the materialisation of risks, 
while the outputs the model delivers are largely dedicated to the strategic planning and 
decision-making processes. The FRM model considers the appetite established for 
particular types of risks and provides guidance on optimising strategies in accordance 
with risk appetite. As explained by TRM-Alpha: 
“The model suggests policies which maximise the cash retained in each airline per  
unit of risk retained” (TRM-Alpha).  
Possible scenarios of business plans of the Alpha airlines or the Alpha holding company 
are tested within the limits of risk appetite established for particular types of exposures, 
and the FRM model estimates cash positions in the hypothetical scenarios in a defined 
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time horizon. As explained by the TRM-Alpha, in designing strategic and business 
plans for Alpha, the FRM model considers the macro-questions which might create new 
risks for Alpha, hypothesising on possible scenarios such as changes in the Joint 
Aviation Requirements (JAR) in the matters related to airline operations, a sudden rise 
in emission trading (ETS) costs, an unpredicted necessity to replace the fleet, and other 
macro-challenges.         
 
A Financial Committee has been established in the Alpha holding company in order to 
centralise the financial risk management function among the Alpha entities and 
facilitate discussion on policies regarding cash management and management of fuel, 
foreign exchange, and interest rate risks. The Financial Management Committee holds 
monthly meetings attended by relevant members of financial departments of the Alpha 
airlines, and it serves as a forum for an exchange of ideas and concerns regarding 
financial risk management. The Financial Committee was evidenced to cooperate 
closely with operational planning departments, which is aimed at adjusting structured 
finance policies to the business plans of the Alpha airlines. The Financial Committee, as 
reported by the interviewees connected to the finance functions in the Alpha entities, 
regularly delivers reports directly to the Management Committee of the Alpha holding 
company. Close cooperation of these two organisms is believed to facilitate informed 
decision-making and timely re-adjustments of financial risk management policies to 
corporate strategic decisions. Despite the existence of highly formalised policies and 
procedures regulating the financial risk management function across Alpha, the 
researcher evidenced positive feedback among the interviewees related to this particular 
function. Contrarily, the interviewees engaged in risk management processes targeting 
other types of exposures had a negative opinion of the issues of high formalisation 
versus organisational agility. As explained by MSF/2-Alpha:  
“Everything we [Financial Committee] work on in terms of risks gets reported 
directly to the Management Committee, there are no communication burdens in 
between” (MSF/2-Alpha);  
MSF/2-Alpha provided an example of flexible cooperation between the Financial 
Committee and the Management Committee of the Alpha holding company: 
“For example, in December we saw really attractive levels of euro/dollar, and we 
decided to take advantage of that. We approached the Management Committee and 
requested a waiver from the previously defined policy in order to take advantage of 
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the situation, and it was approved immediately, so we passed it on to the airlines 
which traded accordingly with the new policy” (MSF/2-Alpha).  
The interviewees related to the financial risk management function also conveyed their 
understanding of the importance of maintaining diligent records of the evolution of 
financial risks and their effects on the overall performance of airlines:  
“It is crucial for us to maintain a database where we record the evolution of risks... 
We register all relevant [financial] risks with their management status... It allows us 
to track how operating results were affected when we were, for example, more 
exposed to currency fluctuations” (MSF/1-Alpha). 
 
With regard to the integration of the financial risk management pillar with corporate 
risk management systems and, as previously mentioned, separate reporting lines have 
been created by linking the financial risk management dimension to the top corporate 
levels of airlines and the Alpha holding company, while data on major financial risk 
positions is additionally communicated to airlines’ Risk Directors and to the CRO-
Alpha for their inclusion in corporate risk maps. As evidenced by the researcher, 
evolution of the financial risks is recorded in separate databases together with their 
corresponding controls. Furthermore, policies regulating management of the financial 
risks are developed at the Alpha holding company level and imposed for 
implementation in the Alpha airlines. As explained by MSF/1-Alpha: 
“In terms of fuel, we control whether all airlines operate within the levels stipulated 
in the fuel hedging policy of the Group. In terms of foreign exchange and interest 
rate risks it´s similar; we check whether all airlines operate within the limits pre-
established in group policies… As per the cash management, we check airline 
liquidity levels, and check whether the financial counterparts of individual airlines 
have satisfactory ratings” (MSF/1-Alpha).  
MSF-1 also explained how market forecasts are discussed during the Financial 
Committee’s meetings, and conclusions are fed-back to the policy makers, with 
suggestions on hedging mandate quotas for the coming months. 
     
Hedging of financial risks is an indispensable risk management strategy for airlines, for 
it retains and restores liquidity while being considered a competitive factor in the 
industry (Carter et al., 2006). However, according to MCM-Alpha hedging alone is not 
enough to effectively manage all financial risks facing airlines. MCM-Alpha reported 
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on his journey that led him to conclude on the need to invest in sophisticated financial 
risk management software and specialists due to the fact that “the marginal productivity 
is very high”. MCM-Alpha advocated development of a systematic approach to 
managing financial risks, where risks are measured through aggregation and are stress-
tested through simulation while the overall approach is aligned to strategic business 
plans of Alpha airlines. A proprietary methodology, the Financial Risk Management 
model (FRM) was designed in order to assist the decision-making of senior 
management in the light of the full set of risks faced by Alpha. The model was 
internally developed in one of the Alpha airlines, based on risk modelling solutions 
implemented in the financial industry, and later its scope was extended to cover group-
wide exposures. The majority of the interviewees, in discussions during which the 
subject of FRM appeared, believed that it allows for aligning the risk management 
function with strategic and business planning functions. The researcher studied the 
functionality of the model in order to verify this belief, mainly through interviews with 
members of the Alpha holding company, but also through a review of different business 
scenarios ‘stress-tested’ by using the FRM model, which led the researcher to confirm 
interviewees’ opinions in this regard. The researcher recognised the FRM model as one 
of the ‘best practices’ identified in the course of the empirical research, while its 
functioning and utility are reviewed as follows.  
 
The FRM model is operated in the Alpha holding company, and outcomes of the model 
are used not only for establishing financial management policies across Alpha but also 
for evaluating the impact of different management scenarios on Alpha´s overall 
performance. The FRM model facilitates projection and evaluation of management 
decisions in five major areas. Firstly, the FRM model tests the effects of management 
decisions on the evolution of financial ratings granted to the Alpha airlines by their 
rating agencies. Secondly, the FRM model is used for optimisation of the hedging 
strategies across Alpha. Thirdly, the FRM model tests affordability of investment 
decisions across changing business cycles; long-term capital expenditure scenarios are 
assessed, for example, in designing fleet acquisition strategies. Fourthly, corporate 
growth decisions are evaluated by using the FRM model, to test whether, for example, 
the acquisition of a competitor airline would be accretive or dilutive in terms of 
shareholder value, as reflected in earnings per share values (EPS). Finally, the FRM 
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model is applied in advanced scenario analysis, in order to estimate the impact of 
operational disruptions on Alpha’s performance.   
 
FRM is oriented towards maximising Alpha’s utility function at pre-established levels 
of risk appetite. A Monte Carlo simulation is conducted, creating thousands of scenarios 
with stress-forecast financial statements. The FRM performs stress tests of business 
plans, considering three main groups of variables - macroeconomic conditions, 
operating conditions, and financial variables. Airline business is strongly correlated 
with the evolution of macroeconomic conditions in the global economy (Mason, 2005); 
therefore, the FRM model considers projections of macro-variables in the future. Alpha 
airlines’ operations can be temporarily restricted by a wide array of ‘unknown 
unknowns’ events such as strikes or adverse weather conditions which cause disruptions 
to operational schedules; the FRM model allows for considering restrictions in the 
scheduled operations of particular airlines, in addition to the financial consequences of 
such events. Furthermore, airlines’ business plans are tested at different values of three 
financial variables: fuel prices, currency exchange rates, and interest rates. A complex 
structure of variances and co-variances was incorporated in the FRM model, in order to 
reflect correlations among the inputs of the model. Business plans tested in short 
horizons assume moderate volatility of inputs, while testing in long horizons assumes 
extreme volatility of inputs in order to capture extreme scenarios, the so called ‘black 
swan’ events. Testing of business plans in the FRM model reflects development of 
financial measures in hypothesised scenarios such as cash flow, free cash flow, cash to 
equity, debt, operating profit, funds from operations, or EPS.  As explained by TRM-
Alpha:  
“We can factor into the FRM model any type of event that appears on the risk map of 
[...] and check its financial impact… So the model, by assessing impact, allows us to 
prioritise risks” (TRM-Alpha).  
With regard to the previous discussion on the role of the model in developing an 
integrated view of Alpha-wide exposures, TRM-Alpha explained how the FRM model 
combines Alpha-wide scope while testing different hypothetical operational scenarios:  
“Definition of correlations between various risks and operational scenarios is a 
crucial part of the [FRM] model. It would make no sense to assume that the 
variables we consider in the model are independent of one another… For example, 
volatility in fuel prices may be related to different events, such as changes in GDP 
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levels, a financial crisis, or terrorist attacks, so it is important to have a well-defined 
structure of correlations in place in order to capture the interrelation of variables of 
the model” (TRM-Alpha).  
The developers of the FRM model stressed that it provides an additional input to the 
decision-making process, yet such input does not constitute a base for decisions. TRM-
Alpha claimed: 
“We are aware of the modelling mantra ‘trash in, trash out’” (TRM-Alpha). 
By this logic the quality of input determines the quality and usability of the FRM 
model’s outputs. TRM-Alpha continued: 
“We are using FRM as an additional source of data, sometimes in order to test the 
intuitions of Management, yet we are not fanatics of this model. Nothing can 
substitute common sense, experience, and expertise of the managers that we are 
lucky enough to have in our Management Committee leading the Group” (TRM-
Alpha).         
 
Since the FRM model provides input in the first instance to the financial risk 
management team of the Alpha holding company, and in the second and third instances 
to its Management Committee and the Board, it was no surprise for the researcher to 
realise that despite the important role that the FRM model plays in the risk management 
and strategic management function of Alpha, awareness of the model was barely 
existent among the Financial Risk Managers or Risk Directors of the Alpha airlines.  
When this issue was raised in a complementary, informal discussion with the developers 
of the FRM model, TRM-Alpha argued: 
“It´s not important to know how to build a car; it´s important to know how to drive a 
car… Managers in the [Alpha] airlines are involved in the process in that they 
participate in risk meetings, we exchange information on financial risks, and they 
are informed of the policies and the quotas, for example, for hedging. But we run the 
system internally, in the [Alpha] holding company” (TRM-Alpha). 
TRM-Alpha continued: 
Also, when we talk to the Management Committee, there are some great minds there, 
strategic minds, and not always numerical minds. So when they ask us to evaluate a 
strategic decision, we come back to them with ‘yes or no’ and ‘because’, but without 
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explaining mechanisms that lead to our feed-back, they don´t need to know how we 
play with the numbers [laugh]” (TRM-Alpha).      
 
Safety Risk Management 
Safety risk management, just as financial risk management, is an independent yet 
interdependent pillar within Alpha’s ERM model. Safety risks encompass a wide range 
of operational exposures, ranging from minor incidents to important hazard risks which, 
if materialised, can have multiple severely negative consequences for airlines, including 
financial or reputational losses. The safety risk management framework employed in the 
Alpha airlines, denominated in the industry as ‘Safety Management System’, is strongly 
conditioned by an extensive regulatory framework encompassing stipulations of air 
transport associations such as, among others, IATA, IOSA, and EASA (Otero, 2006; 
Curran and Fisher, 2012), that demonstrates the effects of, among other things, risk 
profile contingencies and coercive pressures on the development of risk management 
solutions in airlines (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.1; Appendix C). Thanks to the courtesy 
of the interviewees, the researcher was able to examine some of the risk management 
procedures guiding collection of relevant safety data in special risk registers, or general 
rules for handling diverse types of incidents. The researcher also reviewed analytical 
software employed in the airlines in order to spot trends in safety records and mobilise 
intervention strategies when necessary. The major issues of interest to this research, 
regarding the safety management framework of Alpha, are the coupling between safety 
rules and routines enacted by organisation members, in addition to its functionality and 
alignment with the corporate risk management system. 
   
As previously indicated, the safety risk management function in Alpha has dedicated 
safety governance structures at the executive levels in the airlines and in the holding 
company, led by the Safety Committees. The safety risk management function in Alpha 
is regulated through a complex framework of policies and procedures for the prevention 
and handling of operational accidents and incidents; contingency plans are developed to 
deal with major safety-related threats and events, and crisis manuals are defined and 
tested on a regular basis. Safety missions are defined and guidance is provided to safety 
officers on the requirements of safety management strategies, with clearly defined and 
detailed objectives and priorities. However, as indicated by the interviewees, there are 
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discrepancies between the formalised rules and institutionalised routines in the Alpha 
airlines. The safety function is structured close to operational / production departments, 
encompassing, among others, pilots, maintenance engineers, flight attendants, or ground 
crew. As indicated in particular by SRM/1-Alpha, adherence to safety manuals in their 
different dimensions varies among particular groups of the production departments, 
which are additionally influenced by their cultural backgrounds, for, as explained by the 
interviewee, some cultures foster following the rules more than others.   
 
Attaining to the problem of decoupling, and in order to promote positive risk cultures, 
several initiatives have been undertaken in Alpha in an attempt to extend the merits of 
safety systems from reactive to preventive safety risk management. According to 
SRM/2-Alpha, the most important initiative was aimed at changing the reporting 
culture, in order to foster trust and incentive communication sharing rather than 
suspicion reigns. Since pilots play an important role in safety structures, they are 
encouraged to become safety managers, and full-time dedication to this position is 
encouraged rather than it simply being performed in addition to flying. The safety risk 
management function generates separate risk maps and risk reports. Major safety-
related threats such as aircraft crush would be included in the general risk maps 
presented by the Risk Directors of the Alpha airlines or by CRO-Alpha for the sake of 
completeness. However, as reported by the interviewees, they do not constitute the core 
of discussion within Alpha’s ERM model; safety risks are reported and discussed within 
separate structures established for this purpose. As noted by SRM/1-Alpha: 
”Because in the safety area we do not compromise, there is not much room for 
discussion, risk tolerance is extremely low” (SRM/1-Alpha).  
DRC-Alpha additionally explained:  
“Safety management systems are quite independent, although essentially integrated, 
within the general corporate risk management system… ERM considers major safety 
risks mainly because they are related to other risks such as, for example, reputation 
risk, so we share information regarding safety risk situations with safety risk 
management structures” (DRC-Alpha).  
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6.3.4 ERM internal environment 
Internal environment sets the tone for organisational ERM approach. It can be regarded 
in terms of institutional logics encompassing values, norms, ideas, beliefs, and broader 
meaning systems influencing the actions of actors, actors’ understanding of 
organisational strategies including the risk management strategy, and the 
conceptualisation of uncertainty (Arena et al., 2010). The elements of Alpha’s internal 
environment which are particularly relevant to the performance of the ERM approach 
are risk appetite and risk culture. Risk appetite, which reflects Alpha’s inclination 
toward risk, is set by the Board in risk management strategies, considering the interests 
and risk-preferences of major external and internal stakeholders. Risk appetite varies in 
different areas of Alpha’s operations. While the risk appetite for strategic risks is 
defined as high, Alpha claims to have no tolerance for safety risks or breaches of legal 
and regulatory obligations. Risk appetite is applied to risk management strategies and is 
employed throughout the Group in the risk management processes via tolerance 
thresholds established for particular groups of risks. 
 
Members of Alpha airlines interviewed for the purpose of this research shared common 
beliefs regarding the importance of developing risk awareness at all levels within the 
organisations. MCM-Alpha made an interesting point on this subject: 
“I think risk management in airlines is a culture that has to be implemented from 
operations to strategy, and you need to develop awareness at every level. This 
approach is more effective [ERM embedded across the organisation] than having big 
theoretical [risk management] models. You can have a very nice model, but if risk 
awareness is not embedded at different levels within the company, it will be useless” 
(MCM-Alpha).  
 MCM-Alpha further emphasised the commitment of Alpha organisations to fostering 
positive risk cultures within all levels of organisational hierarchies. DRC-Alpha 
explained how risk-aware culture is promoted within Alpha by risk teams established in 
the Alpha airlines, which, among other initiatives, develop manuals and provide training 
on risk management processes and procedures:  
“We [a risk team of one of Alpha airlines] deliver training across the airline in 
order to explain the risk management approach that we want to promote... We 
explain how risk identification and management should be incorporated into the 
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everyday activities of employees… We also train people on how to use the risk 
software, and we advise them sometimes on how to properly define controls” (DRC-
Alpha).  
On a similar note, CRO-Alpha emphasised that in order to formalise desired risk 
management approaches within the Alpha airlines, risk management responsibilities are 
included in the job descriptions of employees at different levels in the organisations.  
 
In order to better understand, among other things, the risk culture across the Alpha 
organisations, the researcher conducted interviews not only with representatives of top 
organisational levels, but also with employees from middle and lower management; 
additionally, during the site visits the researcher had the chance to speak informally to 
employees at the operational level. The researcher concluded that the awareness of 
organisational risk management strategy and employees’ commitment to the risk 
management function varied across different functional and organisational levels. 
Notwithstanding, the researcher concluded that active efforts are undertaken in Alpha in 
order to promote positive risk management culture. By way of an example, an interview 
with MSF/2-Alpha revealed how the risk management rules and routines 
institutionalised in Alpha facilitate adoption of desired risk management approaches. 
MSF/2-Alpha described the work of the Financial Committee that the interviewee forms 
part of and which is operated by the Alpha holding company. The Financial Committee 
meets regularly in different international locations, gathering financial risk management 
experts from the various Alpha airlines in order to discuss the main risk exposures. 
MSF/2-Alpha noted: 
“The fact that we [Financial Risk Committee] meet regularly facilitates continuity of 
risk management initiatives... Also, the fact that people travel from different 
countries in order to meet and discuss risks gives extra importance to our role, 
showing that risk management is treated seriously, and I think it helps our 
operations a lot... The data sharing culture [regarding risk issues] is really open” 
(MSF/2-Alpha).   
Alpha’s risk profile is regularly discussed by the Management Committee and the 
Board of the Alpha holding company, which establishes the strategic direction for 
Alpha. Similarly, risk discussions take place in the individual airlines on a regular bases 
at equivalent executive levels. While actively involved in the analysis of risk maps, the 
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executive and non-executive directors set the tone from the top encouraging risk 
awareness across the Alpha airlines and advocate implementation of risk management 
rules and routines. CRO-Alpha, who cooperates closely with these corporate 
governance units, explained: 
“[Tone from the top encouraging ERM] tends to come from executive and non-
executive directors. Also, if a non-executive director says something new should be 
done in terms of ERM, it´s because they have seen it done elsewhere, so they make 
suggestions as to how to improve our systems. But not everything that works 
elsewhere would work well in our business, airlines are very specific” (CRO-Alpha). 
 
6.4 Conclusions and lessons learnt 
The analysis of the Alpha case conducted herein was considered within the context of 
the group’s broader regulatory, social, cultural, and technical environments, which 
shape the logics of organisation members and the rationales of their actions; the analysis 
recognised the effects of various and sometimes conflicting pressures for legitimacy, 
effectiveness and efficiency in designing Alpha’s risk management system. This being 
said, Alpha’s choice of risk management system, in accordance with the theoretical 
tenets of the contingency perspective, was influenced by the group’s organisational 
context. The analysis demonstrated how the transition of risk management systems 
within the Alpha airlines towards adopting the enterprise-wide approach to managing 
risks was mostly incremental and elapsing at a different pace within the individual 
airlines, except for the revolutionary step of aligning the Alpha-2 approach with that of 
other Alpha entities upon its incorporation into the group. The evolution of Alpha´s 
joint risk management approach led to institutionalisation of the ERM principles in the 
system of organisational risk management rules and routines. Scarce evidence of 
decoupling between ERM rules and routines suggested mostly instrumental rather than 
ceremonial roles and uses of ERM in the organisations under study. The analysis of 
Alpha’s risk management rules and routines confirmed previous conclusions (Chapter 
5) of a high level of maturity and advancement of the ERM system. The analysis 
allowed the researcher to draw conclusions on the best practices and shortcomings of 
Apha’s risk management system, and provided valuable lessons for implementing ERM 
in airlines in such a way that allows for an alignment of the risk management function 
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with strategic planning and decision-making. A selection of these multiple lessons is 
outlaid as follows.  
 
Firstly, findings from this study suggest that creating a positive risk management culture 
is essential for effectively managing enterprise-wide risks. In Alpha high formalisation 
of the risk management system was necessary due to the size and complexity of the 
Alpha airlines (see Chapter 5, section 5.2.2 for discussion of organisational contingency 
factors; see Appendix C); meanwhile, the criticism of excessive formalisation was 
voiced by some organisation members who believed it hinders organisational agility. 
However, the existence of risk management rules does not guarantee that actors in 
organisations will enact them diligently. The risk management routines reproduced by 
organisational actors may be driven by their individual criteria of technical utility of 
actions; if organisational actors do not perceive sufficient value in risk management 
rules, their actions may be contrary to what is conveyed in the rules, and the reproduced 
actions may lead to institutionalisation of routines which do not embrace ERM 
principles. Therefore, educating organisation members, creating a positive risk-culture, 
and conveying the value of ERM to them is a condition for their ‘buy-in’ and successful 
implementation of ERM across organisational hierarchies.       
 
Secondly, findings from the case study of Alpha’s risk management system suggest the 
importance of developing mechanisms which facilitate enterprise-wide identification of 
risks, including important strategic and emerging risks. The risk management 
procedures instilled in the Alpha airlines were evidenced to involve organisation 
members from top, middle, and lower management in the risk identification process. 
This allows not only for detecting the process-level risks affecting mainly the cost bases 
of airlines’ operations, but also for including external and strategy-related risks in the 
risk portfolio.  
 
Thirdly, the case study of Alpha exemplified how the airlines designed their risk 
management frameworks in function of their risks profiles; as previously mentioned, 
and as discussed in more detail in Chapter 5 (section 5.2.2), there are multiple 
institutional pressures and contingency factors which airlines need to balance in 
development of functional risk management approaches, while risk profile demands, in 
the researcher’s opinion, should be devoted particular attention. Development of 
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separate pillars for the management of financial and safety risks, as exemplified by the 
Alpha airlines, serves as an example of the case for the need to align risk management 
structures and practices to risk profile requirements.  
 
Fourthly, through the analysis of the risk governance structures of Alpha organisations, 
the researcher learned about the importance of appointing dedicated risk units, such as 
risk committees or risk directors, which are responsible for coordinating enterprise-wide 
risk management efforts and developing an integrated view of enterprise-wide 
exposures. Additionally, findings from the case study point to the importance of 
integrating three lines of defence in the risk management systems of organisations, and 
of creating an assurance map from the group rather than individual airlines’ perspective.     
 
Fifthly, findings from the case study demonstrate following the alignment of the risk 
management function with strategic planning and decision making in organisations as a 
best practice. The Alpha case study demonstrated the existence of different 
organisational routines which empower an integration of these functions, one of which 
is development of the FRM model. The FRM model allows for testing business and 
strategic plans in different time horizons, in the context of changing macroeconomic, 
operational, and financial conditions, whilst it considers the potential effects of 
hypothesised scenarios on the evolution of airlines´ financial ratings; ratings granted to 
airlines by rating agencies are of utmost importance in order for airlines to be highly 
leveraged. The FRM model allows for testing major capital expenditures such as 
acquisition of competitor companies, affordability of new fleet orders, or setting up new 
routes in the network.  
 
The above mentioned and other best practices discussed in more detail in Chapter 8 
(section 8.2), have allowed the Alpha organisations to adopt a functional, enterprise-
wide risk management approach which is considered by the interviewees as beneficial 
for their respective Alpha organisations and which, as reported by the interviewees, has 
transformed the way that organisation-wide routines are performed in multiple areas of 
airline operations. The interviewees reported, among other factors, aligning hedging 
policies with operational business plans. Alpha airlines increased the amount of cash 
and cash equivalents in order to be better equipped to face unexpected challenges. 
Financing sources were diversified; the airlines would lend smaller amounts from a 
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larger pool of banks, and would issue bonds in order to reduce dependence on the 
financial entities. A systematic, enterprise-wide approach to managing risks in Alpha 
supports shareholder value creation by reducing the volatility of Alpha’s performance; 
as explained by TRM-Alpha, reduced volatility leads to improved credit ratings and 
lower costs of both equity and debt capital, while also decreasing the probability of 
liquidity problems. ERM adoption in Alpha is believed, as expressed by the 
interviewees, to have improved their understanding of risks, which, by their accounts, 
led to a more informed strategy setting and better preparation of the group for 
operational crises and ‘black swan’ events. The findings from the Alpha case study are 
discussed and analysed in more detail in Chapter 8, which additionally draws on 
Alpha’s risk management ‘best practices’ in formulating the ERM framework in the 
airline industry.    
 
 
 
 
172 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 
Case Study: Risk Management System in Beta Airline 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the integral components of the ERM system of the Alpha 
airlines, the rationales underlying its organisational design, and the logics of 
organisational actors involved in performing the risk management function. This 
chapter aims to extend the analysis of airline risk management systems by presenting a 
second case study; that of the Beta airline. In the first case study, the unit of analysis 
was chosen due to the advancement of the ERM systems implemented in Alpha-1 and 
Alpha-2 airlines, as indicated in the field study analysis, which was later confirmed 
through the case study analysis. The choice of the airline codenamed ‘Beta’ as a unit of 
analysis of the second case study was motivated by several factors. The field study 
analysis revealed that although Beta has not officially adopted ERM, as ERM adoption 
was planned to occur in an undefined future time horizon, the airline’s risk management 
system was evaluated to be fairly advanced; notwithstanding, despite recognising 
potential for improvement in Beta’s risk management system, the airline’s 
representatives regarded the system as functional and well aligned to organisational 
needs (see Chapter 5, sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2; Appendix C). Previous research provided 
evidence of how ERM may fall into a rule-based compliance function in organisations 
(e.g. Power, 2007, 2009; Bowling and Rieger, 2005; Bruce, 2005), while serving as a 
ceremonial demonstration of external legitimacy (Covaleski et al., 1996). Contrarily, 
organisations may adopt ERM principles as a means of achieving organisational 
objectives, without announcing the adopted approach as “enterprise-wide” or “ERM” to 
external stakeholders (Woods, 2009, 2011). Therefore, the case study of Beta provides 
an interesting base for investigating an alternative yet effective way of organising risk 
management structures and practices in airlines.   
 
The second important characteristic differentiating Beta from the Alpha airlines is the 
business model. While the case study of Alpha (Chapter 6) focused on two legacy 
airlines, Beta is a low-cost carrier. Therefore, the researcher found it interesting to 
analyse a risk management model in an organisational setting of a different business 
model. Thirdly, and related to the second rationale for choosing Beta’s risk management 
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system for further investigation, the scope of Beta’s operations is smaller than that of 
the analysed Alpha airlines; again, it is interesting to investigate the coupling of the risk 
management function in a different organisational setting – in terms of the 
organisation’s size and complexity of operations. Fourthly, since the airline industry 
undergoes a process of intense consolidation (Belobaba et al., 2009), examining the 
perspective of a single airline, subsidiary of a large airline group (versus the 
consolidated perspective analysed in Chapter 6) may be enriching to this study. Hence, 
the case study of Beta should allow for examining the alignment of the airline’s risk 
management system to varying contextual circumstances; the context for examining 
Beta’s risk management system versus that of the Alpha airlines varies in terms of 
organisational settings such as the business model, size and complexity of operations, or 
presenting a subsidiary airline perspective, as well as in terms of different extra-
organisational factors.     
 
Following the layout of the analysis presented in Chapter 6, the analysis of Beta’s risk 
management system presented herein considers the airline’s ‘risk management 
technologies’, ‘risk management experts’, and the ‘context and rationalities’ of the risk 
management approach that were previously analysed in the field study (Chapter 5). 
Similarly to the perspective adopted in Chapter 6, the analysis of Beta’s risk 
management system is grounded in the theoretical perspectives of institutional and 
contingency theory, and refers to the concepts of organisational fields and actors, risk 
management institutions, rules and routines, institutionalisation, or contingency and 
institutional pressures. Similarly to the approach adopted in the analysis of the risk 
management systems of the Alpha airlines, the analysis conducted throughout this 
chapter has both an exploratory and explanatory character, and addresses both the 
“how” and “why” questions regarding Beta’s design choice of the risk management 
system. This case study explores the integral components of Beta’s risk management 
system, explains the rationales underlying its configuration from both institutional and 
contingency theory perspectives, and explains the logics and perceptions of 
organisational actors regarding the risk management function.  
 
Data for this case study was collected via multiple means, while the study relied in 
particular on the data from 12 semi-structured interviews conducted with Beta’s 
representatives, mainly from the fields of finance, internal audit, safety, IT, and 
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production (see Table 4-2 in Chapter 4 for the interviewees’ list). Internal 
documentation was analysed, such as the framework of policies and procedures 
regulating performance of the risk management function in Beta or internal audit 
reports. In addition, the researcher reviewed the risk management tools employed in 
Beta, such as risk maps and matrices. Publicly available information on Beta was finally 
examined in order to gain a better understanding of the airline, and in order to contrast 
the researcher’s conclusions of Beta’s risk management rules and routines with the 
information reported to investors and to the general public.     
 
The analysis presented in this chapter is organised into four sections. The section to 
follow provides a brief overview of the case under study and outlines the nomenclature 
to be used throughout this chapter. The third section presents the risk management 
system of Beta; risk management governance structures, rules, routines, and tools are 
reviewed, and both interviewees’ and researcher’s views are reflected regarding the 
maturity and functionality of Beta’s risk management system. The final section 
summarises the major findings from the case study.  
 
7.2 Outline of the case study  
Beta is a low-cost carrier which forms part of an international group of airlines. 
Terminology used across this chapter distinguishes between ‘Beta’, the single airline 
forming the unit of analysis for this study, and the ‘Beta group’ or ‘the group’ referring 
to all airlines forming Beta’s respective group including the holding company. Due to a 
competitive business model and its cost base, Beta has consistently increased its 
capacity while remaining profitable during recent years, which can be considered a 
rather rare occurrence in the context of the challenging macroeconomic environment of 
the airline industry and its persistently low profitability (IATA, 2013; see Chapter 1, 
section 1.4). Beta’s business model stands on high utilisation of a single-aircraft fleet, 
high crew productivity, and short turnarounds. Beta operates several international bases, 
providing services primarily across Africa and Europe. Despite operating as a group 
subsidiary, Beta’s risk management system, at the time the empirical study of the airline 
was conducted (April-May 2014), had not been aligned with the ERM framework 
officially implemented in other airlines of Beta’s respective group. This was reported to 
be mainly due to the size of Beta’s operations and the consequent level of materiality of 
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the airline’s exposures, which are considered low in the context of the group. As further 
explained throughout this chapter, despite operating a non-consolidated risk 
management system, the rules and routines constituting Beta’s risk management system 
have been, to a certain extent, affected by the airline’s affiliation to the group.   
  
Following the rationale presented in the case study of the Alpha airlines (Chapter 6), the 
description of Beta and its respective group has been purposely limited in order to 
safeguard their confidentiality, as stipulated in a formal agreement between Beta and the 
researcher. Disclosure of more detailed information on Beta’s operations or societary 
structure might facilitate uncovering the identity of Beta or its respective group, and 
thus compromise the confidentiality and anonymity undertakings. For the same reason, 
titles of some of the positions held by the interviewees from Beta, due to their 
specificity, were purposely alternated in such a way that they describe in general terms 
the functions performed by the individuals while masking their original titles, thus 
preventing the readers of this thesis from discovering the identities of Beta’s 
representatives and the airline itself.  
 
7.3 Risk management model 
Governance guidelines issued by both “statutory and professional bodies” (as defined 
by Crawford and Stein, 2004, p. 498) reflect the view that risk management, internal 
control, and corporate governance functions are inter-related, while the boundaries 
between these functions appear blurred (Woods, 2009). Organisations may assign 
diverse roles to the risk management system, focused on facilitating decision-making 
processes, internal auditing, or compliance to corporate governance codes; these roles, 
however, are not exclusive (Arena et al., 2011). According to Arena et al. (2011), the 
importance assigned by organisations to the particular roles of the risk management 
function determines where organisations are placed on a continuum between 
compliance-driven and performance-driven approaches. The risk management approach 
adopted in Beta appears to integrate the three risk management objectives discussed by 
Arena et al. (2011) through a combination of both formal and informal risk management 
institutions; while formal institutions are grounded in procedures, manuals and rules, 
informal institutions such as norms, routines, or political processes have a rule-like 
status (North, 1990). Although the formal risk management rules developed in Beta 
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suggest the airline’s risk management approach supports principally the internal audit 
and compliance to corporate governance codes functions, as is further demonstrated in 
section 7.3.2, a combination of formal and informal risk management routines supports 
informed, risk-based decision making in the airline. The risk management approach of 
Beta, assigning different roles and uses to the risk management function, is reflected in 
the formalisation of risk management rules and routines, assignment of responsibilities 
and accountabilities for risk management throughout the airline, and the risk 
management processes and tools described throughout this section.   
 
Risk management and internal control functions are often aligned in organisations in 
response to regulatory requirements which impose an increasing amount of 
responsibility on boards of directors in terms of creating strong corporate governance 
structures and communicating reliable data on company performance (Miccolis et al., 
2001; Spira and Page, 2003). The integration of the internal control and risk 
management systems in Beta is directed at providing assurance of conformity of the 
airline’s financial statements to the regulatory framework. As a subsidiary of a listed 
company, Beta is required to comply with the requirements of the Internal Control over 
Financial Reporting (ICFR) framework and risk reporting requirements relevant to its 
host country. This was clearly stated by the HIA-Beta, who reported:  
“Our risk management approach is to a large extent focused on compliance with the 
requirements of the ICFR framework” (HIA-Beta).  
Thus, Beta´s risk management system includes a series of mechanisms for timely 
identification and management of risks related to generating viable financial 
information.  HIA-Beta continued:  
“We have got many procedures in place which guarantee that we properly identify 
risks related to the quality of financial information and reporting and that our 
controls are effective” (HIA-Beta).  
 
Internal Audit´s relation to the risk management function in organisations is often 
defined as supportive, in that internal auditing should ensure the effectiveness of risk 
management processes (Fraser and Henry, 2007). The outputs of the risk management 
function are often capitalised on in designing internal audit plans (Arena and Azzone, 
2007). As is explained in more detail in the following sections of this chapter, in Beta 
the risk management function is closely integrated with the Internal Audit function, 
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while the latter may appear to dominate in this relationship considering a high level of 
formalisation of the internal audit processes versus a low level of formalisation of risk 
management processes in several areas of the airline’s operations. However, upon a 
closer analysis of both formalised and informal risk management routines it becomes 
clear that risk management is dedicated significant attention in Beta. HIA-Beta 
commented on the coupling of the risk management and internal audit functions 
performed in the organisation:  
“Taking into consideration that the terminology is the same, and the underlying 
concepts are similar, the line dividing the fields of competences of risk management 
and internal audit is not clear. However, risk management and internal audit should 
be regarded as independent functions, and so they are in [Beta]. Internal audit 
reviews the efficiency of the controls we have in place, while risk management covers 
a broader range of activities… Internal audit provides support to the management of 
[Beta]” (HIA-Beta).   
 
As previously mentioned, Beta’s governance, risk and compliance framework (GRC) is 
characterised by a high level of formalisation of the internal audit and internal control 
functions; governance structures and policies and procedures have been put in place in 
support of these functions. IA/1-Beta explained:  
“When it comes to auditing our operations and verifying the controls, we put a lot of 
interest into having these processes well regulated and documented” (IA/1-Beta).  
IA/1-Beta went on to say:  
“The role of internal audit is clearly defined in [Beta]… We have regulations in 
place which lay out our processes and responsibilities” (IA/1-Beta).  
Contrarily, based on an analysis of risk management routines performed in selected 
functional departments, and based on an analysis of the airline’s internal documentation, 
the researcher concluded that the level of formalisation of risk management routines 
varies significantly depending on the type of exposure they are targeted at. By way of 
an example, financial or operational safety risks were evidenced to be managed through 
highly formalised routines. Notwithstanding, other types of risks such as IT risks or, to a 
certain extent, market risks, are managed rather informally. ITD-Beta noted: 
“We are trying to avoid excessive formalism in our risk management initiatives. I 
don´t think regulating all aspects of your operations brings value at the end of the 
day” (ITD-Beta). 
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Similarly, DTR-Beta stated:  
“Risk management does not constitute unnecessary bureaucracy” (DTR-Beta).  
This notion was also supported by DC-Beta in a discussion on Beta’s risk management 
system versus the systems implemented in other airlines from its respective group:  
“Some airlines have implemented more structured systems, but it all depends on the 
resources you have and that you want to put into this. If we implemented a system 
that works for us and at a lower cost, as long as it works it means we are more 
efficient” (DC-Beta).  
CFO-Beta was convinced of the functionality of Beta’s current approach: 
“What we have is a healthy common sense approach to risk management, and I think 
it works quite well” (CFO-Beta). 
Although in the interviews with Beta’s representatives such as HSS-Beta, FSM-Beta, 
IA/2-Beta, or MM-Beta, the researcher evidenced a high level of overall satisfaction 
with the risk management system, some of the interviewees, among others FF-Beta, SF-
Beta, and DC-Beta, voiced the need for the introduction of a more structured approach.   
 
Many scholars argue that the risk management function should be ideally integrated 
with organisational strategic and business planning processes, in order to effectively 
manage strategic uncertainties and facilitate informed decision-making (e.g. Beasley et 
al., 2006; White, 2004; Beasley and Frigo, 2007). The risk management system of Beta, 
although regarded to a large extent as informal in that the existing formal protocols for 
risk identification, management, and reporting do not cover all types of exposures, was 
evidenced to extend beyond the compliance arena, and to provide significant input into 
decision-making processes at corporate, strategic, and operational levels in the airline. 
Risks in Beta are conceptualised in different terms; for example, as non-compliance 
with regulatory requirements, as non-conformity with manuals, as not-reaching 
performance standards, or as events causing adverse deviation from strategic and 
business objectives. Thus, as will be further discussed throughout this chapter, Beta’s 
risk portfolio considers a wide array of risks ranging from risks threatening reliability of 
financial information, to enterprise-wide risks such as safety, financial, market risks, 
and others.  
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7.3.1 Risk management governance structures  
The multi-functionality of Beta’s risk management approach determines the division of 
responsibilities and accountabilities across the airline’s organisational hierarchy. As 
noted by HIA–Beta:  
”As you will see, we do not give priority in our formal GRC framework to risk 
management. We don´t even have a specific risk management unit in the 
organisation” (HIA-Beta).  
However, HIA-Beta further explained:  
“But it does not mean the function doesn´t exist, it´s very complex indeed, although 
the processes are often more informal” (HIA-Beta). 
The ultimate responsibility for risk management is assigned to the internal audit 
department, which reports to the Audit and Compliance Commission of the Beta 
holding company and to Beta´s management team. The internal audit department 
collaborates with different functions from across the airline in collecting and assessing 
data of both risks related to financial reporting and other enterprise-wide exposures 
(except for management of hazard and safety risks, see section 7.3.2). The internal audit 
department maintains a central risk register and, based on the data included therein, risk 
maps and risk reports are generated for further discussion among Beta´s management 
team and for risks reviews at the group level. HIA-Beta insisted on the independency of 
the internal audit function:  
“Internal Audit assesses the controls designed to manage different risks… We 
operate independently so we can properly assess the effectiveness and adequacy of 
controls” (HIA-Beta).  
HIA-Beta also reported:  
“Independent audits are indispensable because the executives have a natural 
tendency to perceive the controls they have designed as effective” (HIA-Beta). 
As explained by HIA-Beta, by integrating data on risk controls from across the 
organisation and reporting on them to relevant levels in the organisation, the internal 
audit department facilitates discussion on risks and promotes understanding of the 
airline’s overall risk profile. However, the close involvement of the internal auditors in 
risk management processes may raise questions regarding their independence and 
providing unbiased assurance of functionality of the risk management system.  
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Consistent with the above arguments, DC-Beta noted that a cross-functional advisory 
risk unit should be appointed in Beta in order to, among other things, better integrate 
risk-related information from across the company; the interviewee stressed:  
“It would be easier to get a global perspective of our risks” (DC-Beta). 
Contrarily, CFO-Beta and HIA-Beta, with regard in particular to the integrated view of 
enterprise-wide risks, were of the opinion that the existing risk governance structure 
does allow for incorporating enterprise-wide risk information into key management 
decisions; as stated:  
“[In Internal Audit] we integrate information on risks from across the company... It 
is clearly visible on risk maps” (HIA-Beta).  
However, as will be further elaborated on in the forthcoming section, it can be doubted 
whether Beta’s management effectively relies on the risk maps in the discussion on 
risks and strategies. CFO-Beta would rather emphasise informal risk management 
routines institutionalised in Beta, which facilitate risk-based strategy setting and 
decision-making in the airline. By way of an example, CFO-Beta explained:  
“In preparation of business plans we need to cooperate with different departments to 
see their projections and concerns and to consider them in key decisions… So we 
know what the key risks are because the departments talk amongst each other… We 
have a working environment in which information sharing is very open” (CFO-
Beta). 
In the discussion with other managers such as DC-Beta or DTR-Beta, the existence of 
risk maps compiled by internal audit was acknowledged, yet the researcher did not find 
clear evidence supporting their extensive use in organisational risk management 
routines.   
 
Although lacking formal appointments, the empirical study evidenced that 
responsibilities and accountabilities for the risk management function are cascaded 
through Beta. Multiple actors are involved in the risk management processes across the 
organisation, although few policies and procedures exist in Beta which formally lay out 
the risk governance structure, in particular at the lower management levels. Some 
functional areas within Beta have dedicated risk management units; by way of an 
example, the Financial Risk Committee oversees Beta´s financial exposures and the 
Safety Commission delegated by Beta´s board of directors oversees the management of 
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safety and hazard risks. Managers of other functional areas were reported to act 
informally as local risk experts within their respective areas of responsibility.  
 
7.3.2 Risk management technologies  
As previously referred to in this thesis (Chapter 6, section 6.4.2) and as defined in 
Arena et al. (2010), the concept of ‘risk technologies’ denotes a complex set of rules, 
routines and tools enrolled in the management of risks. The following analysis examines 
Beta’s risk management technologies, considering both formal and informal risk 
management rules and routines; in addition, it also reflects on the extent to which 
formal risk management policies and procedures are translated into the practices 
enacted by individual actors within the organisation. The following analysis of the 
major pillars of Beta’s risk management model demonstrates how the organisation’s 
rules, routines, and tools are designed to fit with the diverse roles assigned to the risk 
management function in Beta, which, as previously discussed, provide support in 
decision-making processes, internal audit processes, and in compliance with corporate 
governance codes. The analysis is conducted from a subsidiary perspective, where risk 
management technologies are, to a certain extent, either formally imposed or 
recommended by Beta’s holding company. The holding company indicates a series of 
group-level risks which need to be regularly considered for plausibility at the subsidiary 
level, apart from the formal requirement of considering the risks under the ICFR 
framework. In multiple ways the risk appetite of the holding company is transferred to 
Beta by requiring conformance to policies and decisions generated at the group level, 
thereby affecting the risk management technologies implemented in Beta.  
 
Management of enterprise-wide risks  
Several formalised and non-formalised risk management processes are simultaneously 
conducted in Beta, which consist of successive steps of identification, assessment, 
management, monitoring, and reporting of risks. Formalised risk management processes 
of financial or operational safety risks coexist with less formal or informal routines for 
management of other types of risks. As previously indicated, the internal audit 
department coordinates the enterprise-wide risk management efforts. Internal audit 
compiles catalogues of enterprise-wide risks, which are identified and managed with 
different levels of formalisation in their corresponding functional departments. Apart 
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from risks which are relevant specifically to Beta’s operations, Beta is requested to 
additionally assess the applicability of several group-level risks at the subsidiary-level. 
As explained by HIA-Beta:  
“We are requested to analyse the risks applicable to other subsidiaries or to the 
holding company, and assess their plausibility… For example, exposures related to 
fuel prices and transferring it to ticket prices tend to be shared at the group level… 
Although pension plan risks are only relevant to [group subsidiary], due to their 
importance and materiality they are discussed at the group level… Aircraft financing 
is important to the group; however, due to our fleet structure we do not consider it a 
key risk, our financing in this area is well managed”(HIA-Beta).  
 
Risks applicable to Beta are analysed in terms of their materiality and, if assessed 
important enough, they are incorporated into the consolidated risk catalogue at the 
group level. However, due to the size of Beta’s operations, the materiality of its risks is 
considered very low at the group level, and thus they are rarely incorporated into the 
group’s risk management system. Beta’s risk management process is additionally 
conditioned by the group in that, apart from conducing internal risk assessments in the 
airline, decisions of Beta’s management team in several areas require approval at the 
group level. By way of an example, investment expenditures of above a certain level 
need to be reported and approved at the holding company level; fleet capacity decisions, 
among others, once analysed within a wider business plan context at the subsidiary 
level, require approval of the holding company. Similarly, financial risk management 
policies are imposed by the holding company, although the subsidiary is provided with 
a certain margin of flexibility.  
 
Risks are assessed by using an impact and probability matrix. HIA-Beta explained:  
“We evaluate risks in these two dimensions based on our subjective perceptions, we 
do not conduct any detailed risk modelling” (HIA-Beta). 
Risk assessment methodology used in Beta is different from the approach employed in 
other group companies. Risks in other subsidiaries of the group and in the Beta holding 
company are assessed at their residual levels, in terms of their respective levels of 
probability of occurrence. However, risk assessment in Beta commences at a previous 
stage; it considers inherent risks and the effectiveness of their controls to arrive at 
183 
 
 
 
residual risks and determine their respective levels of probability of occurrence. HIA-
Beta explained: 
“It´s very difficult to evaluate the inherent risks and their corresponding controls, 
but you need to undertake this difficult task of judgment, a common sense analysis, 
or however you want to call it, in order to be able to draw conclusions on risks at the 
residual level”(HIA-Beta). 
 HIA-Beta further expressed his view:  
“I personally think that by assessing residual risks, without having previously 
conducted any analysis at the inherent level, and without having evaluated the 
effectiveness of their controls, you ignore the most complex and most useful part of 
risk analysis” (HIA-Beta).   
Both qualitative and quantitative measures are used. Qualitative evaluations are often 
applied to emerging or strategic risks where little specific information is available. 
Quantitative risk assessments express the potential monetary impact on Beta´s operating 
results and form the basis for evaluating potential deviations from business plans. 
Subsequently, risk responses and controls are deployed for particular risks. Internal 
audit periodically monitors the risk management system in terms of adequacy and 
effectiveness of the controls in place. As previously indicated, the findings of internal 
audits are reported to Beta´s board of directors, and to the group’s Audit and 
Compliance Commission. Additionally, risk owners are provided advice on potential 
areas for improvement of risk controls.  
 
As evidenced through interviews with airline representatives, there are several parallel 
risk management processes taking place simultaneously across the airline in different 
functional departments, featuring different levels of formalisation. For example, and as 
previously mentioned, the Internal Audit department deals with risks related to financial 
reporting in addition to conducting reviews of risk controls and compiling enterprise-
wide risk data; the legal department manages compliance risks; the financial department 
supervises financial exposures; the IT department manages IT risks; the broadly defined 
production departments manage operational and safety risks; simultaneously there are 
transversal processes for dealing with strategic or market risks. Although apart from the 
ICFR, safety, and financial risks there are no formal specifications regarding the 
frequency of updating risk portfolios, the majority of the interviewed representatives of 
different departments across the airline claimed performing risk reviews on a regular 
184 
 
 
 
basis; however, the timeframe for regular reviews was defined differently by the 
interviewees. By way of another example, the management team holds regular weekly 
“rollings” during which business projections are contrasted with reality, the strategy is 
adjusted, and new risks are considered. CFO-Beta pointed to the reviews of business 
and strategic plans being conducted at regular intervals:  
“Since we update our business plans regularly every few weeks, we also consider the 
related risks and adjust our operations accordingly” (CFO-Beta). 
CFO-Beta also noted: 
“We are requested by the holding company to regularly review the strategic risks of 
the Group to see if they are applicable to us, and also strategic risks at the local 
level” (CFO-Beta).  
The risk management team that oversees financial risks conducts risk and strategy 
reviews on a weekly basis; as explained by DTR-Beta:  
“We [the Financial Committee] meet once a week to discuss the evolution of the 
market and adjust our hedging positions” (DTR-Beta).  
IT risks are reviewed on a monthly basis; ITD-Beta explained: 
“I meet with our Internal Auditors once a month to discuss flaws in IT controls and 
to report on what we have done with previously identified problems” (ITD-Beta).  
Similarly, HSS-Beta, MM-Beta, IA/2-Beta, and FSM-Beta suggested that other 
functional departments also revise their relevant risks with relative consistency, either 
through periodical audits or implicitly through examining conformity with operational 
manuals developed for their respective functions. However, such reviews appear to be 
conducted as informal routines in the organisation. IA/2-Beta commented as follows 
regarding the risk management responsibilities of various employee groups across the 
organisation:  
“Risk management is implicit in multiple operating manuals regulating our day-to-
day operations... It is regarded as a responsibility of all our employees… It is 
implied in performance standards we have pre-defined at the operational level” 
(IA/2-Beta).   
The implicit nature of risk management exercised through adherence to performance 
standards regulating airline operations was also acknowledged by MM-Beta:  
“We have very detailed instructions on how to do our job [aircraft maintenance]; 
everything is explained in guidelines and also during work training sessions we are 
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advised on what the consequences may be if we do not conform to the instructions… 
So we know what the risks are, and we manage them by doing a good job and 
following the manuals” (MM-Beta). 
This was also confirmed by the Flight Safety Manager (FSM-Beta):  
“In the production part [departments] we move people from point A to B in the 
safest manner possible, so our operations are very regulated... There are many 
industry regulations, and also internal regulations that we need to comply with; 
everything is described in guidebooks and manuals... I think people are very much 
aware of the risks of not following, for example, maintenance manuals, although 
culture is a different thing; it really affects how much attention people pay to obeying 
the instructions” (FSM-Beta).  
Thus, risk management can be considered an integral part of the responsibilities of 
airline members at the operational level; risk management, performance management, 
and compliance with operating standards and manuals seem to go hand in hand.  
 
Although risks seem to be managed in silos at the operational level, according to HIA-
Beta, they are later coordinated and integrated within the internal audit function. The 
internal audit conducts periodical reviews of risks, manages a central risk catalogue of 
both the risks relevant to reliability of financial reporting and other enterprise-wide 
risks, and generates risk maps gathering enterprise-wide exposures. During site visits 
the researcher reviewed the tools that operationally support risk management processes 
in Beta: the risk registers and risk maps. Separate risk registers are compiled in 
particular departments by using simple spread-sheets, from which the most plausible 
risks are later included in the general risk register managed by the internal audit 
department. The risk registers compile data on the identified risks, their controls and 
risk owners. Risk maps synthesise risks with the highest materiality levels, and are 
presented to the group´s Audit and Compliance Commission. The airline is planning to 
implement centralised software that would operationally support risk management 
processes by, for example, collecting more detailed data on the evolution of risks in the 
past and on the forecasted exposures.  
 
As previously indicated, a discrepancy was noticed in the accounts of HIA-Beta 
regarding the reliance on risk maps as a tool facilitating an integrated view of risks and 
employed in the discussions of the airline’s senior management, and the accounts of the 
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latter. In the context of limited policies and procedures regulating risk reporting across 
the airline, the management team would emphasise rather integrating information on 
enterprise-wide exposures via informal routines. By way of an example, officers HIA-
Beta, CFO-Beta, DTR-Beta, and DC-Beta reported on informal cooperation between 
departments in preparation of business plans and a joint review of risks. Furthermore, 
the empirical study evidenced that the ownership of risks, as specified in the risk 
registers, is formalised and executed in organisational routines solely in selected pillars 
of the risk management model, in particular with regard to the ICFR, safety, and 
financial risks. Review of the corporate risk maps compiled by internal audit and the 
posterior consultations with the management team led the researcher to conclude on a 
loose link between risk ownership assigned to selected types of risks, and a reflection of 
such ownership in organisational routines. By way of an example, despite assigning 
ownership for particular strategic risks to selected members of the management team, 
there seemed to be no formal follow-ups in this regard; strategic risks would be 
discussed, as previously explained, on a regular basis, yet the findings of such 
discussions would not be regularly documented in the risk registers.       
 
Despite only a moderate level of formalisation of organisational risk management rules 
and routines, which also varies across departments, risk management was reported to be 
integrated within relevant managerial processes in Beta such as strategic and business 
planning. As stated above, such integration was reported possible owing to the 
cooperation of various functions within the airline and sharing of risk information. In 
the development of strategic and business plans, the management team considers 
potential changes in major macroeconomic variables or operational disruptions, and 
makes decisions based on its resilience to accommodate the possible negative 
implications of alternative scenarios. However, the managers do not use sophisticated 
risk modelling techniques or automated frameworks as described in the case of Alpha 
airlines in the previous chapter; the analyses are rather unstructured and CFO-Beta 
would describe them as “a common sense approach”. Strategic plans of Beta are 
reviewed on a quarterly basis, in order to consider changes in the airline’s wider 
operating environment. Risk management is implicit within the strategic reviews; 
strategic options are assessed with consideration of their related risks.  
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CFO-Beta exemplified the strategic network review process:  
“In the airline industry we have the advantage of adjusting our strategic choices 
fairly easily. Our assets are mobile, so we can allocate them where we think there is 
major potential to generate revenue” (CFO-Beta).  
CFO-Beta further explained:  
“We tend to assume a three-year maturity period for new routes and if, after that 
period revenues from the routes do not match the projections, we consider moving 
the assets to serve different, more profitable routes... We analyse the options we have 
in terms of revenue generating potential connections, the cost structure, and the risks 
we may run into in general” (CFO-Beta).  
Development of strategic and business plans is grounded in a risk analysis of alternative 
options considering, for example, volatile macroeconomic conditions, fluctuating 
demand, and the resultant capacity risks. Demand forecasts underlie the development of 
strategic and business plans and decisions on capacity requirements. FF-Beta 
highlighted the importance of making capacity-related decisions in a broader context, 
and classified fleet capacity risks among priority concerns of airline organisations: 
”Many airlines have gone bankrupt because they failed to properly manage their 
capacity risks” (FF-Beta). 
Beta manages the fleet capacity risks through combining asset acquisitions with 
medium-term leases, which provides the airline with the flexibility to temporarily 
downsize operations when demand falls.       
 
In the development of business plans special attention is dedicated to fuel price and 
exchange rate fluctuations; business plan sensitivity analyses are conducted in order to 
assess the airline’s flexibility to pass cost increases onto customers or adjust the cost 
structure, and to suggest potential effects of particular scenarios, if materialised, on the 
airline’s cash flow results. CFO-Beta pointed out:  
“Price elasticity of demand is limited, so we also need to be able to respond to 
unfavourable business conditions by adjusting our cost structure... We saw a source 
of our competitive advantage in introducing a high flexibility into our cost structure” 
(CFO-Beta).  
In line with this rationale, certain positions in airline cost structure which are typically 
associated with fixed costs can be regarded as semi-fixed costs in the case of Beta. This 
has been possible due to contracting part of the cabin crew staff with temporary 
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contracts and, as previously indicated, opting for aircraft leases versus aircraft 
ownership; individual aircraft leases expire gradually year by year, which allows Beta to 
effectively manage the capacity risk and downsize its operations when necessary due to 
lower demand. CFO-Beta noted:  
“It´s very easy to grow; on the contrary, managing downturns is a real challenge. 
You have to know how to pass costs to your customers and how to cut your costs. 
And this is what we evaluate in sensitivity analyses of our business plans” (CFO-
Beta).  
CFO-Beta continued:  
“When you prepare business plans and consider possible future scenarios, it´s all 
about knowing the flexibility you have in your costs... So we cooperate with different 
departments to see how much cost we can pass on to customers, how much we can 
reduce our costs, but it´s all pretty informal. You just talk to the marketing people 
and say ‘[name], no more posters this month [laughter]... Luckily we haven´t had to 
face this kind of situation yet, but you have to be prepared for when it happens” 
(CFO-Beta).  
 
Although management of certain types of corporate risks features a relatively low level 
of formalisation, versus, as previously discussed, formalised management of financial, 
safety, or IFCR risks as discussed in the following paragraphs, the risk management 
routines enacted in Beta support strategic and operational decision-making, while they 
are integrated within strategy and business planning processes. Therefore, despite 
moderate formalisation of risk management rules and routines, the risk management 
function in Beta is implicitly integrated within performance management.    
 
Management of the ICFR risks  
In terms of risks related to the reliability of financial reporting, as previously indicated, 
formal rules regulate their risk management processes. Six key processes were 
identified as having a high potential impact on Beta´s financial reports such as sales, 
payroll, fuel purchasing, IT controls, entity-level controls, and closure of the financial 
statements. Risks relevant to these processes are identified and reflected in a risk map 
which serves as a baseline for conducting regular audits.  
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As explained by HIA-Beta:  
“By delegation of [the group’s] Audit and Compliance Commission, [Beta’s] 
internal audit department reviews the effectiveness of controls in processes which 
affect the quality of financial information” (HIA-Beta). 
 HIA-Beta further explained: 
“For example, within the [relevant ICFR framework] sales processes are analysed 
for their related risks strictly from the financial control perspective. Ownership of 
the identified risks is not assigned to the Commercial Director, but rather to the 
Financial Director... There are also sub-owners assigned to particular processes or 
risks, such as Head of the Accounting Department, who is responsible for ensuring 
that sales are properly registered in the accounting systems. The Commercial 
Director would only be involved in this formal process if the controls ensuring 
reliability of sales data were to be designed and executed from his area… Then 
Internal Audit reviews the controls” (HIA-Beta). 
In the context of the different possible modalities of coupling of organisational rules and 
routines previously indicated, officers IA/1-Beta and IA/2-Beta were both of the 
opinion that the risk management routines adhere to the formalised statements of 
procedures in management of the ICFR-related risks.   
 
Financial Risk Management   
The importance of managing financial risks was recognised in Beta through constitution 
of formal governance structures dedicated specifically to this function. The Treasury 
and Risk Management responsibilities are merged into one executive position of DTR-
Beta, who reports directly to CFO-Beta and liaises with the Financial Risk Committees 
both at the subsidiary and at the holding company level. Beta´s local Financial Risk 
Committee meets on a weekly basis, and its members additionally periodically 
participate in meetings of an equivalent committee celebrated at the group level, where 
the overall financial policy for the group is designed. The group dictates guidelines for 
financial risk management policies to be implemented in Beta, regarding the hedging 
strategies, liquidity requirements, and counterparty ratings in financial transactions.  
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As illustrated by DTR-Beta:  
“The management of financial risks is given a lot of attention, it´s very formalised... We 
have policies for hedging... I need to maintain cash levels according to what the policies 
say...” (DTR-Beta).   
The group´s policies indicate the ratios of overall fuel and currency needs in different 
time horizons which need to be covered with hedges, and price targets which, when met 
by market conditions, allow for executing additional trades. Based on these guidelines, 
and with a pre-defined flexibility range expressed in percentage variations, Beta´s 
Financial Risk Committee executes the hedges. However, DTR-Beta noted:  
“If we find it more beneficial to act contrary to the group policies, we explain our 
rationale to the [group’s] Financial Risk Committee, which have so far always been 
approved, and so we manage the financial risks according to what we think is best 
for [Beta]” (DTR-Beta). 
On multiple occasions, in order to negotiate the most favourable conditions with 
hedging counterparties, the trades are executed jointly with other airlines from the 
group.  
 
With reference to counterparty risks, group policies limit the maximum portion of cash 
Beta is authorised to invest with a single financial entity, for the objective is to 
significantly diversify short-term financial investments between various institutions and 
countries. Additionally, minimum rating requirements are established for Beta´s 
financial counterparties, which delimit the pool of admissible counterparties. Finally, 
considering Beta´s fleet structure with a significant ratio of leased assets and with a 
majority of leases closed on a fixed rate, interest rate risks are considered less relevant 
compared to other financial exposures.  
 
Safety Risk Management   
The safety risk management framework developed in Beta incorporates the ERM 
principles in a sense that it fosters a proactive risk management culture throughout the 
production departments of the airline. As indicated on multiple occasions throughout 
this thesis, airlines’ operations are delineated and coordinated by various regulative 
frameworks. Such frameworks obligate airlines to adopt organisational structures for 
safety management and development of safety management systems (SMS). However, 
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the formal requirement of developing SMS is interpreted diversely among airlines 
(Wittmer and Drax, 2014); different rules and routines are created in individual 
organisations. As explained by HSS-Beta:  
“When the guidelines say that SMS should be integrated throughout the 
organisation, it doesn´t specify how... you interpret it the way it works for you” 
(HSS-Beta). 
 
Beta incorporated the four pillars of the SMS framework (safety policy and objectives, 
safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion, see Chapter 2, section 
2.3.1 and 2.3.1.2) with the underlying aim of creating a closed-loop risk management 
system which reaches beyond the compliance function and promotes proactive safety 
risk management culture. HSS-Beta reflected on the evolutionary nature of the 
development of the SMS framework:  
“SMS would focus on accident prevention and flight safety programmes... Safety 
investigators worked in a ‘bunker’; they were receiving data, analysing them, 
publishing documents, and nobody would care if they were ever used, it was an open 
loop. They [safety investigators] would find root causes for incidents and accidents, 
issue recommendations to post holders, and there would be no follow up, no 
mandatory implementation, no checks in the organisation. It was all very reactive, 
but we have been working hard over the years to change the approach towards 
safety management” (HSS-Beta).  
 
The analysis of Beta’s SMS framework suggests the organisational safety structures 
were not developed ceremonially in pursuit of legitimacy. HSS-Beta reported on the 
rules and routines institutionalised in the airline which promote a proactive safety risk 
management culture:  
“For every safety accident there tends to be several previous incidents that warn 
you. Of course there may be some black swan events which don´t give previous 
warnings, but they are rare. Normally you get many warnings that something is 
going on… So we encourage people to report on the incidents, because it allows us 
to trigger investigations. We promote rather than punish the reporting… If we 
implement changes based on a reported incident root cause or a trend, we notify the 
person who made it visible, we ask them to write about it in our bulletin, we follow 
up with that person… So the most important thing is to have people who are ready to 
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recognise the red flags and advise us on them. You need these people to keep you in 
the loop” (HSS-Beta).  
The airline shifted from reactive to preventive risk assessment and safety barriers 
creation. Preventive risk analysis is performed prior to entering any new route by the 
airline. HSS-Beta reported:  
“We don´t wait for something to happen to put safety barriers in place… We start 
our risk analysis before opening a new route. Before selling the tickets we know we 
are going to fly to [destination], so we start scanning the organisation – are we 
ready to start flying there? What are the possible hazards on the route? Maybe we 
need to reinforce the training because of certain factors, maybe not everybody can 
fly there?” (HSS-Beta).  
 
HSS-Beta explained how different internal and external sources of data are fed to safety 
risk management processes: 
”You cannot base your conclusions solely on one type of data. It may be biased, or it 
may lead to a reactive approach” (HSS-Beta).  
The safety risk management system is fed with data from both the inside and the outside 
of the organisation; examples of internal data sources are past events, trends, or data on 
changes in the organisation in terms of technology, procedures, and training, while 
external data can be sourced from reports on safety accidents or incidents released from 
other airlines or regulative bodies. FSM-Beta additionally stressed the role of inter-
departmental information sharing:  
“You need to talk to people; you need to know what is going on in the organisation, 
what are the plans. You need to train people to detect changes in the organisation 
and assess them in terms of risks. And you need to train the directors so that they 
understand that your recommendations need to be taken seriously” (FSM-Beta).  
 
Beta’s safety risk management framework is audited internally by the compliance 
function, which ensures its conformity with regulatory standards, and externally by 
auditors from regulative bodies. The framework is not revised by the Internal Audit 
department of Beta, while only major safety threats appear on corporate risk maps 
compiled by HIA-Beta. Beta’s safety risk management framework appears to operate 
with a high degree of independence from the remaining pillars of the airline’s risk 
management system. HSS-Beta reported that he found this division appropriate and that 
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he did not find it potentially beneficial to integrate safety risk management more closely 
with other corporate risk management processes. However, this rationale seems to be in 
contrast with the opinion of HIA-Beta, who insisted on the need for further alignment of 
different risk management processes across the airline, as expressed:  
“When you use the same methodology for assessing and reporting different types of 
risks, it´s easier to compare their materiality... You know, you are comparing apples 
to apples and bananas to bananas, it´s easier to get a global view of the materiality 
of all your exposures - financial, safety, compliance, and all the others” (HIA-Beta).            
Beta’s safety risk management framework differs from the frameworks incorporated in 
other airlines of the group. HSS-Beta stressed the need to align organisational safety 
management rules and routines to particular needs of the organisation, which seemed to 
be a premise against future standardisation of such frameworks across the group. 
Furthermore, HSS-Beta viewed the safety risk management system as very advanced:  
“I cooperated in a project with [names of airlines] and I compared our framework 
with what they had; I was surprised that big companies still work with open-loop 
systems... Our system is much more advanced” (HSS-Beta). 
 
7.3.3 Functionality of Beta´s risk management system  
The assessment of functionality of Beta’s risk management system, as reflected in the 
analysis of risk management rules, routines, and institutions conducted throughout this 
chapter, was based on selected criteria such as the comprehensiveness of the risk 
portfolio, the level of embeddedness of the risk management function across the 
organisation, the level of integration of risk management routines enacted across 
different departments and at different organisational levels, and the alignment of the risk 
management and strategic management functions. These assessment criteria were, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, inspired mainly by the work of Arena et al. (2011). 
 
The portfolio of risks managed in Beta through both formal and informal routines can 
be regarded as comprehensive. By analysing the documentary evidence in the form of 
the risk maps and general risk register compiled at the corporate level, and the risk 
registers held at lower levels in the organisation, the researcher observed a wide range 
of risks being considered. The risks maps included both risks managed through 
formalised processes, such as risks related to reliability of the financial statements, 
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safety and financial risks, and a variety of corporate risks aggregated from risk registers 
held across different organisational departments. Additionally, the airline’s 
representatives, especially from middle and lower management levels, emphasised that 
risks are informally and implicitly managed in Beta through adherence to operational 
manuals and standards, although some exposures may fail to be reflected in the risk 
registers.  
 
The risk management function presents a moderately high level of embeddedness in the 
context of different organisational levels and functions in Beta embracing risk 
management through either formal or informal institutions. As has been explained 
throughout this chapter, risk governance structures have been established in Beta in 
order to support specific functions in the airline such as management of financial, 
safety, or ICFR risks. Management of other types of corporate exposures is conducted 
in a less structured manner, although supervised by the Internal Audit department. The 
aforementioned discussion on the alignment of strategic planning and risk management 
pointed to the involvement of Beta’s top management in identification and management 
of strategic and emerging risks. At the operational level, risk management was argued to 
be embedded informally in organisational culture through adherence to operational 
manuals and performance standards, and through periodical audits of business 
processes.  
 
An integrated view of risks is achieved at the corporate level in Beta mainly via inter-
departmental collaboration in preparation of corporate and business strategies and the 
related risk analysis. Representatives of different functions, for example finance, 
network planning, or business development, liaise and share risk information which 
forms the grounds for risk-based decision making. Additionally, risk management is 
centralised under the Internal Audit department, which collects and integrates 
enterprise-wide data on the majority of risks for their further presentation mainly to the 
holding company. At the operational level, risks are managed in silos within different 
organisational functions; integration of enterprise-wide risk data is achieved only after it 
is escalated to the upper levels of the organisation. Additionally, as argued in section 
7.3.2 of this chapter, the risk management and the strategic management functions are 
aligned in Beta through informal routines of periodical risk and strategy reviews which 
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integrate relevant data on Beta’s risks; different strategic options are assessed, taking 
into account their related risks.   
 
The risk management system was assessed positively by the majority of the 
interviewees, while at the same time, and in line with the researcher’s opinion, the 
interviewees recognised that the  risk management framework of Beta holds significant 
potential for improvement. CFO-Beta commented on the changes to be introduced in 
the airline’s risk management model:  
“We are moving towards a more sophisticated model, because for now what we have 
works well for us, but it´s pretty informal… We do analyse risks in major strategic 
decisions, but it´s all very casual right now, there is definitely room for 
improvement” (CFO-Beta).  
HIA-Beta similarly emphasised the transitional character of Beta’s risk management 
system:  
“We are in the process of transition. What we have is not definite yet, we are 
constantly trying to improve our practices…” (HIA-Beta).  
When explicitly asked about the future official adoption of ERM, CFO-Beta and HIA-
Beta confirmed it should take place in the future. Based on interviewees’ accounts the 
researcher concluded that the adoption decision is driven primarily by the pressures 
from Beta’s respective group. In the discussion on the evolution of Beta’s risk 
management system the interviewees focused on the flaws of the current risk 
management system and the changes to be introduced in the future, rather than 
suggesting legitimacy-driven adoption of ERM. HIA-Beta additionally commented on 
the validity of Beta’s current risk management approach:  
“Of course we are working on making our risk management function ever more 
comprehensive, especially now that we can talk to other companies [within the 
group] and see their solutions… but, for example, a highly formalised system is like 
a double-edged sword, it´s not always good for you… You cannot just copy what 
other airlines have; you have to see what works for you. We are a smaller company, 
so we cannot just copy what [group airline] has” (HIA-Beta).   
 
Evidence from officers ITD-Beta, DC-Beta, and IA/2-Beta suggests that, although 
generally considered as quite advanced and well fitted to the airline’s needs, Beta’s risk 
management system could be improved in several areas. ITD-Beta suggested that 
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specialised risk management software would support the routinisation and intra-
institutionalisation of risk management practices:  
“It would help us to better organise the risk management processes… It would be 
easier to collect, process and share information on risks” (ITD-Beta). 
IA/2-Beta suggested extending the focus of the risk management system: 
“We should focus more attention on other relevant types of risks, rather than just the 
hazard risks or safety risks… We don’t really have any incentives or any formal 
procedures for the managers to look at, let’s say, reputation risks. It doesn’t mean 
it’s not being done now, but it could be done in a better way” (IA/2-Beta). 
However, interviews with the senior management of Beta suggested that important 
strategic and external risks are considered in the strategic planning process (see section 
7.3.2), although there are no formal procedures regulating this area. Finally, DC-Beta, 
who previously worked for a different airline with a well-implemented risk management 
system, commented on the need to institutionalise new risk management routines in 
Beta:  
“It would help us if we held more regular reviews specifically to review the risk 
maps, rather than having ad-hoc meetings whenever something big is about to come 
up” (DC-Beta). 
Furthermore, as previously specified (7.3), DC-Beta advocated the need to re-define the 
roles of internal audit and risk management in the organisation, and to introduce 
dedicated governance structures to facilitate deployment of the risk management 
function in the airline.  
 
7.4 Conclusions and lessons learnt 
The analysis presented in this chapter complemented the findings from Chapters 5 and 
6, and added to the previous discussion on the heterogeneity of risk management 
approaches in the airline industry. The integral components of Beta’s risk management 
model were analysed, reflecting their fitting with institutional and technical demands of 
the airline’s intra- and extra-organisational environments. The analysis explained how 
the roots of Beta’s risk management approach lie in the corporate culture, business 
model, overall structure of the organisation, and its position within a broader 
organisational field of airlines. In this empirical study of Beta’s risk management 
system the researcher investigated the underlying context and rationalities, the risk 
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management technologies in use, the risk governance structures, and the organisational 
logics of risk experts involved in enterprise-wide risk management processes. The case 
study of Beta allowed the researcher to verify and extend the findings from the field 
study (Chapter 5) and to provide valuable lessons which can advance the risk 
management practice in airlines.  
 
The case study of Beta demonstrated how risk management in airlines can have 
different roles and uses. The risk management approach employed in Beta was 
evidenced to serve different organisational purposes, for it falls under both the audit-
compliance domain and the performance management domain. The outputs of the risk 
management processes are used in order to demonstrate compliance with corporate 
governance requirements; they are incorporated in internal audit plans and are 
considered in the preparation and execution of strategic and business plans.  
 
The case study demonstrated how organisations can incorporate some of the main 
principles of ERM, or may undertake initiatives to improve the risk management 
function, without labelling their systems as ‘ERM’ in pursuit of external legitimacy. 
Despite lacking a complex risk architecture, and despite only limited formalisation of 
the overall risk management approach of Beta, this study demonstrated how the routines 
institutionalised across the airline allow for the management of important strategic risks 
and aligning risk management with the performance management function, which are 
considered important tenets of ERM. The airline seems to prioritise effectiveness of 
organisational risk management processes over creating bureaucratic trails which 
externally evidence the quality of management processes.   
 
The case study of Beta provided evidence of a risk management framework with a 
moderate level of formalisation. Varying opinions have been documented among 
organisation members regarding the extent to which further formalisation of risk 
management rules and routines would be beneficial to the airline. The calls for 
increased formalisation of risk management routines in Beta, especially regarding 
identification and management of some corporate-level risks, were grounded in 
expectations of improved consistency and repeatability of the risk management 
processes, clarity in risk appetite and risk tolerances, and enabling a more 
comprehensive and integrated view of risks. However, some representatives of the 
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management team perceived the risk management ‘status quo’ as properly aligned to the 
airline’s needs. Despite the informal nature of many of the risk management routines, 
the risk management function was often regarded to be well embedded in the day-to-day 
activities of airline management. Furthermore, high formalisation of rules, policies, 
procedures, and other control mechanisms was perceived as potentially dysfunctional, 
restricting informal interactions across the airline and hindering organisational agility in 
decision-making processes.  
 
The case study of Beta demonstrated the importance of proper institutionalisation of 
organisational principles as reflected in the system of rules, in the logics of actors in the 
organisation and, consequently, in their enacted routines. It has been demonstrated in 
Beta that development of formal structures and procedures does not guarantee that 
organisation members will conform to them. This has been exemplified in the write-up 
of this case study with reference to assigning risk ownership over selected strategic 
risks, and the failure of risk owners to formally document their management. As 
explained by Oliver (1991), organisational actors evaluate the potential utility of 
conformity with the rules, and if they perceive that the objectives of the rules are in 
conflict with their perceptions of organisational interests, they may fail to comply with 
the rules.  
 
Finally, the case study raised the issue of separating internal audit and risk management 
functions in organisations. Some interviewees suggested that the airline could benefit 
from an independent, dedicated, and, at an executive level, centralised risk management 
unit, rather than the internal audit department being involved both in deployment of the 
risk management function and in the assessment of its functionality. Further discussion 
on the findings from the case study of Beta, and reflections on the lessons learnt from 
this case, which laid the grounds for development of the ERM framework in the airline 
industry, are presented in the following chapter (Chapter 8).     
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Chapter 8 
Discussion 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This research aims to investigate structures and practices of airline risk management 
systems in order to develop an enterprise-wide risk management framework in the 
airline industry. In order to achieve this aim, the researcher conducted an empirical 
study based on a sample of ten international airlines. Firstly, a field study was 
conducted, aimed at exploring the different designs of airline risk management systems 
and their technical and institutional determinants. Additionally, the field study 
examined the developments and shortcomings of airline risk management systems, and 
the degree of assimilation of ERM principles in the airlines forming the sample. 
Secondly, two case studies were conducted in order to examine in more detail risk 
management systems of selected airlines and the alignment of such systems with 
airlines’ respective business contexts. Findings from the empirical research were based 
on multiple types of evidence. The analysis relied principally on interviews carried out 
with airline representatives who have wide knowledge of the risk management systems 
of their respective organisations, internal documentation evidencing risk management 
rules and routines, a review of risk management tools employed in the airlines, and a 
review of publicly available data on the airlines and their risk management approaches 
in particular. 
 
The discussion conducted in this chapter combines the field study findings with a cross-
case analysis of findings from the case studies. Furthermore, the discussion of the 
empirical research findings reflects on the theoretical framework developed for this 
study (see Chapter 3). Additionally, the discussion of the empirical findings is 
positioned within the context of previous studies which are relevant to risk management 
systems in general and ERM systems in particular. Due to limited availability of 
literature on the investigated subjects specifically related to the airline industry, the 
findings are contrasted with studies considering risk management systems in other 
industries.  
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The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: the second section presents an ERM 
framework developed on the basis of the findings from this research. In the context of 
the framework the researcher reflects on the designs of airline risk management and 
ERM systems, concludes on drivers of effective enterprise-wide risk management in 
airlines and, finally, under the tenets of structural contingency theory, discusses the 
need to align airline risk management systems to the requirements of their respective 
task and institutional environments. The third section reviews the technical and 
institutional determinants of airline risk management structures and practices and shows 
how the determinants cause homogeneity or diversity within airline risk management 
systems. The fourth section assesses maturity, roles and uses of airline risk management 
systems. The fifth section summarises conclusions from this chapter.            
 
8.2 ERM framework in the airline industry  
Based on the findings from the empirical study of airline risk management and ERM 
systems this study developed an enterprise-wide risk management framework in the 
airline industry. Findings from the empirical study, which were presented in Chapters 5, 
6, and 7, helped to conceptualise integral components of ERM and identify drivers of 
effective risk management in airlines. The ERM framework is presented in figure 8-1 
and comprises five principal components that support and sustain risk management 
throughout airlines: ERM process, ERM governance structures, airline risk portfolio, 
ERM internal environment, and ERM architecture. These five structural components of 
the ERM framework in the airline industry mirror risk management best-practices of the 
airlines under study, whilst also drawing on the principles of effective risk management 
conveyed in the recognised risk management frameworks and standards (presented e.g. 
in COSO, 2004; ISO 31000, 2009; see Chapter 2, section 2.5), and on a range of 
academic studies of ERM, which are discussed as follows. The findings discussed in the 
context of the framework should support airline professionals in development or 
optimisation of the enterprise-wide risk management systems of their respective 
organisations. 
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Figure 8-1: ERM framework in the airline industry  
 
The conceptualisation of the findings from this research into the framework, in 
particular the findings related to the drivers of effective ERM, is conducted within the 
system approach of contingent fit (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; previously discussed 
in Chapter 3). Multiple aspects of ERM are mapped under several key elements and 
potential relationships between the elements are considered; the possible co-existence of 
multiple configurations of fit simultaneously is also considered. Therefore, the 
framework does not portray a universal risk management approach applicable to all 
organisations and circumstances, but rather acts as a guide to the selection of 
appropriate ERM system configurations for particular airlines, recognising the 
uniqueness of their task and institutional environments. Due to contextual differences 
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between airlines, no “universally appropriate” (Otley, 1980) ERM system can be 
recommended; however, through the discussion presented in the following sections the 
researcher emphasises the factors that need to be considered in designing or optimising 
airline ERM systems. As portrayed in figure 8-1, the components comprising ERM are 
influenced by demands stemming from both intra- and extra-organisational realms, 
denominated as different institutional pressures and contingency factors (see Chapters 3 
and 5). Due to the influences of organisation-specific institutional pressures and 
contingency factors, following recommendations from the ERM framework by airlines 
should lead to varying couplings and uses of the ERM systems. The following table 8-1 
summarises the major findings of this research, related to the drivers of effective, 
enterprise-wide risk management systems in airlines. These findings are further 
elaborated on in this chapter in the following sections 8.2.1 to 8.2.4, grouped under the 
components of the ERM framework, which also provide a discussion of the various risk 
management structures and practices of the airlines forming the sample.   
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Table 8-1: Drivers of effective risk management in airlines  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.2.1 Risk governance structures 
This study detected differences between the airlines claiming ERM adoption and the 
airlines with more traditional risk management approaches in assignment and 
coordination of risk management responsibilities across organisational hierarchies. The 
Framework 
Components Drivers of effective risk management 
Enterprise-wide integration and coordination of the risk management efforts achieved through:
Three lines of defence in risk management - engaging multiple actors in risk management processes, across 
various functional and organisational levels (executive levels, local risk experts, internal and external 
auditors) 
Cascading risk management responsibilities and accountabilities throughout the organisational structure, 
beyond the ICFR, financial, or safety areas
Strong, formalised commitment and endorsement of risk managememt programmes by airlines’ boards and 
management teams
Coordination of enterprise-wide risk management efforts by central, senior-level executive risk specialists 
dedicated solely to the risk management function, holding the positions of Chief Risk Officers (CRO) or their 
equivalents
Delegation of responsibilities and accountabilities for management of key risks to centralised, dedicated 
committees joining the perspectives of interdisciplinary risk leaders at the executive levels in the 
organisations and engaging them in the risk and strategy review processes
Independence of the internal audit function providing assurance on the design, adequacy, and effectiveness 
of internal controls across business areas
Risk management identification, analysis, and management techniques, as well as risk experts involved in the 
process, should be properly matched with the typology of airline’s risk portfolios: preventable, strategic, and 
external risks characterised by different degrees of controllability, probability of occurrence and impact
Combination of top-down and bottom-up risk management processes
Risk identification linked with the objectives of organisational strategies
Feasibility of both qualitative and quantitative assessment techniques if properly matched with the types of 
risks assessed
Risk assessment methodologies beyond the criteria of financial impact. considering inter-relation between 
risks, facilitating a comprehensive view of enterprise-wide exposures
Linking risk reviews to the strategic planning and performance management processes
Deployment of effective risk management approaches requires the establishment of a series of facilitators 
enabling dissemination of the ERM function across the organisation: processes guided by policies and 
procedures, and tools and technology
Formalised risk management policies and procedures facilitate regularity and diligence of risk identification 
and assessment processes, their timely escalation to decision-makers at adequate levels in airlines, as well as 
coordination of risk management efforts between departments
ERM architecture needs to be aligned in terms of the level of formalisation and the selection of tools and 
technology for risk management to organisational needs and characteristics
Development of a formalised risk management strategy specifying the objectives of the risk management 
programme and appetites for particular types of risks 
Interconnected formulation and execution of airline ERM strategy and corporate and business strategies 
Importance of instilling positive risk cultures -  effectiveness of risk management conditioned by the 
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airlines involved in this study which did not claim ERM adoption were evidenced to 
lack centralised structures for coordination of risk management initiatives undertaken 
across different organisational functions and levels. Multiple actors from across 
operational, management, and executive levels manage different types of risks either 
formally or informally, yet without enterprise-wide integration and coordination of the 
risk management efforts. With regard to coordination of risk management initiatives, an 
exception was noticed in the case of one airline (Beta), who was among those that did 
not claim ERM adoption. Despite not having officially adopted ERM, the airline 
assigned responsibility for coordination and integration of enterprise-wide risk 
management processes to the internal audit function, and created multiple reporting 
lines to the management team and to the airline’s respective holding company. 
However, the case study revealed concerns regarding independence and providing 
unbiased assurance of functionality of the risk management system by the internal audit 
function, if internal auditors are too involved in the risk management process. 
Consistent with these concerns, Fraser and Henry (2007) argue that the internal audit 
function should provide independent assurance on the design, adequacy, and 
effectiveness of internal controls within business areas, monitoring management of 
relevant risks beyond the areas of compliance with auditing and financial reporting 
standards. 
 
Findings from the selected airlines that participated in the field study and adopted ERM 
reflected how engaging multiple actors in risk management processes, such as the 
Board, the risk committee, the position of CRO or its equivalents, local risk experts, or 
internal audit, creates multiple lines of defence. Furthermore, the concept of three lines 
of defence in risk management was discussed in more detail in the context of Alpha 
airlines, providing interesting insight into best practices of assigning accountabilities 
and responsibilities for risk management across organisational hierarchies. In Alpha 
airlines, under the concept of three lines of defence, risk management responsibilities 
and accountabilities are formally assigned across various organisational levels and 
functions, facilitating inclusion of enterprise-wide exposures in the corporate risk 
portfolio. The case study evidenced how the multi-dimensional risk governance 
structure in the Alpha airlines, engaging members from different organisational levels to 
take on responsibility for management of the risks corresponding to their respective 
business units, facilitates identification and management of a wide range of risks. Apart 
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from local risk experts performing day-to-day risk management activities and risk 
oversight functions designed at the executive levels, internal and external auditors 
additionally perform independent assessments of the two other levels of risk assurance. 
With reference to the previous discussion of the internal audit role of Beta, under the 
concept of three lines of defence the issue of independence of the internal audit function 
is of key importance. In Beta multiple actors were evidenced to be involved in the risk 
management processes performed across the organisation. However, the case study of 
the airline led the researcher to conclude that the airline could benefit from more 
formalised appointments of risk management responsibilities and accountabilities 
cascaded throughout the organisational structure, beyond the ICFR, financial, or safety 
areas where such appointments currently exist.  
 
The case study of Alpha provided an example of how risk management responsibilities 
and accountabilities are formally integrated within the executive levels of the airlines 
and the Alpha holding company. In the Alpha organisations it is the Boards who are 
ultimately accountable for ERM and responsible for overseeing it; by setting the 
strategic direction for organisations they implicitly set organisational risk appetites 
which, in the cases of the Alpha airlines, are later documented within ERM strategy. 
The case study of the Alpha airlines demonstrated how strong commitment and 
endorsement of airlines’ Boards and management teams promoted institutionalisation of 
ERM principles in organisational cultures. The importance of the Board’s commitment 
to risk management has been widely discussed in literature (e.g. Baxter et al., 2013; 
Kimbrough and Componation, 2009; Daud et al., 2011).  
 
This research demonstrated how similar organisational roles became involved in the 
conceptualisation and management of risks in airlines. In the airlines claiming adoption 
of the ERM approach, risk management efforts are coordinated by central, senior-level 
executive risk specialists dedicated solely to the risk management function, holding the 
positions of Chief Risk Officers (CRO) or their equivalents. Prior studies discussed the 
emergence of new positions (e.g. CRO) in organisations related to the adoption of ERM 
(e.g. Aabo et al., 2005; Gates, 2006; Lam, 2003; Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003). The case 
study of Alpha demonstrated how the risk management function is facilitated by the 
CRO-Alpha operating at the holding company level, or by equivalents of this position in 
individual Alpha airlines, while these risk specialists coordinate group-wide or 
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enterprise-wide risk management initiatives, facilitating production and dissemination 
of risk-related data. The case study also evidenced how these professionals play an 
important role in the airlines by facilitating portfolio-views of risks.  
 
The empirical study also demonstrated how the Boards may delegate responsibilities 
and accountabilities for management of key risks to specialised committees, such as the 
ERM Committee overseeing enterprise-wide risk management efforts, or specialised 
functional committees in charge of certain types of risks (e.g. Financial or Safety Risk 
Committees). In the cases of selected airlines claiming adoption of ERM (Alpha-1, 
Zeta, Eta, Theta, Iota), risk committees were created either in the airlines or in their 
respective holding companies to overview enterprise or group-wide risk management 
systems. In Alpha-1 a cross-functional Risk Committee was created, engaging 
interdisciplinary risk leaders from across the airline, which was believed to facilitate 
sharing of risk information and also the creation of an integrated view of enterprise-
wide risks. In Alpha-2 and the Alpha holding company this function is assigned to their 
corresponding Management Committees, which engage executive members of different 
functional areas and which were reported to perform an equivalent function to the Risk 
Committee of Alpha-1; independently of the nomenclature assigned to these governance 
structures, their functionality seems to lie in joining the perspectives of interdisciplinary 
risk leaders at the executive levels in the organisations and engaging them in the risk 
and strategy review processes. The risk review routines of the Alpha airlines revealed 
the importance of creating organisational spaces for debate about risks at the executive 
levels, and linking risk reviews to the strategic planning and performance management 
processes. In Beta there is no formal, inter-disciplinary risk governance structure. Some 
interviewees argued that the enterprise-wide view of risks at the executive level is 
achieved through regular meetings of the management team where risks and strategies 
are reviewed simultaneously; however, there were also calls for increased formalisation 
of risk management responsibilities and processes at the executive levels, which were 
believed to improve the quality of risk management processes.    
 
A high degree of resemblance was evidenced in risk governance structures of the 
airlines under study in that specialised functional committees were established in order 
to be in charge of certain types of exposures. All of the airlines participating in this 
study have Safety Committees overseeing the management of safety risks; in addition, 
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the majority of airlines (except Gamma and Delta) have Financial Committees for 
managing financial and market risks. The case studies of Alpha and Beta airlines 
demonstrated the mechanisms by which insight on management of safety and financial 
exposures is reported to centralised risk coordinating units, which allows for their 
assessment in the context of consolidated risk portfolios. Both case studies reflected on 
the importance of managing safety and financial exposures beyond the scope of their 
functional silos, which used to be typical of airline risk management practice in the past 
(Yilmaz, 2008a), and integrating their management with other types of corporate risks 
by using common assessment methodology and their reflection on corporate risk maps. 
Separate functional departments lack the capacity to perform comprehensive risk 
management single-handedly, without coordination with other departments. Therefore, 
this study suggests that the risk management function in airlines, which has traditionally 
been concentrated in functional departments (particularly in the aforementioned safety 
and financial departments), should be integrated at the enterprise-level.  
 
8.2.2 Management of enterprise-wide risks: ERM process and airline risk profile 
Findings from the case studies demonstrated how the different stages of risk 
management processes in airlines need to be properly matched with the typology of 
risks forming their risk portfolios. Some of the risks airlines face change hourly, such as 
flight-related safety and operational threats, while others change over longer intervals, 
such as those related to changes in demand for services or to regulations. Risk 
management routines, tailored to the typology of risks they are designed to address, 
should match the velocity of evolution of the different types of risks, allowing for a 
continuous scanning of airline business environments for changes in the risk portfolios 
that could affect organisational performance in any way, and their effective 
management. Apart from the different frequencies of risk identification, assessment, 
treatment, and monitoring, different types of risks call for different risk experts to be 
involved in their management processes.   
 
Airline risk profile comprises a variety of preventable, strategic and external risks 
(typology introduced by Kaplan and Mikes, 2012, 2014), which are characterised by 
different degrees of controllability, probability of occurrence and impact. Taking on 
preventable, process-level risks, such as the above mentioned safety and operational 
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risks, brings no benefit to airlines and their occurrence should therefore be minimised. 
The case studies of Alpha and Beta demonstrated how the airlines control and mitigate 
these risks through extensive systems of internal control. Previous research stressed the 
importance of extending the scope of risks which airline risk management systems 
would traditionally concentrate on, such as insurable, safety, or financial risks (Yilmaz, 
2008a; Otero, 2006), to also include important strategic and external risks. Airlines are 
exposed to multiple external risks beyond their ability of influence and control, and thus 
they design management processes aimed at reducing the impact of various external 
risks should they occur by, for example, preparing contingency plans. Furthermore, the 
third general type of risks (Kaplan and Mikes, 2012, 2014), the strategy-execution risks, 
are of particular relevance to this research. Previous studies demonstrated that declines 
in airlines’ profitability are primarily due to external and strategic exposures, while 
being broadly related to the industry structure, and to inconsistent strategic choices of 
airlines, rather than to factors related to their operations (Wojahn, 2012; IATA, 2011, 
2013). Therefore, it is of primary importance to airlines to extend the focus of their risk 
management programmes beyond the traditional functional siloes (Yilmaz, 2008a) and 
to develop risk management technologies (see definition Chapter 3) facilitating all 
stages of the strategic risk management process. The case studies provided evidence of 
the relevance of external and strategic risks in airlines’ risk profiles (see also discussion 
in section 8.3.2 of this chapter and in Chapter 2).  
 
The field study reported how the airlines claiming adoption of ERM have developed 
formal methodologies guiding enterprise-wide risk management processes and 
delineating procedures and protocols for identification, assessment, treatment, reporting, 
and monitoring of risks. The case studies of Alpha and Beta airlines further 
demonstrated how the airlines employ diverse risk identification techniques, both 
through top-down and bottom-up processes, conditioned by the types of risks they are 
aimed at; individual business units are involved in identification of risks at local levels, 
while identification of external and strategic risks with high potential impact on 
organisational performance involves airlines’ top management levels. For example, the 
cases studies revealed how safety risks are detected both through investigation of past 
incidents and a forward-looking analysis of hazards; process mapping and auditing are 
employed for identification of operational risks; scenario analysis, SWOT analysis, and 
analysis of potential threats to the achievement of organisational strategies facilitate 
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focusing on important strategic and external risks. It was emphasised in the interviews 
with representatives of the Alpha airlines that the risks that have the strongest impact on 
organisation performance are those which are the most difficult to identify and assess. 
Therefore, as suggested by the interviewees, it is recommendable to undertake “an 
exercise of imagination” (DRC-Alpha) in order to factor important external exposures 
into risk portfolios. Although adopting different approaches in terms of formalisation, 
Alpha-1, Alpha-2, and Beta demonstrated linking, to some extent, risk identification 
with the objectives of organisational strategies. However, the researcher concluded on 
higher functionality of the approach adopted in the Alpha airlines as it ensured greater 
regularity and diligence of risk identification at different organisational levels. 
Furthermore, as previously debated, the formalised risk reporting and review routines 
institutionalised in Alpha also facilitate development of a portfolio view of enterprise-
wide risks and their consolidated assessment.   
 
The empirical study indicated that airlines embrace diverse logics of calculation (Power, 
2007) and different calculative cultures (Mikes, 2009), ranging from high to low 
quantitative risk conceptualisation approaches. The case studies of Alpha and Beta 
airlines explained how the airlines assess risks by their levels of likelihood and 
significance, according to the risk appetites for particular types of exposures, while their 
reliance on qualitative and quantitative assessment techniques varies depending on the 
airline and on the types of risks assessed. Quantitative rating scales are believed to 
provide more precision and measurability in the assessment process (Hampton, 2009). 
However, as emphasised by Alpha’s representatives, nominal or ordinal assessment 
scales are better suited for assessment of certain types of exposures, such as emerging 
risks. An interesting point was also raised in the Alpha case study of the need to assess 
risks not merely by their financial impacts, but also factoring in “the human face” and 
the “ethical and moral considerations” (Abeyratne, 2001, p. 339) of the potential impact 
of some risks, such as safety risks.  
 
Complex, interconnected systems such as airlines face a multiplicity of interconnected, 
counterintuitive vulnerabilities (IATA, 2013). Apart from the levels of risk impact and 
probability of occurrence, the interconnectedness with other risks and the combined 
effect of likelihood and consequences need to be considered in the assessment 
methodologies (Szabo, 2012). The case study of Alpha airlines provided an example of 
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an effective mechanism for assessing the interconnected effects of multiple hypothetical 
scenarios of materialisation of a wide range of risks, which was executed through the 
FRM framework. The combined effects of events involving changes in  
macroeconomic, operating, or financial conditions, are jointly assessed through the 
FRM framework in terms of their potential impact on airlines’ financial performance 
measures and agency ratings. Findings from the Alpha case also emphasised the 
importance of gaining a comprehensive view of enterprise-wide exposures. Different 
types of exposures are managed within different management frameworks in airlines; 
for example, Safety Management System (SMS), Quality Management System (QMS), 
Security Management System (SeMS), Environmental Management System (EMS), 
Supplier Management System (SUMS), and others which, as argued through the Alpha 
case study, should be jointly considered under an integrated portfolio perspective. In the 
case study of Beta, although the global view of risks was achieved through an 
aggregated representation of individual risk assessments on risk maps and matrices, 
these assessments did not consider interconnections between risks. The top management 
of Beta believed the inter-relation between risks is tackled through informal routines of 
regular risk reviews at the occasions of preparations and adjustments of business and 
strategic plans; however, the approach adopted in Alpha seems to be more effective in 
this respect.   
 
8.2.3 ERM architecture 
Findings from this study demonstrated how deploying effective, enterprise-wide risk 
management in airlines requires the establishment of a series of facilitators, in terms of 
processes guided by policies and procedures, tools and technology. The enablers of the 
ERM function are jointly defined under this framework as the ‘ERM architecture’. As 
evidenced in the case studies ERM architecture needs to be aligned in terms of the level 
of formalisation and the selection of tools for risk management to organisational needs 
and characteristics. The field study and the case studies indicated that risk management 
systems of airlines vary from highly structured approaches with detailed formalised 
procedures and hierarchies for managing multiple types of risks, to minimalist 
approaches where risk management is structured only to the extent required by relevant 
regulatory frameworks. Previous research often related formalisation of structures and 
practices of management control systems to organisational size and complexity 
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(Merchant, 1981; Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; Woods, 2009). However, the field study 
and the case studies suggested that a high level of formalisation of risk management 
systems in the analysed airlines was related to proclaimed adoption of ERM by the 
airlines rather than to organisational size and complexity, as highly formalised risk 
management structures were observed in organisations with varying sizes and 
complexity. The rules and routines constituting the ERM systems of the airlines under 
study were heavily documented, specifying in addition the responsibilities and 
accountabilities in the risk management processes across organisational hierarchies. A 
variety of risk management guidelines had been developed, structuring different phases 
of risk management processes such as identification, recording, assessment, treatment, 
or monitoring of risks.  
 
The Alpha airlines and the Beta airline, which were subjects of the case study research, 
demonstrated different approaches to formalisation of the risk management function. 
The case study of Alpha demonstrated how formalised procedures facilitated regularity 
of risk identification and assessment processes, their timely escalation to decision-
makers at adequate levels in the airline, as well as coordination of risk management 
efforts between departments. The case study of Beta provided an example of 
formalisation of risk management processes restricted to selected types of risks. As 
argued by Kaplan and Mikes (2014), effectiveness of risk management systems is more 
dependent on their coupling by actors in organisations than on the formal rules guiding 
risk management approaches. Both of the case studies demonstrated how employee 
accountability was encouraged through the institutionalisation of a positive risk culture, 
either through formal policies and procedures or informally. Therefore, consistent with 
the arguments of Collier et al. (2006) or Mikes (2009), and based on the analysis of 
Beta’s risk management system, a conclusion was drawn on the feasibility and 
functionality of less structured and less calculative risk management approaches. 
Although the highly formalised approach of Alpha was regarded by airlines’ 
representatives as necessary in the context of the size and complexity of the airline’s 
structure, the interviewees demonstrated awareness of the potential threat of over-
formalisation to the agility of risk management processes. The case study of Beta 
provided an interesting observation that a highly formalised approach is not necessarily 
a pre-requisite for creating positive risk management cultures. Although Beta’s risk 
management system was assessed as functional both by the airline’s representatives and 
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by the researcher, the need for further formalisation of selected risk management 
processes, especially those related to identification and management of important 
external risks, was reported; however, despite the calls for increased formalisation in 
some areas, Beta demonstrated having created a positive risk culture. Therefore, 
organisations need to find a balance in terms of formalisation of the risk management 
function that best suits their organisational characteristics.  
 
The field study and the case studies revealed that the tools engaged in the collection, 
processing, and reporting of risk-related data in the airlines under study range from 
simple, non-automated systems to sophisticated programs or intranet platforms. As per 
integrating, prioritising, and reporting of risks, risk matrices and maps providing a 
portfolio view of risks are commonly used tools; risk matrices and maps plot in a visual 
display the ratings of probability and the potential impact of risks on achieving business 
objectives, therefore allowing airlines to adopt a sharper focus on management of key 
risks. The Alpha case study provided an example of how custom-designed technological 
solutions can facilitate the extraction and processing of data which is relevant to 
organisational performance and risks. The Alpha airlines relied on proprietary software 
for risk management, arguing that in-house development of the risk tool allowed them 
to best tailor utility of the tool to organisational needs, facilitating incorporation of the 
risk management function into the ordinary business activities of individual 
departments. The tools employed in risk management processes across Beta were less 
sophisticated. The risk registers at different organisational levels are compiled using 
simple spread-sheets, from which data is later exported to risk maps and matrices. 
However, the case study raised concerns regarding the reliance of Beta’s management 
team on the data compiled in the risk maps during periodical risk and strategy reviews, 
pointing to the need to better institutionalise the uses of risk management tools in 
organisational risk management routines or, alternatively, to improve the functionality 
of the tools themselves.  
 
8.2.4 ERM  internal environment   
In the framework presented in figure 8-1 the component denominated as ‘ERM internal 
environment’ is related to ‘risk rationalities’ (see Arena et al., 2010) which influence the 
way airlines conceptualise uncertainty into risk when forming their portfolios and the 
213 
 
prevailing logics of organisational actors (see definition in Chapter 3). ERM internal 
environment, as portrayed in the framework, is considered in terms of ERM strategy, 
risk appetite, and ERM culture. Evidence from the empirical study revealed that the 
airlines claiming ERM adoption have relatively more clarity and consistency in the risk 
definition protocols and use more sophisticated tools for capture, storage, and analysis 
of risk data than the rest of the airlines forming the sample. The field study findings and 
the findings from the Alpha case study suggest that this can be attributed to the 
existence of formalised ERM strategies in airlines. By way of an example, the Alpha 
airlines´ documented ERM strategies for management of multiple-types of risks specify 
risk appetites, risk governance structures and risk management architecture (see above 
‘ERM architecture’) to be implemented across the organisations. Analysis of the risk 
management system within the Alpha group indicated the importance of aligning risk 
management strategies with corporate and business strategies; this was achieved in the 
Alpha airlines, for example, through testing the premises of organisational strategies 
using the FRM framework. Previous research argued the benefits of aligning corporate 
and business strategies with airline risk appetites, which allows for balancing 
organisational goals and objectives and their associated risks and opportunities (e.g. 
Althonayan et al., 2011a; Ben-Amar et al., 2014). 
 
In the Alpha and Beta airlines, risk appetites for particular types of exposures were set 
by the Boards, indicating airlines’ inclination toward risk taking in different business 
areas. In accordance with Power’s (2009) critique of COSO’s (2004) formulation of risk 
appetite, the case studies suggested the existence of multiple risk appetites in airlines for 
different types and levels of risks (e.g. aversion to safety risk, high appetite for market 
risks). Risk appetites are applied throughout the airlines in the risk management 
processes via tolerance thresholds established for particular groups of risks, which 
facilitate identification, mitigation, and monitoring of the evolution of particular 
exposures. However, Beta’s risk approach was also found to be less formalised in this 
respect; risk appetites are documented only for selected types of exposures. Alpha’s 
highly structured ERM system was found to be predicated by normative propositions of 
ERM frameworks, such as the COSO framework (2004), advocating adoption of a 
systematic approach to defining organisational risk appetite and its translation into 
quantified risk tolerances for objectives of organisational strategies. 
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The case studies of Alpha and Beta airlines suggested the importance of creating 
positive risk cultures. Risk cultures can be considered in terms of the extent to which 
the principles of risk management strategies are encoded in organisational risk 
management routines, and how the latter are embedded in or decoupled from formal 
rules. Institutionalisation of ERM principles is of particular importance to this research. 
Upon introduction of new risk management rules in organisations, resulting from the 
decisions of ERM adoption, new principles should become encoded in risk management 
routines. Introduction of new ERM rules in airlines is aimed at deinstitutionalisation of 
existing beliefs and routines and arrival of new ones encoding ERM principles (Scott, 
2001). Previous research (e.g. Bowling and Rieger, 2005; Bruce, 2005; Martin and 
Power, 2007) discussed the mechanisms by which institutionalisation of ERM may be 
inhibited by the existence of established risk management practices, which may 
continue to be seen as legitimate managerial devices by actors, while ERM may be 
perceived merely as ”an add-on for internal control and compliance to external 
regulations” (Arena et al., 2010, p. 9). This issue was also the subject of interest to 
Power (2009, p. 849), who criticised normative ERM guidance for following the “logic 
of audit and trail” and for placing emphasis on the processes of description and 
evidencing of risk management practices rather than fostering “a boundary challenging 
practice which confronts and addresses the complex realities of interconnectedness”.  
 
Inconclusive evidence was collected from the airlines which claimed the 
implementation of ERM and which participated in the case study (of the Alpha group) 
conducted in the course of this research. The study found that the level of awareness of 
ERM was lesser in the lower levels in the subject organisations, where it was perceived 
as a tool directed at statutory requirements. Some interviewees from these airlines 
signalled the need to strengthen the risk culture through training in order to permeate 
ERM in the actions of actors, to assure ERM rules are truly enacted by actors in risk 
management routines, and in order to change the perception of ERM as a burden and 
foster the perception of ERM as bringing value and streamlining organisational 
operations in the long term. Other interviewees were convinced of having appropriate 
risk cultures ingrained in the organisations and of ERM principles being properly 
institutionalised and encoded in organisational routines. This research, in line with the 
findings from previous studies investigating the embeddedness of ERM in organisations 
(e.g. Woods, 2011; Aabo et al., 2005; Mikes, 2009, 2011), argues the importance of 
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instilling positive risk cultures in organisations, as effective risk management is 
conditioned by the commitment of members across various levels of organisational 
hierarchies, rather than existence of complex systems of formal rules (Kimbrough and 
Componation, 2009; Coccia, 2005; Mikes, 2009).    
 
8.2.5 Context-specific design of an ERM system  
Similarity was reflected throughout this study in the major pillars constituting airline 
risk management systems, such as the structures and practices developed for 
management of safety, hazard, or financial risks. Institutional isomorphic forces 
detected in this study within the organisational field of airlines emphasise the logic of 
legitimacy in the processes of homogenisation of airline risk management systems. 
However, the analysis showed how certain levels of coherence coexist with systematic 
variations in airline risk management systems, which is noticeable in configurations of 
responsibilities and accountabilities in risk management processes and their constituent 
routines. By way of an example, although the Alpha and Beta airlines have developed 
safety management systems (SMS), the routines enacted in managing safety-related 
risks varied among organisations. Consistent with the findings of Granlund and Lukka 
(1998), this study demonstrated that divergence can be driven by both technical and 
institutional factors.  
 
Considering the objectives of this research, the phenomena of homogeneity and 
diversity in the institutions, rules, and routines constituting ERM systems of airlines are 
of particular relevance to this study. This study expanded beyond the analysis of rules 
guiding risk management processes, and analysed the routines of organisational actors 
acting within organisational and cultural contexts, which were revealed to be the 
sources of variations in implementation of ERM among organisations. This was 
consistent with the approach proposed by Kaplan and Mikes (2014), who discussed how 
ERM drives development of new institutions, rules and routines for comprehensive 
management of risks, and emphasised that despite similarity of ERM rules in 
organisations their risk management routines should vary. This study demonstrated how 
the rules guiding airline risk management systems were modelled based on the 
provisions of various normative ERM frameworks or risk management standards such 
as the COSO framework (2004) or the ISO 31000 standard (2009). However, despite 
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being modelled on common frameworks and standards, airlines’ risk management 
routines varied at the operational levels.  
 
The field study and the case study evidence revealed how the variations in airline ERM 
systems are attributable to the differences in the contextual factors that exist within their 
respective task and institutional environments, which is discussed in more detail in 
section 8.3 of this chapter. Similar findings of systematic variations in ERM 
implementation were found in previous studies conducted in the contexts of different 
industries, and in organisations from the same industry; the studies also attributed 
variations in ERM systems to different institutional pressures and technical demands of 
business environments. For example, Arena et al. (2010), in a study of three Italian 
organisations from different sectors, demonstrated the fluid nature of ERM and 
reciprocal interactions of newly established ERM rules with pre-existing routines for 
controlling uncertainty, leading to variations in practices. Woods (2011) conducted four 
case studies in organisations from different industries and attributed the differences in 
their ERM systems to contextual factors specific to particular industries. Mikes (2009) 
conducted a study of ERM systems implemented in two banks, and argued the existence 
of systematic variations in organisational coupling of ERM. Woods (2009) and Jabbour 
(2013) demonstrated diversity in ERM practices within single organisations, from the 
public sector and the insurance industry respectively. Additionally, multiple studies 
based on survey methodologies explored organisational design choices of ERM systems 
and argued the existence of variations in implementation of ERM (e.g. Paape and 
Spakle, 2012; Beasley et al., 2005; Hoyt and Liebenberg 2011). However, as previously 
discussed (Chapter 2), these studies are criticised for analysing ERM based on a limited 
number of simplistic proxies and thus being unable to properly reflect complex 
phenomena and thoroughly capture implementation of ERM (Kaplan and Mikes, 2014).  
 
Findings from this research, which revealed differences in risk management routines in 
airlines despite their risk management systems drawing on provisions of common risk 
management standards or ERM frameworks (e.g. COSO, 2004; ISO 31000, 2009), 
suggest that airline risk management systems are not designed in a vacuum (Woods, 
2011), and that they convey the lack of a “universally appropriate” design of an ERM 
system applicable to all airlines in all circumstances (Otley, 1980). A similar argument 
was offered by previous studies of ERM systems conducted in a variety of industries, 
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which called for aligning ERM with contextual settings of organisations (e.g. Gordon et 
al., 2009; Kaplan and Mikes, 2014; Woods, 2009, 2011; Paape and Spakle, 2012; 
Mikes, 2009; Barton et al., 2010), and which were discussed in Chapter 2. Considering 
arguments from the previous studies on the relation between ERM system designs and 
organisational contexts, and based on the findings from the empirical study on airline 
risk management systems, under the multiple contingent perspective (Fisher, 1998) this 
study advocates the need to consider the requirements of task and institutional 
environments in the development of effective ERM approaches in airlines. Therefore, 
the question ‘how to design an effective ERM system in airlines’ extends beyond 
simply complying with regulatory requirements or choosing one of the multiple risk 
management standards or ERM frameworks to follow, into the realm of aligning ERM 
principles with airlines’ contextual requirements (Woods, 2011). The following section 
explains in more detail the different technical and institutional drivers which were 
evidenced to shape airlines’ risk management and ERM systems.  
 
8.3 Determinants of airline risk management and ERM systems 
As suggested in the previous sections, this study lends evidence of technical and 
institutional drivers of homogeneity and diversity of organisational designs of airline 
risk management and ERM systems. However, the major focus of this empirical study is 
that it demonstrated how institutional pressures and contingency factors drive 
deinstitutionalisation of the existing risk management rules and routines in airlines as 
well as adoption of ever more comprehensive approaches to risk management. The 
empirical study also suggested re-institutionalisation of risk management rules and 
routines, which was reflected in the adoption of ERM in several of the investigated 
airlines.  
 
8.3.1 Institutional determinants of airline risk management systems 
A wide spectrum of external and internal institutional pressures was shown to affect the 
risk management systems of the airlines under study. Institutional environment of 
airlines exerts legitimacy pressures which are the underlying causes of isomorphism 
observed within the organisational field of airlines (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
However, as previously discussed (section 8.2.5) this study also provided examples of 
institutional pressures causing diversity among airline risk management systems.  
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External institutional pressures were evidenced to be relevant in determining the risk 
management approaches of the airlines under study. The findings of this study suggest 
the particularly high relevance of regulatory frameworks delineating and coordinating 
the  structures and processes of airline risk management systems. The airline industry is 
heavily regulated with diverse stipulations affecting multiple areas of airline operations, 
and risk management structures and practices among them (Adler and Gelmann, 2012). 
Among others, governance structures over operational safety risks are imposed on 
airlines by regulatory bodies, affecting organisational designs of Safety Management 
Systems (SMS). Apart from the regulatory framework comprising both international 
conventions and national laws, air transport associations such as ICAO, IATA, or 
EASA prescribe both regulations and best practice standards and procedures for 
managing risks in diverse areas. In terms of risk management, the focus of regulators 
and industry normative bodies is primarily concentrated on operational, safety, and 
hazard concerns.  
 
Additionally, coercive influence on airline risk management systems was evidenced in 
this study based on the observed relevance of corporate governance requirements for 
listed companies, and corporate governance best practices gaining momentum across 
publicly traded and privately held companies. Regulators and normative institutions 
exert pressures on organisations across industries in order to improve risk management 
and reporting systems; an increasing amount of responsibility is imposed on boards of 
directors in terms of creating strong corporate governance structures and 
communicating reliable data on company performance. By way of an example, 
institutions such as the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or The Toronto 
Stock Exchange require disclosures of organisational risk management efforts (Miccolis 
et al., 2001; Spira and Page, 2003, Kaplan and Mikes, 2014). Multiple regulatory 
requirements have been introduced internationally, such as the UK’s Combined Code 
on Corporate Governance, NYSE Corporate Governance Rules and the Sarbanes Oxley 
Act in the USA, or the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG), which linked the risk 
management function to internal control and extended its focus beyond financial risks, 
compelling organisations to consider a broader spectrum of risks (Fraser and Henry, 
2007; Spira and Page, 2003).  
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A variety of studies was conducted in the risk management and ERM area that linked 
organisational risk management design choices to regulatory pressures. In a study of 
Canadian non-banking organisations by Kleffner et al. (2003), they highlighted 
compliance with regulatory guidelines as an important driving force in ERM adoption. 
Collier et al. (2006) attributed the increasing popularity of ERM across industries to 
ever more extensive regulatory pressures. Studies from the related area of management 
control systems and the drivers of their organisational designs also report on the 
relevance of regulatory frameworks; by way of an example, Arena et al. (2006) argued 
the relevance of regulatory guidelines on development of Internal Audit departments in 
Italian organisations; Arnaboldi and Lapsley (2003) studied the adoption of new 
management accounting techniques in organisations as a reaction to coercive pressures 
from the UK’s central government. However, previous studies also raised an interesting 
question related to the degree to which governance codes in fact enforce adoption of 
more comprehensive and embedded risk management approaches, and the extent to 
which following of best practice governance guidelines beyond mere legitimacy 
purposes is an individual choice for organisations.  
 
Pagach and Warr (2011) acknowledged that regulated industries had been at the 
forefront of ERM development. They noted that implementation of ERM purely as a 
response to regulatory pressures should result primarily in development of ceremonial 
risk management systems, yet they observed that the adoption of ERM in the 
organisations forming the sample of their study was due rather to the economic benefits 
it had been expected to bring to the organisations. Additionally, the researchers noted 
that ERM had been implemented in a variety of organisations operating in industries 
with a lesser degree of regulation; as suggested by Paape and Spakle (2012), the 
intensity of enforcement of corporate governance codes varies significantly across 
industries. Woods (2011) also argued best governance practices can be implemented in 
organisations regardless of the  intensity of regulatory pressures. In this context it 
should thus be noted that the airlines under study demonstrated increasing interest in 
adopting ever more comprehensive risk management systems, even though some of 
them had not been listed and therefore had not been bound by mandatory governance 
codes, but rather they followed risk management “best practices” gaining momentum 
across diverse industries. Finally, it should be highlighted that some studies 
investigating the driving forces of adoption and implementation of ERM did not lend 
220 
 
support to the supposed influence of governance codes. The study of Paape and Speklé 
(2012), based on 825 organisations with headquarters in the Netherlands, did not lend 
support to the supposed influence of governance codes on the adoption of ERM in 
organisations. Similarly, Muralidhar (2010) in a study of ERM adoption in GCC oil and 
gas industry organisations did not find evidence supporting the effects of regulatory 
frameworks on the risk management systems in the analysed cases.  
 
The intention of demonstrating financial strength to rating agencies was revealed in this 
study to be another relevant type of coercive pressures affecting airline risk 
management system designs. Rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s have begun to 
consider the quality of organisational risk management processes in their rating 
algorithms, while considering ERM as a blueprint of sound governance systems (e.g. for 
the insurance industry - S&P, 2013). This study suggests that satisfactory credit ratings 
are believed to add credibility to airlines, something which, consequently, favours them 
in negotiations in the commodity markets. Additionally, since airlines tend to be highly 
leveraged, positive credit ratings reflecting organisational credit-worthiness are 
considered important as they lower the cost of capital. Studies from across industries 
confirm the relevance of rating agencies influences on organisational risk management 
approaches (e.g. Hoyt and Liebenberg, 2011; Kaplan and Mikes, 2014). 
 
This study showed the evidence of occurrence of mimetic behaviors among airlines in 
the structuring of their risk management approaches. Environmental uncertainty 
encourages imitation of organisational structures and practices (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983); environmental uncertainty is significant in the airline industry (Engau and 
Hoffmann, 2011). Previous research into management control systems provided insights 
into mimetic practices of organisations from different industries. One example of this 
can be seen in the work of Lapsley and Pallot (2000), who reported on the adoption of 
similar management accounting structures among Scottish organisations, motivated 
both by the desires to achieve external legitimacy and to adopt secure, proven practices. 
Although the airline industry is characterised by high volatility and a high degree of 
uncertainty (Adler and Gellman, 2012), this study only lends evidence for airlines’ 
modeling of risk management systems on the approaches adopted in other organisations 
from their respective groups; the empirical evidence collected throughout this study 
indicated multiple rationalities for airlines’ mimetic behaviors, such as environmental 
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uncertainty, the need to conform with group-wide standards, or the expected synergy 
effects of adopting aligned risk management approaches across group organisations. 
Additionally, the field study provided evidence of the adoption, to varying extends, of 
best practices of organisations other than those forming the groups of the respective 
airlines.  
 
Findings from this study point to the influences of normative pressures on airline risk 
management approaches. Institutional theorists relate normative pressures primarily to 
professionalisation of the fields (Zucker, 1987), and suggest, for example, university 
education, advisory influences, or operation of professional networks as the most 
significant normative influences (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The normative 
pressures manifested in this study are linked mainly to the professionalisation of the risk 
management field through an increasing popularity of landmark risk management 
frameworks. International risk management standards and frameworks such as COSO 
(2004) or ISO 31000 (2009) constitute important sources of normative guidance for 
organisations in designing risk management systems. Multiple studies in the risk 
management area reported on organisations from different industries modeling risk 
management approaches based on internationally recognised standards and frameworks 
(e.g. Beasley et al., 2005; Woods, 2009). A variety of air transport associations such as 
IATA or ICAO provide guidance on airline risk management approaches, promoting 
adoption of ever more comprehensive risk management systems (IATA, 2014; Salter, 
2008) and contributing to professionalisation of the organisational field of airlines in 
terms of risk management.  
 
Empirical evidence from this study indicates strong influence of normative risk 
management standards and frameworks on the organisational designs of airline risk 
management systems. Interestingly, evidence from the study suggested relevance of the 
recommendations of normative airline industry organisations regarding management of 
selected types of risks, yet it did not provide support for their influence on adoption of 
ERM approaches in airlines. Cooperation with professional advisors in developing or 
optimising risk management systems was also reported in several airlines under study, 
yet the usefulness and applicability of consulting advices was questioned in some cases, 
what was attributed principally to lack of consultants’ understanding of the specificity 
of airline operations. This is consistent with Beasley et al. (2005) who reported on 
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consulting influences driving both ERM adoption and organisational designs of risk 
management systems. However, the study of  Paape and Spekle (2012) is at odds with 
the findings of Beasley et al. (2005), as the researchers did not find supporting evidence 
for consulting effects on ERM development. In this empirical study involving airlines, 
consulting influence was evidenced rather as having driven the decision to adopt ever 
more comprehensive approaches than organisational designs of risk management 
systems.  
 
This study provided additional evidence of other external institutional drivers of airline 
risk management approaches. In some airlines, gaining legitimacy in the eyes of 
shareholders or other capital providers was regarded as one of the drivers, although not 
of key importance, which motivated development of ever more comprehensive risk 
management systems. These drivers are also related to the previous discussion of credit 
ratings and increasing efforts of organisations to gain external legitimacy. Shareholder 
influence was discussed in previous literature as an important driver of ERM adoption 
(e.g. Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Mikes, 2009; Nielson et al., 2005). Investors are 
believed to benefit from ERM as it drives risk-based decision-making in organisations 
and, consequently, increases their value (Meulbroek, 2002); yet the influences of 
shareholder pressures are less relevant in cases of dispersed ownership and more 
relevant in cases of institutional ownership (Kane and Velury, 2004). Interestingly, 
Paape and Spakle (2012) did not find evidence of the effects of institutional ownership 
on the adoption of ERM, and insinuated about the possibility of investors not valuing 
ERM adoption. With respect to signalling legitimacy to shareholders and other capital 
providers, Gordon et al. (2009) argued organisations may adopt ceremonial displays of 
ERM yet fail to institutionalise effective risk management in organisational routines.  
 
The analysis of the empirical data revealed influence of internal institutional pressures 
such as impulses from the management team on airline risk management approaches or 
of organisational cultures. The finding of the management influence on organisational 
risk management institutions, rules, and routines, is broadly consistent with previous 
work in the risk management field. Baesley et al. (2005) concluded that the stage of 
ERM implementation in organisations is positively related to the advocating tone set by 
management and the presence of CRO. Similarly, Kleffner et al. (2003), Paape and 
Spekle (2012), Altuntas et al. (2011), Sobel and Reding (2004), and Gordon et al. 
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(2009) concluded on the influence of risk specialists and support from the executive 
teams to be associated with the stage of development of organisational risk management 
systems. Colquitt et al. (1999) discussed the tendency to integrate organisation-wide 
risk management processes and linked risk managers’ professional and educational 
backgrounds to the way organisations structure their risk management approaches. 
Mikes (2009) argued that the influence of the institutional and professional backgrounds 
of risk specialists shapes organisational institutional logics, which consequently 
determine the configuration of risk management systems.    
 
The analysis of the empirical data from this study suggested the determining power of 
organisational culture on airline risk management approaches. Although classified 
herein as a normative pressure, the effects of organisational culture on organisational 
designs can be considered both in terms of pressures stemming from institutional and 
task environments. The logics guiding the actions of actors in organisations are 
influenced by wider socio-cultural contexts, which suggests categorisation of cultural 
influences as an institutional pressure. Findings from this research point to the effects of 
national cultures on the values, norms, beliefs, and cultural models comprised in 
institutional logics, which determine how airline members perceive uncertainty and 
design responses to manage it in terms of, for example, required levels of formalisation 
of organisational practices, or the perceived importance of signalling to external 
shareholders compliance of risk management systems to standards institutionalised in 
the industry. On the other hand, other findings from this research, also related to 
organisational culture, imply that cultural influences should also be considered as 
contingency factors derived from organisational task environments. Findings from this 
study suggest the influence of ownership structure, and specifically public versus 
private ownership, on airline risk management systems. Publicly and privately held 
organisations are believed to be characterised by different working cultures (Uttley and 
Hooper, 1993), differing among others in terms of agility of work processes (Morgan, 
1993), which was also pointed out by the interviewees in this study. Previous research 
considered the effects of corporate or national cultures on the design choices of 
management control systems (e.g. Nishimura, 1995; Chow et al., 1994; Granlund and 
Lukka, 1998; Ahrens, 1996; Merchant et al. 1995). Researchers would adopt 
interchangeably the institutional view of cultural characteristics (e.g. DiMaggio, 1988) 
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and the contingency theory perspective to analysing the influences of organisational 
task environments on culture (e.g. Cancel et al., 1999; Smircich, 1983). 
 
8.3.2 Technical determinants of airline risk management systems 
Multiple contingency factors were evidenced to affect the design choices of airline risk 
management and ERM systems. Under the structural contingency theory organisations 
adapt their structures to best fit with their technical, economic environments (task 
environments, Donaldson, 1996). According to the contingency perspective the primary 
imperative for airlines is to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of their operations 
by adapting risk management structures to best fit with the requirements of task 
environments (Scott, 2003). Notwithstanding the above, categorisation of the drivers of 
organisational designs as institutional or technical may raise debate; by way of an 
example, the previous sub-section pointed to deinstitutionalisation and re-
institutionalisation phenomena accompanying the decisions of ERM adoption in 
airlines, which according to Oliver (1991) apart from political and social pressures can 
be triggered by functional pressures resulting from perceived low utility of 
institutionalised routines. Although Oliver’s (1991) analysis of functional pressures is 
conducted under the institutional perspective, this research ascribes the pressures related 
to utility and effectiveness to the contingency school of thought. Within this 
specification, the contingency factors evidenced in the empirical study of airline risk 
management and ERM systems fall into the three categories predefined in the 
theoretical model proposed for this study (see Chapter 3), namely environmental and 
industry-related contingency factors, organisation-specific contingency factors, and 
contingency factors related to the specificity of airline risk profiles.  
 
Findings from this study provide strong evidence for the influence of factors related to 
airline external task environments. Multiple facets of environmental uncertainty were 
found to condition the structures of management control systems across industries; 
environmental uncertainty is broadly defined as “the change and variability in the 
organisation’s external environment” (Gordon et al., 2009). Literature across industries 
emphasizes increasing importance of managing external uncertainty, especially in the 
context of ever-increasing integration across borders of markets, institutions, and 
politics (Soin and Collier, 2013). Environmental uncertainty is considered a 
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fundamental contingency factor in the MCS studies (Hartmann, 2000; Chapman, 1997). 
Environmental uncertainty was found to be relevant in this study in the aspects related 
to political, economic, and natural realms of airline operations. The competitive 
environment is becoming ever more turbulent and complex (Floricel and Miller, 2001), 
with forces such as globalization, new technologies, or deregulation creating uncertainty 
for organisations (Barton et al., 2001). Macroeconomic volatility translates to changes 
in jet fuel prices, exchange and interest rates, in addition to demand for airline services 
linked to multiple market and commercial risks facing airlines. Political instability 
poses a risk to airline operations in unstable markets, ranging widely from temporary 
suspensions of operations to threats of terrorist attacks. Airline operations are also 
affected by natural hazards such as extreme weather conditions which pose numerous 
operational and safety risks. Changes in the competitive environment were also revealed 
in this study to be relevant to airline risk management approaches.  
 
These findings are consistent with previous research on the drivers of change in 
management control systems related to diverse manifestations of environmental 
uncertainty. Craig and Douglas (1996) discussed adoption of new organisational forms 
providing administrative and organisational flexibility in response to the challenges of 
fast-changing world markets. Firth (1996) investigated the transformation of accounting 
systems of Chinese enterprises in response to introduction of competitive market 
dynamics. Granlund and Lukka (1998) conveyed that the technical drivers of 
management accounting practices are primarily related to fluctuations in global 
economics, increased competition, as well as advances in production and information 
technologies. Gordon et al. (2009) in a study of the effectiveness of ERM argued that 
the relationship between ERM and organisational performance is contingent upon 
appropriate matches between ERM and five groups of factors, among which appear 
environmental uncertainty and industry competition. Additional studies similarly 
confirmed the importance of the link between environmental uncertainty and the 
designs of management control systems (e.g. Evans et al., 1986; Mia and Chenhall, 
1994; Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; and others). Studies from this area often consider 
external environment in the dimensions of uncertainty, hostility, and complexity (e.g. 
Tymond et al., 1998; Imoisili, 1985; Chapman, 1998; and others). Based on a review of 
MCS research in relation to environmental uncertainty, Chenhall (2003) concluded that 
increases in uncertainty of external environment are positively related to the openness 
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and external focus of management control systems. Similarly, it was argued that 
hostility and turbulence in external environments lead to greater reliance of 
management control systems upon formal controls. Although previous studies of MCS 
and external environment often discussed the influence of production and information 
technologies (e.g. Kogan et al., 1997; Cooper et al., 1995; Kawada and Johnson, 1993; 
Granlund and Lukka, 1998; and others), this research did not provide evidence of the 
relevance of technology-related factors to airline risk management approaches.   
 
Evidence from this study lends support to the relevance of internal, organisation-
specific contingency factors to the designs of airline risk management systems. Airline 
representatives participating in this study would explain the design choices of risk 
management systems of their respective organisations by linking them to the sizes and 
levels of complexity of organisational structures and operations. In cases of the airlines 
which have implemented structured risk management systems, the need for increased 
formality and control was reported to be related to organisational size and complexity. 
In the airlines which have adopted less formalised structures, their members argued that 
excessive formalism would have led to a lack of organisational agility and would have 
impaired the effectiveness of their risk management routines. This rationale is 
consistent with the work of Child and Mansfield (1972), who argued that increases in 
organisational sizes are associated with increasing needs for effective control of 
information which stimulates organisations to institute controls such as formal rules and 
procedures. Similarly, Chenhall (2003) related large organisations to more diversified 
operations, formalisation of procedures, specialisation of functions, more divided 
organisational structures and more sophisticated organisational controls. Previous 
studies also found organisational size and complexity related to the designs of risk 
management systems. Gordon et al. (2009) claimed that the relation between ERM and 
organisational performance is contingent on the match between ERM and size and 
complexity-related factors. Similarly, Beasley et al. (2005), Kleffner et al. (2003), Hoyt 
and Liebenberg (2011), Pagach and Warr (2011), and Colquitt et al. (1999) argued there 
is a positive relation between the adoption of ERM in organisations and their size. Hoyt 
and Liebenberg (2011) also argued this positive relationship with organisational 
complexity. Paape and Spakle (2012) hypothesised about possible economies of scale 
experienced by large organisations implementing ERM which, due to their size, can 
afford to develop truly comprehensive and functional approaches. Paape and Spakle 
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(2012, p. 540) also claimed formalisation to be typical of larger organisations that “may 
be conducive to ERM adoption”. Multiple studies additionally indicated the influence of 
organisational structure in its facets related to size and complexity on organisational 
designs of management control systems (e.g. Bruns and Waterhouse, 1975; Merchant, 
1981; Haka et al., 1985). 
   
According to Chenhall (2003) management control systems provide support to 
managers in the process of aligning organisational responses to environmental 
conditions, while assisting them in formulating strategies related to markets and 
products, required technologies and structures. Similarly Fisher (1998, p. 5) explained 
that “the firm uses the organisational control package in attempting to achieve firm 
objectives”, while the scholar pointed out the control package is determined by 
contingency factors. This rationale can be transferred to risk management systems 
which provide support to managers in managing risks related to the cost and benefit 
drivers of airline competitive advantages which determine adoption of particular 
business models (e.g. legacy, low-cost, hybrid business models) and development of 
competitive strategies. Findings from this research suggest airline risk management 
systems are conditioned by the objectives set out in organisational strategies, among 
which appears the risk management strategy. Airlines conceptualise risk according to 
different features of their business models, forming multi-dimensional risk portfolios; 
these features include network scope, pricing and branding of services, fleet type and 
scope, and others. The priorities set out in organisational strategies and risk tolerance 
levels assigned to risks which may threaten the achievement of their objectives are 
reflected in the emphasis that airlines place on management of particular types of risks. 
An example of this is the development of structures dedicated exclusively to manage 
particular types of exposures.  
 
Researchers advocating the need for implementation of more comprehensive risk 
management systems in airlines (e.g. Adler and Gellman, 2012; Bisignani, 2011; Engau 
and Hoffman, 2011; Yilmaz, 2008a; Flouris and Yilmaz, 2011a,b,c) advocate 
redirecting their focus to important strategic and external risks which are believed to 
have the most significant impact on airline values (e.g. Zea, 2004; Bisignani, 2011; 
IATA 2011; Mikosz, 2011; Nomura, 2003). The airlines of this study which have 
adopted structured approaches to facilitate management of important strategic risks 
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have institutionalised rules and routines facilitating identification, assessment, 
management, and reporting of these risks. Representatives from five of the seven 
airlines in this study that claimed adoption of ERM argued the ERM adoption decision 
in their respective organisations was related to perceived potential benefits of 
developing increasingly structured and comprehensive risk management approaches 
which had been believed to lead to improved management of strategic risks, 
achievement of organisational objectives, and improved performance. The findings of 
Pagach and Warr (2011) are  conclusive of this argument, as the researchers found that 
ERM adoption in organisations was due to expected maximization of shareholder 
wealth, rather than to ceremonial compliance purposes. Similarly, Barton et al. (2001) 
argued the adoption of ERM approaches in organisations is driven by the necessity to 
strategically manage risks and avoid organisational debacles. Additionally, previous 
research lent support for the relationship between organisational risk management 
system designs (Jabbour, 2013), management control system designs (Simons, 1987, 
1991, 1994), and the drive for achievement of organisational strategies. This research 
further elaborates on the relation of organisational strategies and airline risk 
management approaches, in the discussion of airline risk profile characteristics.  
 
The ownership structures of the airlines investigated in this study were evidenced to 
affect organisational risk management systems in multiple ways. Forming part of a 
larger group of organisations was found to affect the adoption of ERM in airlines in 
addition to determining organisational designs of risk management institutions, rules 
and routines. Mimicking by airlines of the risk management approaches of other 
organisations from airlines’ respective groups was reported to be driven mainly by 
instrumental purposes, although sporadic evidence was also registered pointing to 
legitimacy-driven mimicking practices. As previously indicated, in some airlines 
ownership structures were evidenced to affect corporate cultures and, consequently, the 
designs of risk management institutions, rules and routines. In the analysis of empirical 
evidence an interesting notion was raised on the rationale behind aligning of the risk 
management system of one of the investigated airlines (Beta) with the ERM approach 
adopted in other airlines from the same group. The need to consider contextual 
specificity of particular organisations was emphasised by airline members, something 
which was discussed in more detail in the section (8.2.5). As previously noted, the link 
between ownership structures and organisational risk management approaches was 
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confirmed in prior research (e.g. Pagach and Warr 2011; Kane and Velury, 2004; and 
others). Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) positively related the degree of institutional 
ownership to the effectiveness of shareholder pressures ultimately encouraging adoption 
of ERM. The findings of Paape and Spekle (2012) did not provide evidence of the 
effects of institutional ownership on ERM adoption, yet the researchers raised an 
interesting notion related to owner-managed organisations. They argued that owner-
managed organisations are less inclined to recognise the need for ERM as there are no 
agency conflicts, and reliance on formal control systems is lower in these organisations 
(Lovata and Costigan, 2002). This rationale was observed in this study in the Gamma 
airline (see Chapter 5).  
 
The theoretical model developed for this research conceptualises airline risk profiles as 
a separate category of determinants of airline risk management approaches. Risks facing 
airlines stem both from external and internal technical contexts. Exogenous events such 
as the security implications of September 11th 2001, the 2003 outbreak of the Severe 
Acute Respiratory Syndrome, the housing price bubble of 2007 in the United States and 
the recession affecting worldwide economies that followed, in addition to multiple other 
external events impacted demand for airline services in both short and medium terms 
(Adler and Gellman, 2012). These external risks, often of strategic importance, differ in 
their levels of impact and probability of occurrence from internal risks, particularly 
from those of operational nature. Additionally, airline risk profiles are conditioned by 
internal institutional environments, by institutional logics which shape the way 
organisation members conceptualise uncertainty into risks forming the risk portfolios, 
the way in which priority is assigned to management of particular risks (which is 
reflected in the development of dedicated structures for management of strategic, 
financial, safety risks), and the way in which the roles of risk management systems are 
perceived (e.g. performance-driven approaches versus compliance-driven approaches). 
Kaplan and Mikes (2014) argued that organisations need to develop risk management 
institutions, rules, and routines aligned with the specificity of risks constituting their 
risk profiles. The scholars distinguished between rule-based risk management models 
adequate for the control of operational risks yet unsuitable for managing risks inherent 
in organisational strategies, and more advanced approaches for management of relevant 
external and strategic risks. Consistent with the arguments of Kaplan and Mikes (2014), 
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this research provided evidence of airline-specific risk profiles driving the rules and 
routines institutionalised in organisations in order to manage uncertainty.  
 
As reviewed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, previous literature broadly discussed the major 
exposures facing airlines and the rules and routines institutionalised in airlines for their 
management. Lin and Chang (2008) clearly summarised this notion by visualising in a 
form of a matrix the link between different types of airline risks and their corresponding 
risk management strategies. Airlines are exposed to multiple hazard risks which may 
cause accidental or incidental damages to aircrafts and multiple derives costs, such as 
liability claims related to passenger injuries or general liability to third-parties. Due to 
the relevance of hazard risks for airlines, the organisations under study proved to have 
developed extensive structures and processes aligned to the perceived levels of 
probability and impact of hazardous events, such as crisis management committees or 
procedures delineating roles, responsibilities and actions to be taken in cases of risk 
materialisation. These risks characterised by low probability and high severity levels are 
also transferred by airlines to external parties through insurance policies (Flouris et al., 
2009; Lane, 2005). Other external types of risks of high severity and high probability of 
occurrence are not-insurable; airlines employ avoidance and controlled-loss strategies to 
deal with these risks. Multiple strategic exposures fall into this category, one example 
being the risks derived from competitors actions. Airline risks of high frequency and 
low severity, such as operational risks are managed in the airlines under study through 
establishment of safety management systems or operational manuals in the production 
departments; risk management and rule-compliance are believed to be inter-related 
strategies for promoting operational safety in hazardous industries (Hopkins, 2010). 
Risks of low severity and low frequency of occurrence are often retained by airlines due 
to their low impact on airline resources.  
 
Furthermore, this research demonstrated how institutional logics determine assignment 
of priorities across airline risk profiles which consequently determine the institutions, 
rules, and routines comprising airline risk management approaches. As expressed by 
Mikes (2009, p. 22) “top management’s personal philosophies about the manageability 
of risks are shaped by their institutional backgrounds”. By way of an example, 
institutional logics of actors within the airlines under study conditioned their focus on 
performance versus compliance objectives and allocation of resources to management 
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of different types of risks, by means of developing structures and practices facilitating 
organisation-wise risk-based decision making versus merely fulfilling compliance 
requirements of regulatory frameworks and corporate governance best practice codes. 
Institutional logics of actors within the organisations under study were evidenced to 
determine the changing appetites for particular types of risks, priority assigned to 
managing selected types of exposures and consequently, the designs of risk 
management institutions, rules, and routines. This is consistent with the arguments of 
Power (2009) who postulated that organisations have different appetites for varying 
types of exposures that change over time reflecting changes in organisational contexts, 
and which are recognised in the logics of actors and reflected in periodical adjustments 
of organisational strategies. Power’s argument was additionally reflected in the case 
studies of Alpha and Beta airlines, whose risk appetites varied depending on the types 
of exposures; by way of an example, the airlines have an extremely low appetite for 
safety risks, yet a higher appetite for strategic or market risks.  
 
8.4 Maturity, roles and uses of airline risk management and ERM systems 
In addition to documenting differences in the rules and routines comprising airline risk 
management and ERM systems, this research assessed the levels of maturity and 
advancement, and also to the roles and uses of such systems; adoption versus non-
adoption of ERM was examined, as well as differences in the maturity of risk 
management systems among the airlines which claimed to have implemented ERM. 
Consistent with previous research conducted in various industries (e.g. Paape and 
Spakle, 2012; Arena et al., 2010, 2011; Mikes, 2009; Woods, 2011), this study 
demonstrated that the term ‘ERM’ is employed as an umbrella for diverse risk 
management approaches and is often externally reported for legitimacy purposes, 
whereas organisations vary in the extent to which they have adopted ERM principles.  
In the assessment of airline risk management approaches this study recognised the 
multi-dimensional nature of their maturity and considered different factors indicative of 
maturity. Literature proposes different criteria for assessing the levels of maturity of risk 
management systems in organisations. Critics of risk management maturity often 
examined distribution of responsibilities and accountabilities for risk management, the 
scopes of risks taken under consideration, and the techniques and tools employed in risk 
management processes (e.g. Calderon and Pero, 2013; Muralidhar, 2010; Jabbour, 
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2013). This research referred to the maturity assessment criteria proposed in academic 
and industry-based literature and brought them down to four major themes; airline risk 
management systems were assessed as per the comprehensiveness of risk portfolios, the 
level of embeddedness of the risk management function across organisations, the level 
of integration of enterprise-wide risk management practices, and the roles and uses 
assigned to the risk management function. This research demonstrated how some 
airlines have developed mature and sophisticated risk management systems, while 
others rely on siloed approaches and manage risks in an ad hoc manner as they 
materialise. In the cases of airlines claiming adoption of ERM, employee perception of 
the maturity of the risk management systems in their respective organisations was 
contrasted with an independent maturity assessment conducted by the researcher. The 
level of coherence of these two assessments was significant; the airlines were placed 
high on the continuum of advancement of risk management approaches. Interestingly, 
this study also inferred that airlines may operate fairly advanced risk management 
systems without denominating them as ‘ERM systems’ (see Chapter 7); this implies the 
case of external legitimacy motivations related to developing risk management systems 
being offset by technical efficiency factors or, in other words, the offset of ceremonial 
uses of risk management systems by their instrumental uses.           
 
However, the most interesting focus point of this study lies in the roles and uses of 
ERM in airlines, often questioned by both ERM scholars and practitioners. Previous 
empirical research identified multiple roles and uses of ERM in organisations, 
distinguishing primarily between the focus on compliance to corporate governance 
codes, building an external image of sound management control systems, development 
of risk management systems in support of internal audit and control functions and, 
finally, development of risk management systems in support of risk-based decision-
making processes aimed at overall improvement of organisational performance (e.g. 
Arena et al., 2011; Tekathen and Dechow, 2013; McRae and Balthazor, 2000; Woods, 
2009). Aside from recognising the multiple benefits of risk-based decision making at 
operational and strategic levels, ERM was often criticised in literature for being 
ceremonially adopted, serving primarily as an external accountability device (Bruce, 
2005; Collier et al., 2006; Fraser and Henry, 2007), while legitimacy-driven risk 
management approaches have been institutionalised and globalised across organisations 
from different industries (Power, 2009). Previous researchers also recognised the 
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interdependent nature of risk management, management accounting, and corporate 
governance roles, as organisations adopt risk controls for instrumental purposes and as 
they strive to make such controls visible in order to engender legitimacy (Bhimani, 
2009), while “risk functions as an organising category for management in general” 
(Hutter and Power, 2005, p. 9). Consistent with the findings of previous academic 
inquiries into organisational roles and uses of ERM, the analysis of risk management 
context and rationalities in the airlines forming part of this research also indicated 
“diverging organisational significance of risk management approaches” (Mikes, 2009, 
p. 35) and diverse couplings of ERM with other management control processes, serving 
different organisational purposes whose boundaries appear blurred.  
 
As previously discussed (sections 8.3.1 and 8.3.2), the ERM systems of the investigated 
airlines have been developed in response to the requirements of relevant regulatory 
frameworks, as means of externally demonstrating adherence to corporate governance 
best practices, in support of organisational controlling processes or decision-making and 
planning, or in fulfilment of a combination of all of these roles to certain extents. 
However, considering the previously discussed features of airline ERM systems such as 
embeddedness, integration, and comprehensiveness of airline risk management systems 
in terms of the factors defined above, this study infers the ERM approaches of the 
airlines under study have been driven by performance rather than compliance 
objectives. Evidence from this study suggests airlines strive to portray themselves as 
accountable organisations adhering to regulative frameworks and corporate governance 
best practices; by establishing ERM rules and instituting dedicated risk management 
positions in the organisational structures, airlines create auditable representations of 
ERM. However, at the same time, in the Alpha case study ERM was evidenced to 
impact airline decision-making and planning processes; upon assimilation of ERM 
principles into business processes representatives of the Alpha airlines reported on 
improved understating of risks embedded in their strategies and in the external 
environment. An example of the alignment of the risk management function with 
strategic planning and management can be observed in the analyses performed under 
the FRM framework in the Alpha airlines. The case study of Beta, although the airline 
did not claim ERM adoption, provided examples of integration of risk management and 
planning and performance management functions through informal routines; however, 
the researcher perceives these routines as less effective than that of the Alpha airlines.  
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The advantages of developing performance-driven ERM approaches in organisations 
have been broadly discussed in literature, yet the studies provided inconsistent 
conclusions. Pagach and Warr (2011), Beasley et al. (2008), and Baxter et al. (2013), 
who discussed the effects of ERM implementation on organisational value in specific 
industries including financial, energy, and insurance industry, or Paape and Spakle 
(2012) who studied organisations from a variety of industries, did not suggest that ERM 
had the power to significantly affect long-term organisational values. Contrarily, the 
empirical studies of McShane et al. (2010), Ellul and Yeramilli (2012), or Hoyt and 
Liebenberg (2011) concluded that ERM added value to organisations. They, along with 
other academics (e.g. Barton et al., 2002; Lam, 2003; Nocco and Stulz, 2006; Miccolis 
et al., 2001; Kleffner et al., 2003; Stroh, 2005) discussed multiple other benefits of 
implementing ERM which may indirectly affect enterprise value, such as improved 
understanding of organisational risk profiles, improved operational and strategic 
decision-making, creating synergies between different risk management activities, 
reducing the cost of external financing, and decreasing earnings and stock price 
volatility. As suggested by these multiple potential benefits of ERM, organisational 
performance in relation to ERM implementation may be assessed in different 
dimensions. This study did not explicitly focus on examining the effects of 
implementing ERM in airlines or achieving appropriate matches between ERM systems 
and airline-specific contingency factors, yet in the course of the field research the 
interviewees reported their perceptions of the benefits which their respective 
organisations had derived from the performance-driven ERM approaches. On multiple 
occasions the interviewees emphasized gaining improved understanding of risks, which 
led to more informed strategy setting and decision-making processes. Furthermore, the 
interviewees believed that ERM improved the overall credibility of their respective 
organisations in financial and commodity markets, consequently affecting their 
negotiating powers in these markets. Finally, some interviewees pointed to ERM 
reducing volatility of the operating results and to overall improved performance of their 
respective organisations.        
 
Relevant to the discussion of roles and uses of risk management and ERM systems are 
the instrumental versus ceremonial motivations driving the designs of such systems, 
while the latter have been often associated in literature with decoupling or loose 
coupling of risk management rules and routines. Previous research (e.g. Huber and 
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Rothstein, 2013; Arena et al., 2010) discussed the decoupling or loose coupling of 
formal ERM rules, often established in organisations in an attempt to gain external 
legitimacy, from routines enacted by organisation members in order to preserve 
technical efficiency. As previously discussed (section 8.3.1), airline risk management 
approaches are influenced by diverse regulative and normative institutions, which may 
suggest a certain degree of airlines’ propensity to developing risk management systems 
in pursuit of external legitimacy. However, the data from this study suggests the 
legitimacy pressures in the cases of the airlines which claimed ERM adoption were 
lesser than organisational intentions for improved performance. Although the empirical 
data signalled varying degrees of encoding of ERM principles into the actions of airline 
employees, the researcher did not perceive the signals sufficiently potent as to suggest 
major discrepancies between ERM rules and routines which may imply ceremonial 
adoptions of ERM; thus, instrumental motivations appear to surpass ceremonial drivers 
of ERM adoption. Another factor which may have contributed to collection of limited 
evidence of decoupling and loose coupling between ERM rules and routines is the fact 
that, in the cases of airlines which claimed adoption of ERM, the researcher interviewed 
senior risk executives responsible for implementation or coordination of ERM in their 
respective organisations, who were unlikely to criticise the systems which they had been 
in charge of, or in the development of which they had participated. Extending the 
number of case studies on airlines forming the sample (versus applying the field study 
methodology) may have provided additional insights on the phenomenon of decoupling 
or loose coupling of risk management rules and routines.       
 
8.5 Conclusions  
This chapter reflected on the findings from the field study and two case studies of 
airline risk management and ERM systems presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, in the 
context of the theoretical model underpinning this study, and in the context of academic 
literature. Based on these findings the researcher developed an ERM framework in the 
airline industry which should support airline professionals in implementing or 
optimising ERM systems. Throughout the framework best practices of airline ERM and 
risk management systems were reflected on, pointing the reader’s attention to the issues 
which need to be taken into consideration in designing ERM systems.  
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The discussion and analysis conducted herein demonstrated systematic variations of 
airline risk management routines despite airlines’ risk management approaches being 
guided by common ERM frameworks or risk management standards. The varying and 
common features of airline risk management systems were explained in the discussion 
by the influences of institutional pressures and contingency factors; the configurations 
of airline risk management and ERM systems were evidenced to be context-specific, 
adhering to the demands of task and institutional environments of the particular airlines 
in question. The discussion also emphasised the need to align airline risk management 
systems to the requirements of airlines’ task and institutional environments. Under the 
tenets of structural contingency theory the discussion argued lack of a “universally 
appropriate” design of an ERM system applicable to all airlines in all circumstances 
(Otley, 1980). Finally, this chapter discussed maturity and roles and uses of airline risk 
management systems, demonstrating the tendency for adoption of ever more 
comprehensive risk management approaches. Different roles and uses of airline risk 
management systems were evidenced, adhering to ceremonial and instrumental 
purposes: organisational responses to requirements of relevant regulatory frameworks, 
means of externally demonstrating adherence to corporate governance best practices, 
support of organisational controlling processes and decision-making and planning, or 
fulfilment of a combination of all of these roles to certain extents. The following table 
8-2 resumes some of the major findings of this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
237 
 
Table 8-2: Review of key findings  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Adoption of ERM in airlines drives development of NEW institutions, rules, routines for 
comprehensive management of risks
Systematic variations in airline risk management and ERM systems are conditioned by institutional 
as well as technical divers
Stronger influence of technical, efficiency and effectiveness criteria for adoption and 
implementation of ERM rather than legitimacy criteria
Varying configurations of risk management systems in airlines may lead to different, yet functional 
approaches if properly aligned with organisational contexts
Institutionalisation of new organisational rules and routines triggered by adoption of ERM 
Fluidity in organisational designs of ERM; variations among airlines’ ERM routines versus 
homogeneity of formal rules systems
Interdependent nature of airlines’ ERM systems and other management control systems; different 
roles and uses of ERM systems in airlines: compliance to corporate governance codes, building an 
external image of sound management control systems, support in internal audit and control 
functions, as well as support in risk-based decision-making processes 
Additionally, findings from this study allowed to: 
Conceptualise integral components of ERM systems in airlines                                                     
(figure 8-1: ERM framework in the airline industry)
Identify drivers of effective risk management in airlines
This study evidenced: 
Key Findings
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions 
 
9.1. Introduction  
This research aimed to investigate structures and practices of airline risk management 
systems in order to develop an enterprise-wide risk management framework in the 
airline industry. This research was founded on a critical review of literature indicating 
an under-explored field of ERM, in particular in the context of the airline industry, 
revealing shortcomings of airline risk management systems and suggesting the need for 
development of ever more comprehensive and integrated systems (see Chapter 2). This 
research also responded to the calls for organisational studies of risk management 
(Gephart et al., 2009; Power, 2009) adopting a more holistic approach to organisational 
practices, considering risk management within broader cultural frameworks (Lounsbury, 
2008), investigating organisational coupling of risk management (Mikes, 2009), and 
conducting institutionally grounded studies of practices (Nicolini, 2009). 
 
In order to fulfil the aim and objectives stated for this thesis (see Chapter 1), the 
researcher revised a wide spectrum of academic literature and industry publications 
relevant to risk management and airline management, and empirically investigated risk 
management systems in ten international airlines. Firstly, a field study was conducted in 
ten airlines exploring the diversity of configurations of airline risk management systems, 
the developments and shortcomings of such systems, the technical and institutional 
determinants of their design choices, and finally, the degree of assimilation of ERM 
principles in the airlines forming the sample (field study methodology as defined in 
Lillis and Mundy, 2005). Secondly, two case studies were conducted involving airlines 
from the field study sample; the case studies examined in more detail airlines’ risk 
management systems and the alignments of the systems to airlines’ respective business 
contexts. Based on the empirical research findings and the review of relevant academic 
and industry literature, an enterprise-wide risk management framework in the airline 
industry was developed (see Chapter 8).  
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This concluding chapter begins by revisiting the research questions guiding this study 
and resuming its major findings. Secondly, contributions of this study are reviewed in 
different dimensions, including contributions to theory, methodology applications, and 
knowledge and practice. This leads to a discussion on the limitations of this study, 
which is followed by suggesting directions for further research. This chapter concludes 
with a brief section of final remarks.  
 
9.2 Research questions revisited 
This research was driven by a set of research questions which are revisited in this 
section, where the main empirical findings are also synthesised to reflect how they 
contribute to answering the research questions.  
 
9.2.1 Determinants of adoption and implementation of risk management systems in 
airlines 
The first research question dealt with characteristics of airline business contexts, and the 
way in which they influence the risk management systems of airlines. Chapters 1 and 2 
provided insight into airline operating environments. Chapter 5 presented empirical 
findings of the factors driving adoption and implementation of particular framings of 
risk management systems in airlines. A combined approach of contingency and 
institutional perspectives was applied in order to examine both technical and 
institutional determinants of the risk management structures and practices constituting 
such systems, stemming both from airlines’ internal and external environments. 
 
RQ1: How do different institutional and technical contextual factors determine the 
adoption and implementation of airline risk management systems?  
Consistent with the propositions of structural contingency theory and findings resulting 
from studies of management control systems in general, and studies of risk management 
and ERM systems in particular conducted under this perspective, this study provided 
evidence of context-specific configurations of airline risk management systems that 
were attributed to differences in contextual factors within airlines’ task and institutional 
environments. The study demonstrated that the dual context of task and institutional 
environments exerts efficiency and legitimacy pressures on airlines. Simultaneous 
tailoring of airline risk management systems to multiple institutional and technical 
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drivers was evidenced, documenting also how organisational institutional logics 
determine the necessary trade-offs between the conflicting drivers in designing risk 
management systems. The institutional environment of airlines was found in this study 
to exert legitimacy pressures which cause both isomorphism and divergence in 
organisational risk management systems. Airlines were also evidenced to adapt their 
risk management structures and practices to best fit with their technical environments 
under the imperative of enhanced efficiency and effectiveness of their performance. 
Similarly to the case of institutional influences, contingency factors stemming from the 
task environment were recognised to drive both homogeneity and diversity in airline 
risk management approaches. These findings are consistent with those of prior studies 
which documented intertwined influences of technical and institutional drivers of 
framings of management control systems in general, and risk management and ERM 
systems in particular.  
 
Numerous institutional pressures and contingency factors were evidenced to affect the 
adoption of particular risk management approaches in airlines, including the adoption 
and implementation, or non-adoption decisions of ERM. In cases of ERM adoption 
which were of particular interest to this study, it documented how a combination of 
institutional pressures and contingency factors drive deinstitutionalisation and re-
institutionalisation of risk management rules and routines. Research findings suggest 
influence of multiple external institutional pressures, such as coercive, mimetic, 
normative, among others, in addition to internal institutional pressures, on the framings 
of airline risk management systems. This study evidenced the particularly high 
relevance of regulatory frameworks and corporate governance best practice codes, both 
falling within the category of coercive pressures. Normative influence of 
professionalisation of the risk management field, affected by widespread popularity of 
international risk management standards and frameworks, was also proved to be 
remarkably relevant. This study also proved the relevance of contingency factors 
categorised as external factors related to the environment and the industry, internal, 
organisation-specific factors and, finally, factors related to the typology of risks that 
airline risk management systems aim to address. The third herein mentioned category of 
contingency factors, related to airline risk profiles, was evidenced in this study to be of 
particular relevance; this is mainly due to the fact that the risks facing airlines stem both 
from external and internal technical contexts, while they may be affected additionally 
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by institutional contexts, and thus this category of contingency factors conceptualises a 
synthesis of a variety of other influences. Consistent with the arguments of previous 
researchers (Kaplan and Mikes, 2014), this study provided evidence of airline-specific 
risk profiles driving the rules and routines institutionalised in organisations in order to 
manage uncertainty. Based on these findings, this study further advocated the need to 
develop appropriate mechanisms in airline risk management systems in order to identify 
a wide spectrum of all relevant risks and align risk assessment and management 
techniques to their typology.  
 
9.2.2 Organisational structures and practices within airline risk management 
systems 
The following research question deals with organisational structures, practices, and 
dynamics of airline risk management systems. In order to address this question, 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 analysed risk management structures and practices with their 
intertwined dynamics constituting risk management systems of the airlines under study, 
in addition to the rationalities underlying particular configurations of such systems. The 
analysis was largely informed by the theoretical tenets of old institutional economics 
and new institutional sociology. The empirical study analysed the institutions, rules, and 
routines comprising airline risk management systems, demonstrating both their 
convergent and divergent features. The study also analysed isomorphic forces and 
institutionalisation processes occurring in the organisational fields of airlines, as well as 
the institutional logics of actors within these fields.  
 
RQ2: How do airlines structure and perform risk management functions?  
The analysis of empirical data of institutions, rules, and routines comprising airline risk 
management systems illustrated how the major pillars of such systems have traditionally 
been developed to facilitate management of safety, hazard, and financial risks, while 
new structures and practices are commonly being developed in airlines following 
organisations’ decisions to expand their risk management agendas. Considering the aim 
underlying this study, the risk management structures and practices of the airlines which 
have adopted ERM approach have been of special interest.  
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Different levels of formalisation of airline risk management systems were evidenced in 
this study; the study suggested that high level of formalisation of risk management 
systems in the airlines analysed was related to the proclaimed adoption of ERM by 
airlines rather than to organisational size and complexity. ERM adoption is associated 
with development of formal methodologies guiding enterprise-wide risk management 
processes and delineating procedures and protocols for identification, assessment, 
treatment, and reporting of risks. Highly structured ERM systems of the airlines under 
study were found to be predicated by normative propositions of ERM frameworks 
which conceptualise risk management as a control mechanism facilitating achievement 
of organisational objectives. Structured ERM systems were found to be associated with 
more clarity and consistency in the risk definition protocols, and to use more 
sophisticated tools for capture, storage, and analysis of risk data. This study also 
evidenced a combination of qualitative and quantitative risk assessment approaches. 
The findings indicated potential feasibility and functionality of both high and low 
structured, as well as highly and low calculative approaches in airlines, provided that 
they are properly matched with the requirements of specific airline business contexts.   
 
Consistent with prior research, this study suggested that the effectiveness of risk 
management systems is dependent on organisational risk cultures and the level of 
institutionalisation of risk management principles in organisational routines, rather than 
on the formal rules guiding risk management approaches. The study evidenced 
differences in assignment and coordination of risk management responsibilities across 
organisational hierarchies in the airlines which have and have not adopted ERM. 
Adoption of ERM in airlines was evidenced to drive development of new institutions, 
rules, and routines for comprehensive and integrated management of risks, which was 
exemplified by development of new organisational coordination structures such as risk 
committees or risk management positions of CRO or its equivalents, or the introduction 
of structured routines for enterprise-wide identification, assessment, and management of 
risks. Contrarily,  in the cases of non-adoption of ERM this study evidenced less or lack 
of  centralised structures for coordination of risk management initiatives undertaken 
across different organisational functions and levels. The phenomena of homogeneity 
and diversity of airline risk management structures and practices are further elaborated 
on as follows.  
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The study provided evidence of a certain degree of homogeneity of airline risk 
management systems, which can be observed principally in the formal rules underlying 
performance of the risk management functions; in particular, airline ERM rules 
demonstrate a high level of homogeneity in their fits with generic ERM models such as 
COSO (2004). It was also illustrated how certain levels of homogeneity in airline risk 
management systems coexist with variations in certain aspects of such systems. This 
was noticeable, for example, in the assignment of responsibilities and accountabilities 
for risk management processes and their constituent routines; despite the similarities of 
ERM rules among organisations, ERM routines are aligned to the requirements of 
organisational contexts, causing cross-case variations in performance of ERM 
especially at the operational and instrumental levels.  
 
Evidence from this study attributes homogeneity of airline risk management systems 
mainly to the isomorphic forces acting within the organisational field of airlines; the 
isomorphic forces emphasise the logic of legitimacy in the processes of homogenisation. 
The phenomena of divergence in airline risk management system configurations, as 
previously discussed, can be attributed both to technical and institutional factors. In the 
institutional realm, enactment of risk management rules and routines through actions of 
actors in airlines is influenced by the existing institutions and institutional logics, which 
cause variations in routines and possibly in rules in the long term. In the technical realm, 
enactment of ERM can be affected by actors’ perception of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of rules. Findings from this study are consistent with previous research 
indicating similarities in organisational modelling of risk management rules based on 
normative guidelines, and evidencing variations in implementation of ERM and other 
management control systems in organisations from different industries and even from 
the same industry.  
 
9.2.3. Assessment of airline risk management systems 
The third research question focused on assessment of airline risk management systems. 
Critical review of academic and industry literature (Chapter 2) provided initial insights 
into this subject. The empirical study (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) analysed airline risk 
management systems in the aspects related to risk management rationalities, 
technologies, and risk experts (as defined in Chapter 3), forming the bases for 
244 
 
 
 
evaluation of the state of advancement and maturity of the approaches in the airlines 
under study, in addition to identification of both the shortcomings and best practices of 
their risk management systems.   
 
RQ3: Where are airlines placed on the continuum of maturity and advancement of 
risk management approaches, and what are the roles and uses of their risk 
management systems?  
As discussed in section 8.4 of this thesis, this research assessed the maturity and 
advancement of risk management systems of the airlines under study according to four 
main factors. Airline risk management systems were assessed as per the 
comprehensiveness of risk portfolios, the level of embeddedness of the risk 
management function throughout organisational structures, the level of integration of 
enterprise-wide risk management practices, and the roles and uses assigned to the risk 
management systems. It was demonstrated how on the continuum of risk management 
systems’ maturity and advancement some airlines ranked low with their siloed 
approaches and ad-hoc risk management initiatives, whilst others ranked high with their 
mature and sophisticated ERM systems. Apart from documenting differences in the 
levels of maturity and advancement of the risk management approaches of airlines, 
consistent with prior literature this study also evidenced a tendency for adoption of ever 
more comprehensive risk management approaches in airlines. Particularly in the cases 
of airlines claiming adoption of ERM, organisations were placed high on the continuum 
of maturity and advancement of risk management approaches. This study also showed 
how airlines may operate fairly advanced risk management systems without 
denominating them as ‘ERM systems’ (e.g. Beta).  
 
Multiple rationalities drive risk management approaches of airlines, which were found 
to be aimed at addressing both ceremonial purposes, such as demonstrating external 
compliance and legitimacy, and instrumental purposes of improving organisational 
performance and gaining economic benefit. With specific regard to airline ERM 
systems, they were found to perform multiple roles and have numerous uses in 
organisations, ranging from compliance to corporate governance codes, building an 
external image of sound risk governance, development of ERM systems in support of 
internal audit and control functions, to development of ERM systems in support of risk-
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based decision-making processes. Despite evidencing diverse organisational roles and 
uses of ERM, this study inferred that ERM approaches of the airlines under study had 
been driven by performance rather than by compliance objectives. This was also found 
to be true for the above-cited case of Beta, which exemplified how external legitimacy 
motivations related to developing risk management systems are offset by technical 
efficiency factors, or in other words the offset of ceremonial uses of risk management 
systems by their instrumental uses.  
 
9.2.4. Recommendations for improvement of airline risk management systems 
This fourth research question focused on developing propositions for improvement of 
airline risk management systems. In order to address this research question, Chapter 8 
argued the need to align airline risk management systems to the requirements of their 
respective task and institutional environments and, based on findings from the empirical 
study and a review of relevant literature, an enterprise-wide risk management 
framework in the airline industry was developed. 
 
RQ4: How can airlines improve and align their risk management systems with the 
requirements of their business contexts?   
As explained above in the discussion of contextual determinants of airline risk 
management approaches, this research conveyed that both external and internal 
technical and institutional contextual factors need to be considered when configuring 
the risk management systems in airlines. The multiplicity of technical and institutional, 
sometimes conflicting requirements, needs to be balanced according to the priorities 
inherent in organisational strategies. Consistent with prior studies this research 
advocated lack of a universally applicable design of an ERM system which is applicable 
to all airlines in all circumstances, and suggests the need to consider numerous technical 
and institutional requirements of airline environments when developing customised 
ERM systems. Among these different requirements, the determinant role of airline risk 
profiles on the framing of risk management systems was emphasised; although 
portrayed as a separate category of contingency factors, airline risk profiles are 
conditioned by numerous requirements of institutional and task environments. Airline-
specific risk profiles call for alignment of risk management structures and practices to 
the specificity of risks faced by airlines; airlines should employ different techniques for 
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management of preventable, strategy-execution, and external risks. Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 
8 analysed and discussed employment of diverse risk management rules and routines in 
airlines, suited to target organisation-specific risk typologies.  
 
From a sample of ten airlines this study analysed a variety of approaches distributed 
along the continuum of risk management maturity and advancement; the empirical 
findings formed the basis for identifying key drivers of effective risk management in 
airlines. In response to this research question, and combining the findings from the 
empirical research (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) with the findings from the review of a wide 
spectrum of academic and industry literature (Chapters 1, 2, and 8), this study 
developed the aforementioned enterprise-wide risk management framework in the 
airline industry. The framework (presented in Chapter 8, section 8.2) depicts an 
entanglement of institutions, rules, and routines of an airline ERM system through five 
structural components, namely ERM process, ERM governance structure, airline risk 
portfolio, ERM internal environment, and ERM architecture. Throughout the discussion 
of the research findings falling within the particular components of the framework the 
researcher indicated the key issues which airline professionals need to consider when 
developing or optimising the ERM systems. The framework advocates considering a 
wide spectrum of enterprise-wide risks, embedding the risk management function across 
all organisational levels and integrating risk management initiatives across 
organisational hierarchy, whilst also positing that configuration of the risk management 
function in airlines should be sensitive to the specificity of their contextual requirements. 
Considering the contingent nature of ERM on the specificity of airline business contexts, 
following the recommendations proposed throughout the framework should lead to 
varying couplings and uses of the risk management systems in airlines, which should be 
noticeable, for example, in variations of airline ‘ERM mixes’ (Mikes, 2009). 
 
9.3 Contribution of the study  
This study provided numerous contributions to the body of knowledge, which are 
discussed as follows in the theoretical, methodological, and empirical dimensions.  
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9.3.1 Contributions to theory  
In order to conceptualise and later empirically assess the structures and practices 
constituting airline risk management systems and their determinants, a multi-theoretical 
framework was developed supporting and informing this research. The framework 
integrated structural contingency theory with selected strands of institutional theory, in 
particular new institutional sociology (NIS) and old institutional economics (OIE). This 
study extends the institutional and contingency theory literature in the field of 
management control systems, and specifically in the field of risk management, with 
several theoretical contributions.   
 
This research recognised the limitations of investigating independently the influences of 
task and institutional environments on organisational structures and practices, and 
responded to the calls of previous researchers  to consider jointly the technical and 
institutional pressures (e.g. Scott and Meyer, 1983; Carruthers, 1995; Baxter and Chua, 
2003; Suddaby, 2010; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988). The limitations of adopting 
independently the theoretical perspectives was addressed through the conjoint 
application of the contingency and institutional theories; the theoretical framework 
developed for this research allows for recognising the effects of both task and 
institutional environments on the organisational risk management structures and 
practices, and exploring intra-organisational coupling of the risk management function; 
this general framework can be drawn on in future studies set in different industries.  
 
Consistent with previous findings, this research concluded on the determining effects of 
both technical and institutional factors on configurations of management control 
systems in organisations, and allowed for understating how organisational risk 
management structures and processes acquire meaning in both technical and 
institutional dimensions. Within the studies of management control systems, in the 
under-researched field of risk management systems, the conjoint application of 
contingency theory and institutional theory in understanding the determinants of 
organisational structures and practices provides an extension to the existing theory. This 
research confirmed several categories of technical and institutional determinants of 
organisational structures and practices discussed previously in studies of management 
control systems in general, and of risk management systems in particular, and extended 
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the theory by evidencing new categories of technical and institutional pressures relevant 
specifically to airline risk management systems. Consistent with previous studies of 
management control systems adopting structural contingency theory perspective, this 
research argued the need to align organisational configurations of airline risk 
management systems to contingencies existing within their respective environments.   
 
In the exploration of airline risk management structures and practices, this research 
referred to the tenets of new institutional sociology (NIS) and old institutional 
economics (OIE). Combination of these two strands of institutional theory allowed for 
conceptualising risk management structures and practices as organisational rules and 
routines influenced by intra- and extra-organisational institutions at micro- and macro-
levels, and considering intra-organisational dynamics and the phenomenon of risk 
management in the organisational field of airlines. Both OIE and NIS have often been 
applied to studies of management control systems and risk management systems, yet the 
novelty of this research lies in applying this conjoint theoretical perspective to the study 
of the airline industry. Under this theoretical approach, this research responded to the 
calls for studies recognising organisational fluidity of management control systems in 
general, and risk management systems in particular, while considering the specificity of 
organisational contexts (Miller et al. 2008; Arena et al., 2010; Woods, 2011; Gephart et 
al., 2009; Mikes, 2009; Arena et al., 2010).  
 
9.3.2 Contributions to methodology applications 
The major contribution of this study to methodology applications resides in adopting an 
approach to collect and analyse empirical evidence which has not been often applied to 
organisational studies of risk management, yet which allows for drawing meaningful 
inferences on airline risk management systems and their contextual determinants.  
Previous studies of organisational risk management systems, and especially those 
related to implementation of ERM in organisations, often relied on surveys and were 
associated with several methodological limitations. In order to explore organisational 
coupling of risk management systems, in addition to verifying the existence of rules 
guiding risk management programmes it is necessary to investigate how routines are 
enacted by actors in organisations. The survey-based studies of risk management tend to 
rely on simple proxies to identify the components of organisational systems or indicate 
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their advancement and maturity; the proxies are often insufficient to explore the 
complexities of risk management and its organisational embeddedness. By way of an 
example, exploring adoption of ERM in organisations based on simple proxies, such as 
the appointment of CRO, is problematic as organisations may create ceremonial, 
auditable trails of ERM and fail to truly implement ERM principles in their risk 
management rules and routines. Conversely, organisations may implement 
comprehensive and integrated risk management approaches without denominating them 
as “ERM” or creating organisational structures commonly associated with ERM. 
Similarly, the survey-based assessments regarding the extent of ERM implementation 
often rely on employees’ opinions measured on simple scales, conditioned by 
respondents’ familiarity with the advancements in the risk management field. Due to the 
limitations of the survey-based evidence, many empirical studies only explore small 
fractions of organisational risk management systems in terms of their characteristics, 
variability, or maturity.   
 
Recognising the methodological limitations of previous studies in the risk management 
field, this research adopted a qualitative approach, conducting a field study and 
analysing two case studies of selected airlines. The adopted approach considered the 
complexity and importance of contextual issues in exploring the risk management 
phenomenon in airlines, and allowed for better understanding of the structures and 
practices adopted in airlines, their nature and maturity, and their determinants. To the 
best of the researcher’s knowledge there has been very limited use of case studies and 
field studies in the studies of risk management, and especially studies of the adoption 
and implementation of ERM. Under the chosen theoretical approach this research 
responds to calls for exploring control systems in operation (Otley, 1999) and adopting 
a more holistic approach to organisational practices and considering risk within broader 
cultural frameworks (Lounsbury, 2008).  
 
9.3.3 Contributions to knowledge and practice  
This research addressed the gaps identified in the literature of risk management and 
ERM in particular, and in the literature of airline management. ERM has been gaining 
momentum in the research agendas of scholars from diverse fields (Bhimani, 2009). 
The majority of ERM studies, similarly to studies of other management control systems, 
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have been conducted to date in the context of financial and related industries, which 
have become pioneers in ERM implementation (Arena et al., 2010). As the practice of 
ERM has become more widespread, a number of academic studies have followed 
investigating ERM in the context of diverse industries. However, the phenomenon of 
ERM in airlines has attracted limited attention from researchers. This study contributed 
to the literature of ERM by providing new insight on organisational coupling of ERM, 
in addition to the drivers of its adoption and implementation, from the under-explored 
perspective of the airline industry.    
 
There has been limited empirical research comprehensively assessing risk management 
structures and practices in airlines. Previous studies would mainly focus on risk 
management structures and practices targeting particular types of exposures, such as 
airline financial or safety risks, yet the literature lacked an empirical study exploring 
airline risk management systems in a more comprehensive manner. This study provided 
a useful and timely analysis of the airline industry from the perspective of risk 
management systems, adopting a multi-dimensional approach to the assessment of such 
systems.  
 
As previously indicated, although ERM has been gaining ever-increasing interest 
among airlines, empirical research exploring the ERM concept in relation to airlines is 
scarce; particularly in terms of ERM adoption and implementation in the airline 
industry, there have been very few empirical studies carried out. To the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, this study is one of the pioneer investigations exploring ERM 
in the organisational contexts of airlines, assessing enactment and institutionalisation of 
ERM principles, cultural significance of ERM, maturity and advancement of ERM, its 
level of integration in managerial decisions, and distribution of responsibilities and 
accountabilities for risk management among actors in airlines.  
 
Apart from responding to the ‘how’ questions related to organisational coupling of 
ERM in airlines, this study also addressed the ‘why’ questions behind the decision to 
adopt ERM or not, in addition to whether  the risk management function in airlines 
should be configured in a particular manner. This study is one of the first studies to 
explore the determinants of organisational designs of the risk management systems in 
airlines. It contributed to the literature by explaining the drivers of airline risk 
251 
 
 
 
management approaches, as indicated above, from both technical and institutional 
perspectives. Findings from this study gain relevance in the context of relatively fewer 
studies being conducted through qualitative research methodologies than survey-based 
research. Previous prevailingly quantitative research investigating organisation-related 
characteristics related to ERM, would not allow for exploring ERM in cultural and 
organisational contexts; these studies also suffered from inherent limitations related to 
identifying organisations with truly embedded ERM based on simplistic proxies.   
 
This study evidenced how ERM adoption in airlines drove development of new 
institutions, rules and routines for comprehensive management of risks, as exemplified 
by appointments of CROs or other equivalent positions, formalisation of risk 
management processes, or employment of diverse risk management and reporting tools. 
Findings from this study are consistent with previous research arguing context-specific 
configuration of ERM systems (e.g. Mikes, 2009; Woods, 2009, 2011; Arena et al., 
2010, 2011; Beasley et al., 2005; Hoyt and Liebenberg 2011). Despite certain common 
elements in airline risk management systems which were noticeable, for example, in the 
structural components of ERM frameworks often modelled on the provisions of various 
normative standards or frameworks (e.g. COSO, ISO 31000), this study evidenced the 
existence of systematic variations in airline risk management systems. Variations were 
especially noticeable in configurations of responsibilities and accountabilities in risk 
management processes and their constituent routines. This is consistent with the 
findings of Paape and Spakle (2012), signalling variation in ERM systems especially at 
the operational and instrumental levels.  
 
The findings of systematic variations of airline ERM systems (for example in the 
aspects related to calculative versus non-calculative cultures, or formalised versus 
informal approaches), are also related to conclusions on different drivers of the 
functionality of risk management systems. This study showed how varying 
configurations of ERM rules and routines may lead to different, yet still functional, 
approaches if they are properly aligned with organisational needs. On a related note, this 
research also showed how airlines may encode many of the ERM principles without 
denominating their systems as ERM, paying little interest in ceremonial displays of 
ERM; a similar argument was proposed by Woods (2011), based on an investigation of 
a case which lacked the commonly employed characteristics manifesting ERM, such as 
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the CRO position or a formalised, auditable risk management framework (the ‘Tesco’ 
case).     
 
Findings from this study proved the importance of proper encoding of ERM principles 
into organisational cultures. Similarly to other researchers in this field (in particular, 
Kaplan and Mikes, 2014; Kimbrough and Componation, 2009; or Coccia, 2005), 
throughout this study the researcher argued that the effectiveness of risk management 
systems is more dependent on the commitment of organisation members at various 
levels than on the formal rules guiding risk management approaches.  
 
Critical of the assessments of ERM maturity proposed in survey-based studies of ERM, 
which often relied solely on respondents’ understanding of the risk management 
systems of their respective organisations and on their perceptions of the maturity 
concept (e.g. Beasley et al. 2010), this study assessed the maturity and advancement of 
airlines’ risk management systems through multiple criteria; the criteria considered the 
extent of integration of enterprise-wide risk management routines, embeddedness of the 
risk management function across organisational hierarchies, and comprehensiveness of 
risk portfolios. Additionally, findings from this study pointed to the interdependent 
nature of risk management and other organisational management control systems (see 
Bhimani, 2009), and evidenced different roles and uses of ERM in airlines as also 
suggested by previous studies (e.g. Arena et al., 2011; Tekathen and Dechow, 2013; 
McRae and Balthazor, 2000; Woods, 2009); these varied between compliance to 
corporate governance codes, building an external image of sound management control 
systems, development of risk management systems in support of internal audit and 
control functions and, finally, development of risk management systems in support of 
risk-based decision-making processes aimed at overall improvement of organisational 
performance.  
 
Prior studies pointed both to technical and institutional drivers of convergence or 
divergence of ERM system configurations (e.g. Gordon et al., 2009; Mikes, 2005; 
Pagach and Warr, 2011). Similarly, this empirical study of the driving forces of airline 
risk management systems demonstrated the influence of a variety of institutional 
pressures and contingency factors. In the context of previous studies suggesting 
ceremonial adoption of ERM, serving primarily as an external accountability device 
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(Bruce, 2005; Collier et al., 2006; Fraser and Henry, 2007), in many of the investigated 
airlines evidence suggested stronger influence of technical, efficiency and effectiveness 
criteria for adoption of particular risk management configurations, rather than the 
influences of legitimacy pressures.    
 
Due to the methodological design of this study, it did not allow for a statistical 
generalisation of the findings. However, through purposefully employing variability in 
the sample, this study captured the varying characteristics of the risk management 
phenomenon in airlines and generated patterns and concepts. In this context, the 
findings and conceptual developments generated in a particular environment can be 
transferred to other environments (Norman, 1970), which suggests transferability of the 
recommendations and implications from this research to the organisational settings of 
other airlines. Furthermore, the enterprise-wide risk management framework in the 
airline industry developed throughout this study, which identified key drivers of 
effective risk management in airlines, advocated uniqueness of organisation-specific 
task and institutional environments and conveyed that implications from the framework 
should be aligned to organisations’ contextual requirements. 
 
9.4 Research limitations  
This research provided multiple contributions in the theoretical, methodology 
application, conceptual and practical dimensions; however, each research design is 
associated with certain limitations. The limitations of this research are acknowledged 
and discussed as follows. The limitations axiomatically indicate avenues for further 
research in the investigated areas.    
 
This research relied primarily on new institutional sociology and old institutional 
economics in the exploration of organisational coupling and significance of risk 
management systems in airlines. Other theoretical perspectives are also suitable to 
respond to the questions stated by this study; by way of an example, organisational 
theories such as the agency theory, the stakeholder theory, or the theory of the firm, 
might additionally broaden the perspective and enrich the interpretation of data 
collected throughout this research. However, following a review of the theoretical 
perspectives adopted in organisational studies of management control systems, the 
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researcher concluded that NIS and OIS were commonly used as they provide suitable 
bases for exploring the problem as stated for this research.    
 
Considering the objectives stated for this study, the study investigated the technical and 
institutional determinants of the design choices of risk management systems in airlines 
with varying levels of maturity and advancement; hence, the rationales behind adoption 
and implementation of ERM, and non-adoption of ERM, were jointly investigated. 
Introducing a greater level of detail in future studies in terms of the distinction between 
the drivers of adoption and implementation of ERM might provide additional interesting 
contributions. However, since during the course of this study the driving forces of 
adoption and implementation of ERM were often reported to be similar, the researcher 
chose to analyse them collectively.     
 
Previous studies of management control systems conducted under the contingency 
theory perspective and within the system approach of contingent fit have often analysed 
the effects of multiple contingency factors on organisational structural characteristics 
and on organisational performance. This study concentrated on analysing the technical 
and institutional determinants of organisational designs of airline risk management 
systems; however, the presented list of factors should not be considered exhaustive. 
Although this study, in a complementary manner, reported on interviewees’ perception 
of improved organisational performance related to ERM adoption and implementation, 
analysis of the relations between particular configurations of risk management systems 
and organisational performance was beyond the scope of this study considering the 
objectives stated for this research.      
 
The methodological limitations of this research also need to be acknowledged. Chapter 
4 provides detailed accounts of the means undertaken throughout the research process 
by the researcher in order to mitigate the inherent limitations of the chosen 
methodological approach. This study explored a limited subset of the large population 
of airlines; the fieldwork was limited to ten international airlines. Extending the sample 
size for the investigated phenomena would improve validity of the findings from this 
study. In order to alleviate this limitation, field study data was complemented with rich, 
contextualised data collected through case studies.   
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As previously mentioned (section 9.3.3), this study does not allow for statistical 
generalisability of the findings, but rather for theoretical interference. This limitation is 
believed to have been partly outweighed by providing rich and contextualised data, 
which allowed for making conceptual developments related to organisational coupling 
of airline risk management systems, and to rationalities behind the selection of 
particular framings of such systems; the theoretical developments may be relevant to 
other organisational settings beyond the investigated spectrum of airlines. 
 
Limitations to internal validity of this study have also been considered (see Chapter 4, 
section 4.4 for more details). The biases inherent in the data collection method are 
especially relevant. Data for this research was collected mainly from interviews with 
knowledgeable representatives of the airlines forming the core sample for this analysis. 
Although in the cases of three airlines (Alpha-1, Alpha-2, and Beta) data was collected 
across different organisational levels, including peripheral positions to the central risk 
management functions, in the remaining organisations involved in the field study 
evidence was collected from a limited number of professionals from each organisation. 
However, in the latter cases the selected professionals were in charge of organisational 
risk management functions; these individuals were chosen due to the strategic positions 
they held in their respective airlines and their expertise of organisational risk 
management processes, despite the high difficulty of involving them in this research; 
their accounts were therefore more informative than those that would have been 
provided by other organisation members. This research relied on cross-sectional and, for 
a substantial part, self-reported data which might have been influenced by interviewees’ 
conditions at the time of data collection. Notwithstanding, in order to alleviate these 
biases, empirical evidence was collected from multiple sources. 
 
Continuing with the method bias, the researcher conducted both face-to-face and remote 
interviews with airline representatives; the latter data collection technique allowed for 
airlines from diverse international locations to be included in the sample, in the context 
of time and funding limitations. The researcher acknowledges relatively better quality 
of data collected through the face-to-face interviews. However, due to the nature of this 
research, the value of collecting evidence from airline representatives in different 
geographical locations offset the inconvenience of using telecommunication tools.  
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9.5 Recommendations for further research  
Avenues for further research can be derived from the findings and limitations of this 
study. Since adoption and implementation of ERM in airlines is a novel research area, 
there still remain numerous unresolved issues for further studies which could improve 
understanding and practice of risk management in airlines.  
 
 As previously indicted, exploring the link between contingent fits of ERM in 
airlines and organisational performance was beyond the scope of this study. Further 
research exploring the relation of organisational performance, including both 
financial and non-financial performance measures, and the fit between airline ERM 
systems and contextual factors, could provide valuable contributions to literature.  
 Interesting insights could be derived from further studies on the dominance of 
certain contingency and institutional factors over others, as well as the relationships 
of correlation, causality, or conflict between the factors, both in the context of the 
airline industry and other industries. Understanding in more detail how technical 
and institutional pressures are determined exogenously or through management 
decisions and how they evolve over time, would be a relevant extension to the 
knowledge of ERM. Exploring these issues with the aid of alternative, quantitative 
research methodologies could lead to interesting findings.  
 ERM is intertwined with multiple other management functions in airlines. Further 
research could explore in more detail the relation of ERM and diverse management 
and control systems. Furthermore, more detailed studies of adoption of ERM 
principles in different organisational departments in airlines and at various 
organisational levels, such as financial risk management, safety risk management, 
operational risk management, and many others explored across organisational 
hierarchies, should be valuable additions to the body of knowledge; further case 
study research would be especially helpful in exploring these issues.  
 This research provided a theoretical platform for exploring organisational coupling 
of risk management, and rationales behind employing particular configurations of 
the risk management functions in organisations. Considering the scarcity of 
research on ERM fluidity in organisations and multiple unresolved issues related to 
the determinants of ERM adoption and implementation, other studies can draw 
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from the theoretical framework underlying this research and apply it in the context 
of different industries. 
 The empirical study was primarily conducted in a sample of ten international 
airlines, and it allowed for making conceptual developments related to, among 
others, best practices of airline risk management, as well as to organisational 
couplings of airline risk management systems and their determinants; the ERM 
framework in the airline industry was developed (Chapter 8, section 8.2). Further 
research, building on the findings from this study, could validate the propositions of 
the framework by applying it to a larger sample of organisations from the airline 
industry, as well as from other industries characterised by a similar risk profile. 
Particularly interesting findings could be delivered in the course of future research 
by validating the propositions of the framework in the organisational contexts of 
airlines with traditional, siloed risk management systems, which would adopt ERM 
by following the recommendations from this research.   
 
9.6 Final remarks 
This thesis recognised the changing paradigm of airline risk management practice, and 
explored multiple aspects of airline risk management systems, especially with regard to 
the latest developments from the corporate governance field, Enterprise Risk 
Management. Airline risk management approaches have evolved toward ever more 
comprehensive and integrated systems, which is believed to have improved 
understanding and treatment of the multiple challenges facing this industry. As the 
industry matures, based on current trends, it can be inferred that the adoption of ERM 
principles in airlines should increase. Research in this area, such as the one conducted 
herein, is supportive of configuring ERM in airlines in a way that best fits their 
contextual requirements.   
 
Review of the findings of this investigation conducted throughout this chapter 
demonstrated that the aims and objectives stated for this study have been achieved. The 
significance of this research lies in contributing to the under-researched fields of 
coupling, dynamics, and determinants of ERM in wider organisational contexts, and of 
the risk management phenomena in airlines; airline risk management systems were 
comprehensively assessed in terms of their constituent institutions, rules, and routines, 
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in addition to the rationales behind the configurations of such systems. Finally, 
developing an enterprise-wide risk management framework in the airline industry 
supporting the implementation or optimisation of ERM systems in airlines contributed 
towards closing the gaps in ERM literature and practice.   
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Appendix A: Theoretical Framework 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical framework developed for this study. This appendix elaborates on 
the different theoretical perspectives underlying the study, and provides additional insights into 
previous scholarly work in the field of management control systems which relies on structural 
contingency theory, new institutional sociology  (NIE), and old institutional economics (OIE).   
 
A. Duality of technical and institutional environment 
Previous research calls for consideration of the influences of both task and institutional 
environments on organisations’ structures and practices. Scott and Meyer (1991) 
suggested that organisational analysis should benefit from considering the institutional 
and task environments as two interdependent dimensions. Technical pressures, often 
also referred to as rational or performance pressures, are regarded orthogonal to 
institutional forces by Scott and Meyer (1983). Carruthers (1995) discussed the 
dynamics between organisational structures and practices in use, and regards the 
relation between technical and institutional factors affecting such dynamics as an 
unsettled issue calling for more research in new institutionalism. Similarly, Baxter and 
Chua (2003) highlighted that the interaction of technical and institutional imperatives 
affects the designs of organisational management control systems. Organisational 
behaviours may conform to institutional pressures, yet such conformance may conflict 
with objectives of a technical nature; as expressed by Suddaby (2010, p. 15): “The 
empirical reality is that organisations often behave in ways that defy economic logic or 
norms of rational behaviour”. However, it is also argued that conformance to 
institutional pressures is consciously assessed in organisations as per the degree to 
which it is aligned with achievement of technical objectives (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 
1988). Extending organisational analysis beyond the technical aspects of environment 
and including the institutional aspects facilitates understanding of “how organisational 
structures and processes acquire meaning beyond their technical goals” (Suddaby, 2010, 
p. 14). Suddaby (2010) argues the boundary between technical and institutional 
influences is blurred, while he refers to constructivist arguments of the definition of 
technical objectives as being socially determined.   
 
Contingency perspective has often been referred to in studies of organisational formal 
structures in general (e.g. Brignall, 1997; Hickson et al. 1971; Woodward, 1965), and 
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management control systems in particular (e.g. Dent, 1990; Chapman, 1997; Chenhall, 
2003, 2006; Chenhall and Chapman, 2006). Donaldson (2001) advocates the 
contingency theory provides a major framework for organisational structural design by 
fitting the structure with organisational contingencies. Contingency theory conveys lack 
of a best, universally applicable organisational structure, since different environments in 
which organisations operate have important effects on the structures (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967). The contingency view therefore considers the influence of organisational 
context upon the choice of management control system design (Chenhall, 2003; Woods, 
2009). An essential implication of the contingency view is that contingency factors 
should be determined for particular designs of control systems, as opposed to proposing 
a single best solution for diverse types of organisations; appropriate matching of 
contingency factors with organisational designs can improve organisational 
effectiveness (Donaldson, 2001). The design and use of control systems is not static, as 
they are influenced by contingency factors which are internal (e.g. strategy) or external 
(e.g. environmental uncertainty) to organisations (Hinings et al., 1974; Burns and 
Stalker, 1961). Therefore, this study draws on the contingency perspective in order to 
examine the external and internal determinants of the structures and practices 
comprising airline risk management systems.  
   
The institutional perspective extends the view of organisations as technical systems, and 
considers them as embedded in institutional environments. Under the (neo) institutional 
perspective, the environment is viewed as the location of a set of institutional rules 
delimiting social reality (Scott, 1987; Dobbin, 1994) that exert a deterministic influence 
on organisational structures and practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; DiMaggio, 1988). Organisations design their structures in order to 
conform to the institutional rules encoded in institutional environments, and that 
conformity generates legitimacy, secures support of society, and enhances survival 
chances (Baum and Oliver, 1991; Singh et al., 1986). Thus, framing this research within 
the institutional perspective allows for exploring adoption of particular risk 
management structures and practices in airlines as a desire to gain social legitimacy and 
improve survival chances, as well as examining the institutional determinants of risk 
management coordination and control mechanisms. Additionally, under the institutional 
perspective, this research studies the risk management phenomenon as shaping and 
simultaneously being influenced by institutions in airlines. Airline risk management 
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practices and structures are conceptualised as a system of rules and routines encoding 
the beliefs and values common to organisation members, namely organisational 
institutions. 
 
B. Contingency theory perspective  
Contingency theory was developed in response to the universalistic perspective, which 
posits that optimal control design is applicable to all settings and organisations. The 
universalistic view of organisational control evolved from the scientific management 
theory, which proposed the existence of a single best way to design operations in 
organisations which maximises performance. However, empirical evidence did not 
support the applicability of the universalistic perspective to management control system 
designs (Fisher, 1998). An opposite approach to the universalistic perspective is the 
situation-specific approach, which argues uniqueness of the factors affecting control 
systems and impossibility to apply general rules or frameworks to guide their designs. 
Fisher (1998) argues the contingency approach falls between these two extreme 
propositions; it recognises the need to align control systems to organisational contexts 
but it also allows for generalisations of control systems for major classes of 
organisational characteristics. 
 
Contingency theorists analysed the impact of different contingency factors on 
organisational structure. Several seminal studies related to structural contingency theory 
emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Initial studies in this field concentrated on the effects 
of environment uncertainty and technology on organisational design. Burns and Stalker 
(1961) argued the existence of a fit between environmental uncertainty and organic or 
mechanistic organisational structures; it was argued that high-uncertainty environment 
determines organic organisational structures, while low-uncertainty environment drives 
mechanistic structures. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) discussed the effect of 
environmental uncertainty and, specifically, the differences between environments of 
organisational subsystems on differentiation of various parts of an organisation or 
integration between them. Woodward (1965) proposed that organisational structures 
depend on the complexity of technology in use, distinguishing between small-batch 
production, large-batch production, mass production, and process-production 
technologies. Perrow (1967) discussed the fit with technology contingency in terms of 
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non-routineness or occurrence of exceptions and problems in production processes. 
Thompson (1967) viewed task interdependence as a contingency that organisational 
structure needs to fit with, while he discussed increasingly complex levels of task 
interdependence. Strategy is another contingency factor discussed in the pioneer 
contingency theory studies. Chandler (1962) analysed diversified strategies and their fit 
with organisational structures; he argued the need for structural adaptation along the 
organisational growth processes. Miles and Snow (1978) empirically analysed 
relationships among organisational strategies, structures, and processes, and identified 
commonly occurring configurations denominated as defender, analyser, and prospector. 
Organisational structures were also associated with size and diversification, and 
structure-related contingency factors (Blau 1970, 1972; Child 1973; Pugh and Hickson, 
1976; Hoskisson et al., 1990). 
 
Research in the contingency field was developed in various disciplines of management, 
generating a multiplicity of studies on the above mentioned contingency factors and 
leading to identification of new contingencies. Contingency studies have evolved from 
examining single dimensions or plotting matrices of two contingencies, towards 
employing multiple dimensions of contingencies. Contingency research further 
elaborated on the main factors, such as strategy (e.g. Burton et al., 2002, 2003; 
Govindarajan, 1988; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985), size and structure (e.g. Kraft et 
al., 1995; Powell, 1992), task and external environment uncertainty (e.g. Pennings, 
1987; Argote, 1982; Drazin and Van de Ven 1985; Van de Ven and Ferry 1980; Van de 
Ven and Delbecq 1974), and technology (e.g. Keller 1994; Ahuja and Carley 1999; 
Waterhouse and Tiessen, 1978). New variables were considered such as national culture 
(e.g. Hickson and McMillan, 1981; Frucot and Shearon, 1991), organisational culture 
(Pratt and Beaulieu, 1992; O’Connor, 1995) and others (Donaldson 1996, 2001). 
Studies considered both the effects of single and multiple variables on organisational 
structures. For example, Mintzberg (1979) considers contingency factors such as 
organisational age and size, regulation of technical systems, environmental stability, 
complexity, or diversity, ownership, etc. Hofer (1975) identified 54 possible 
contingency factors and speculated that some factors have priority over others. The 
number of relevant contingency factors is extensive and the list presented herein is 
illustrative and not exhaustive.  
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Contingency-related literature in MCS 
The following review of contingency-related literature in the management control area 
is selective and illustrative of the issues pertinent to development of the theoretical 
framework guiding this research of airline risk management systems, and is not 
intended to provide a comprehensive coverage of contingency theory research in 
management control systems.  
 
Otley (1980), in research on management accounting, claimed a lack of a “universally 
appropriate” control system applicable to all organisations and in all circumstances. 
Evans et al. (1986) referred to the contingency approach while suggesting that optimal 
framing of management control systems should depend on particular features of 
organisational environment. Organisationally-grounded research in management control 
issues often explored contingency in terms of context-specific variations in management 
control in general, or risk management in particular, among organisations from different 
industries and even within the same industry (e.g. Colquitt et al., 1999; Bhimani, 2003; 
Chapman, 1997, 1998; Hopwood, 1987; Broadbent and Guthrie, 1992; Miller and 
O'Leary, 1990; Mikes, 2005, 2009; Mouritsen, 1999; Simons, 1991; Kaplan and Mikes, 
2014). Research in management control systems in general, and later in risk 
management in particular, confirmed the major contingency factors (environment, 
technology, size, structure, strategy, and culture) as descriptors of fundamental, generic 
components of organisational context. Recent research considered relevance of 
additional contextual factors to the design of management control and risk management 
systems. Woods (2009) studied risk management systems of public sector organisations 
and concluded that although their general risk management structures were coherent 
with generic models, the operational controls were contingent upon three core factors – 
government policies, information and communication technologies, and organisational 
size. Additional factors such as leverage (Liebenberg and Hoyt, 2003; Pagach and Warr, 
2011), presence of internal risks specialists (Kleffner et al., 2003; Beasley et al., 2005; 
Paape and Speklé, 2012), organisational and industry-related characteristics (Gordon et 
al., 2009; Lin et al., 2012), and others were also identified in management control 
literature as organisation-specific factors influencing the design of organisational 
control and coordination structures. Despite important contributions of the contingency 
studies on management control systems, it is argued their findings cannot be integrated 
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into a coherent framework; while management control systems are multidimensional, 
prior studies would concentrate only on specific subsets of such systems and would 
investigate one or a limited number of contingency factors at a time, ignoring possible 
correlations between the factors (Fisher, 1998). 
 
C. Institutional theory perspective   
There has been an increasing interest in recent years in institutional theory in 
management studies (Scott, 2001; Burns and Scapens, 2000). Institutional perspective 
has often been referred to, in the broad field of corporate governance, in studies of 
different aspects of management and control (e.g. Chenhall, 2003; Arena, 2010; Modell, 
2003; Al-Twaijry et al. 2003; and others). Scholars recognised that internal and external 
institutions have an impact on different aspects of management control systems in 
organisations. Academic literature incorporating institutional theory in the field of risk 
management has emerged in several research streams. Diversity of risk management 
practices was investigated across organisations in different industries (e.g. Arena et al. 
2010; Woods 2011), organisations in the same industry (e.g. Hall et al., 2013; Mikes, 
2005, 2009, 2011), or even within the same organisation (e.g. Woods, 2009). Scholars 
analysed normative and regulatory influences, as well as mimetic pressures influencing 
the shaping of risk management programmes in organisations (Kleffner et al., 2003; 
Paape and Speklé; 2012; and others). Institutional theory provides a rich theoretical 
foundation which allows for conducting analysis on multiple organisational levels.  
 
New Institutional Sociology 
Organisational fields supporting various populations of organisations adhere to 
particular archetypes for organising by employing similar institutional logics and 
actions, while being controlled with coordinated governance structures (Scott et al., 
2000). Institutional studies of organisational dynamics often focused on isomorphic 
forces driving convergent institutional change, promoting similarities in organisational 
structures and processes; isomorphic forces are the primary reason for organisations 
exhibiting a relatively high coherence within organisational fields, leading to 
convergence of organisational shapes, forms, and structures. DiMaggio and Powel 
(1983) introduced a typology of external institutional pressures - coercive, normative 
and mimetic, causing organisational isomorphism. According to these scholars, 
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organisations seek to become isomorphic within their contexts in order to gain 
legitimacy and increase their probability of survival.  
 
Organisations strive to demonstrate conformity with institutionalised beliefs through 
their choices of organisational structures. Yet, it is believed organisations may 
ceremonially adopt elements of formal organisational structures, such as standardised 
coordination and control processes, in pursuit of legitimacy, overlooking the efficiency 
criteria and effects on actual performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer et al., 
1983). Meyer and Rowan (1977) described this phenomenon as institutionalisation. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) argued that through institutionalisation 
organisations “construct around themselves an environment that constrains their ability 
to change in future years”. Internal technical activities may become separated from 
externally directed symbolic display of rationality (Gupta, 1994). Decoupling or loose 
coupling may arise from discrepancies or conflicts between stated objectives and actual 
work practices and performance, when organisations formally implement rules in 
compliance with external legitimisation demands, yet without incorporating them in 
everyday business (Modell, 2001). Relating this concept to the study of risk 
management structures and practices suggests organisational designs of risk 
management systems can serve as ceremonial displays of organisations’ commitment to 
legitimised external expectations, rather than representing rational and objective reality 
(Covaleski et al., 1996); decoupling or loose coupling may occur between risk 
management rules and actual routines aimed at preserving technical efficiency. Previous 
research provided evidence of how risk management may fall into rule-based 
compliance function in organisations (e.g. Power, 2007, 2009). 
 
Building on the neo-institutional perspective of organisations Scott (2001, p. 33) 
discussed organisational isomorphism as a means for ensuring legitimacy in regulative, 
normative and culturally-cognitive fields; the scholar developed a definition of 
institutions by combining different strands of institutional theory: “Institutions consist 
of cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability 
and meaning to social behaviour. Institutions are transported by various carriers - 
cultures, structures, and routines - and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction”. 
Scott’s regulatory pillar of the institutional context discusses coercive pressures and 
posits compliance as its basis of expedience; legitimacy is driven by the presence of 
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rules, sanctions, and laws. The normative pillar draws from Dimaggio and Powell’s 
(1983) tenet of normative pressures; under this pillar compliance is regarded as a social 
obligation in accordance with social norms and values, and certification and 
accreditation are used as a basis for legitimacy. The third cultural-cognitive pillar is an 
elaboration of the concept of mimetic pressures; common social beliefs and shared logic 
serve as a culturally supported basis of legitimacy. Under Scott’s understanding of 
social reality, this research considers airline risk management systems in the broad 
context of airline regulative, normative, and culturally-cognitive fields. Existence of 
possibly conflicting institutional logics is also recognised in the social reality, as well as 
their potential to erode and create new institutions.  
 
The research agenda in the stream of NIS was broadened beyond the phenomena of 
convergence to cover issues of institutional divergence (Scott, 2010). This strand of 
research showed how different institutional contexts and pre-existing or conflicting 
organisational logics (Alford and Friedland, 1985) can alter adoption of behaviours and 
practices (e.g. Townley, 2002; Fiss and Zajac, 2004; Goodrick and Salancik, 1996). The 
research of Lounsbury (2001, 2007, 2008) provided interesting findings on institutional 
diffusion of changes in organisational fields by exploring how the spread of new 
practices can be influenced by multiple forms of rationality, ‘competing logics’. 
Lounsbury (2007) argues that a multiplicity of broader cultural beliefs and rules (jointly 
regarded as logics) affects cognition and decision making of actors in organisational 
fields. Competing logics may contribute to the process of deinstitutionalisation, which is 
defined by Scott (2001, p. 182) as a process “by which institutions weaken and 
disappear”; this may be associated with re-institutionalisation – “the weakening and 
disappearance of one set of beliefs and practices is likely to be associated with the 
arrival of new beliefs and practices” (Scott, 2001, p. 184). Oliver (1991) also discussed 
erosion of institutionalised practices and identified different ways in which 
organisations strategically respond to institutional pressures, as opposed to simple 
mimicking and acquiring of new practices spreading across an organisational field. 
Organisations may seek to compromise with multiple constituents, apply tactics of 
avoidance, manipulate the sources of institutional pressures, or partly ignore such 
pressures. Oliver (1991) argued that pressures for deinstitutionalisation stem from 
functional, political, and social sources; functional pressures are linked to technical 
aspects of institutionalised practices and their perceived utility; political pressures stem 
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from changes in distribution of political power supporting existing rules for legitimacy; 
social pressures are associated with changes in social expectations or varying social 
beliefs.  
 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) developed a framework resuming an interplay of 
contextual forces and intra-organisational dynamics, leading to variety in responses to 
organisational pressures. In the field of management control systems and ERM in 
particular, scholars discussed how ERM is challenged by values which are 
institutionalised in organisations and how new risk rationalities are confronted with pre-
existing practices, resulting in heterogeneity of ERM systems. Arena et al. (2010) 
adopted an institutional perspective in the exploration of varying implementations of 
ERM across organisations. ERM is subject to a continuous process of translation 
(Latour, 1987), and entanglement between new and existing practices for controlling 
risks. The on-going reciprocal interactions between new and established risk 
management practices can lead to various degrees of assimilation of ERM principles, 
placing ERM on a continuum between decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and 
embeddedness (Fraser and Henry, 2007). In the same line, findings of Mikes (2005, 
2009) and Power (2007, 2009) demonstrate how ERM may vary across organisations in 
terms of actual practices, embeddedness levels, or cultural significance. Consideration 
of competing logics can be further used to explain potential variations in the framings of 
airline risk management systems, deinstitutionalisation of existing practices and 
institutionalisation of new ones.         
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Appendix B: Coding Scheme 
 
Chapter 4 discusses techniques for organising and analysing empirical data collected in the course 
of this research. This appendix provides additional insights into the coding scheme.    
 
Empirical data collected throughout this research was coded under the categories pre-
defined in the theoretical framework and synthesised by drawing together of relevant 
themes and concepts, following the recommendations of Yin (2009), Miles and 
Huberman (1994), and Strauss and Corbin (1998). Besides the codes derived from the 
framework, “free” codes were further developed as suggested by additional topics 
which emerged from the data, permitting empirical flexibility and revision of the 
existing theory (Malina and Selto, 2001). 
 
A. Institutional pressures 
Coding rules: data indicating explicitly or implicitly institutional determinants of airline risk 
management systems was coded under the following codes: 
 Coercive pressures 
 Mimetic pressures 
 Normative pressures 
 Other external institutional pressures 
 Internal institutional pressures 
 
B. Contingency factors 
Coding rules: data indicating explicitly or implicitly technical determinants of airline risk management 
systems was coded under the following codes: 
 Environmental and industry-related contingency factors 
 Organisation-specific contingency factors 
 Contingency factors of airline risk profiles 
 
C. Characteristics of airline risk management systems: risk management 
institutions, rules, routines 
Coding rules: data indicating explicitly or implicitly characteristics of airline risk management systems 
was coded under the following codes: 
 Evolution of organisational risk management systems 
 Perceived status of risk management development 
 Formalisation of risk management systems 
 Risk management strategies 
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 Division of roles and responsibilities in different phases of risk management 
processes 
 Methodologies guiding risk management processes 
 Mechanisms for reporting and integration of enterprise-wide risk data  
 Risk management tools and technologies 
 Risk portfolio 
 Risk culture 
 Risk appetites 
 Links between risk management processes and other management and control 
processes 
 Best practices and shortcomings of risk management systems 
 Institutionalisation of risk management rules and routines; decoupling and loose 
coupling 
 Perceived maturity and functionality of risk management 
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Appendix C: Analysis of Field Study Findings  
 
Chapter 5 reports on the major findings from the field study. This appendix elaborates on the field 
study findings, and complements the findings with relevant quotes from the interviews conducted with 
airline representatives.    
 
A. Determinants of airline risk management approaches 
Institutional coercive pressures  
Regulatory framework governing airline operations 
Interviewees from all ten airlines pointed out the importance of the regulatory 
framework governing numerous areas of airline operations. By way of an example, 
SCRO-Theta stated:  
“Operations of airlines are extremely regulated in many fields. It all comes 
indicated, I mean formalised, by the civil aviation associations of each country. It’s 
[name of the corresponding association] in our case; we have to follow their 
protocols” (SCRO-Theta).  
The interviewees pointed out that the regulatory framework has an impact on 
organisational structures and practices of airlines in general (in multiple areas), and also 
specifically the risk management rules and routines. HSS-Beta elaborated on this notion 
by emphasising the complexity of the legislations governing management of safety 
risks:  
“We have protocols for ground operations and flight operations… You need to 
comply with them… This is a form of risk management” (HSS-Beta).  
HSS-Beta further commented on the safety management area:  
“There are mandatory technical requirements and administrative procedures, so you 
have to adapt if you want to be certified” (HSS-Beta).  
DRC-Alpha, although not directly involved in the safety risk management function, also 
explained:  
“Management of operational safety risks is another pillar… Operational processes 
are highly regulated by the [geographical indication] law, which specifies the risk 
management positions that all airlines need to have, and the functions they need to 
perform... So the risk management structure in this area is defined by law” (DRC-
Alpha).    
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However, although the regulatory frameworks relevant to particular airlines impose 
standards and requirements for multiple areas of business operations, it is the air 
transport associations (for example, IATA), rather than the regulators, who advocate 
best practices in the area of centralised management of corporate risks, in addition to 
issuing recommendations and requirements for management of operational, safety, or 
hazard risks.   
 
Regulatory requirements for listed companies 
Evidence supporting the influence of regulatory requirements applicable to listed 
companies on airline risk management structures and practices was found in the airlines 
Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Beta, Gamma, and Zeta. Notably, this cluster of airlines comprises 
both publicly traded and privately held organisations; however, in the interviewees´ 
responses, they would refer in some cases to the present situation of their respective 
airlines, and in other cases to airlines’ past situation or that of other airlines. CRO-
Alpha provided a clear example of the influence of regulatory demands for listed 
organisations, while explaining the triggers for adopting ERM:  
“I think it was probably the [name of the country-specific regulation setting out 
standards for listed companies], which recommends that risk management should be 
considered at the Board level” (CRO-Alpha).  
Similarly, DRC-Alpha affirmed:”Bear in  mind that the [name of the country-
specific regulation setting out standards for listed companies] affects how companies 
manage risks” (DRC-Alpha).  
By way of another example, RMD-Zeta stated:  
“One of the reasons for all listed companies, not only [Zeta], for developing risk 
management functions is the new law, or development of the existing law, we call it 
[name]. According to that, listed companies have to take care that the risk 
management is effective…” (RMD-Zeta).  
CFO-Gamma also provided evidence for the influence of regulatory frameworks for 
listed organisations on risk management rules and routines; CFO-Gamma also indirectly 
provided evidence for the influence of regulatory frameworks for listed organisations on 
risk management rules and routines: 
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”We are not quoted; we are a small company, so the regulations [national corporate 
governance codes for listed companies] don´t apply here… We have more flexibility” 
(CFO-Gamma).  
In further discussion CFO-Gamma also expressed a sceptical view of compliance-
driven risk management structures often created in organisations, which, as reported, 
may pose more of a burden than a benefit to organisations.   
 
Rating agencies´ assessment methodologies 
The representatives of Zeta and the Alpha group devoted significant attention in their 
discourses to the influence of rating agencies’ assessment methodologies, although, in 
the case of the latter, different members of the group attributed different levels of 
importance to this coercive pressure. RMD-Zeta reported on the importance of credit 
ratings for organisations which trade on the commodity markets:  
“If we are rated highly we can negotiate more favourable conditions in the market, 
we are a credible counterparty… We raise capital at a lower cost” (RMD-Zeta).  
RMD-Zeta further continued:  
“[Name] is our rating agency. They come here and have discussions with our 
management, and they get information about our risk management processes and 
systems. So I assume that it is also a relevant topic” (RMD-Zeta).  
RMD-Zeta went on to explain how financial risks are managed and financial decisions 
are taken in function of their potential effects on Zeta’s credit rating. Additionally, 
CFO-Gamma indirectly confirmed the significance of credit ratings:  
“We only use banks for raising capital… We don´t have official ratings because we 
are a privately-owned company, but in another case of course we would pay a lot of 
attention to the ratings” (CFO-Gamma).  
TRM-Alpha referred to the utility and uses of the risk management model operated in 
the Alpha holding company (Financial Risk Management Framework, further discussed 
in Chapter 6). TRM-Alpha stated: 
“What we are most interested in is testing business plans and contrasting their 
potential consequences with the rating matrix of [credit rating agency]” (TRM-
Alpha).  
However, although CRO-Alpha acknowledged the relation between financial risk 
management and credit agency ratings, the interviewee was of the opinion that credit 
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agency ratings had not affected the development of the ERM approach in Alpha 
airlines:  
“[With regard to credit rating agencies] they are rather interested in financial risk 
management, they would say they are interested in ERM, but I don´t really think they 
are. I imagine they have a tick box for financial performance measures. They might 
say ‘yes, we say you have ERM because we saw it in your annual report’, but that´s 
it. So they would rather concentrate on financial risk management. I don´t think they 
are really interested in how we implement ERM” (CRO-Alpha).    
 
Institutional mimetic pressures 
Influence of the approach adopted in group organisations 
With regard to mimetic behaviours within Alpha, DRC-Alpha referred during the 
interview to the incorporation of the Alpha-2 airline to the Alpha group:  
“Our risk map has evolved; we have come closer to the systems that [Alpha airlines] 
have. We have introduced new risks to our risk management system, and there were 
some risks which we stopped worrying about at the operating company level because 
they are now managed by the holding company” (DRC-Alpha).  
DRC-Alpha regarded the adjustments of the risk management system of Alpha-2 to the 
overall risk management approach of the Alpha group as positive in terms of bringing 
benefits to Alpha-2, while interviewee’s perception was shared by other members of the 
Alpha group. On the contrary, HIA-Beta expressed concern regarding unification of risk 
management approaches among Beta and its respective group, emphasising the need to 
consider the uniqueness of organisational circumstances, a view which was also shared 
by CFO-Beta.   
The risk management system of Gamma is aligned with that of other organisations from 
its respective group. CFO Gamma considered it in terms of a necessity and means for 
achieving a global view of group-wide risks; CFO-Gamma explained:  
“[Group name] allies also tour operators, travel agencies, and hotels, so risks are 
not analysed only in terms of their effects on airline operations; they are considered 
with respect to the whole group. Sometimes the risk of creating a new route, a flight 
to a new destination, may be very different and have different implications for the 
airline and for the rest of the companies in the group” (CFO-Gamma).  
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Similarly, HRC-Epsilon demonstrated how Epsilon’s affiliation with a multi-enterprise 
group triggered adoption of the ERM approach, and explained the rationality for a 
group-wide alignment of risk management approaches.  
HRC-Epsilon stated:   
“It [ERM] was introduced after the merger, and our approach was aligned to what 
[group name] had or was trying to develop” (HRC-Epsilon).  
The interviewee further endorsed the adopted approach:  
 “We have tried to standardise our approach across the group… The methodology is 
consistent across the group, even in terms of risk assessments, risk criteria, risk 
matrixes. It makes it easier to compile and compare all risks at the group level” 
(HRC-Epsilon).  
The arguments of RMD-Zeta confirm, in a similar manner, partial unification of risk 
management approaches within Zeta’s respective group, and the related benefits:  
“Risk management processes, development of standards, for example methodologies, 
implementation and running of IT systems for risk management, it´s all coordinated 
group-wide… It´s easier to coordinate the systems implemented in all the airlines, 
and combine information on risks” (RMD-Zeta).  
Alignment of group-wide approaches was suggested in the interviews conducted with 
RCM-Eta, SCRO-Theta, and RMC-Iota. RCM-Eta explained:  
“Two or three years ago in [Group name] we started a project aimed at 
implementing risk management guidelines across the group, including the smaller 
airlines… We had an example of what should be developed, and how the system 
works” (RCM-Eta). 
RMC-Iota recalled on the project of ERM implementation across the group, whilst the 
interviewee also emphasised context-sensitive implementation of the risk management 
systems:  
“From the very beginning of that project all main players of the group, the big 
airlines and the regional players, were involved… So now I would say we have a 
common framework, all of the airlines are following a similar approach. But it is not 
exactly the same system in [Iota] and in [group airline], because our risks are 
different” (RMC-Iota). 
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According to SCRO-Theta, the airline implemented risk management practices which it 
had observed in another group company, and which it had considered potentially 
beneficial:  
 “It is a learning process… We were encouraged to introduce a more structured 
approach [to risk management], but we also saw it as something favourable, 
something that could help us understand better our risks” (SCRO-Theta).  
Interestingly, RCM-Eta referred to the complex and volatile nature of the airline 
industry and justified mimicking the approach adopted in airlines from the respective 
group as a form of reassurance, by saying:  
“It´s a difficult industry, very risky, but some of us do just fine…  If you look at 
[airline name], it´s a much bigger airline, they have more resources. Some of their 
[risk management] solutions are interesting, but we don´t have these resources here, 
and we don´t have the need, I think, to make it overly complex” (RCM-Eta).    
 
Adoption of best practices of other organisations 
With regard to following risk management best practices of other organisations, HSS-
Beta reported on cooperation and sharing of best practices among airlines in the 
development of Safety Management Systems (SMS):  
“When ICAO first published guidance on constructing SMS in airlines, there was no 
practical reference. Everyone started to create systems the way they wanted to, so 
they were very different… But we know each other, the safety people, we talk when 
there are investigations… So I could see what [airline name] or other airlines had, 
and they took ideas from our system as well” (HSS-Beta).  
MCM-Alpha discussed the evolution of the risk management approach of Alpha-2, and 
provided evidence of adopting best practices from another industry:  
“When I realised I needed to better understand our risks, I didn´t have the people, I 
didn´t have the means in the company to build the [risk management] system. So I 
said ‘Well, I´m going to hire people who can do that, some advisors’. And I hired 
advisors from [an investment bank]. I couldn´t pay them a lot of money, so I said 
‘Well, if you help me to frame this, then you can participate in the business that will 
follow’ [hedging opportunities]” (MCM-Alpha).  
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The notion of following industry best practices was also raised in the interview with 
CRO-Alpha, who discarded the influence of competitors’ practices on the current shape 
of the risk management system of the group:  
“I don´t think our competitors really mattered. I guess we started doing ERM mainly 
because it was a requirement and not because everyone else started doing it” (CRO-
Alpha).  
CRO-Alpha also added:  
“I have no relationship with risk managers in [name of a competitor company] or 
[name of a competitor company]. I would maybe have a look at what they put in their 
annual reports, but that would be it. I wouldn´t benchmark myself against them. We 
have to be very careful about talking to other airlines” (CRO-Alpha).   
 
Institutional normative pressures 
Professionalisation of the risk management field 
Representatives of five airlines, Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Zeta, Theta, and Iota, reported on the 
influence of the international risk management standards and frameworks such as 
COSO or ISO31000 in framing of the risk management systems of their organisations. 
RMD-Zeta and RMC-Iota emphasised that although the risk management models of 
their respective organisations incorporate general principles of such standards and 
frameworks, more importantly they have been designed to fit with the particular risk 
management approaches the airlines aimed to adopt. RMD-Zeta explained:  
“Of course I am aware of COSO or ISO [31000] and I learned from there… But we 
developed it [the risk management system] from scratch; the focus was to build a 
risk management framework which is able to be integrated into steering processes 
such as management accounting or decision making. Because, for us, an important 
side of risk management is to calculate the upside and the downside of our 
management accounting budgets” (RMD-Zeta).  
RMC-Iota presented a similar notion:  
“We looked at the framework [as above], but our concern was also to build risk 
management which is very much and very closely integrated with controlling” 
(RMC-Iota).   
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Recommendations from consulting companies 
HRC-Epsilon informed that Epsilon relied on external consultants when implementation 
of ERM had commenced in the airline, yet the airline draws currently from in-house 
resources in execution of the ERM approach:  
“We attained training and now we have in-house expertise… Now our level of 
expertise is more mature than that of external providers, because we not only 
understand the methodology, but we also have the advantage of understanding the 
business and knowing exactly what the business needs. It´s crucial because this is a 
very special industry” (HRC-Epsilon).  
Similarly, CRO-Alpha, MCM-Alpha, RMD-Zeta, and RCM-Eta agreed that consulting 
advice had influenced the decision to adopt ERM and, in some organisations, it had also 
added value to their businesses. However, DRC-Alpha raised an interesting point, partly 
aligned with the view of HRC-Epsilon regarding specificity of the airline industry and 
the understanding of organisational needs: 
“Consultants don´t understand the particularity of this business. I think the general 
opinion here is that we can deliver better results when we design solutions in-
house… When we had just started ERM, a consulting company came to set the bases. 
But later on, when we wanted to take the system further, they were not of too much 
help; they didn´t know the business. Also, it isn´t only about knowing the industry, 
each company is different” (DRC-Alpha).  
A similar view was expressed by CFO-Gamma:  
“Since I´ve worked here consultants from [name of a consulting company] have 
come twice to help us with risk management, but honestly I didn´t like what they 
offered. They don´t add value, or at least they didn´t add any the two times they came 
here. In the end they just put in a power point whatever you explain to them, and this 
isn´t the kind of help you expect when you hire someone from the outside” (CFO-
Gamma). 
 
Other external institutional pressures 
Representatives of the Alpha group indicated meeting shareholder expectations as an 
additional institutional driver of airline risk management efforts. DRC-Alpha reported: 
“We report on our risk management system in annual reports not only because of 
regulatory requirements, but also because we want to send a message to our 
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shareholders, let them know we take risk management seriously, and that we take 
good care of their money. That´s why we also talk about risk management in the 
corporate social responsibility reports” (DRC-Alpha).  
DRC-Alpha also stated:  
“The Board has a fiduciary duty; they were entrusted to manage investors’ funds. 
We want to show the investors that, through effective governance systems, we are 
able to produce benefits for them” (DRC-Alpha).  
CRO-Alpha added:  
“This is how we communicate with our shareholders. They can read about ERM in 
our accounts” (CRO-Alpha).  
Additionally, CFO-Gamma and CFO-Beta suggested risk management practices in their 
respective organisations had been targeted at gaining credibility in the eyes of capital 
provides, banks in both cases. CFO-Gamma explained:  
“[Through financial risk management] we are trying to maintain stable and 
reasonable financial results because it grants us access to bank financing” (CFO-
Gamma).  
CFO-Beta presented a similar rationale:  
“Until now we´ve been financing our operations with bank loans… Banks see our 
results, it means we must be doing something right, there isn´t much volatility in 
year-end results, we´ve managed well our growth. This gives them confidence” 
(CFO-Beta).          
 
Internal institutional pressures 
Impulses from the management team 
Although representatives of all the airlines from the sample claiming adoption of ERM 
(Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Epsilon, Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota) mentioned in the interviews in 
general terms the role of ‘tone from the top’, advocating enterprise-wide 
implementation of ERM, the representatives of the Alpha airlines and the Epsilon, Zeta, 
and Iota airlines elaborated on the involvement of the management teams in ERM 
adoption decisions of ERM implementation processes. By way of an example, CRO-
Alpha reported on a continuous evolution of the ERM system, and that the tone 
suggesting changes in the system tends to come from the management team. The 
interviewee further clarified:  
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“When the directors say something new should be done [in terms of risk 
management], or that we should do things differently, it´s usually because they have 
seen it done elsewhere” (CRO-Alpha).  
Yet, CRO-Alpha underlined the importance of aligning risk management practices from 
other industries to the specificity of the airline business. 
CRO-Alpha continued:  
“But sometimes it wouldn´t necessarily work well in the airline business, because 
this business is very specific, and because our resources are limited, so sometimes 
the return isn´t worth the effort” (CRO-Alpha). 
HRC-Epsilon attributed the perceived success of the risk management of Epsilon to the 
approach proposed by his predecessor in the position of Head of Risk and Compliance 
(see Chapter 4, section 4.5.1 for additional comments on the nomenclature of 
interviewees’ positions), who advocated using common denominators for diverse risks 
which, according to him, facilitates enterprise-wide aggregation of risk effects and their 
joint evaluation, which in his opinion is not a common practice in the industry. RMD-
Zeta and RMC-Iota reported on prior experiences of executive managers from their 
respective organisations, which were believed to be translated into their risk 
management approaches.    
 
Organisational culture 
CRO-Alpha, while referring to the Alpha holding company, provided clear evidence of 
the effects of national cultures on organisational cultures:  
“You have to remember that this is the [country adjective] working culture, which 
really affects how we work and the level of formality of our processes” (CRO-
Alpha). 
Similarly, HSS-Beta reported on the influence of the culture of Beta’s country of origin 
on its organisational culture, and later on the airline’s risk management routines. HSS-
Beta referred to the implementation of the ICAO’s recommendations regarding safety 
risk management:  
“In the [country adjective] culture we don´t follow recommendations until they are 
mandatory; so in [Beta] we had to create mechanisms to assign responsibility for 
implementing recommendations [as per management of particular types of safety 
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risks]. If you were in the [country], recommendations would always be followed. 
Nobody questions whether they are suggestions or obligations” (HSS-Beta).   
RMD-Zeta and RMC-Iota reported on having integrated the ERM frameworks of their 
respective organisations with the management accounting and controlling functions. 
These interviewees further indicated the cultural influences of their respective countries 
and organisations on the adoption of particular risk management approaches. RMD-Zeta 
also underlined the integration of the airline’s ERM with the decision-making function, 
and stated:  
”I have to underline this point because in the [language adjective]-speaking 
countries you often find risk management systems which are mainly focused on just 
fulfilling governmental rules” (RMC-Iota).  
Similarly, RMC-Iota reported: “In [country], internal control is mostly focused on 
regulatory compliance” (RMC-Iota).    
Cultural influences on airline risk management systems can also be considered in 
relation to organisational ownership structures. CRO-Alpha also provided an interesting 
notion on cultural issues related to institutional versus private ownership, and 
implementation of ERM in Alpha-2:  
“[Alpha-2] has a different culture, which is definitely related to the fact that it used 
to operate for a long time as a public company. It had the DNA of a public company, 
so introducing changes in risk management was slower, I think” (CRO-Alpha).  
CRO-Alpha described the current risk management system of Alpha-2 “as more 
informal”, “with less structure”, and “less agile”, attributing these features to the 
organisational culture of Alpha-2. Similarly, CCO-Delta directed the researcher’s 
attention to the airline’s ownership structure, and specifically to the effect of partial 
state-ownership which, according to the interviewee, is the reason for “old school” 
management style, also in the area of risk management.    
 
Environmental and industry-related contingency factors 
The high volatility and uncertainty characteristic of the airline industry was commonly 
recognised in the field study to drive development of airline risk management systems, 
as summarised by RMD-Zeta:  
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“Other drivers are definitely the dynamics and the volatility of the airline industry, 
which makes it more and more important to have emergency cases and to have 
reaction plans in place” (RMD-Zeta).  
The accounts of MCM-Alpha emphasise the relevance of changing macroeconomic 
paradigms to airline business, while the interviewee referred specifically to historical 
events that made him realise the need to embrace a different approach to risk 
management in Alpha-2:  
 “I remember I used to read ‘Financial Times’ to understand how the economic 
environment could affect my company. I still have the article that talked about the 
new paradigm of jet fuel.... where it said the jet fuel could go to a new paradigm, 
where the new low is USD 60, and the maximum is USD 100... I thought ‘if this 
happens, we are dead’” (MCM-Alpha).  
With regard to cyclicality of airline business, CFO-Beta stressed the importance of 
including flexibility margins in business plans and of agility in response to risks:  
“All companies face the risk of fluctuating demand, but the airline industry is more 
affected than others by the economic cycles; airline travel is often discretionary... 
Our demand changes in summer and winter months... It is crucial to consider the 
demand risks and have a certain degree of flexibility in your business plans” (CFO-
Beta).  
CFO-Beta further continued: “You may have aircrafts coming [orders from aircraft 
manufacturers]… You will have to make fixed payments on your orders and empty 
planes… It is a short way from when your aircrafts are on the ground to bankruptcy, 
especially if you have them in ownership” (CFO-Beta).  
Airline businesses are susceptible to uncertainty and hazards related to the natural 
environment; as exemplified by CCO-Delta:  
“We need to be prepared for the unexpected. You don´t know what it will be, but you 
know something unexpected can happen; a volcano may erupt, there may be a snow 
storm or a hurricane collapsing our operating schedules. You need to have protocols 
in place, an immediate response” (CCO-Delta).  
Field study findings from five airlines underlined the importance of responding to risks 
embedded in political or social contexts, which required maintaining flexibility in 
airline operational and business planning. Geopolitical instability in various areas of the 
world was reported to have a major impact on airlines’ operations. For example, CFO-
Beta commented on political and social issues affecting the demand for airline services:  
311 
 
“Events such as the Arab Spring, they affected our demand; we may not be able to 
fly to places where conflicts occur... Or epidemics such as SARS, you need to take 
these risks into account” (CFO-Beta).  
MCM-Alpha also recalled an event which changed the way airlines conceptualise risk, 
with consequent changes in airline risk management structures and practices:  
“…But something happened – the terrorist attacks of September 11th [2001]. That 
day changed everything in our sector” (MCM-Alpha).  
TRM-Alpha explained the need for aligning strategic planning with risk management 
processes in the context of dynamic changes in the airline market structure:  
“Your strategic planning has to be dynamic, because the market structure is so; you 
are not a sole player in the market... With the ‘Open Skies’ policy airlines are much 
more susceptible to the actions of their competitors... New players are now entering 
the [geographical indication] market, offering huge supply at dumping prices. We 
have processes in place to monitor strategic risks, and adjust our strategic plans, 
and our network accordingly” (TRM-Alpha).  
RGD-Delta and ORM-Delta also commented on the airline market structure, yet from a 
different perspective. RGD-Delta, in a discussion on managing competitor risks, 
compared the European and the American market structure in terms of airline transport 
service providers and availability of complementary means of transport; RGD-Delta 
emphasised the importance of choosing appropriate methods and tools (software) for 
simulating competitor’s moves, customer demand, and managing commercial risks, as 
different types of software may serve some markets better than others. Additionally, 
with reference to managing commercial or competitor risks, ORM-Delta noted that in 
no industry other than the airline industry had the market structure been so precisely 
parameterised, and especially on the demand side; ORM-Delta added:  
“The [airline] market is highly parameterised and mathematically analysed when it 
comes to managing commercial risks. You can better plan your network and optimise 
the revenue management system” (ORM-Delta).  
 
Organisation-specific contingency factors 
The effects of size and complexity of organisational structures on airline risk 
management systems were especially noticeable in the airlines Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Beta, 
Gamma, Epsilon, Zeta, and Eta. By way of an example, CFO-Gamma linked the level 
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of formalisation of the airline’s risk management approach with organisational size and 
complexity:  
”We don´t have formal procedures, sophisticated risk maps; we know what our risks 
are. After all this is a relatively small airline, we all work very closely together. If we 
introduce too many formal processes, it might make us loose our agility. There have 
been discussions on creating a risk committee, but such committee might later 
constrict us... Our size is still very manageable, so if a new threat comes up, I just go 
to the office next door and talk about it” (CFO-Gamma).  
However, CFO-Gamma also admitted a certain level of clarity and formalisation of the 
airline’s risk management practices might be beneficial. Similarly, in discussions on the 
risk management systems of their respective airlines, RMD-Zeta and CFO-Beta related 
the designs of such systems to airlines’ sizes; RMD-Zeta clearly stated:  
“We are a big airline, so we adopted a structured, formalised approach” (RMD-
Zeta). 
 CFO Beta explained:  
“In [Beta] we don´t have an Audit Committee; it´s a small company, so the Head of 
Internal Audit holds the ultimate responsibility” (CFO-Beta).  
Under the same rationale, RCM-Eta and HRC-Epsilon related the design choices of risk 
management systems of their respective airlines, and of other airlines from their groups, 
to organisational complexities. Finally, HSS-Beta emphasised the need to adopt risk 
management systems according to the uniqueness of organisational structure and needs; 
HSS-Beta was sceptical about standardising the safety risk management function across 
the group that the airline forms part of:  
“We are different airlines, with different sizes, structures and needs, so integration at 
the level of safety… I´m not sure up to what point it would make sense” (HSS-Beta). 
With reference to another group of internal contingency factors, which can be broadly 
defined as related to organisational strategies and the objectives they are driven with, 
representatives of Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Beta, Epsilon, Zeta, and Theta reported on 
numerous achieved or perceived potential benefits of developing ever more structured 
and comprehensive risk management approaches, which were generally believed to 
enhance achievement of organisational objectives, just as reflected in the examples 
listed below. HRC-Epsilon perceived the adoption of ERM as a means towards 
achieving airline objectives:  
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“We implemented ERM because we wanted to be able to better identify both the risks 
and opportunities facing our business. So since we were constantly trying to 
improve, we thought ‘why not do it right?’ In this industry you can achieve huge 
commercial gains if you manage your risks correctly” (HRC-Epsilon).  
HRC-Epsilon further added:  
“It´s also about our reputation; this applies to compliance and to meeting company 
objectives” (HRC-Epsilon).  
Similarly, RMD-Zeta reported on the perceived benefits of ERM which drove the 
adoption of ERM in the airline:  
“I would say one of the most important ones [ERM drivers], and related to the need 
of top management to have functions like risk management, is giving them good 
information and transparency of risks for the upcoming month and year” (RMD-
Zeta). 
SCRO-Theta, in a discussion on the ERM approach adopted in his organisation, 
explained how risk management facilitates achievement of airline objectives:  
“If you analyse the strategy and define your risks from there, it makes it easier to 
achieve what you have planned” (SCRO-Theta).  
MCM-Alpha reflected on how the need for an improved understanding of airline risks 
drove advancements in the risk management system of Alpha-2:  
“When I understood how much of our revenue was at risk, I realised we either 
needed to earn more money to have a cushion, or the other alternative was to reduce 
the level of risk, in order to have a more comprehensive programme of hedging… We 
needed to smoothen out our risk profile” (MCM-Alpha).  
CRO-Alpha also explained how the perceived benefits of ERM drove ERM adoption in 
Alpha-1:  
“We needed to control operations more efficiently, and centrally manage all risk 
information… Because I think the main value of ERM is that it flashes out bad news 
from the operation, and brings it out to the management committee. So it´s a way of 
highlighting what´s going on” (CRO-Alpha).  
The case studies of the Alpha airlines and the Beta airline, presented respectively in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 of this thesis, provide further evidence of how the airlines 
developed their risk management approaches in order to improve organisational 
performance or achieve organisational objectives. 
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As discussed in the section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5, related to mimetic behaviours of airlines 
forming part of airline or multi-enterprise groups, evidence was found for the ownership 
structures affecting the risk management solutions adopted in airlines. Since ownership 
effects can be considered both in terms of their institutional and technical pressures on 
organisations, related, as evidenced in this study, to ceremonial or instrumental 
alignments of airlines’ risk management systems to the systems of their respective 
groups, for the sake of completeness table 5-2 (Chapter 5) repeats the data included in 
table 5-1 (Chapter 5) regarding mimetic pressures linked to group affiliations.   
 
Contingency factors related to airline risk profile   
With reference to the deterministic influence of airline risk profile, MCM-Alpha 
explained how the risk management model of Alpha-2 was adjusted to better respond to 
the changing risk landscape, especially in terms of external risks:  
“We had to adapt the model over time, because the one we did with [advisor’s name] 
was before the big events affecting our industry took place, terrorist attacks, fuel 
spikes…; so we had to adjust the model to make it less conservative in terms of what 
can happen in the economy” (MCM-Alpha).  
Evidence supporting the role of risk profiles as contingency factors for organisational 
designs of airline risk management systems was most clearly exemplified in the 
interviews in which airline representatives emphasised the need to adapt risk 
management systems to the specificity of their risk landscapes. As an illustration, 
RMD-Zeta laid out the following argument in his discourse on introducing group-wide 
risk management standards:  
“In fact there are differences in the risk landscape [of particular airlines of Zeta’s 
respective group], that´s for certain. Using the same standards and methodology 
doesn´t mean that we all have to manage and report exactly the same risks” (RMD-
Zeta).  
HIA-Beta explained how Beta’s risk management approach draws from that of its 
respective group, yet it is aligned to fit Beta’s specific risk landscape:  
“We are requested to analyse the risks applicable to other subsidiaries or to the 
holding company, and assess their plausibility…  Aircraft financing is important to 
the group, yet due to our fleet structure we don´t consider it a key risk…” (HIA-
Beta).  
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Since the fleet structure of Beta relies more on asset leases than asset purchases, yearly 
cash outflows are not as significant as in the cases of other group airlines; the leases 
tend to be closed at fixed rates, and thus the interest rate risk, often considered one of 
the most relevant airline financial risks, is not significant to Beta, which is reflected in 
the lack of formalised practices for the management of such a risk. Contrarily, the 
airline considers relevant risks related to the volatility of fuel prices and exchange rates, 
and thus there are formalised protocols and procedures in place for the management of 
these risks. A more detailed analysis of Beta’s risk profile, and of the corresponding risk 
management structures and practices, is available in Chapter 7.  
 
B. Review of airline risk management systems 
Characteristics of airline risk management systems 
Perceived status of risk management development 
The interviewees from the airlines claiming ERM adoption, despite an overall 
satisfaction with the ERM frameworks in place, recognised the need for continuous 
efforts to embed the ERM culture throughout the airlines, and to periodically update the 
risk management systems. By way of an example, HRC-Epsilon stated:  
“It [ERM] is mature; it does what we need it to do… Of course it´s a continuous 
process; we have to keep training new people, maintain the topic fresh to create the 
desired risk culture… We are constantly updating our risk registers… If you 
implement it once and leave it, it [the ERM system] will easily become obsolete” 
(HRC-Epsilon). 
The majority of representatives of the airlines claiming adoption of ERM recognised the 
need to adopt a forward-looking perspective to identifying new risks versus relying on 
historical records of exposures summarised in organisational risk registers. In some 
airlines, such as the Alpha airlines, this responsibility was formalised and explained in 
detail in organisational policies, which reflects airlines’ view of the evolving nature of 
ERM. The airlines also tended to express awareness of the flaws of their present 
frameworks. This provides signs of criticality in airlines’ perceptions of their ERM 
frameworks. However, organisations viewed their future trajectories towards improving 
ERM differently; some planned to advance significantly their risk management 
technologies (technologies as defined in Chapter 3, section 3.3), while others recognised 
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the need for continuous evolution of ERM,  but also expressed concern that ERM is 
becoming overly bureaucratised. 
Representatives of Beta reported that the risk management system is currently in 
transition; the following statement of CFO-Beta accurately describes the general 
opinion of several interviewees regarding the status and the character of Beta’s risk 
management approach:  
“We are moving toward a more sophisticated model, because for now what we have 
works well for us, but it´s pretty informal… We do analyse risks in major strategic 
decisions, but it´s all very casual right now, there´s definitely room for 
improvement” (CFO-Beta).  
Although the above statement points to casualty in risk management processes of 
strategic exposures, the airline has introduced a structured approach to the management 
of selected types of exposures. Regarding the transition stage of Beta’s risk 
management system, Beta forms part of a larger group of airlines in which ERM was 
implemented, and in the future Beta’s risk management system will be integrated with 
the approach of the group. However, at the time of conducting this research Beta’s 
representatives were not aware of the date of the planned integration. As explained in 
Chapter 7, despite the recognised need to further develop Beta’s risk management 
system, contrary opinions were evidenced in Beta with regard to the perceived 
usefulness of integration of Beta’s system with the ERM systems of other group 
organisations, which is later discussed in terms of the need to align risk management 
approaches with the requirements stemming both from airlines´ intra- and extra-
organisational environment.  
As per the maturity of Gamma’s risk management system, airlines’ representatives 
acknowledged the shortcomings of the current approach; according to CFO-Gamma 
further developments are not probable in the near future. Discussions were held in 
Gamma’s Board on creating a Risk Committee, yet the idea was not favoured by some 
executive members of the airline, and was later dropped due to lack of consensus.  
With reference to Delta’s risk management system, it is generally regarded as simple yet 
functional. Some of Delta’s representatives (ORM-Delta, RGD-Delta) insisted that the 
system needs to be further developed, especially in terms of managing important 
commercial and strategic risks; other interviewees (such as CCO-Delta) reported on the 
system’s functionality despite recognising the need to introduce a more structured 
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approach. Discussions are held at the Board level with regard to advancing Delta’s risk 
management approach. Shortly before the interviews with Delta representatives took 
place (April 2014), the airline had celebrated its first official Board meeting dedicated 
exclusively to risk management.   
 
Formalisation of risk management systems 
With regard to highly formalised risk management systems, HRC-Epsilon explained the 
airline’s formalised approach: 
“Now there is no room for doubt in our [risk management] programme. We have 
manuals, procedures, and formally assigned functions across the company for 
managing different types of risks” (HRC-Epsilon).  
In five out of seven airlines claiming adoption of ERM, formalisation was reported to be 
related to regulatory pressures such as governance codes, or regulatory and reporting 
requirements, which posed demands for auditable trails of comprehensive risk 
management systems. At the same time concerns were raised in the airlines regarding a 
focus on demonstrating to external stakeholders the existence of formalised systems for 
managing risks, rather than on effective management of risks. RMD-Zeta explained:  
“Yes, every year we report on our risk management programme… And we show 
auditors our policies, all our systems, but you have to be careful just like in any other 
case, where there is too much bureaucracy it´s discouraging, it becomes a burden to 
log into the system every two months and write about risks” (RMD-Zeta).  
The interviewee further added:  
“It´s more about the culture you have in place than about the procedures… It´s all 
about how people see this responsibility” (RMD-Zeta).     
Based on the critical views of the interviewees regarding the formalisation of ERM 
programmes, propensity towards decoupling of risk management rules and routines may 
be expected. However, evidence collected through the field study regarding possible 
decoupling or loose coupling was too limited and therefore inconclusive, except for 
signals of non-adherence to risk management manuals at the operational levels.        
The risk management approach of Beta is less formalised. There are formal structures in 
place for management of selected types of risks, such as risks related to financial 
reporting, safety risks or financial and market risks, yet management of a variety of 
other types of risks is conducted in a non-formalised manner. A more in-depth 
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investigation of Beta’s risk management system, presented in Chapter 7 of this thesis, 
provided evidence of well-developed, informal routines institutionalised among risk-
aware employees of Beta and enacted on a regular basis, which by many of them were 
believed to have an equivalent capacity to a formal system of rules, offsetting the 
pressures for major changes exerted by the group to which the airline pertains. Gamma 
and Delta airlines have adopted minimally formalised risk management structures in 
compliance with relevant regulatory frameworks. By way of an example, the 
organisations developed safety management structures and crisis prevention and 
management systems imperative for airlines. However, management of other risk types 
is conducted through informal routines. As previously indicated, CFO-Gamma related 
the low formalisation of the risk management function to the size of the organisation, 
and argued that the introduction of a more structured approach might constrict 
organisational agility in decision-making processes. However, when asked about 
suggestions for improvements in the current risk management system, CFO-Gamma 
stated:  
“I would ask for clearer policies in terms of decision making, better delineated roles 
and decision-making power in management of financial risks. This is the most 
important thing we should improve, having better defined hedging levels and better 
divided responsibilities for who does what” (CFO-Gamma).  
The above statement suggests a more formal risk management structure might prove 
beneficial for Gamma, despite its possible threat to organisational agility, as expressed 
by CFO-Gamma. CCO-Delta recognised the need for a more structured approach to risk 
management in Delta, and reported on changes which were to be introduced to Delta’s 
system in this regard in the future. CCO-Delta explained:  
“During the Board meetings we discuss strategy and risks, and minutes are taken so 
that we can follow up later, but we don´t have any formal procedure for that… There 
is no official regulation for that, approved by the Board… We are now working on a 
more complex risk management system, but it hasn´t been launched yet, it´s currently 
under construction” (CCO-Delta).   
 
Division of roles and responsibilities   
The airlines Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Epsilon, Zeta, Eta, Theta have dedicated risk 
management positions at the executive levels which coordinate and bear responsibilities 
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for proper functioning of ERM, denominated as chief risk officers, heads of risk 
management, risk directors, and others. As described by the interviewees, their 
functions aim to, for example, “coordinate risk management” and “make sure ERM is 
implemented in all the divisions” (RMD-Zeta), “integrate  [risk] information” (TRM-
Alpha), or “prioritise risks” (DRC-Alpha). Pyramid-like risk ownership structures in 
which the boards were specifically assigned responsibility for risk management, and 
risk management responsibilities and accountabilities are cascaded throughout their 
hierarchies. By way of an example, CRO-Alpha commented on delegating 
responsibility for risk management from the Alpha holding company to Alpha-1 and 
Alpha-2:  
“We are a small holding company, so risks need to be actually managed in 
particular airlines, so lots of responsibility is delegated to them… However, we are 
constantly exchanging information between the boards and the risk committee” 
(CRO-Alpha). 
Beta’s risk management approach was described as being “in transition” (HIA-Beta); it 
was pointed out that in the future the risk management and internal audit roles may be 
separated. HIA-Beta commented on its role: 
 “Internal control has a lot in common with risk management… We provide 
assurance on controls and on risk management to the board” (HIA-Beta). 
HIA-Beta justified the double role of internal audit in Beta, pointing to the lack of 
dedicated, centralised risk management function; however, the issue of independence of 
the internal audit function did not seem to pose a concern. 
 
Risk management process  
The accounts of the interviewees representing the airlines claiming adoption of the 
ERM approach indicated conducting the different stages of the risk management 
process according to group-wide standards and methodologies, as per the processes of 
the Alpha airlines and Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota airlines.  
The methodologies of Alpha-1 and Alpha-2 have been separately developed in the two 
airlines, yet they were later aligned in terms of integrating and reporting of risks through 
risk maps, which feed to the risk registers and risk maps of the Alpha holding company, 
therefore facilitating the generation of a portfolio-view of risks at the group level. 
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According to HRC-Epsilon, the risk management methodology introduced in Epsilon 
allows for integration of the airline’s risk map with those of other companies from its 
respective group, whilst additionally being consistent across the airline for the 
management of different types of risks. 
HRC-Epsilon reported: 
“We have a common methodology… Even in terms of using the same risk criteria, 
common risk matrices, assessment methodologies; we use a common denominator 
for risks, so we can effectively compare business risks with, for example, safety 
risks… So we don´t have separate systems for safety exposures and corporate risks, 
which is often the case [in other airlines]” (HRC-Epsilon).   
The airlines which did not claim ERM adoption, use less sophisticated tools to support 
their risk management processes. By way of an example, CFO-Gamma explained:  
“We talk about risks, but we don´t use any specific programmes, as you see it´s all 
pretty informal… Sure, safety directors need to report to the authorities, so I guess 
it´s a more structured process, but when here we discuss finance, network, or 
competition, it´s a whole different style” (CFO-Gamma). 
By way of another example, CCO-Delta reported:  
“We discuss risks during Board meetings, and minutes from the meetings are later 
distributed and archived, but we don´t have other mechanisms so far, but, as I said, 
this should change once we formalise this process” (CCO-Delta).      
 
Maturity and advancement of airline risk management approaches 
Comprehensiveness  
Airline risk portfolios vary as they are determined by organisation-specific 
constellations of institutional pressures and contingency factors, while, additionally, 
organisational logics affect how airlines prioritise some types of risks over others. The 
interviewees underlined the role of top executive levels in identification of strategic 
risks. As explained by RMC-Iota:  
“In the corporate planning process considering strategic risks is a must. We cannot 
quantify them as they are extremely difficult to quantify, but you need to keep in mind 
many ‘what if’ scenarios… It sounds very obvious, thinking of risks when you define 
strategies, but it helps to have it on paper. Then we can track the evolution of these 
321 
 
risks and, depending on the risk, if they materialise, we can see how close we were in 
our predictions” (RMC-Iota). 
The assessment of comprehensiveness of airline risk portfolios in the cases of airlines 
claiming adoption of ERM is, in the cases of five organisations, based solely on the 
opinions of sole interviewees, which leaves room for bias. However, Chapter 6 provides 
additional insight, based on multiple interviews, into the mechanisms of forming risk 
portfolios of Alpha-1 and Alpha-2 airlines.      
 
Embeddedness of risk management 
The airlines Alpha-1, Alpha-2, Epsilon, Zeta, Eta, Theta, and Iota demonstrate high 
levels of embeddedness of the risk management function across their organisational 
structures; SCRO-Theta explained how risk champions are assigned throughout Theta, 
overseeing identification and escalation of risks in their respective areas; SCRO-Theta 
stated:  
“We encourage the ‘bottom up approach’… You need the right culture for that, you 
need to make people feel responsible for risks, so that it´s not only somewhere in 
regulations, but they also understand the value of risk management and have the 
right tools to act upon the risks” (SCRO-Theta).  
The interviewees stressed the importance of institutionalisation of risk management 
being among the priorities of line managers. However, RMD-Zeta pointed out the 
challenge of effectively involving organisation members in the process beyond 
complying with internal regulations, and doubted whether this has been achieved in 
Zeta. RMD-Zeta also commented on the enterprise-wide division of risk management 
responsibilities, while explaining the assignment of the ownership for risks:  
“Risks are identified at different levels, and we are trying now to make sure that this 
takes place regularly… Risk ownership is assigned at the line manager level and 
above” (RMD-Zeta).  
RMC-Iota reported on a comparable mechanism of involving employees in the risk 
management function and selecting risk owners:  
“Lower management is involved in identifying and evaluating risks and the risk 
owners are responsible for reporting risks in their scope of responsibility, which 
might be a project or a process, or a business unit. Nevertheless, we define that the 
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risk owner is at least our management member. It cannot be delegated to employees 
that work in the standard line” (RMC-Iota). 
Similarly, RCM-Eta indicated delegation of risk management responsibilities across 
different organisational levels and functions in the airline. RCM-Eta claimed:  
“Local risk managers report on the high-rated risks [ratings of probability and 
occurrence] to upper levels, and so we get the global view, we get feedback on risks 
from managers of different lines” (RCM-Eta).  
In the cases of Alpha-1 and Alpha-2, evidence of high embeddedness of risk 
management responsibilities across their organisational structures is presented in 
Chapter 6.  
The discourse of HRC-Epsilon, although suggesting assignment of risk ownership 
across the organisation, does not allow for clearly concluding on the extent to which 
employees from lower organisational levels are involved in identification of risks. 
HRC-Epsilon stated:  
“All risks have identified owners and action owners; as for who is assigned this 
function, it depends on the risks, which level risk it is, from which area…” (HRC-
Epsilon).  
The researcher recognises the need to further clarify this issue with the interviewee 
before reaching a final conclusion on this regard.  
 
Integration of risk management 
In the airlines claiming ERM adoption, the central risk management units, such as 
enterprise-wide risk committees and not committees dedicated only to selected types of 
risks, or risk management coordinators such as CROs or their equivalents, compile risk-
related data from across the organisations and report on an integrated view of risks to 
organisational boards. By way of an example, SCRO-Theta explained how aggregate 
reports on different exposures are considered at the executive level in the airline:  
“We [dedicated risk officers] deliver reports and show the risk panorama to 
management, and they [risks] are regularly discussed during management meetings” 
(SCRO-Theta).   
Regarding the ranges of risks compiled by these units in particular airlines, in Epsilon, 
risk maps compiled by HRC-Epsilon for review of the risk management committee 
consider a wide variety of risks including different types of safety and hazard exposures, 
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whereas in Iota centralised risk maps are focused on risks related to compliance and 
financial reporting, whilst excluding hazard and safety exposures. Similarly, although in 
Eta the risk maps presented by RCM-Eta to the airline’s management include a 
comprehensive range of risks, the corporate and safety risk management systems 
operate independently. RMD-Zeta explained how mechanisms exist across Zeta by 
which risks from different departments beyond particular rating levels are escalated to 
upper levels, facilitating development of an integrated view of enterprise-wide 
exposures. Similar mechanisms were evidenced in Alpha-1 and Alpha-2, which are also 
elaborated on in Chapter 6.    
Despite having assigned the roles of integrators and coordinators of enterprise-wide risk 
management initiatives to cross-discipline risk committees or executive risk 
management positions, some representatives of the above cited airlines mentioned the 
difficulty that is posed by the need to assess interdependencies between risks. DRC-
Alpha used the expression “exercise of imagination” to describe the practice of 
assessing multi-dimensional effects that particular risks may have if they materialise. 
RMC-Iota, in justification of the airline´s strong reliance on qualitative risk assessment 
techniques, stated:  
“After having spent many years in this business, we know the mechanisms by which, 
for example, a new train line can affect our demand, or the effects oil crises can have 
on many areas of our business. But quantifying them is a different thing... When you 
know the industry, when you´ve been around for a long time, you know what can 
happen and you design business plans prudently, but you can never correlate all the 
scenarios...” (RMC-Iota).   
With regard to integrating risk-information, in Beta it constitutes an unstructured 
process; the management does not hold meetings specifically dedicated to assessing the 
airline’s risk panorama. Aggregation and integration of risks is additionally conducted 
by the Head of Internal Audit (HIA-Beta), who compiles them on risk maps and 
formally presents to Beta’s holding company and management. However, interviews 
with Beta’s managers did not provide evidence of considering this tool (risk maps and 
matrices) in decision-making processes; the interviews suggested that management 
conducted risk reviews in an unstructured manner.  
With regard to integration of risk management practices in Gamma and Delta, the 
airlines engage multiple actors in the management of different types of exposures while 
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lacking centralised units coordinating risk management practices. Fieldwork evidence 
suggests the existence of disparate risk management practices in these airlines for 
dealing with diverse risks, and the existence of various independent, non-correlated risk 
management systems such as, for example, for managing safety risks, financial risks, or 
hazard risks. Integrated view of risks in these airlines was only suggested by 
interviewees’ accounts of regular, informal reviews of business plans conducted by 
management, during which unexpected occurrences are analysed, risks are implicitly 
considered, and business plans and strategies are adjusted accordingly. CCO-Delta 
explained:  
“During our weekly committees we discuss incidents, deviations from business plans, 
whether there were delays, strikes, or anything else that might have affected 
operations, and we talk about what may happen next week, so yes, we look at risks… 
So we have opinions from different directors, fleet managers, operational safety, 
network planning, everyone” (CCO-Delta).   
As was previously discussed, integration of commercial and financial strategies and risk 
management strategies was reported by CFO-Gamma at the group level, although 
through informal risk management routines.     
 
Roles and uses of risk management  
The airlines Epsilon, Eta and Theta demonstrated alignment of risk management 
processes with strategic and business planning, which was reported to facilitate risk-
based decision making. RCM-Eta explained:  
“We are trying to integrate risk management with the forecast processes” (RCM-
Eta). 
Similarly, HRC-Epsilon emphasised the link between risk management and strategic 
management processes:  
“It [ERM] goes way beyond compliance; it´s oriented towards strategy setting” 
(HRC-Epsilon).  
SCRO-Theta commented on the phenomena of ERM often being used ceremonially in 
organisations, or operating as an independent system which does not bring real value to 
organisations; SCRO-Theta insisted on the role ERM plays in Theta:  
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“You will only get into the decision rooms if you have implemented risk management 
that is adding value… We are concerned to have risk management in place which is 
integrated in decision making processes” (SCRO-Theta).  
With regard to the alignment of Zeta’s risk management process with strategic and 
business planning processes, RMD-Zeta noted:  
“We check route profitability or fleet profitability, we have many indicators for 
performance, and you can also check risk against them if they [values of indicators] 
fall below certain levels” (RMD-Zeta).  
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Appendix D: Extension of Findings from Alpha Case Study  
 
Chapter 6 reports on the findings from the Alpha case study. This appendix elaborates on the case 
study findings, and provides a complementary discussion of several characteristics of Alpha’s risk 
management system, including quotes from interviews with airlines’ representatives. This appendix 
presents information on the evolution of Alpha’s risk management system, formalisation and the levels 
of maturity and advancement of the system. 
 
Evolution towards ERM in Alpha airlines  
The analysis presented in the field study provided an introductory insight into the 
context and rationalities for adoption and implementation of ERM in Alpha-1 and 
Alpha-2. The analysis of the institutional and technical drivers and of organisational 
logics and rationales of the Alpha airlines is further extended in this section, elaborating 
on the evolutionary versus revolutionary nature of embracing ERM principles in these 
organisations. Evidence from the interviews with Alpha representatives suggested that, 
in the majority of the cases, the risk management approaches of these organisations 
evolved gradually over many years in an evolutionary manner, from basic, siloed 
practices to a comprehensive, enterprise-wide approach. Evolution of the risk 
management systems would occur non-linearly, at a different pace in Alpha-1 and 
Alpha-2. Although, as outlined below in the records of interviewees’ accounts, 
evolution was triggered by similar contingency factors and institutional pressures, 
Alpha-1 formalised ERM prior to Alpha-2, while it also advised the latter in introducing 
particular elements of the risk management programme. Following the association of 
Alpha-2 with Alpha-1 under the Alpha holding company, the development of ERM in 
Alpha-2 adopted a revolutionary character in some facets. The evolutionary and 
revolutionary changes in the risk management approaches of Alpha airlines, in addition 
to their underlying rationales, are outlined as follows.  
 
Similar trends in the evolution of risk management approaches were reported in Alpha-
1 and Alpha-2. It could be inferred that the risk management function would 
traditionally concentrate on financial exposures, in addition to hazard, safety and 
security issues, while each of these risk groups would be managed independently by 
their corresponding functional departments.  
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As indicated by the Chief Risk Officer (CRO-Alpha), pertaining to the Alpha holding 
company, while referring to Alpha-1 for which he had worked before:  
“We used to have financial risk management, which used to be reported to the 
Management Committee and the Board, but there was no structured overview of all 
the relevant non-financial risks” (CRO-Alpha).  
A member of the Management Committee of the Alpha holding company (MCM-
Alpha) commented in a similar manner on the risk management routines employed in 
the past in one of the Alpha airlines:    
“[Name of the airline] did not have any integrated view of different types of risk. 
Even within the financial and market risks, the analyses were conducted separately. 
If the USD goes up then I will lose that, so I need to hedge that, and if the jet fuel 
goes up, I need to hedge that, and it was all analysed in silos, but there was no joint 
holistic view of all financial risks in the  development of hedging policies, let alone of 
other related risks” (MCM-Alpha). 
 
Safety and security risks have long constituted important pillars of airline risk 
management systems of the Alpha airlines. Airlines have been required to develop 
mitigation systems targeting safety and security exposures (according to e.g. EASA, 
ICAO requirements). Under the influence of regulatory requirements and normative 
recommendations of air transport associations such systems have evolved, which is 
exemplified by, for example, the development of increasingly advanced Safety 
Management System (SMS) frameworks. The Safety Risk Manager of one of the Alpha 
airlines (SRM/1-Alpha) explained:  
“After ICAO required airlines to adopt SMS, we formalized and expanded our 
procedures” (SRM-Alpha). 
 
Financial risk management has long been practiced in the Alpha airlines, while the 
scope and sophistication of the rules and routines employed have become ever more 
complex, following the approaches and techniques developed in the financial industry. 
As explained by MCM-Alpha, who moved from the financial industry to the airline 
industry, where he first held the position of Director of Finance in Alpha-2:  
“Thanks to my previous banking experience I had a holistic view of [financial] risks; 
while in the bank I had been helping to manage risks in big corporations, so I kind of 
knew how to translate the banking perspective to other businesses” (MCM-Alpha).  
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Financial risk management techniques have become ever more complex as airlines 
gained a better understanding of the scope of their exposures and the values at risk. The 
Treasury and Risk Manager of the Alpha holding company (TRM-Alpha) reported:  
“We started analysing in more detail the risks embedded in our financial and 
commodity operations – basically interest rate, foreign exchange, and fuel, and we 
began to wonder how to better adjust the risk management products to the structure 
of our cash flow – in terms of where do you fly, what are the currencies you receive, 
what are the currencies in which you get loans, buy fuel and aircrafts. We wanted to 
understand well what our risks were and how they could impact our cash flow” 
(TRM-Alpha).  
MCM-Alpha further explained:  
“When I understood how much of our revenue was at risk, I realised we either 
needed to earn more money to have a cushion, or the other alternative was to reduce 
the level of risk, in order to have a more comprehensive hedging programme… We 
needed to smoothen out our risk profile ” (MCM-Alpha).  
He further added: 
 “Apart from hedging on the commodity market we also understood that we needed 
to have more cash. So instead of buying aircrafts we introduced more leasing, using 
aircrafts to cushion the money, so we started to hold cash instead of spending it” 
(MCM-Alpha).  
Apart from hedging and holding cash, diversification of financing sources was also 
consequent of the changing risk management approaches. One of the Alpha airlines 
reported on issuing bonds in order to become less dependent on bilateral lending by 
banks. The airline would also initiate cooperation with multiple banks from different 
countries in order to mitigate counterparty and country risks. 
 
Risk management practices which are siloed and limited in scope, just as reflected in the 
cases of Alpha-1 and Alpha-2, used to be common in the past in organisations across 
industries (Fraser and Simkins, 2010). Airlines’ focus on the limited scope of risks 
comprising mainly, as reflected above in the interviewees’ accounts, financial, hazard, 
safety and security risks, has been criticised in literature in the context of insufficient 
attention devoted to management of important strategic and emerging exposures 
(Mikosz, 2011). The majority of the interviewees who reflected on the evolution of 
ERM in the Alpha airlines expressed criticism regarding their functionality, pointing, 
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for example, to historical and not forward-looking risk identification techniques in the 
case of safety-related risks, or to inadequate limits of hedging operations in cases of 
financial risks. The pool of interviewees also included individuals whose trajectory in 
the Alpha airlines was relatively short, and who have not witnessed the changes in risk 
management approaches in the aforementioned areas; these interviewees were unable to 
assess the evolution in risk management rules and routines and judge their changing 
functionality.       
 
The risk management approaches of the Alpha airlines further developed as the airline 
industry faced unprecedented challenges such as a sudden increase in fuel prices to 
above USD 100 per barrel, or the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001. MCM-Alpha 
referred to these events as ‘black swans’, concluding:  
“Black swans happen, they happen and they change our business environment, 
causing a change in paradigm and forcing you to manage challenges you have not 
considered before” (MCM-Alpha).   
The risk management models used in the Alpha airlines had to be adjusted to fit with 
the new operating paradigms, making the models less conservative in terms of 
projecting volatility of business scenarios and macroeconomic conditions, and 
considering occurrence of the ‘unknown unknowns’ affecting the operational 
environment of airlines. MCM-Alpha concluded that even though the risk management 
model of one of the Alpha airlines he would work for at that time did not prepare the 
airline for the events which changed the operating paradigms of the airline industry and 
the scale of challenges they posed, nevertheless: 
“It was still a good thing we at least tried to model the risks, because it made us 
change our economic policy and financial policy… One of the lessons of risk 
management is that you do not need to be accurate, what you need is to be able to 
guess which is going to be the direction of changes in the market” (MCM-Alpha).  
Gradually the Alpha airlines have expanded the scope of the risk portfolios they 
managed and the risk management rules and routines have become ever more advanced, 
while interviewees’ accounts suggested an evolutionary character of the changes; 
Alpha-1 was the first to officially adopt the ERM approach. Following the formal 
affiliation of Alpha-2 under the Alpha holding company structure, the risk management 
system of Alpha-2 was aligned with the ERM approach developed in Alpha-1. When 
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asked about the nature of this alignment, the interviewees expressed mixed opinions. 
SRM/2-Alpha claimed that Alpha-2 had been operating a complex and comprehensive 
risk management system, although without actually referring to it as “ERM”. 
Contrarily, DRC-Alpha considered the change to have a rather revolutionary character;  
DRC-Alpha noticed, while referring to the advances of the risk management approach 
of Alpha-2:  
“Before our risk map and risk management procedures were much simpler; now they 
consider a wide range of risks and their interrelations” (DRC-Alpha).  
The discrepancy between the opinions of SRM/2 and DRC-Alpha may be due to the 
fact that SRM/2-Alpha has been involved with the safety management function, which, 
despite an increasing integration with the corporate risk management system, has been 
operating as a fairly independent pillar of the overall risk management approach; thus, 
SRM/2 may not have been directly involved in the transition. Currently Alpha operates 
a mature ERM system, in which the systems of both airlines have been consolidated to 
fit with the ERM approach. As defined by DRC-Alpha, the group has adopted a 
“structured corporate governance approach to managing risks in the organisation”, in 
which management of enterprise-wide risks is coordinated under the ERM model, 
analysed in Chapter 6. 
 
Formalisation of Alpha’s risk management system 
The level of formalisation of the risk management function is high in all Alpha entities, 
which on one hand can be considered in terms of increased corporate governance 
requirements of complex organisations, and on the other hand in terms of the perceived 
level of utility of the myriad of rules and level of coherence between formal rules and 
enacted routines. When discussing the rules comprising Alpha’s risk management 
framework, CRO-Alpha linked the highly formalised approach with organisational 
complexity of Alpha-1 and Alpha-2, and with cultural influences (see sections 5.2.1 and 
5.2.2 of Chapter 5; Appendix C). CRO-Alpha was aware of the threat of ERM 
becoming overly bureaucratised, which might have counterproductive effects 
considering ERM objectives, and emphasised the importance of institutionalising a 
positive risk culture across Alpha:  
“We are trying to convince people that risk management should not be seen as an 
administrative burden, as something that they are required to do, as something that 
is unproductive, and takes a lot of time… We want them to start seeing risk 
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management as something that is done every day and that forms an integrated part 
of their responsibilities, so we are trying to foster this philosophy” (CRO-Alpha).       
Inconclusive evidence was found in terms of interviewees’ perceptions of the complex 
system of formal institutions and rules. While some interviewees, for example ISM-
Alpha and MSF3-Alpa, reported their views of excessive formalisation of the risk 
management function, others have not found it appropriate. By way of an example of 
the latter, MSF/1-Alpha, who works in the Alpha holding company, noted with regard 
specifically to financial risk management rules:  
“Financial risk management is formalised in detailed policies and procedures, but I 
still think we work in a very flexible manner; if we want to trade above the levels 
specified in the policies, we present the rationale to the Committee [Financial Risk 
Committee in the Alpha holding company], so there is a lot of common sense in the 
overall approach” (MSF/1-Alpha).   
 
Maturity and advancement of the ERM system of the Alpha Airlines 
In Chapter 5, based on the field study findings the researcher evaluated the maturity and 
advancement of the risk management systems of Alpha-1 and Alpha-2, according to the 
criteria of comprehensiveness, integration, embeddedness, and organisational roles and 
uses assigned to the systems. Additionally, throughout Chapter 6 the researcher 
analysed in broader terms the rules and routines comprising the risk management 
systems of the Alpha airlines in the context of their affiliation within Alpha, providing a 
valuable perspective of organisations’ members on the rules and routines in their 
various aspects, which allows for a more critical assessment of maturity and the state of 
advancement of the risk management systems.  
 
The high level of maturity and advancement of the risk management system adopted in 
Alpha is manifested through several aspects. These include, among others, having a 
formalised framework of policies and procedures in place with an enterprise-wide 
scope, assignment of responsibilities and accountabilities for risk management 
throughout the organisational hierarchies of Alpha-1, Alpha-2, and the Alpha holding 
company, having created organisational mechanisms for enterprise-wide coordination 
and integration of risks, and finally, having aligned the risk management function with 
strategic planning and decision making. In addition to the afore-presented analysis of 
Alpha’s risk management rules and routines paired with relevant interviewees’ 
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perception of them, this section additionally extends the analysis with a selection of the 
interviewees’ views, specifically regarding the issues of maturity and advancement of 
ERM.       
 
Of all the semi-structured and informal interviews conducted with members of the 
Alpha airlines and the Alpha holding company, in the conversations with organisations’ 
members from top organisational levels who were most knowledgeable about Alpha’s 
risk management approach, the researcher inquired about their personal assessments of 
the maturity and functionality of the ERM approach. The interviewees shared the view 
that the ERM system is comprehensive and mature. By way of an example, MCM-
Alpha stated: 
“We are very happy with the ERM model. It gives you lots of information so that you 
can make more informed decisions, understanding the levels of risk related to 
particular scenarios” (MCM-Alpha).  
However, in relation to the claims praising the ERM approach, as is exemplified above, 
it is important to keep in mind that the interviewed professionals with the most 
extensive vision of the ERM model were also those that have been closely related to 
development of the overall approach or of its constituent solutions. Therefore, their 
views may be biased in the sense that they may be less critical of the ERM system that 
they have helped to create.    
CRO-Alpha commented on the maturity of Alpha’s ERM in the context of directions for 
future development:  
“My personal view is that it is very mature. I think it does what it needs to do. I think 
taking it further in our case may quickly cease to add value, as you always have to 
verify whether the benefits the changes would deliver would compensate for the 
effort and the resources you put into it” (CRO-Alpha).  
CRO-Alpha also reflected on the basic functions of the ERM approach:  
“What we do now is we identify the potential challenges, we look at the bad side of 
the business while we cooperate with the strategy department that looks at the same 
events in terms of opportunities. The risk team, however, we identify and assess the 
challenges and we make sure they are properly addressed and that they are properly 
escalated to upper levels in the company… So that is useful risk management” 
(CRO-Alpha).  
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CRO-Alpha concluded: 
“I don´t think taking the risk management system much further would bring real 
value to the business” (CRO-Alpha). 
With regard to the latter comment, CRO-Alpha was especially concerned about the 
potentially adverse effects of over-bureaucratisation of ERM, for in his opinion further 
development of ERM would be inevitably associated with the creation of additional 
formal rules. From the interviewee’s point of view, the real challenge consisted in 
institutionalising ERM principles in organisational culture, which is manifested in the 
coherence between the rules and routines enacted by the organisation members.   
  
In the discussion on the perceived maturity and advancement levels of the ERM 
approach adopted in Alpha, MCM-Alpha and TRM-Alpha pointed to the broad scope of 
business scenario analyses conducted on a regular basis in the development of corporate 
and business strategies by using the outputs of the FRM model. These interviewees 
argued that the advanced risk management systems in use across the Alpha entities 
provide significant support in preparation for the ‘black swan’ events, despite not 
knowing exactly what they would consist of. As expressed by TRM-Alpha: 
“In our analyses we do not assume we operate in a Gaussian reality [normal or 
Gaussian distribution defined in probability theory], because black swans happen. 
So in our analyses we consider abnormal values of financial vectors such as jet fuel 
prices, foreign exchange rates, or interest rates, which may be caused by geo-and-
macro political events… So we do not only perform analyses in the operating 
paradigm as we know it. We know paradigms can change, just as they changed in the 
past when fuel prices increased over a very short period of time from USD 45 to 
USD 110” (TRM-Alpha).  
TRM-Alpha also stated:  
“There isn´t really any crisis manual to perfectly prepare an airline for something 
that is unprecedented. However, in this industry unprecedented risks and unknown 
unknowns happen, so you can prepare for a crisis even though you don´t know what 
kind of crisis it will be” (TRM-Alpha).  
TRM-Alpha further argued the ability of the FRM model to consider a great variety of 
scenarios and their potential effects on the business plans of the Alpha organisations, 
which allows for correlating cause-effect relationships. MCM-Alpha explained: 
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“When we consider abnormal values of particular inputs to the [FRM] model, we 
consider them in a context. For example, if you test the effects of jet fuel prices 
reaching USD 200, you also have to think about whether it´s the effect of an 
unprecedented expansion of economies which would also affect your passenger 
numbers, or whether it´s due to a geo-political conflict, or to a shortage of supply… 
So we think of black swans and their interrelated effects on our business” (MCM-
Alpha).  
 
The interviewees argued the maturity and advancement of the ERM system of Alpha by 
emphasising, among other things, its capacity to identify and determine important 
strategic and emerging risks. As previously explained, in Alpha this function is partly 
covered through the analyses conducted by use of the FRM model. However, it was also 
pointed out by the interviewees that identification of emerging risks forms part of the 
Management Committee’s and the Board’s agenda. MCM-Alpha provided an example: 
“In the case of big, emerging risks such as, for example, the break-up of the 
European Union, they are really thoroughly assessed, discussed [at executive levels], 
and analysed in terms of whether any action needs to be taken or not” (MCM-
Alpha).  
Thus, MCM-Alpha described the ERM system of Alpha as: 
“Holistic, for it considers all the important risks that can happen to an airline, 
strikes, loss of rating, a terrorist attack, or similar events” (MCM-Alpha).         
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Appendix E: Interview Agenda Designed for the Field Study 
 
Interviewees: CRO-Alpha, DRC-Alpha, HRC-Epsilon, RMD-Zeta, RCM-Eta, 
SCRO-Theta, RMC-Iota 
 
The interview agenda includes the main issues of interest to the researcher which guided semi-
structured interviews, and which were complemented with additional questions varying depending on 
the flow of the conversation.    
 
 
 
 
 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Time: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Location: ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Name of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………... 
Code of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………… 
Organization: ………………………………………………………………………. 
Code of the Organization: …………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening MR, MRS, MISS: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.  
 
This research project focuses on risk management systems of airlines. In this interview I 
would like to learn about the risk management structures and practices adopted in your 
airline. I have planned this interview to last no longer than 40 minutes.  
 
As a researcher, I follow an ethical code and I would like to assure you that all the 
information will be treated with complete confidentiality; neither your name nor the 
name of the airline will be published. 
 
I hope you do not mind this conversation being recorded.  
 
 
 
 
Interview Reference Number: 
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Background Information 
1. What is your position and the scope of responsibilities in the airline?  
2. How long have you worked for the airline?  
3. Could you please describe how you are involved in the risk management function?  
 
ERM System 
1. How would you describe the level of advancement of the risk management system 
of the airline? Why do you think so?  
2. Does the airline follow recommendations of any of the risk management 
frameworks or standards such as COSO or ISO 31000?  
3. Could you please describe how the responsibilities for risk management are 
assigned throughout the airline?  
4. How are the board and the management team involved in risk management?   
5. Is the risk management function concentrated in any particular department or 
business unit? 
6. Is there any unit or position in the airline overseeing and coordinating the 
management of different types of risks altogether?  
7. How is internal audit involved in the risk management process?  
8. How do employees from lower levels in the airline participate in identification and 
assessment of risks relevant to their business units? 
9. Is there a documented risk management strategy?  
10. Which groups of risks are managed within formal programmes, with established 
policies and procedures?  
11. To what extent are the methodologies for conducting the different stages of the risk 
management process formalised?  
12. Do you think that the ERM system allows for identifying relevant exposures from 
all across the airline’s business units? Please explain. 
13. Could you please describe the mechanisms by which risk data from all across the 
airline’s business units is integrated?  
14. What kind of tools does the airline use to record and present information on risks?  
15. Is there any specialised risk management software in use?  
16. How do you think the ERM system of the airline could be improved?  
17. What in your opinion are the major shortcomings of your ERM system?  
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Determinants of Risk Management Approach 
1. Could you please describe the factors that influenced the airline to adopt ERM? 
2. How does the regulatory framework influence the way the airline manages risks?    
3. How has the risk management system of the airline been influenced by 
recommendations of consulting companies?  
4. How did the best practices of your competitors influence the airline’s risk 
management approach?  
5. What was the influence of other companies from your group on the risk 
management system of the airline?  
6. Could you please describe the influence that the different industry associations (e.g. 
IATA, ICAO, etc.) had on the way the airline manages risks?   
7. How was the ERM adoption decision influenced by the credit rating agencies?  
8. In your opinion, was the ERM adoption decision influenced more by external 
factors, such as demonstrating sound governance over risks, or by internal motives, 
such as improved performance?     
9. How does the nature of the airline business influence the way your company 
manages risk?  
10. Which types of risks is the airline most concerned about, and how did they 
influence the way the airline manages risks?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
338 
 
Appendix E: Interview Agenda Designed for the Field Study - continued 
 
Interviewees: CFO-Beta, CFO-Gamma, RGD-Delta, CCO-Delta, ORM-Delta 
 
The interview agenda includes the main issues of interest to the researcher which guided semi-
structured interviews, and which were complemented with additional questions varying depending on 
the flow of the conversation.    
 
 
 
 
 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Time: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Location: ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Name of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………... 
Code of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………… 
Organization: ………………………………………………………………………. 
Code of the Organization: …………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening MR, MRS, MISS: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.  
 
This research project focuses on risk management systems of airlines. In this interview I 
would like to learn about the risk management structures and practices adopted in your 
company. I have planned this interview to last no longer than 40 minutes.  
 
As a researcher, I follow an ethical code and I would like to assure you that all the 
information will be treated with complete confidentiality; neither your name nor the 
name of your company will be published. 
 
I hope you do not mind this conversation being recorded.  
 
 
 
 
 
Interview Reference Number: 
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Background Information 
1. What is your position and the scope of responsibilities in the airline?  
2. How long have you worked for the airline?  
3. Could you please describe how you are involved in the risk management function?  
 
Risk Management System 
1. How would you describe the level of advancement of the risk management system 
of the airline? Why do you think so?  
2. Is the airline planning to implement ERM? If so, what are the reasons for that? 
Please explain. 
3. Could you please describe how the responsibilities for risk management are 
assigned throughout the airline?  
4. How are the board and the management team involved in risk management?   
5. Is the risk management function concentrated in any particular department or 
business unit? 
6. Is there any unit or position in the airline overseeing and coordinating the 
management of different types of risks altogether?  
7. How is internal audit involved in the risk management process?  
8. How do employees from lower levels in the airline participate in identification and 
assessment of risks relevant to their business units? 
9. Is there a documented risk management strategy?  
10. Which groups of risks are managed within formal programmes, with established 
policies and procedures?  
11. To what extent are the methodologies for conducting the different stages of the risk 
management process formalised?  
12. Do you think that the risk management system of the airline allows for identifying 
relevant exposures from all across the different business units? Please explain. 
13. Could you please describe the mechanisms by which risk data from all across the 
airline is integrated?  
14. What kind of tools does the airline use to record and present information on risks?  
15. Is there any specialised risk management software in use? 
16. How do you think the risk management system of the airline could be improved?  
17. What in your opinion are the major shortcomings of your risk management  
system?  
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Determinants of Risk Management Approach 
18. How does the regulatory framework influence the way the airline manages risks?    
19. How has the risk management system of the airline been influenced by 
recommendations of consulting companies?  
20. How did the best practices of your competitors influence the airline’s risk 
management approach?  
21. What was the influence of other companies from your group on the risk 
management system of the airline? (optional question) 
22. Could you please describe the influence that the different industry associations (e.g. 
IATA, ICAO, etc.) had on the way the airline manages risks?   
23. Has your risk management system been influenced by the pressures from credit 
rating agencies? (optional question) 
24. How does the nature of the airline business influence the way the airline manages 
risk?  
25. Which types of risks is the airline most concerned about, and how did they 
influence the way it manages risks?   
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Appendix F: Interview Agenda Designed for the Case Studies 
 
Interviewees: MCM-Alpha, CRO-Alpha *(complementary interview), DRC-Alpha 
*(complementary interview), TRM-Alpha, DRC-Alpha, IA-Alpha 
 
The interview agenda includes the main issues of interest to the researcher which guided semi-
structured interviews, and which were complemented with additional questions varying depending on 
the flow of the conversation.    
 
 
 
 
 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Time: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Location: ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Name of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………... 
Code of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………… 
Organization: ………………………………………………………………………. 
Code of the Organization: …………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening MR, MRS, MISS: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.  
 
This research project focuses on risk management systems of airlines. In this interview I 
would like to learn about the risk management structures and practices adopted in your 
company. I have planned this interview to last no longer than 40 minutes.  
 
As a researcher, I follow an ethical code and I would like to assure you that all the 
information will be treated with complete confidentiality; neither your name nor the 
name of your company will be published. 
 
I hope you do not mind this conversation being recorded.  
 
 
 
 
Interview Reference Number: 
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Background Information 
1. What is your position and the scope of responsibilities in the holding company 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘company’) / airline?  
2. How long have you worked for the company / airline?  
3. Could you please describe how you are involved in the risk management function?  
 
ERM System 
1. Could you please describe the transition of the risk management system toward 
adopting ERM?  
2. How would you describe the level of advancement of ERM? Why do you think so?  
3. Could you please describe how the responsibilities for risk management are 
assigned throughout the company/airline?  
4. How are the board and the management team involved in risk management?   
5. Is the risk management function concentrated in any particular department or 
business unit? 
6. Is there any unit or position in your company/airline overseeing and coordinating 
the management of different types of risks altogether?  
7. How is internal audit involved in the risk management process?  
8. How do employees from lower levels in the organisation participate in 
identification and assessment of risks relevant to their business units? 
9. Is there a documented risk management strategy?  
10. Which groups of risks are managed within formal programmes, with established 
policies and procedures?  
11. To what extent are the methodologies for conducting the different stages of the risk 
management process formalised?  
12. Could you please explain how risks are identified throughout the company/airline? 
13. Do you think that the ERM system of your company allows for identifying relevant 
exposures from all across the company/airline? Please explain. 
14. Could you please explain how risks are assessed, prioritised, and escalated 
throughout the company/airline? 
15. Could you please describe the mechanisms by which risk data from all across the 
company is integrated?  
16. What kind of tools does your company/airline use to record and present information 
on risks?  
17. Does your company/airline use any specialised risk management software?  
18. How do you think the ERM system of your company/airline could be improved?  
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19. What in your opinion are the major shortcomings of the ERM system of your 
company/airline?  
20. How did the risk management structures and practices change in the 
company/airline after introducing ERM? 
 
Determinants of Risk Management Approach 
21. Could you please describe the factors that influenced your company/airline to adopt 
ERM? 
22. How does the regulatory framework influence the way your company/airline 
manages risks?    
23. How has the ERM system of your company been influenced by recommendations 
of consulting companies?  
24. How did the best practices of your competitors influence your company’s/airline’s 
risk management approach?  
25. What was the influence of other companies from the group on the risk management 
system of the airline?  
26. Could you please describe the influence that the different industry associations (e.g. 
IATA, ICAO, etc.) had on the way the company/airline manages risks?   
27. How was the ERM adoption decision influenced by the credit rating agencies?  
28. In your opinion, was the ERM adoption decision influenced more by external 
factors, such as demonstrating sound governance over risks, or by internal motives, 
such as improved performance?     
29. How does the nature of the airline business influence the way your company/airline 
manages risk?  
30. Which types of risks is your company/airline most concerned about, and how does 
it influence the way your company/airline manages risks?   
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Appendix F: Interview Agenda Designed for the Case Studies - continued 
 
Interviewees: SRM/1-Alpha, SRM/2-Alpha 
 
The interview agenda includes the main issues of interest to the researcher which guided semi-
structured interviews, and which were complemented with additional questions varying depending on 
the flow of the conversation.    
 
 
 
 
 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Time: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Location: ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Name of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………... 
Code of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………… 
Organization: ………………………………………………………………………. 
Code of the Organization: …………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening MR, MRS, MISS: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.  
 
This research project focuses on risk management systems of airlines. In this interview I 
would like to learn about the risk management structures and practices adopted in your 
company. I have planned this interview to last no longer than 30 minutes.  
 
As a researcher, I follow an ethical code and I would like to assure you that all the 
information will be treated with complete confidentiality; neither your name nor the 
name of your company will be published. 
 
I hope you do not mind this conversation being recorded.  
 
 
 
 
 
Interview Reference Number: 
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Background Information 
1. What is your position and the scope of responsibilities in the airline?  
2. Could you please describe how you are involved in the risk management function?  
 
ERM System 
1. What are the major risks your department is concerned about? 
2. How do regulatory framework and guidance from industry associations influence 
the management of safety and operational risks? 
3. Could you please describe how responsibility for risk management is assigned 
throughout the production departments? 
4. What is the role of the Safety Committee? 
5. Could you please describe how the risk management is performed under the 
airline’s Safety Management Framework?  
6. To what extent are risk management structures and practices formalised within the 
production departments? Please explain.  
7. How do you perceive the risk culture in the production departments?  
8. Could you please explain how SMS is integrated within airlines’/group’s ERM 
system?  
9. How are safety and operational risks escalated within the airline’s structure?  
10. How are employees from the production departments involved in the identification 
and assessment of risks relevant to their areas of responsibility?  
11. What kind of tools and software does your department use to record and present 
information on risks?  
12. How do you think the risk management processes relevant to safety and operational 
risks could be improved?  
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Appendix F: Interview Agenda Designed for the Case Studies - continued 
 
Interviewees: TRM-Alpha *(complementary interview), MSF/1-Alpha, MSF/2-Alpha, 
MSF/3-Alpha 
 
The interview agenda includes the main issues of interest to the researcher which guided semi-
structured interviews, and which were complemented with additional questions varying depending on 
the flow of the conversation.    
 
 
 
 
 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Time: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Location: ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Name of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………... 
Code of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………… 
Organization: ………………………………………………………………………. 
Code of the Organization: …………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening MR, MRS, MISS: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.  
 
This research project focuses on risk management systems of airlines. In this interview I 
would like to learn about the risk management structures and practices adopted in your 
company. I have planned this interview to last no longer than 30 minutes.  
 
As a researcher, I follow an ethical code and I would like to assure you that all the 
information will be treated with complete confidentiality; neither your name nor the 
name of your company will be published. 
 
I hope you do not mind this conversation being recorded.  
 
 
 
 
Interview Reference Number: 
 
347 
 
Background Information 
1. What is your position and the scope of responsibilities in the airline?  
2. Could you please describe how you are involved in the risk management function?  
 
ERM System 
1. What are the major risks your department is concerned about? 
2. Could you please describe how responsibility for risk management is assigned 
throughout the financial departments? 
3. Could you please describe the risk management process of financial risks?  
4. To what extent are risk management structures and practices formalised within the 
financial department? Please explain.  
5. Could you please explain how the management of financial risks is integrated 
within airlines’/group’s ERM system?  
6. How are financial risks escalated within the airline’s structure? 
7. What is the role of Financial Risk Committee?   
8. Could you please describe the mechanism of the Financial Risk Management 
framework? (TRM-Alpha) 
9. What kind of tools and software do financial departments use to record and present 
information on risks?  
10. How do you think the risk management processes relevant to financial risks could 
be improved?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
348 
 
Appendix F: Interview Agenda Designed for the Case Studies - continued 
 
Interviewees: SDA-Alpha, TS-Alpha, ISM-Alpha, GOO-Alpha 
 
The interview agenda includes the main issues of interest to the researcher which guided semi-
structured interviews, and which were complemented with additional questions varying depending on 
the flow of the conversation.    
 
 
 
 
 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Time: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Location: ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Name of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………... 
Code of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………… 
Organization: ………………………………………………………………………. 
Code of the Organization: …………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening MR, MRS, MISS: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.  
 
This research project focuses on risk management systems of airlines. In this interview I 
would like to learn about the risk management structures and practices adopted in your 
company. I have planned this interview to last no longer than 30 minutes.  
 
As a researcher, I follow an ethical code and I would like to assure you that all the 
information will be treated with complete confidentiality; neither your name nor the 
name of your company will be published. 
 
I hope you do not mind this conversation being recorded.  
 
 
 
 
Interview Reference Number: 
 
349 
 
Background Information 
1. What is your position and the scope of responsibilities in the airline?  
 
ERM System 
1. Are there established policies and procedures guiding and regulating management 
of risks relevant to your business area?  
2. Are there communication protocols in place to escalate information on risks to 
upper levels in the airline?  
3. What types of risks is your department most concerned about?  
4. Are risks identified regularly in your department?  
5. Are members of your department clear about the risk management tasks they are 
expected to perform?  
6. How is participation of employees from your department encouraged in the risk 
management process?   
7. Please describe how risks are identified, assessed, managed and reported in your 
business area.  
8. How do you think the management of risks could be improved in your department?  
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Appendix F: Interview Agenda Designed for the Case Studies - continued 
 
Interviewees: CFO-Beta *(complementary interview), HIA-Beta, DC-Beta, DTR-Beta, 
IA/1-Beta, IA/2-Beta 
 
The interview agenda includes the main issues of interest to the researcher which guided semi-
structured interviews, and which were complemented with additional questions varying depending on 
the flow of the conversation.    
 
 
 
 
 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Time: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Location: ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Name of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………... 
Code of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………… 
Organization: ………………………………………………………………………. 
Code of the Organization: …………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening MR, MRS, MISS: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.  
 
This research project focuses on risk management systems of airlines. In this interview I 
would like to learn about the risk management structures and practices adopted in your 
company. I have planned this interview to last no longer than 40 minutes.  
 
As a researcher, I follow an ethical code and I would like to assure you that all the 
information will be treated with complete confidentiality; neither your name nor the 
name of your company will be published. 
 
I hope you do not mind this conversation being recorded.  
 
 
 
 
Interview Reference Number: 
 
351 
 
Background Information 
1. What is your position and the scope of responsibilities in the holding company 
(hereinafter referred to as ‘company’) / airline?  
2. How long have you worked for the company / airline?  
3. Could you please describe how you are involved in the risk management function?  
 
Risk Management System 
1. How would you describe the level of advancement of airline’s risk management 
system? Why do you think so?  
2. Do you consider introducing ERM in the future? If so, what are the reasons for 
that?  
3. Could you please describe how the responsibilities for risk management are 
assigned throughout the airline?  
4. How are the board and the management team involved in risk management?   
5. Is the risk management function concentrated in any particular department or 
business unit? 
6. Is there any unit or position in your airline overseeing and coordinating the 
management of different types of risks altogether?  
7. How is internal audit involved in the risk management process?  
8. How do employees from lower levels in the organisation participate in 
identification and assessment of risks relevant to their business units? 
9. Is there a documented risk management strategy?  
10. Which groups of risks are managed within formal programmes, with established 
policies and procedures?  
11. To what extent are the methodologies for conducting the different stages of the risk 
management process formalised?  
12. Could you please explain how risks are identified throughout the company/airline? 
Do you your current risk management system allows for identifying relevant 
exposures from all across the airline? Please explain. 
13. Could you please explain how risks are assessed, prioritised, and escalated 
throughout the airline? 
14. Could you please describe the mechanisms by which risk data from all across the 
airline is integrated?  
15. What kind of tools and software are used at different organisational levels to record 
and present information on risks?  
16. How do you think the risk management system of your airline could be improved?  
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17. What in your opinion are the major shortcomings of the risk management system of 
your airline?  
 
Determinants of Risk Management Approach 
18. How does the regulatory framework influence the way your airline manages risks?    
19. How has the risk management system of your airline been influenced by 
recommendations of consulting companies?  
20. How did the best practices of your competitors influence the airline’s risk 
management approach?  
21. What has been the influence of other companies from the group on the risk 
management system of the airline?  
22. Could you please describe the influence that the different industry associations (e.g. 
IATA, ICAO, etc.) had on the way the airline manages risks? 
23. In your opinion, what are the most significant pressures from airline’s stakeholders 
which influence the way the airline manages risks? (followed by an explanation)   
24. How does the nature of the airline business influence the way the airline manages 
risk?  
25. Which types of risks is the airline most concerned about, and how does it influence 
the way risks are managed in the airline?   
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Appendix F: Interview Agenda Designed for the Case Studies - continued 
 
Interviewees: HSS-Beta 
 
The interview agenda includes the main issues of interest to the researcher which guided semi-
structured interviews, and which were complemented with additional questions varying depending on 
the flow of the conversation.    
 
 
 
 
 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Time: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Location: ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Name of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………... 
Code of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………… 
Organization: ………………………………………………………………………. 
Code of the Organization: …………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening MR, MRS, MISS: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.  
 
This research project focuses on risk management systems of airlines. In this interview I 
would like to learn about the risk management structures and practices adopted in your 
company. I have planned this interview to last no longer than 30 minutes.  
 
As a researcher, I follow an ethical code and I would like to assure you that all the 
information will be treated with complete confidentiality; neither your name nor the 
name of your company will be published. 
 
I hope you do not mind this conversation being recorded.  
 
 
 
 
 
Interview Reference Number: 
 
354 
 
Background Information 
1. What is your position and the scope of responsibilities in the airline?  
2. Could you please describe how you are involved in the risk management function?  
 
Risk Management System 
1. What are the major risks your department is concerned about? 
2. How do regulatory framework and guidance from industry associations influence 
the management of safety and operational risks? 
3. Could you please describe how responsibility for risk management is assigned 
throughout the production departments? 
4. What is the role of the Safety Committee? 
5. Could you please describe how the risk management is performed under the 
airline’s Safety Management Framework?  
6. To what extent are risk management structures and practices formalised within the 
production departments? Please explain.  
7. How do you perceive the risk culture in the production departments?  
8. Could you please explain how SMS is integrated within the airlines’ risk 
management system?  
9. How are safety and operational risks escalated within the airline’s structure?  
10. How are employees from the production departments involved in the identification 
and assessment of risks relevant to their areas of responsibility?  
11. What kind of tools and software does your department use to record and present 
information on risks?  
12. How do you think the risk management processes relevant to safety and operational 
risks could be improved?  
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Appendix F: Interview Agenda Designed for the Case Studies - continued 
 
Interviewees: DTR-Beta *(complementary interview), FF-Beta, SF-Beta 
 
The interview agenda includes the main issues of interest to the researcher which guided semi-
structured interviews, and which were complemented with additional questions varying depending on 
the flow of the conversation.    
 
 
 
 
 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Time: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Location: ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Name of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………... 
Code of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………… 
Organization: ………………………………………………………………………. 
Code of the Organization: …………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening MR, MRS, MISS: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.  
 
This research project focuses on risk management systems of airlines. In this interview I 
would like to learn about the risk management structures and practices adopted in your 
company. I have planned this interview to last no longer than 30 minutes.  
 
As a researcher, I follow an ethical code and I would like to assure you that all the 
information will be treated with complete confidentiality; neither your name nor the 
name of your company will be published. 
 
I hope you do not mind this conversation being recorded.  
 
 
 
 
Interview Reference Number: 
 
356 
 
Background Information 
1. What is your position and the scope of responsibilities in the airline?  
2. Could you please describe how you are involved in the risk management function?  
 
Risk Management System 
1. What are the major risks your department is concerned about? 
2. Could you please describe how responsibility for risk management is assigned 
throughout the financial departments? 
3. Could you please describe the risk management process of financial risks?  
4. To what extent are risk management structures and practices formalised within the 
financial department? Please explain.  
5. Could you please explain how the management of financial risks is integrated 
within airlines’/group’s risk management system?  
6. How are financial risks escalated to airline’s management? 
7. What is the role of the Financial Risk Committee?   
8. What kind of tools and software do financial departments use to record and present 
information on risks?  
9. How do you think the risk management processes relevant to financial risks could 
be improved?  
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Appendix F: Interview Agenda Designed for the Case Studies - continued 
 
Interviewees: ITD-Beta, MM-Beta, FSM-Beta 
 
The interview agenda includes the main issues of interest to the researcher which guided semi-
structured interviews, and which were complemented with additional questions varying depending on 
the flow of the conversation.    
 
 
 
 
 
Date:………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Time: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
Location: ……………………………………………………………………………. 
Name of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………... 
Code of the interviewee: …………………………………………………………… 
Organization: ………………………………………………………………………. 
Code of the Organization: …………………………………………………………. 
 
 
Good Morning/Afternoon/Evening MR, MRS, MISS: 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this research.  
 
This research project focuses on risk management systems of airlines. In this interview I 
would like to learn about the risk management structures and practices adopted in your 
company. I have planned this interview to last no longer than 30 minutes.  
 
As a researcher, I follow an ethical code and I would like to assure you that all the 
information will be treated with complete confidentiality; neither your name nor the 
name of your company will be published. 
 
I hope you do not mind this conversation being recorded.  
 
 
 
 
Interview Reference Number: 
 
358 
 
Background Information 
1. What is your position and the scope of responsibilities in the airline?  
 
Risk Management System 
1. Are there established policies and procedures guiding and regulating management 
of risks relevant to your business area?  
2. What types of risks is your department most concerned about? 
3. Are risks identified regularly in your department?  
4. Are there communication protocols in place to escalate information on risks to 
upper levels in the airline?  
5. Are members of your department clear about the risk management tasks they are 
expected to perform?  
6. How is participation of employees from your department encouraged in the risk 
management process?   
7. Please describe how risks are identified, assessed, managed and reported in your 
business area.  
8. How do you think the management of risks could be improved in your department?  
 
 
 
